

HEGEL

THE MAN, HIS VISION AND WORK

by
GUSTAV E. MUELLER

Pageant Press, Inc.

New York

Copyright © 1968 by Gustav E. Mueller

All Rights Reserved

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 67-28985

First Edition

Published by Pageant Press, Inc.
101 Fifth Avenue, New York, N. Y. 10003

Manufactured in the United States of America

SOME OTHER PUBLICATIONS BY
GUSTAV E. MUELLER:

- Discourses on Religion*. Bookman, Twayne Publ. Co. N.Y., 1951. Second Edition, 1965.
- Dialectic. A Way into and Within*. Bookman. Twayne Publ. Co. N.Y., 1956.
- The Interplay of Opposites. A Dialectical Ontology*. Bookman. Twayne Publ. Co. N.Y., 1956.
- Hegel: Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Translated and annotated by Gustav E. Mueller. Philosophical Library. N.Y., 1959.
- Plato—The Founder of Philosophy as Dialectic*. Philosophical Library. N.Y., 1965.
- Origins and Dimensions of Philosophy*. Pageant Press. N.Y., 1966.
- Hegel: Denkgeschichte eines Lebendigen*. Francke. Bern., 1959.
- Querschnitt*. Gedichte und Doppelreime. Universitätsverlag Wagner, Innsbruck, Austria.

HEGEL
THE MAN, HIS VISION
AND WORK

Contents

<i>Chapter</i>	<i>Page</i>
<i>Preface</i>	1
<i>Introduction</i>	3
I In The Gymnasium of Stuttgart	13
II College Student in Tübingen 1788-1793	25
III Tutor in Bern 1793-1796	43
IV Tutor in Frankfurt 1797-1800	67
V Privatdozent in Jena 1801-1806	148
VI Newspaper Editor in Bamberg 1807-1808	212
VII Gymnasium-Director in Nurnberg 1808-1817	249
VIII Professor in Heidelberg 1816-1817	300
IX Professor in Berlin 1818-1831	349
<i>Appendix</i>	433
<i>Selected Bibliography</i>	436
<i>Index of Names</i>	443
<i>General Index and Glossary</i>	445

Preface

I should like to present a famous stranger of strange fame to you: Hegel, the Man, his Vision and his Work.

I made his acquaintance in 1917, when his *Philosophy of History* thrilled the schoolboy at the Gymnasium in Bern.

The professor of philosophy at the University of Bern shook his head when the first-semester student clamored for admission into his Hegel seminar; but he let me try.

He was right, of course. I groped through the Phenomenology of Mind with only a faint glimpse of light in a general darkness; and I marvelled how the older students could prepare papers and seemed to understand and enjoy their discussions.

My doctoral Dissertation on the *Categories of Philosophy of History in Marx*¹ still satisfies me. I demonstrated that the naturalism and scientism of Marx was an impossible distortion of Hegel.

Since then I have given many seminars and lectures on Hegel—always with mixed feelings of delight and disgust—the ‘jargon’ seemed insufferable, smacked of what Schopenhauer called a “charlatan”. Schopenhauer was, he tells us himself, a genius of infallible intuition; he borrowed Hegel’s logic once for five days—almost a whole week!²

1. Gustav E. Mueller. *Geschichtsphilosophische Grundbegriffe bei Marx*. Bern. Haupt, 1924.

2. Theodor Hübschar. *Schopenhauer*. Stuttgart. Reclam. 1952, p. 55.

The process of understanding Hegel was very slow, intermittent and gradual. My hope is that this book may abbreviate this voyage of discovery for others.

A German version of this book appeared under the title: *Hegel: Denkgeschichte eines Lebendigen*.³ The subtitle indicates two concerns: (1) That the history told here is more than a biography; it is rather the *story of a world-view* gradually unfolding itself, whose boldness is often in painful contrast to the timidity of the private individual, Georg Wilhelm, who is anxious to hide his revolutionary thought behind the mask of an average professor. (2) The expression *Lebendiger*, in contrast to *Lebender*, means to point to the immense *actuality* of Hegel's philosophy; it is the opposite of a mere 'historical' or antiquarian interest in a queer figure of the past.

This new English version of the same development differs from the German book, in that it is more condensed it emphasizes systematic essentials and leaves out many historical details of the German scene, which would be of little interest to American readers.

3. Bern. A. Francke Verlag, 1959.

Introduction

Some Hegel Legends

Hegel's greatness is famous, his obscurity notorious. The latter is due to his language, not to his thought.

Theodor Haering's¹ work has for the first time cleared up this linguistic problem. By carefully analyzing every sentence from his early writings, which were published only in this century, he has shown how Hegel's terminology evolved. Once its genesis is understood, it ceases to be absurd; Hegel's new usage of some of his key-terms is seen to be proper in view of the complex and concrete contents, which are to be thought. But a reader unwilling to abandon his customary dictionary definition of words must be baffled.

Trying to translate Hegel's language back to inflexible 'abstract' terms of formal logic gives rise to simplifying legends² which are like colored glasses—once you wear them, the text simply vanishes.

For example: Translate "Begriff" by "concept", "Ver-nunft" by "reason" and "Wissenschaft" by "science"—and they are all good dictionary translations—and you have transformed the greatest critic of rationalism and irrational-

1. Haering, *Hegel's Wollen und Werk* (2 volumes, first vol. 784 pages, second vol. 525 pages, Teubner, 1929 and 1938).

2. See the excellent study on this by Walter A. Kaufmann: "The Hegel Myth and its Method" *Philosophical Review*, IX (1951), pp. 459-486.

alism into the inventor of a pan-logistic, rationalistic and scientific 'system'; and since it is impossible to transform reality into a logical 'system', Hegel must be arrogant or ridiculous. But his 'Begriff' is not 'concept,' but a living soul of many opposite functions, derived from Aristotle's definition of *Psyche* as the intelligible essence of all life; his 'Vernunft' is not reason, but a comprehensive totality in which reason (Verstand) with all its formal-logical functions is included; and 'Wissenschaft' is not 'science' but Philosophy.

"What is a *peculiar private possession* of a philosophy can for this very reason only *belong to the form of the system*, but *not to the essence of philosophy* itself. And if a system mistakes its peculiarity for its essence, it nevertheless still may have sprung from genuine speculation, which merely foundered in its attempt to express itself in the form of knowledge (Wissenschaft). Those who are fettered by their own peculiarities see in others nothing but peculiarities . . . *The living spirit, which dwells in a philosophy demands for its disclosure to be reborn in a kindred spirit*. For a mere historical approach, interested in knowing opinions, it passes by like a strange phenomenon and does not reveal its inner life."³

The most devastating Hegel legend, however, is that everything is thought in "thesis, antithesis, and synthesis". If you expect to find this nonsense in Hegel, then no text makes sense, because no text contains this. A prominent illustration of this pathetic attempt to construe Hegel on the preconceived notion of thesis, antithesis and synthesis is W. T. Stace's *The Philosophy of Hegel* (1924). He first supposes that he has to construe Hegel's philosophy in

3. I., pp. 40, 42. (ital. mine.)

"triads of thesis, antithesis, synthesis" (p. 97), then he finds that Hegelian texts do not follow this 'ideal method', and what is his conclusion? "These irregularities do not indicate, however, that our description of the dialectic method is wrong. What they do show is that Hegel has not himself been able to carry out his own dialectic method with absolute consistency in all cases. This is of course an imperfection in his system" (*ibid.*). And although he claims that his chapters "embody all the essential principles," nevertheless, he has to admit that they "can give little idea of the vast fields which Hegel covered, the profuse wealth of his concrete illustrations, the enormous learning which he brought to bear upon these studies, the profundity and breadth of his vision" (p. viii). This abstract separation of 'principles' and 'visions' is utterly un-Hegelian; the concrete unity of these opposites (principles and visions) constitutes precisely Hegel's 'speculative concept' (*Begriff*). It is as variable as the problems grasped. One example of Hegel's speculative concept is Kant's 'synthesis a priori' of logical form and non-logical, perceptual content, or the unity of a priori and a posteriori; this is an essential and concrete unity of opposites, forming the basis of all empirical sciences. The actual texts of Hegel not only occasionally deviate from 'thesis, antithesis, and synthesis', but show nothing of the sort. Dialectic does not mean 'thesis, antithesis, and synthesis'. Dialectic means that any 'ism', which has an opposite, or which is a specialty, leaving the rest to itself—must be criticized by the logic of philosophical thought, whose problem is reality as a concrete world-itself. Dialectic is never the same, because any selected 'whole' is dialectically determined by polarities within itself as well as by other wholes in contrast to which it is what it is in itself.

Hermann Glockner's reliable *Hegel Lexikon* (4 volumes, Frommann, Stuttgart, 1935)⁴ does not list the Fichtean terms 'thesis, antithesis, synthesis' together. In all the twenty volumes of Hegel's 'complete works' he does not use this triad once; nor does it occur in the eight volumes of Hegel's texts, published for the first time in the twentieth century.

Hegel himself refers to 'thesis, antithesis, and synthesis' in the *Preface* of the *Phenomenology of Mind*, where he considers the possibility of this "triplicity as a method or logic of philosophy". According to the Hegel-legend one would expect that he should commend this "triplicity". But, after saying that it was derived from Kant, he calls it a "lifeless schema", "mere shadow" and concludes: "The trick of wisdom of that sort is as quickly acquired as it is easy to practice. Its repetition, when once it is familiar, becomes as boring as the repetition of any bit of sleight-of-hand once it is seen through. The instrument for producing this monotonous formalism is no more difficult to handle than the palette of a painter, on which lie only two colours . . ." (*Preface*, W. II., pp. 48-49.)

In the student notes, edited and published as *History of Philosophy*, Hegel mentions in the Kant chapter, the "spiritless scheme of the triplicity of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis" (*geistloses Schema*) by which the rhythm and movement of philosophic knowledge is artificially prescribed (*vorgezeichnet*).⁵

In the first important book about Hegel by his student, intimate friend and first biographer, Karl Rosenkranz

4. The new critical edition, in process of being published by F. Meiner in Hamburg will contain 32 volumes.

5. W. XIX., *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie*. Dritter Band, 1928, p. 610.

(*Hegels Leben*, 1844), 'thesis, antithesis, synthesis' are conspicuous by their absence. It seems Hegel was quite successful in hiding his alleged 'method' from one of his best students.

The very important new Hegel literature of this century has altogether abandoned the legend. Theodor Haering makes a careful study of Hegel's terminology and language and finds not a trace of 'thesis, antithesis, synthesis'. In the second volume there are a few lines (pp. 118, 126) in which he repeats what Hegel in the above quotation had said himself, i.e., that this "conventional slogan" is particularly unfortunate, because it impedes the understanding of Hegelian texts. As long as readers think that they have to find 'thesis, antithesis, synthesis' they must find Hegel obscure—but what is obscure is not Hegel but their colored glasses. Iwan Iljin's *Hegels Philosophie als Kontemplative Gotteslehre* (Francke, Bern, 1936, 432 pages) dismisses the 'thesis, antithesis, synthesis' legend in the Preface as a childish game (*Spielerei*), which does not even reach the front-porch of Hegel's philosophy as a contemplative vision of the divine life in the world.

Other significant works, like Hermann Glockner: *Hegel* (2 vol. Frommann. Stuttgart. 1929), Theodor Steinbüchel: *Das Grundproblem der Hegelschen Philosophie* (Bonn, 1933), and Theodor Litt: *Hegel: Eine Kritische Erneuerung* (Quelle und Meyer, Heidelberg, 1953), Emerich Coreth S. J.: *Das Dialektische Sein in Hegels Logik* (Herder, Wien, 1952), and many others have simply disregarded the legend. In my own monographs: *Hegel über Offenbarung, Kirche und Philosophie* (Reinhardt, Munich, 1939) and *Hegel über Sittlichkeit und Geschichte* (Reinhardt, 1940), I never found any 'thesis, antithesis, synthesis'.

Richard Kroner, in his introduction to the English edition of selections from Hegel's *Early Theological Writings*, puts it mildly when he says: "This new Logic is of necessity as dialectical as the movement of thinking itself . . . But it is by no means the mere application of a monotonous trick that could be learned and repeated. It is not the mere imposition of an ever recurring pattern. It may appear so in the mind of some historians who catalogue the living trend of thought, but in reality it is an ever changing, ever growing development; Hegel is nowhere pedantic in pressing concepts into a ready-made mold. The theme of thesis, antithesis and synthesis, like the motif of a musical composition, has many modulations and modifications. It is never "applied"; it is itself only a poor and not even helpful abstraction of what is really going on in Hegel's Logic."⁶

Well, shall we keep this "poor and not helpful abstraction" in our attic because "some historians" used it as their rocking-horse? We rather conclude with Johannes Flügge (*Die sittlichen Grundlagen des Denkens in Hegels Logik*). (Hamburg, 1953, p. 17): "Dialectic is not the scheme of thesis, antithesis and synthesis imputed to Hegel."

Nicolai Hartmann (*Kleinere Schriften*, Berlin, 1957, p. 225), after showing how intimately connected Hegel's dialectic is with Plato's and Aristotle's, and how impossible it is to get at Hegel's systematic philosophy by discussing the 'system', concludes: "It is a basically perverse (grundverkehrt) opinion to see the essence of dialectic in the triad of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis . . . this twaddle should gradually subside (sollte allmählich verstummen)."

6. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel: *Early Theological Writings*, University of Chicago Press (Chicago, 1948), p. 32.

The legend was mainly planted by Marx. It is Marxism superimposed on Hegel. Thesis, antithesis, synthesis, Marx says in *Das Elend der Philosophie*, is Hegel's pure logical formula for the movement of pure reason. And the whole system is engendered by this dialectical movement of thesis, antithesis, synthesis of all categories. This pure reason, he continues, is Mr. Hegel's own reason, and history becomes the history of his own philosophy. Whereas in reality, thesis, antithesis, synthesis are the categories of economic movements. (Summary of Chapter II, Paragraph I.)

The few passages in Marx' writings that resemble philosophy are not his own. He practices the Communistic habit of expropriation without compensation. Knowing this in general, I was also convinced that there must be a source for this thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, and I finally discovered it.

In the winter of 1835-36, a group of Kantians of Dresden called on Henrich Moritz Chalybäus, professor of philosophy at the University of Kiel, to lecture to them on the new philosophical movement after Kant. They were older, professional men who in their youth had been Kantians, and now wanted an orientation in a development which they distrusted; but they also wanted a confirmation of their own Kantianism. Professor Chalybäus did just those two things. His lectures appeared in 1837 under the title *Historische Entwicklung der speculativen Philosophie von Kant bis Hegel, Zu näherer Verständigung des wissenschaftlichen Publikums mit der neuesten Schule*. The book was very popular and appeared in three editions. In my copy of the third edition of 1843, Professor Chalybäus says (p. 854): "This is the first trilogy: the unity of Being, Nothing and Becoming . . . we have in this first methodical

thesis, antithesis, and synthesis . . . an example or schema for all the following". This was in Chalybäus a brilliant hunch which he did not use previously and did not pursue afterwards in any way at all. But Karl Marx was at that time a student at the University of Berlin and a member of the Hegel Club where the famous book was discussed. He apparently took the hunch and spread it into a deadly, abstract machinery. Other left-Hegelians, such as Arnold Ruge, Ludwig Feuerbach, Max Stirner do not use 'thesis, antithesis, synthesis', just as Hegel, himself, did not.

But 'thesis, antithesis, synthesis' is not the only Hegel legend fabricated by Marx. Brutal simplifications are Marxistic specialties. 'Thesis, antithesis, synthesis' is said to be an 'absolute method' of Hegel's alleged 'rationalism'. Marx says: "There is in Hegel no longer a history in the order of time, but only a sequence of ideas in reason". Hegel, on the contrary says: "The time-order of history is distinguished from the sequence in the order of concepts." (*Werke*, XII, p. 59.)

A third minor legend is the popular notion that Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* discovered 'the unity of the divine and the human' in the Prussian state! The text referred to, contains not a word justifying the accusation. "Germanische Welt," as Hegel calls it does not mean German ("Germanisch" is not "Deutsch"), but simply refers to the incontestable historical fact that various Germanic tribes after the disintegration of the Roman empire reconstructed Europe or what we call 'The West' in distinction from the Arabic and the Slavic worlds. Hegel's *Philosophy of History*, is not nationalistic. In my German book, I have shown in detail how the Nazi mentality is incompatible with Hegel. History does not culminate in some particular state, but is the omnipresent self-manifestation of the

Absolute—"the unity of the divine and the human"—always, at all times, immersed in the distortions of irrationality.

A fourth legend has it, that Hegel was the willing instrument of Prussian Reaction. It, also, is originally a Marxistic smear; it occurs almost verbatim in Friedrich Engels' crude diatribe "Ludwig Feuerbach and the Exit of Classical German Philosophy" (1847). To him, Hegel's organic conception of the state is, of course, a hated bulwark against his totalitarianism of the 'dictatorship of the proletariat'.

Once the Hegel legend was established, writers of textbooks in the history of philosophy copied it from their predecessors. It was a convenient method of embalming Hegel and keeping the mummy on display for curious visitors of antiquities. Hegel's dialectic was inconvenient for a century, where philosophers liked to belong to partisan schools and abstract 'isms', such as idealism, realism, objectivism, subjectivism, rationalism, skepticism, and so forth. In Hegel's dialectic, philosophy had matured beyond such one-sided possibilities. Hegel's dialectic means that philosophy has found its own logic, as Croce proclaimed it in his book on *What Is Dead and What Is Alive in Hegel* (transl. London, 1912) with which the Renaissance of the twentieth century was initiated.

One of Hegel's favorite sayings was: Let the dead bury the dead. This book is mainly concerned with 'what is alive' in Hegel. It may come as a shock to some how actual or 'alive' he really is!

The quotations are often abbreviated; Hegel's sentences, sometimes a page long, do not lend themselves to literal translation and are frequently redundant; the footnotes are invitations to the reader to see for himself whether I

have rendered the meaning of the passages correctly.

The second liberty I have taken, is to add in brackets what seemed necessary to round out Hegel's sometimes elliptical statements, which often leave out parts without which the sentence is incomplete. Hegel's vision is not abstract, but its expressions sometimes seem to be. My critical English version of *Hegel's Encyclopedia of Philosophy*⁷ has used similar devices to make Hegel's most central work readable.

7. Philosophical Library, N.Y., 1959.

In the Gymnasium of Stuttgart

Family and Background

Georg Friedrich Wilhelm Hegel was born on August 27, 1770, in Stuttgart, the Suabian capital; at that time residence of the Archduke of Wurtemberg, later king by Napoleon's will.

Hegel as an old man used to celebrate his birthday in the night, linking it with the following day, the twenty-eighth, the birthday of Goethe, twenty-two years older.

In this symbol, the close friendship and philosophical affinity of Hegel's and Goethe's world-views was celebrated. Goethe, in a letter (May 3, 1824) to Hegel wrote: "I am glad that you agree with the main tendency of my thinking. Your assent fortifies me in it all the more. I believe I have gained on many sides from you, if not for the whole, certainly for my most inward self. May everything that I may still be able to produce, grow and rise on the foundations which you have laid down."¹

Hegel replied: "When I look back on my spiritual development I find you involved everywhere. I am one of your sons. I have received from you the inner strength to resist mere abstractions."²

Hegel and Goethe are metaphysical twins differing only

1. Gustav E. Mueller: *Hegel. Denkgeschichte eines Lebendigen*. Bern. A. Francke., p. 591, 1959. Henceforth referred to as "Denkgeschichte."

2. *Ibid.*, p. 392.

in the media of thought and poetry, in which they express the same world-view, Weltanschauung.

His father was an accountant in the government; Hegel was to become an accountant in the spiritual 'government'. There is a note from Hegel which says "His father" in the third person instead of the personal pronoun "my father". This impersonal expression is characteristic from the very beginning; 'objectivity' is a mask to cover intense personal confessions! "His father is stooped—he does not dare to lift himself—neither for a serene view of the world—nor in an inner feeling of his own worth—he is shortsighted and can only see one petty thing after another." (Kurzsichtig could also be nearsighted).

Georg Wilhelm lost his mother when he was thirteen. She had taught him Latin before he went to school. This loss must have been a traumatic sorrow. In 1820 he still writes to his sister Christiane that he always commemorates the day of his mother's death.

This sister was melancholic—was in love with Hegel and insanely jealous of his wife; and drowned herself on receiving the news of his death.

His brother Ludwig became a professional soldier and never married.

His family descended from an Austrian emigrant, who left his country for his Protestant faith, rather than submit to the counter-reformation.

The Hegels were teachers and ministers, officials and craftsmen. Hegel was proud of this background of hard-working and professional middle-class people.

The boy's health was precarious and the family did not expect him to survive.

At the Gymnasium

At fifteen years—very early—he entered the *Gymnasium* of Stuttgart. He was not only always the first in his class, but he was also well-liked as an amiable and helpful friend and companion.

He also loved his teachers. One is particularly praised, because he is not satisfied with routine teaching, and because he burns the midnight oil of incessant research. Hegel received a complete set of Shakespeare from him, before he died.³

Hegel's own research and extracurricular activity is unbelievable! Here is an incomplete list: In the four years of the *Gymnasium* from 1785-1788 Hegel, on top of the heavy daily assignments, volunteered in the following projects:⁴ From Hebrew he translated some psalms. From the Greek, he translated from Homer, Plato, Euripides, Thucydides, Aristotle's Ethics, Sophocles, whose Antigone fascinated him particularly—a predilection which remained with him all his life—and from Epictetus, where his manuscript shows the Greek text of the 'Handbook of Morals' on the one page, his German translation on the opposite page. From Latin there are translated excerpts from Tacitus and from Cicero's letters.

The First Philosophical Reflections

Hegel's philosophical development is a Hegelian development: He becomes for himself what he is in himself through hard and incessant labor and effort. The mature man is the explication of the boy, but it is almost uncanny

3. *Denkgeschichte*, p. 15.

4. For further details cf. *Denkgeschichte*, pp. 16-20.

to see how much is already implicit in his beginning!

Already the high school student practices dialectic: He knows that every positive value has a negative side; that isolated and fixed positions are exaggerated and false. "Every good has its evil side."⁵ He begins his life-long habit of appropriating the objective contents and life-values of history as expressions of his own self, to collect facts and to digest what he has read in summaries and excerpts. He listens to others in order to think for himself. Later he called this "to immerse yourself in the objective content and let the objective content take its course in yourself" (*bei der Sache sein und die Sache walten lassen*). "To slowly digest what you have read," the sixteen year old writes, "is to gain a mastery both of expression and of the meaning (*Geist*) which finally will result in quick and good writing; he who is soon through in the beginning, will never achieve this result."⁶ To appropriate the thought of others leads to self-activity; you must think for yourself. Merely to repeat by rote, to believe on the authority of the teacher is "to burn fake incense in honor of an army of spiritless spirits (*geistlose Geister*) in the fog of academic wisdom."⁷ Historical fact must be combined with philosophical meaning, both in order to understand ourselves better in our present situation.⁸ History is to be studied profoundly (*gründlich*) and philosophically,⁹ not for the sake of scholarship, but the enlightenment of the Everyman.

5. July 3, 1785. *Dokumente zu Hegels Entwicklung Herausgegeben von Johannes Hoffmeister*, Stuttgart, Frommann, 1936. All quotations in this chapter refer to this text, unless indicated.

6. Page 33.

7. October 15, 1786.

8. June 27, 1785.

9. March 22, 1786.

The boy Georg Wilhelm is ironically aware of his precocious objectivity towards himself: The fifteen year old dryly observes that he is fond of eating too many cherries, but is forbidden to indulge in this excess. Later, when you might freely indulge in too many cherries, you yourself don't want to any longer. This proposition "is to me painful, but 'most-wisest'. He reaches beyond his age and finds it at the same time funny to do so."¹⁰

The budding philosopher reflects on what it means to be a philosopher: To rise above prejudices and superstitions is only a negative preparation for a 'wise man'. Mere negation of something negative does not show that you are not dominated by that which you abhor. The absolute prerequisite for criticism is a respect and sense for truth; the philosopher must have that resolution and firmness. But he must also be able to test in a manly seriousness why he asserts or denies something, and he must not let himself be deterred either through praise or blame or ridicule.¹¹ He is given to the meticulous interrogation of the finest points.¹²

Essential to the philosopher is the slowness with which he matures his thought, doubting and weighing alternatives; the balancing of "yes" and "no". Thus, he is in contrast to the practical man of the world, who succeeds in grasping freely and boldly his opportunities and risks himself in dangerous and ambiguous situations.¹³

The empirical world of the senses is a realm of infinite relativities and subjectivities. What is far or near, great or small in space, or of long or short duration in time, is

10. June 28, 1785.

11. February 1, 1788.

12. June 5, 1786.

13. October 16, 1786.

linked with the position of the beholder and his subjective interests, which make things appear important or unimportant.¹⁴

Sciences become philosophical when they are oriented in man, if their contributions help to clarify the meaning of human existence individually, socially and historically.¹⁵ In long excerpts and digests from the main works of the German Enlightenment: Lessing, Moses Mendelssohn, Sulzer, Campe, Garve, Nicolai, Kästner, young Hegel outlines his own versions of the traditional disciplines: Metaphysics, Ontology, Cosmology, Psychology, Ethics, Jurisprudence, Economics, Politics. We need not follow him into his neat and careful definitions, but we note both the universality of his interests in all human values, and the firmness and clarity of his comprehension; already the boy Hegel wants to find himself in an historical world and wants to appropriate this world to himself. He already has a *standpoint* in that he identifies himself with the spirit of his eighteenth century, the *Enlightenment*, and begins to think of a logic which would be the method of philosophy. He distinguishes between this 'natural' spirit of philosophy in human actions, institutions and creations from the 'artful' (*kunstmässig*) philosophy as formulated by the professional thinkers.¹⁶ The human spirit is the same in all ages, but modified in its individual development and particular circumstances.¹⁷

Consequently there are two *methods* necessary for philosophy, the synthetic which flows from the insight and whole personality of the finder, without proving that his

14. May 14, 1787-June 28, 1785.

15. March 9 and 10, 1787.

16. March 10, 1787.

17. December, 1788.

insight is true; and the analytic, which shows the way to a whole from its own modifications.¹⁸

Hegel's understanding of the Enlightenment (*Aufklärung*) is guided by two principles, on the one hand by the *Socratic principle of ethics*, and on the other hand by the *Aristotelian principle of the Mean*,¹⁹ in which we see the first budding of the later dialectic. (Mass, Mitte). Negatively, enlightenment is defined by its opposition to miracles, superstitions and prejudices.²⁰ That we find man suffering from those infirmities in other ages, should make us suspicious that what we believe to be normal. May it not be a prejudice also?²¹

The Socratic principle is grasped early: "All men intend to make themselves happy. Some rare exceptions have the sublimity of the soul to sacrifice themselves in order to make others happy. But I believe those have not sacrificed true happiness (*Glückseligkeit*), but only temporal advantages, temporal luck and temporal life. They are therefore no exceptions."²² Socrates is the hero of enlightenment put to death by a "fearful senate" and a "rabid mob".²³

True happiness is the ultimate end of life. To live in accordance with it is wisdom. Health, wealth and fame among men are contributory goods. They are always dependent on others, and those who seek them without regard for the welfare of others are fools. Their right use and cultivation is intelligence. Wisdom and intelligence are not separable. "Lack of wisdom causes us to mistake the true and ultimate end of life and to substitute relative

18. October 16, 1786.

19. August 10, 1787.

20. July 9 and 10, 1785.

21. August 10, 1787.

22. March 22, 1786.

23. July 15, 1785.

goods for it. We then mistakenly embrace an evil which we at that moment think to be good. An isolated intellect, which only manipulates temporal goods, may turn out to be the greatest evil . . . it may then be too late to think of the true end of existence (*Dasein*); we earn what we have sowed, and we cannot undo the consequences of our superficiality, our negligence and our foolishness.²⁴

This cultivation of the virtue of wisdom and of the enlightenment of intelligence (*Verstand*) is also the essence of the Christian religion. Its conception of love is practiced when we fulfill our duties towards each other, in order to further the happiness (*Wohl*) of the whole. Love is the noblest human passion. It is an insatiable desire to see and make others happy. It is the only source of human happiness. Its reward is joy. In its absence, hatred of others makes human community and friendship impossible.²⁵

Enlightenment as employment of practical intelligence is civilization (*Kultur*); as theoretical knowledge it is enlightened self-criticism; in this twofold function it appears in society as culture (*Bildung*). Theoretical enlightenment consists of a correlation of objective sciences, a tested body of reliable knowledge, and subjective logical reflection (*vernünftiges Nachdenken*) on that which matters most, on that which is important with reference to the vocation of man *qua* man. Practical civilization consists in a correlation between objective arts, social customs, moral precepts and subjective industry, ability, application and techniques. Civilization concerns man as citizen, "since practical perfections have value only for social life." Culture and civilization may be in conflict, and both may turn

24. June 17-22, 1786.

25. *Ibid.*

into their own perversions; culture into deedless make-believe and intellectual arrogance, civilization into stupid and oppressive power. "The more perfect a value, the more horrible its disintegration." "Unhappy the state in which the vocation of man is in disharmony with his vocation as citizen". Wisdom is not a finite achievement. The belief to have it is—*übermass*—hybris: "A nation which believes itself to have *achieved* happiness is sick and in danger."²⁶

The second principle is that enlightenment is the Mean or Measure. Politically this Mean has the best chance in the middle classes of society, which are both practically active and theoretically open, against the lower classes which are depressed by poverty, ignorance and indolence; and the higher classes which are spoiled by pride, possession and frivolity.²⁷

Contradictory conceptions of the good in ethics lead to the *middle road of truth*.²⁸ "Enlightenment which concerns man as man is for all, regardless of estates and profession . . . it posits *measure* on the goal to all endeavor."²⁹

Young Hegel's Enlightenment is not only gleaned from 18th century German authors, but also from his intense reading of Greek and Roman literature. A part of his diary is penned in Latin. This study solicits his original thought about *aesthetics*. It balances his ethical and metaphysical reflections.

In his essay on the *Difference between Ancient and Modern Poets* he praises Greek poetry, particularly the Attic tragedy and comedy for its integration with the life

26. May 31, 1787. (italics mine.)

27. August 23, 1787.

28. December, 1788

29. May 31, 1787.

of the people. The modern poets have no nation to speak to, but only a limited public. The Greeks work from great, original and mythical intuitions and are not burdened with a "cold book-learning". The finesse and differentiation of their beautiful language is at the same time simplicity and heartfelt expression. The moderns have an advantage in the understanding of subjective, inner motivations, a play of moving inwardness.

Imagination, the creation of pure images of life, is the basis of a true scholar and a fine spirit (*schöner Geist*). Beautiful fables delight us more than beautiful general truths.³⁰ Wit combines logical reflections with intuition, unity with intuitive variety. Hidden but nevertheless illuminating relations are thus brought to light. "Feeling for the beautiful . . . true expression of feeling always strikes the heart and awakens sympathy (*Mitgefühl*), which is too often suppressed in our condition.³¹ The dialectician must nevertheless warn against an unlimited use of the imagination. "Imagination jumps, creates at random, wants effects without considering causes, does not see that which is, but as it would like something to be, wants to have things better than they are, and gets impatient when others point to reality."³²

Hegel's respect for reality, which demands for its adequate expression dialectic, reaches its climax in his review of a book review by J. A. Ulrich on the relation of Freedom and Necessity in Kant.³³

Here we meet for the first time the name of *Kant*. Kant's problem is to think together man as a natural phenome-

30. March 14-18, 1787.

31. December, 1788.

32. Aug. 17, 1787.

33. July 31, 1788.

non, subject to natural laws, and man as responsible agent of freedom. The author of the review tries to solve the problem by eliminating the ethical 'ought' and by trying to understand man entirely by causes and influences. Hegel criticizes this. This determinism brings man in line with machines, which are moved by mechanical pushes and pulls; with animals, which are moved by sensuous impulses; but makes impossible the understanding of all true ethics. *The unity of these opposites of nature and freedom is impenetrable to a scientific intellect, (Verstand) it appears as an unsolvable mystery (Geheimnis) to objective scientific approaches.* But it is precisely this mystery which opens our mind (Geist) to an intelligible world above the world of the senses. Man's Reason (Ver-nunft) is his freedom and self-activity, which cannot appear in the world apart from the inhibitions and obstacles of natural phenomena and objects. Man is thus both in time and eternity.

The attempt of the reviewed author (Ulrich) to explain away ethical freedom by his naturalistic determinism "is a contradiction, greater than would be involved in accepting Kant's unity of nature and freedom in man; the author would have to contend, that all actions back in time were necessarily happening as results of previous conditions—while the same actions seen to move forward in time could have been different from what they actually were . . . in his world of naturalistic determinism talks about obligations and duties, merit and guilt, virtue and vice would be meaningless; such expressions would have to be replaced by fortune and misfortune, pleasure and pain . . . A world in regard to which a dizzy reason must be lulled by phantasy, a sinister comforter, into a wild dream of a fate, which mechanically moves men through

their beneficial illusions of freedom, and of so-called vices and virtues, towards a goal of an eventual happy outcome.”³⁴

With this clear statement of a dialectical unity of necessary opposites we have reached the end of Hegel’s high school career. A boy whose life and joy lay in learning and thinking should naturally be the first in school. As such a ‘primus’ he had the honor of giving the farewell speech for his class. This address is in line with his own practical convictions. His gratitude for the privilege of learning in a “sacred house”, his modesty towards teachers, his wide view of the social significance of solid and stable ethical institutions, such as family and school, are all genuine and mature convictions of his own.³⁵ He has really passed his ‘Matura’.

Appraisal

I doubt where we could find a second boy, whose years from 14-18 could match the same age in Hegel. This boy is a genius of learning, coupled with a critical spirit, which is not submerged by the substantial sum of appropriated materials; and what is even more amazing, this boy, in spite of his indefatigable diligence, is not an intellectualistic snob but a friendly and helpful comrade among others. His exceptional way of life seems natural to him; he swims in wisdom like a fish in water.

34. July 31, 1788.

35. Autumn 1788, p. 52f.

College Student in Tübingen

1788 - 1793

A Radical Change

In the autumn of 1788 Hegel left the house of his father in Stuttgart and went to the College in Tübingen, called the *Stift*. His study was financed by a scholarship from the State, or, as it was called then, from the Duke of Würtemberg. It was renewed every year for the five-year curriculum, of which the first two were devoted to philosophy, terminated by a Master's degree; and three years to theology after which Hegel was an ordained Lutheran minister—and he does not even have a 'Ph.D.'

In his personal development the change from Stuttgart to Tübingen, from Gymnasium to College coincided with a belated adolescence. His former self, the exemplary schoolboy, all of a sudden goes to pieces. He begins to cut classes; to drink so much wine, that a comrade says to him: "Hegel, I am afraid you will drink away your little bit of mind;"¹ to have timid flirtations with girls;² to take to dancing, horse-back riding, fencing, and hiking in the woods, and to be a foremost champion in fisticuffs between college students and town-boys.³ He is generally

1. *Dokumente zu Hegels Entwicklung*. Hrsq. von Johannes Hoffmeister. Frommann, 1936.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 432.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 433.

liked as a good-natured fellow; but also nicknamed "the old man."⁴ His college friendships lasted for life. He took part in a defiant gesture of the students who went out and planted a 'freedom-tree' in enthusiastic response to the glorious beginning of the great French revolution—a gesture which brought the Duke himself to the *Stift* to investigate this storm in the academic teacup.

The change of place, secondly, is also a change of emphasis from the rational Enlightenment to the Romantic mood; greatly enhanced by his roommate *Friedrich Hölderlin*, the greatest of the coming romantic poets of German literature, and *Schelling*, the foremost philosopher of the Romantic school. They studied Plato, the Greek tragedies and Aristophanes' comedy together. In Plato they saw philosophy as one with the ascent of the soul, moved by the 'gods.' Hölderlin wrote their common motto into Hegel's diary: *Hen kai Pan—The One and (Infinite) All*. Lessing remains Hegel's favorite German author, but he is now joined by an intense study of Jean Jacques Rousseau,⁵ the eternal adolescent. Rousseau is "breaking his fetters."

The change from Stuttgart to Tübingen means, thirdly, a repetition of the historical change from the classical humanity of the Greek and Roman culture to the Judeo-Christian world-view. The orthodox Lutheran version of it was a shocking encounter.

'Know Thyself'

His diligence and intensity of work remains unabated; he "ties the wings of time."⁶ A roommate of Hegel tells

4. *Ibid.*, p. 431.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 430.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 428.

the story that they had an arrangement to wake each other for studies at five in the morning on alternate days; if one over-slept he had to give to the other his portion of wine, which the Stift furnished with every dinner.⁷ We also hear of all-night studies, taking naps on a davenport. But it is no longer schoolwork. The influence of his mediocre professors on him is negligible. He drops from first place in class to fourth. It is his own work of critical reflection which begins. ‘Know thyself,’ the ‘absolute imperative,’ as he calls it, is one problem of his diaries. He is aware of his radical change. He becomes problematic ‘in and for himself.’ He gives account—to himself—on why his former enlightenment belief in reason is unsatisfactory. He knows that the historical change from Greek culture to Christianity has become his own personal problem. Historical objectivity and existential involvement illuminate each other. The concrete and moving whole of historical life is at the same time a challenge and appeal to myself. Abstract intellectualism will not do: “Wisdom is not science—wisdom is an elation of the soul, having risen above dependence on opinions and sense-impressions, through my own inward experience connected with reflection; if it is really practical wisdom, not merely a self-indulgent or boasting show of wisdom, then it necessarily must be accompanied by a quiet glow, a soft fire . . . concepts and syllogisms do not lead to firm convictions of truth—conviction can not be bought in a general market, where everyone, who pays in correct currency, is handed his pack of knowledge—wisdom speaks out of the full heart—enlightenment nevertheless remains a nice advantage as a distinct knowledge of duties . . . but it remains inferior against the incommensurable purity and goodness of heart.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 428.

A good-natured youth is joyful (*Frohsein*); circumstances may inhibit him so that he is thrown back on himself; he then may resolve to become a virtuous man, but lacks the experience. Books can not render him that service—he may take Campe's *Theophron*, reads and thinks about those virtuous doctrines all day—and what will be the result? A real perfection? Human wisdom? Practical prudence? Years of practical experience would be required for that—but meditation of Campe's ruler gets stale in a week! *Our youth appears in society, morose and anxious*, where only he is welcome who contributes to their fun; *timidly* he enjoys pleasures which are palatable only to a carefree heart—*crushed with the feeling of his insufficiency he bows insecurely to everyone—ladies do not cheer him because he is afraid of his own fire—and this makes him look awkward*—but he will not stand this any longer and will shake off his surly paedagogue.”⁸ The lines underscored by me are a touching confusion of profound emotional troubles; life and booklearning fall apart.

Mere verbal knowledge about wisdom results in public tirades and personal vanity and arrogance. Reason misses the tender and sacred life of human feelings. Bookishness is as digestible as a stone in the stomach; *is like a mask hiding the unhealthy and withered lifelessness beneath it.*⁹

This poignant self-confession is at the same time an act of repentance and of liberation, but Hegel's dialectical mind nevertheless does not exaggerate the new romantic philosophy of life against “the beautiful advantage of enlightenment.” The distinguishing, rational intellect is not to be thrown away, but is to be preserved as a necessary function of life, a partial function of the whole!

8. Dr. Herman Nohl: *Hegel's Theologische Jugendschriften*. Tülingen, J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1907, p. 15.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 16.

His M.A. thesis of 1790, written in Latin, answered the question: *Can moral duties be practiced without a belief in the immortality of the soul?* The paper is lost, but Rosenkranz quotes some sentences in the original Latin from it, and gives a summary. It shows that Hegel is well acquainted with Kant, but already strives to overcome his dualism between practical reason and sensuality. He says that both are abstractions from the one activity which is the subject. Like a twentieth-century existentialist Hegel describes a man who believes that his lived life disappears completely into nothing as if he had never existed; such a man, lacking the comfort of 'perpetuitas', will face the moments of his life with the utmost of courage and of effort, and will be most careful in minimizing evils and suffering in this earthly life and in his surroundings; because life is precisely precious because of the short span of time at its disposal.

On the other hand, if he knows himself to be a part of a divine life, of "an all as a perfect whole," then it will be seen as a contribution to this perfect whole in whose eternal life his own mortal existence will be eternally preserved.

Be this as it may, and this seems to have been Hegel's conclusion, *philosophical contemplation must understand the autonomy of the moral life in and out of itself, regardless of whether it is believed to be drifting in a mortal world, or anchored in a religious metaphysical of the eternal.* "*In ipsa rerum natura . . . nulla opinio quidquam poterit immutare.*" External opinions and reflections shall not interfere with the nature of the moral reality which is present to all in their internal perception.¹⁰

10. Karl Rosenkranz: *Erläuterungen zu Hegel's Encyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften*. Leipzig, Dürr'schen Buchhandlung, 1870, pp. 35-38.

The philosopher, the young ‘magister’ says in a fragment, *is content in his family life, useful and competent in his profession, tolerant towards the world, because he is acquainted with its prejudices but strict towards himself.*¹¹

The Shocking Encounter with Theology

Rarely has there been such a dubious student of theology as Hegel. During the day he is officially a student who listens to his professors with one ear; at night he energetically subjects the Bible to ruthless, subversive critique.

The professors had no idea what was going on. Hegel’s mask is being formed. *One* problem is the comparison between Socrates and an historical Jesus, who is totally rejected; this comparison is enlarged and becomes a confrontation of Greek culture and Platonism,¹² with the Christian source book. A *second* approach is a scorching criticism of the traditional churches; there is an analogy here to what the French Revolution was doing to feudal institutions. The *third* critique attacks dogmatic public formulations of religion.

As rationalistic products of the intellect, compared with Greek religion and culture, Christianity is ugly, private and artificial; measured by the postulates of a new ‘Volks-religion’ Christianity is antiquarian, Oriental and without connection with the present life; weighed by the requirement of the heart, the Christian Catechisms are the products of a rationalistic intellectualism.

11. Nohl., p. 33.

12. See Gustav E. Mueller: *Plato. The Founder of Philosophy as Dialectic*. N.Y. Open Court, 1964. By “Platonism” I do not refer to the traditional view of static “ideas” “above” empirical reality—a view I have not found in Plato’s Dialogues.

1. *Greek Humanity and Christianity*. When Hegel came to College he was filled with an ideal of classical humanity, gained from Homer and the tragedy, which was now deepened through the study of Plato with his friends. He knows that this ideal is an "image" (*Bild*), evident to a soul which has feeling for human greatness and beauty.¹³ It is an image of a culture, which does not deny nature, from which it has risen, but which it transfigures in imagination; the individual person finds himself fulfilled in his own communal and shared work. The Greek soul unites joy and seriousness, power and grace, love, friendship, political and intellectual freedom.¹⁴

The Greeks did neither revile nature nor prettify the inexorable course of causes and effects with the edifying illusion that everything will have a happy end—like the Christians—an illusion "which can never be applied to real life." The Greeks respected nature in resigning themselves to that which is not in human power, without therefore losing their enthusiasm for heroic deeds and excellencies of the soul. "Misfortune was misfortune—sorrow was sorrow"—whereas Christians "have so many comfortable arguments handy, that one almost regrets not to be able to lose every week a father or mother or to be struck by blindness." The over-all providence of a loving father, or 'peace on earth', taught in Christian churches, is so much out of tune with real history and the calamities of life, that one is not surprised to see the despondency of the Christians, which are constantly forced to face that discrepancy between their religious illusions and reality.¹⁵

13. *Ibid.*, p. 28.

14. Nohl., p. 22.

15. Friedrich Nietzsche: *Anti-Christ*. Kröner Verlag. Leipzig, 1922, paragraph 22.

The Christian religion wants to make us citizens of heaven, and so estranges us from this world and from human feelings. Our lugubrious communion in remembrance of death (Nietzsche: "cannibalistic blood-drinking")¹⁶ is interrupted by putting money in the plate, privately by the fear of being infected with venereal disease in sharing the holy chalice.

Hegel's confrontation of Socrates and Jesus intensifies and personifies the general contrast between Hellenism and Christianity. Socrates did not preach a system. Haranguing mobs from mountains which is ascribed to the "paper-figure" called Jesus—would have been ridiculous in Greece. Socrates did not tie the people to himself like a uniform body-guard, but on the contrary encouraged them to think for themselves, in order to participate in the life of their people each according to his own talents. Jesus, on the contrary, estranges his 'twelve' from the life of their people, their only assignment is to "preach *his* name."

Socrates is a free citizen of a free society. He is courteous and urbane with everyone, rich or poor; unthinkable that he should address people with "you snakes and vipers." You will not escape to be thrown into the eternal fires of hell. (Nietzsche: "Before opening the New Testament it is advisable to put on gloves, every other book is clean when you come from the 'New Testament.'")

Socrates did not have mysterious-sounding threats to frighten people. He did not compensate his hatred for the goods of this world with megalomania. His modest task was to awaken men to their own highest possibilities and to live what he thought. Jesus, on the contrary, had no life to live, but only an empty promise of a 'hereafter'.

16. Nohl., p. 27.

Socrates participated in the life of his state, saved a friend's life in battle at the risk of his own. "Truth brought him the hemlock which he emptied in sublime equanimity." What, on the contrary, was the expense of Christ when he healed the sick? A word—his miraculous, inhuman powers are neither admirable nor to be imitated, since we have no such powers. Whereas Socrates wants us to follow the logos, leading us to truth, Jesus' intolerant fanaticism does not tolerate arguments and identifies 'the truth' with his worthless self. Christianity is a religion of death, compensated for by a supernatural life. Life is a miserable preparation for another 'life everafter', filled with morbid phantasies of eternal 'damnation' or 'salvation.' The short span of life counts nothing against the all-decisive moment of death. The Christians waste their life for the moment of death. They tremble before the throne of the judge who decides about an individual's eternal fate. No wonder the Christians in their agony anxiously assemble their spiritual utensils (*geräte*) "surrounded by ecclesiastics who whine to them the prescribed and printed sighs." And there are only a very few that are not condemned to the eternal torments of hell.

These magic sacraments are to assuage the same anxiety which the doctrines have inculcated. "Heroes of all nations die differently, for they have lived differently." "How different the images of death which have dominated the Greeks and us. There is a beautiful genius, the brother of sleep, eternalized in monuments, reminiscent of all the values of life (*Geruch des Lebens*); here a skeleton which the preachers use to make us shudder."¹⁷

If we survey all the negative and critical remarks about Jesus, which the young theology student confides to his

17. Nohl., p. 47.

secret diaries, three great discoveries stand out; they anticipate the study of the early eschatological Jesus in the twentieth century.

This historical individual is described by Hegel as an *insane person*, who compensates for his inferiority by hating blindly and furiously all values or excellencies in this world. In his superlative megalomania he pronounces the *immediate* end of the world, his one and only obsession; He identifies his own appearance with its disappearance. Those who believe this his ‘messianic secret,’ will be rewarded in *his* ‘kingdom of the heavens;’ whereas those who disbelieve that he will come at the head of an army of angels on clouds and with fanfare, to destroy the world, them he will ‘finish’ and throw them into ‘everlasting fires of hell’.

The crucifixion Hegel understands as an act of violent atrocity (Greuel), an indirect suicide, a “flight into a void” (Flucht ins Leere). Jesus forces the authorities to get rid of him, in order thereby to usher in the divine ‘Kingdom come’ prophesized by him on his behalf.

2. *Volksreligion and Christianity*. Religion originally is the spiritual bond of a people. It is ‘one of the most important concerns’ of a national life, because it unites all faculties of the soul: Head and heart, energy and imagination, freedom and law. Moral values are sanctioned by religion and are in turn sanctioning it.¹⁸

Religion is tied to the most elementary interests, and it has for this reason been preserved mostly in connection with the basic experiences of birth, marriage and death.

Popular religion is also filled with tender feelings. The feelings of gratitude and trust, of humility and admiration

18. *Ibid.*, p. 19.

are inseparable from it, no less than the opposite feelings of dependence, awe and respect of a spiritual nature, which are feared by the animal and frivolous nature in us.

The original religious life is expressing itself in symbolic ceremonies of prayers, cultic gestures, sacrifices and penitence; and in mythical tales of gods and men. The individual is carried by the religious spirit of his people; he knows that he could not exist only out of or for himself. This feeling of being securely rooted, makes possible enthusiastic heroism and unconditional sacrifice for others.

As reason progresses this *Volksreligion* disintegrates; and when the religious spirit fades, its external manifestations become burdens to the rational mind, they are no longer understood as symbols.

This is the situation in our modern society. Our religious ceremonies and creeds are only remnants of a past, which is irrevocably gone. We have separate and separating sects, not a religion which really moves the people. If we cannot restore religion to its central place, we shall disintegrate further and also lose our secular culture. We need again a spiritual unity, a 'retie' (*religio*) to an absolute whole, in which morality and beauty, heart and mind and imagination are all involved, with celebrations and sacred music which all could enjoy, and without fanaticism and suppression of freedom in mind and conscience.¹⁹ This ideal religion which includes the full use and freedom of mind and conscience lies deeply rooted in the spirit of human nature, which is more than an animal nature. Its ideal of a universal spiritual church is an ideal which we can promote in freeing the people from literalism and from the fetishism of sectarian cults and symbols. If we had such a living *Volksreligion* then we "would not

19. *Ibid.*, p. 50.

be satisfied to lend our ears every seventh day to phrases and images, which had their place and meaning only some thousand years ago in Syria.”²⁰

A spiritual-human religion would interweave love and reason. “Love is the analogy of reason. It finds itself in the other human being. When man forgets himself, stepping out of his isolated existence (*Existenz*) he lives, feels and acts for the other and is given back his self—so Reason (*Vernunft*), is the unifying principle of all practical life; it is the ground of universally valid moral laws. Therefore, and for no other reason, can we recognize in every other rational human being a co-citizen of the intelligible world.”²¹ This analogy of love and Reason (*Vernunft*) shows how misleading it is to translate ‘*Vernunft*’ with *reason*, which in Hegel is always ‘*Verstand*,’ as defined by formal logic.

The dialectical structure both of the emotional and the spiritual life is to be liberated; the eternal truth of human nature must gradually prevail over old fixations. When, on the contrary, man is ruined by despotism and superstition, then loves shrinks to a private, merely sexual caricature of itself.²²

3. *Objective and Subjective Religion*. Fichte’s *Critique of Revelation* appeared in 1792, Kant’s *Religion Within the Limits of Pure Reason* in 1793. Hegel studied them as they came out.²³ He agreed with both that religion is not ‘objective’—it is not an object of scientific theories; it is ‘subjective’, a way of life, a change of heart, a service of God not in formulas but in practice of love, devotion and

20. *Ibid.*, p. 39.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 18.

22. *Ibid.*, p. 19.

23. *Ibid.*, p. 355.

practical commitment. But the anti-rationalistic dialectician Hegel nevertheless also remembers that those books were philosophical—theoretical statements claiming to serve truth. And religion, appealing to the whole man, must also engage his dialectical-philosophical self-comprehension. After accepting from Kant and Fichte the distinction between ‘objective’ theology and ‘subjective’ religion, Hegel pursued his own, independent way of thinking in the direction of his later dialectic.²⁴

Homer's lively mythical stories please our imagination, because there is no rationalistic and dogmatic theology to impose them on us by force. But the contention of absurd dogmas, such as the bodily resurrection of the dead; or that God plunges man into total depravity,²⁵ because an individual ate an apple, and forgives man again, because another individual is murdered²⁶ are a shame and disgrace of humanity. Reason (*Vernunft*) as self-criticism and ‘conversion,’ awakens the sleepers from the lethal smugness of self-satisfaction. After one understood this meaning of Kant's Practical Reason (*Vernunft*) as the principle of totality (later called the Absolute) one recognized in it the daughter of heaven, Truth, and all dogmatism became irrelevant.²⁷

Gellert²⁸ repeats after Tertullian that a child, instructed in the catechism, knows more about God than the wisest of pagans. To Hegel Gellert's child is a conceited brat. The catechism may have been inflicted on his helpless and

24. *Ibid.*, p. 355.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 55.

26. *Ibid.*, p. 62f.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 363.

28. Christian Fürchtegott Gellert was a “Poet” of the German Enlightenment (1715-1769). An example of Gellert's humor is: Homer is immortal—immortaler for Christians, the British Richardson.

tender memory, but living experience connected with a consciousness of its meaning is absent. It is no better than a prayer-mill, the catechism may just as well serve to wrap a piece of old cheese.²⁹

Subjective religion, the heartfelt fullness of faith, is independent of the objective dogma, and may precisely show itself in inconsistency against the dogma held by the intellect. Hegel quotes Lessing's *Nathan*: "That which you call Christian in me is that which I call Jewish in you."³⁰ Hegel anticipates here Kierkegaard's "truth is the infinite subjective passion"—only for him this is not *all* of the truth.

'Objective' religion is a theological system—religion is the life of freedom, of conscience, of grateful sacrifice.³¹ It is the duty of the state to make 'subjective' religion possible, and not impose its political legality on the life of religious motivation and inward morality. The church, likewise, must not confuse itself with a legal-objective system, pretending that its ceremonies, object-beliefs are the only and exclusive ways of salvation—as is the custom with all sects.³²

'Objective' religion is religious intellectualism or rationalism. It is the function of the intellect or reason (*Verstand*) to objectify distance, to isolate and keep in fixed isolation. If the religious spirit is objectified, if it is made to appear as if it were an alien other, estranged from my self, it becomes, like every object, problematic, the battle-ground of never ending wrangles, disputations and uncertainties. Faith is mixed up with an historical "belief" in

29. Nohl., p. 11.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 10.

31. *Ibid.*, p. 48f.

32. *Ibid.*, p. 49.

so-called objective "facts" which are "put before" me (*Vorstellung*).³³

And if one asks the learned theologians, what is this authentic fact, which you call Christian religion, they will all answer as with one mouth: Why, is my textbook not known to you?³⁴

The belief in Jesus as an historical person is such a belief founded on questionable allegations of others. Such historical belief is not founded in the practical-religious needs of Reason (*Vernunft*). 'Reason' is the critique of all historical hearsay; it must test the claims of such historical beliefs.³⁵ Actual faith in alliance with philosophical Reason is strong and autonomous enough to disregard historical beliefs and their scriptural proofs. The theologians will therefore accuse it of punishable frivolity, or of scriptural ignorance. If, on the contrary, philosophical faith studies those scriptures like other human-historical documents and demonstrates that they are most questionable and do not contain what they are supposed to contain, that they are full of nonsense (*Ungereimtheiten*), theological projections, wishful thinking and partisanships of the time, then the theologians will accuse philosophical faith and Reason of malice and blindness.

But historical object-belief is not only based on intellectualism. It is not merely untrue, untenable and uncertain. These are only negations. 'Positively' is also evidence of a religious perversion; it is a parallel to despotism, or as we would translate Hegel's meaning today, political totalitarianism. It is a symptom of self-alienation (*Selbstentfremdung*). This is the origin of Hegel's curious use

33. *Ibid.*, p. 60.

34. *Ibid.*, p. 60.

35. *Ibid.*, pp. 64, 66.

of the term 'positive' and 'positivism' as denoting pious compulsions.

Christianity is a product of decadence. When the Greeks and Romans had lost their *Volksreligion* they regressed to private existence and morbid superstitions. Their former religion became a meaningless and burdensome relic of fixed ceremonies. When they lost their political freedom and their philosophical Reason they plunged into a chaos of fantastic atavisms; compared with Classical Greek culture in Plato and Aristotle, the decay is unbelievable! Ruined by political despotism those uprooted masses projected their hopes outside of themselves onto a supernatural and superhuman Savior. Having lost their freedom on earth they projected it into 'heaven'. The modern world, after slowly emerging from the 'dreadful night' of the Christian period gradually learns to undo that damage. After centuries, humanity again becomes capable of entertaining ideas; the over-anxiousness over individual wickedness disappears; the experience of bad men remains but the doctrine of depravity fades out—if the IDEA (Kant's term) gradually again emerges in its beauty, and, thought by us, again becomes our own—then we shall no longer project the beauty of human nature into a single strange individual, whilst claiming as our own only what is disgusting and depraved; we shall quit treating ourselves as objects of contempt and shall reaffirm and reclaim the idea of self-respect joyfully and realize it as our own common work.³⁶

In the original text this is only a long involved period, whose grammar breaks under the strain of passion. The different lines of reflection—classical humanity versus self-estrangement, *Volksreligion* versus institutional fixations

36. *Ibid.*, p. 71.

and private sentimentality, intellectualistic objectification versus living practice—are all condensed into a single devastating conclusion. There is a close analogy in the text of Friedrich Nietzsche: "With Christianity a religion prevailed which corresponded to a pre-Greek condition of man: Belief in magic causality, bloody sacrifice, superstitious anxiety of daemonic punishments, despair of himself, ecstatic broodings, and hallucinations, man seeing himself as the playground of good and evil spirits."³⁷

Hegel passed his theological examination with some dry moralistic sermons³⁸ and with an innocuous dissertation on the history of the reformation in Würtemberg. His teachers had no idea of the problems that agitated the mind of this unusual young minister of the Lutheran church. His final school-certificate says that his health is delicate; that his oral delivery is poor and without expressiveness; that his morals are good, his judgment sound and that in philosophy he is mediocre.³⁹

Appraisal

Hegel's range of discoveries during his college years is amazing. The whole man philosophizes, passionately, with all he has and is—not merely with the intellect. Human personality is a concrete whole of infinitely diverse and modifiable ends and aspirations. Irrational and 'rational' functions of life; among them imaginative, moral, intellectual and religious pursuits and values are focused in the unity of a self-reflective Comprehension. This 'ideal of

37. Friedrich Nietzsche: *Unzeitgemäße Betrachtungen*, Kröner Verlag, Leipzig, p. 380.

38. *Dokumente*, p. 175-192.

39. *Ibid.*, p. 439.

'Reason' (Vernunft) prevents an abstract isolation or projection of any one of those functions at the expense of others.

Secondly, the person is nothing apart from his community and the community is nothing apart from the person. The matrix man exists in a reciprocal interaction with others, of national cultures and historical situations. These national and historical wholes determine the free individuals, as the individuals also determine them.

This *Volksgeist*, thirdly, expressing itself in *Volksreligion*, is the universal coherence or 'substance' of life, working itself out as well as in representative individuals in particular historical shapes of life. *Factual* historical phenomena are inseparable from *essential* values of life.

The 'ideal of Reason' is directed both against a false over-all unification, "the sour-sweet candy of mysticism,"⁴⁰ as well as against a rationalistic isolation and exaggeration of one-sided interests.

Finally, his discovery and rejection of the historical Jesus as a worthless and pathological individual remained his conviction. It underlies his conflict with the liberal theologian Schleiermacher at the University of Berlin in the 1820's.

Because Hegel had worked secretly like a mole, his later philosophical fame took his former fellow-students by surprise: Who would have thought that of Hegel! they exclaimed.⁴¹

40. Nohl., p. 28.

41. *Dokuments*, p. 434.

Tutor in Bern 1793 - 1796

Hegel, after his graduation in Tübingen, accepted the position of a tutor for the daughter of Carl Friedrich von Steiger in Bern. In the autumn of 1793 he arrived in the beautiful, old city of gray stones and arcaded streets, dating its history back to the Roman and pre-Roman Celtic times. Hegel arrived in the last years of a proud and exclusive aristocratic oligarchy; in 1798, two years after Hegel left Bern, this regime fell after a heroic struggle against the invading armies of the French revolution, invited as allies by Bern's French-speaking rebelling subjects in Western Switzerland.

A contribution to this revolt was a little book by Jean Jacques Cart, a lawyer in Lausanne, printed in Paris in 1793, on the relation of the "Pays de Vaud" to Bern. Hegel translated these 'letters' into German and published them anonymously in Frankfurth in 1798—the year in which the injustice of the aristocrats had led to their destruction and after the author of the letters had been guillotined in Paris.¹

In the notes to his translation, Hegel describes the jealousies and intrigues of the few ruling families, and the economic and financial affairs of the state of Bern.² The

1. Dok., pp. 247-257.

2. Ros., p. 61. Hegel's treatise on *The Financial Constitution of Bern* is lost.

family von Steiger, where he served, belonged to the inner-most ruling circle. Carl Friedrich von Steiger was an enlightened man and offered Hegel the use of his library, one of the finest private libraries in Europe. Hegel read Hume, Voltaire, Montesquieu, Spinoza, Mosheim's *History of Christian 'heresies'*. He was particularly impressed by the study of Gibbon's *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*; from which he translated passages, which fitted his revolutionary critical study of the 'New Testament' in Tübingen. As charter subscriber of Friedrich Schiller's magazine *Die Horen* he was one of the first readers of Schiller's *Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man*, "a Masterpiece"³, besides Gibbon one of the most decisive influences in his Bernese period. Schelling sent his first books to him; the exchange of letters between Hegel and the two friends, Schelling and Hölderlin, offers important insights into his development. In Schelling's first published essay he had demanded that theological expressions should be interpreted philosophically. Hegel writes on Christmas Eve, 1794: "I have met you on your old road leading to an elucidation of theological concepts, and to do away with the old sour dough. I cannot but express my joyous congratulations. The time has come, I believe, when one should begin to use a freer language; the old system is still perpetuated in Tübingen more than anywhere else, although this does not influence good minds . . . Do you know that Cart has been guillotined? . . . This trial has brought to light the whole shameful indecency of Robespierre and his followers."⁴

In 1795 he writes that he has returned to the study of

3. Ros., p. 71.

4. Ros., pp. 65, 66.

Kant's philosophy in order to see how it can be applied to human-practical problems: "Orthodoxy is unshakable, as long as its profession is tied to secular advantages and remains interwoven with the state . . . If this gang (Trupp) reads something which is contrary to its persuasion (if their verbiage may be honored to call it that) and the truth of the Critique is somewhat felt, then they say: yes, that may be true enough—and then—and then they go to sleep again . . . as if nothing had happened . . . it should be interesting to disturb those theological ants, which so industrially carry critical building-materials to re-enforce their gothic temple, to make every move difficult for them, to whip them out of every refuge, until they would find no corner left and would be forced to exhibit their shame to the light of day. Among the materials, which they swipe from the Kantian funeral pile, in order to prevent the incendiary of their dogmas, are still enough burning logs which will facilitate the spread of philosophical ideas . . . Reason and freedom remain our motto and our meeting-place the invisible church."⁵

Schelling sent his book *About the Possibility of a Form of All Philosophy* (1794) which closes with the sentence: "Look for eternal truth in man himself, before you bring it in a divine form from heaven". Hegel responds enthusiastically. Speculative philosophy means in practice a revolution against the old regime of inequality, privileges and oppressions: "No better symptom of our time than this, that humanity is presented as worthy of respect. This is the proof that the glory around the heads of the suppressors and gods of this earth is vanishing. Philosophers prove human dignity and the peoples will learn to feel it and will not only demand but re-appropriate their rights,

5. Ros., pp. 67, 69.

which were trampled into dust. Religion and politics have played under one cover. The former has *taught*, what political despotism has *willed*: Contempt of humanity, its incapacity to any goodness, to be something out of its own self-activity . . . the spirit of such constitutions is in alliance with selfish privileges.⁶

Schelling sent his new book *About the I as Principle of Philosophy or About the Unconditional in Human Knowledge*⁷ (1795), at the same time complaining that his publications have ruined his chances to become a tutor in Tübingen. The book explains that the proposition "I think, I am", is unconditional, indubitable and at the same time a primary reality, a metaphysical principle. It implies its own opposite, the relative and conditional "Not-I", the physical organism, in which the "I am" sees its self alienated, meets its embodiment. Both together, the absolute I and the non-absolute experience of an other-than-I, is interpreted to be the 'speculative' meaning of the Kantian "synthesis a priori"; it is a unity of identity and empirical difference or non-identity. In reply Hegel coolly observes: "I am afraid people will not be persuaded to give up their Non-I". Schelling asks what he is writing. Hegel answers: Not much!, but I reflect on the question "what does it mean to approach God". He comforts his friend that he is far ahead of his time, and particularly of Tübingen. "Let philosophical culture quietly and steadily proceed and the same world will find in fifty years that what you think in isolation now, will be commonplace then." "I feel most intensely the pitifulness of such a situation, where the state wants to interfere with the sacred depth of morality. It is pitiful even if it is meant well: Sadder still if hypo-

6. Ros., p. 70.

7. Schelling *Sammtliche Werke*, 1856, vol. I, pp. 149-245.

rites are installed as censors, which is unavoidable, no matter how honorable were the original good intentions.”⁸

Hegel’s philosophical personality emerges from those letters. We see the young man involved in a quiet, solitary, pertinacious struggle with his own reflections, “which are not worth mentioning”. He feels isolated and longs for the stimulating company of his friends. At the same time he is realistic and descriptive of the political life of Bernese society. His modesty and admiration for the friend’s brilliant philosophical publications are tempered by critical reservations. On the other hand the excesses of the French Revolution do not dampen his enthusiasm for freedom. His fight against theological orthodoxy is, in spite of its fervor, in no hurry; he feels the power of time on his side. He is most sensitive to limitations; different spheres of life must not be confused, the inner life of the individual is sacred and the state has no right to interfere: each such particular sphere of life has its own inalienable value. It is the duty of philosophy which is also the duty of man, to cancel such self-alienations and restore or reform the integrity of human life in its differentiations. We shall meet all those points in his reflections. Hegel thinks what he lives and lives what he thinks.

What Hegel calls “not much” covers several hundred printed pages. For a while, he continued to write on the same themes as in Tübingen. Nohl publishes them together with the Tübingen fragments. I paraphrase some of the central ideas: The state has the authority to enforce its laws, but it cannot enforce moral attitudes or the ethical values of individuals, who must make an effort to cultivate themselves. The rational-scientific criticism of religious dogmas leave the essential religious mysteries un-

8. Ros., p. 74.

touched; they are living mysteries for the heart and for the imagination. On the other hand, the meaning of the Christian religion cannot consist in spreading the name of Christ. Doctrines which have no power to engender new life are dead; to bring every essential form of life (*Wesen*) to the consciousness of itself is to make it truly alive.

The Life of Jesus

A year in Bern has passed. Hegel in the summer of 1795 writes a whole book which Nohl publishes entitled *Life of Jesus*. It is not at all a 'life of Jesus'. Hegel sifts the New Testament, leaves out what seems indigestable and retains what seems to be satisfactory. Much more is left out than retained. Gone is the eschatological Christ of Mark and of the Book of Revelation, whose appearance announces the disappearance of this world now; gone is the dogma of the 'second coming', which was formulated to counter the disappointment, that the apocalyptic prophecy had not been fulfilled; gone is Christ the angelic being and prince of angels who has come to fight demons and drive out devils; gone are all miracles and legends around his birth and resurrection; gone is the magic sacramentalism of Paul and of the Gospel of John as the exclusive way of salvation and of participation; gone is Paul's construction of Christ as a combination of the Jewish Messiah and the incarnate and suffering God of the mystery religions of Syria; gone also is the other Paulinian dogma of the crucifixion as atonement and redemption of Adam's sin; and gone, finally, is John's second person of the Trinity. What is left is a handful of parables, a few quasi-historical episodes, a few 'sayings'; many of which are not scriptural at all, but are inserts from philosophical sources. Hegel

did not attempt to construct a historical and human individual Jesus, because he is through with him. Hegel does not take back what he had found about this worthless individual in Tübingen. He repeats that a belief in historico-empirical 'facts' rests on hearsay and most dubitable sources; that such an historical belief is a playground of scholarly wits and intellectual games of criticism; that the belief or unbelief in allegedly empirical facts is perfectly irrelevant for the religious meaning of the dogma of Christ, in distinction from an empirical person. Hegel practices what a few years later he would have called the phaenomenological method. The texts are selected because they are expressions of a human-divine, of a religious consciousness; the question is what sort of religious consciousness is focused and concentrated in that symbol of itself, 'Our Lord Jesus Christ'. Or to put it the other way around: Hegel's Christ is the name for that life which he understands at that time to be truly and really religious. Unfortunately, his terminology is not consistent, he still frequently says 'Jesus', when he means the Christ dogma.

Hegel's book is a desperate effort. It is desperate because even the minimum of texts does not quite yield the philosophy which he would like to see in it; it is desperate because Hegel wants to speak as Christian, *even when the texts say the opposite of what he wants them to say*. He therefore transcribes them until they fit. This is the usual theological method practiced not only by every church against every other church, but by the original authors of the source books. One example for many: When the Jesus of the text says, "your sin is forgiven because of your faith", Hegel adds "because of your faith that there is still goodness in you which may conquer your tempta-

tions".⁹ The texts know of no goodness in men apart from the saving faith-relation to their savior: "Without me you can do nothing. If a man abide not in me, he is cast forth as a branch, and is withered; and men gather them and cast them into the fire" (literally practiced by the Christian inquisition) "and they are burned".¹⁰

Hegel's 'Jesus', then, is a Hegelian, expressing his philosophical religion inadequately in the Kantian language of Reason (*Vernunft*) using such terms as freedom, moral law, virtue as reward in itself. The genuine Christian 'reward' in any after life is rejected.

The following excerpts may speak for themselves: "Reason (*Vernunft*), incapable of limitations, is the deity—world-itself is ordered according to the plan of Reason; Reason teaches man his destiny and his unconditional purpose of life; frequently it is obscured, but it has never been wholly extinguished, even in the darkness a weak shine of it has been preserved¹¹ . . . men find this their dignity in their own true self, not in a national descent (rejection of the 'chosen people') not in natural urges for sensuous gratifications, not in *being servants of a highly esteemed man, but in the cultivation of that divine spark by which they participate in the deity*—cultivation of Reason is the only source of truth and peace . . . all men can discover this source in themselves . . . reflecting in solitude . . . the true vocation of man does not lie in the study of natural sciences ('Jesus' speaking), which overlook the power of natural obstacles, nor in political power . . . virtue is not tied up with national or church institutions . . .

9. Nohl., p. 92.

10. John XV, 5-6.

11. John I—5 says on the contrary, "and the darkness comprehended it not."

or with commercialism . . . 'Jesus' needed no authority to have faith in reason . . . true greatness, dignity of man . . . through actions . . . repentance through self-knowledge . . . testify to the spirit of a rational world . . . flower of Reason is the moral law, not confined to holy places, not dependent on cultic ceremonies . . . germ of goodness implanted by nature, but it must be worked out by education (must become, through work, for itself what it is) . . . we have to work at our self-improvement . . . cleanse ourselves from evils in order to approach infinite beatitude and holiness . . . the will of God is announced in the moral law of human Reason . . . highest concern of humanity . . . man must produce out of himself the Concept of the deity and the knowledge of the divine will—whoever does not honor this ability dishonors the deity—what man calls his I is sublime beyond the grave and natural dissolution, capable to judge itself . . . you, who quote Moses (or 'Jesus') are grounding your faith on the authority of an alien individual . . . to read your holy scriptures you must apply your own spirit of truth and virtue, then you can find testimony of this spirit . . . and also the condemnation of your own pride, which does not permit you to lift your mind to that which is higher than unspiritual sciences and mechanical customs . . . fight against religious tradition founded on some authority, by reviving Reason . . . this fight honors the better part of mankind,—but most unfortunate he who perverts this new freedom and poisons the well of ethics *by again fettering Reason and freedom to a new tradition, again founded on dead letters and authorities . . . neither from heaven nor out of a grave can come that instruction, which is granted to man in following the law of his own Reason . . . I (Jesus) do not demand any faith in myself, but I want you to respect the conscience*

in your own bosom, your own inner judge . . . as persons we are separated, but our essence is one, if you will only listen to the genuine undiluted voice of truth in yourselves.”

Hegel’s amazing construction becomes understandable when one remembers that his theological training had imbued him with the protestant dogma, that the religion of Jesus was immediately corrupted, when it spread and congealed in the Caesaro-papistic state-church of the Roman empire.

‘Positivity’

Immediately after finishing his transformation of Jesus into a Kantian philosopher, Hegel turned to those negative sides of Christianity, which he had left out of account.¹² He calls this negative side the “*Positivity of the Christian Religion*”—the word “positive” is used in the original Latin sense of “ponere” something is ‘put’ to you by an alien authority. When he says ‘positive’ he means ‘negative’.

“A positive faith is a system of religious coercions which is supposed to be true because it is demanded by an authority which we dare not escape . . . so absurd that no man would have ever thought them to be true . . . forcing the intellect (*Verstand*) to serve as their handmaiden, even if such a service is obnoxious to it.”¹³

What is thus ‘positive’ in Christianity? Miracles, devils, terrifying myths, ‘historical’ beliefs in unverifiable ‘facts’, required cultic ceremonies born of anxieties and fears and in turn feeding them, dogmas and dogmatic-theological

12. Nohl., pp. 139-239.

13. Nohl., pp. 233-236.

constructions, theological majority vote of church councils on fictitious matters, beliefs in moral propositions as good because Jesus has told you so, abject worship of authority —the list is long.

His view of the original Christian literature as being written in bad taste is unchanged in the Berlin series of lectures on the history of Philosophy. He compares the life of Jesus there with the life of Pythagorus as it was embroidered by the late Hellenistic Neo-Pythagoreans. It is “a mixture of miraculous and fantastic fables and prosaic and ordinary reality . . . a hybrid of oriental and occidental styles . . . a turbid and pitiful fancy and craze (*Schwärmerei*) was the point of departure of mystery mongers and perverse minds.”¹⁴

How has this “positivity” come about? Hegel gives three answers to this question. The first lies in Judaism, the second in the disintegration of the Hellenistic-Roman world, the third in Jesus himself.

Hegel’s critique of ‘positive’ religion begins with the Jewish Bible, which had not occupied him in Tübingen, apart from having to take courses in it.

There are admiring appreciations of Judaism in the later Hegel. In the present text Judaism is seen from its beginning in Abraham and Moses as a ‘positive’ religion. Abraham’s existence is one of abstract isolation. He has no relation to nature except one of hostility and indifference. He breaks with his people; he impresses on the Jews his exclusiveness, an outcast, estranged from all organic relationship with natural and social life. He compensates for all this lack by subjecting himself to an absolute and arbitrary will of his God, ready to sacrifice even his beloved son to this will in a blind and unquestioning

14. W. XVIII, p. 236f.

obedience. Hegel's 'Abraham' and his 'God' are two 'objects' in external relation, an abyss of neutral estrangement between them.

Moses expands 'Abraham's' all-exclusive heart and imposes it on the whole people. Moral precepts, political statutes, cultic ceremonies are made the conditions of national survival. After the destruction of the Jewish state they replace the state, and adherence to them becomes all the more fanatical. God does not will them, because they flow out of a loving and reasonable human nature; they are supposed to be good because they are given, posited; they are purely 'positive'.

The deeper and more beautiful human nature in Platonism radiated light before 'Jesus' appeared. His self-appointed task and ideal to burst the strict legality of the Jewish law was impossible. He was bound to come into conflict with the fanaticism of the priests. This conflict embittered him and made him utter the harshest curses. He had to pit the authority of his own person against the Mosaic authority—and thus he was initiating the very 'positivity' in himself, which he had intended to dissolve.

His death disappointed his over-enthusiastic followers, who had expected the end of the old world and the beginning of a new one. They compensated for their disappointment by objectifying his image, demanding absolute belief and obedience to it. Miracles were ascribed to him to prove his supernatural power and glory. Acrimonious and vicious disputes started among the despotic chiefs of the warring and persecuting Christian sects. The Christians fell back to the same 'positive' intolerant, exclusive, religion, which was their Jewish background. This was sealed by Paul's Judaising construction of the Christian

dogma¹⁵ falsifying the Bible into an ‘Old Testament’; “the greatest calamity”.¹⁶ His dogma of the Resurrection contradicted the original eschatological expectations of a second coming and the end of the world.

The miserable conditions in the Hellenistic-Roman empire were ripe and ready for such a ‘positive’ religion. They explained its miraculous victory.¹⁷ It was not necessary to change your heart, it was sufficient to receive baptism; if you knew the right formula you were promised eternal bliss in another world, if you did not you were the devil’s. If you could drive out devils by the sign of the cross, you need not worry about the reform of a decrepit society.

Since the ‘positivity’ of a religion consists of arbitrary beliefs and decrees, it is imperative that you inflict and supervise strict adherence and obedience. Indoctrination, intolerance and persecution are inseparable from ‘positive’ religion. Parents vouch for what their children will have to believe—and see to it that they hear of nothing else. “It is frightful and sad to see in the history of those times, to what miserable levels of culture mankind was reduced by forfeiting the right of Reason to ask what is good and true.”¹⁸ “The river of ecclesiastic truth roars noisily through all streets.”¹⁹ “Thoughts, actions, enjoyments became more and more under rigorous control . . . in a magic world, where man as man became unrecognizable.”²⁰ “The system of the church can be no other than a system of contempt for man”.²¹ “Instead of Reason we find a heated,

15. Nohl., p. 208.

16. Nohl., p. 363.

17. Nohl., p. 220.

18. Nohl., p. 177.

19. Nohl., p. 204.

20. Nohl., p. 206.

21. Nohl., p. 211.

savage, and disorderly fancy, among whose monstrosities a beautiful spark of reason is here and there apparent".²² (Nietzsche's hunch, that Christianity was the triumph of slave-mentality and bad taste, is not only anticipated but fully elaborated by Hegel.)

Degradation and self-alienation of man is the necessary pre-requisite for the triumph of 'positive' religion. The beautiful and organic whole of the classical republics has been destroyed first by the Macedonian and later by the Roman imperialism. The free interchange of individual activities contributing to the beauty of a free republic is replaced by the soulless mechanism of an impersonal system, owned and governed by a few. The many have no share and no interest in this militarized machine. They lose their self-respect and become individualistic mobs seeking their private ends and trivial amusements. The loss of self-government and self-respect implies self-contempt and despair. But because Reason cannot be totally extinguished, its ideal is projected into a 'Beyond' and humanity is objectified and projected in the symbol of a supernatural savior. "Reason could not give up to find its own absolute, practical autonomy, but the will of man could not contain it any more; it showed itself in the deity, which the Christian religion offered, outside of the sphere of our power and will, but not outside of our sighing and praying—the realization of the moral ideal could no longer be willed, it could only be a pious wish."²³ "A people in such a mood must have welcomed a religion which transfigured the 'spirit' (Hegel here means the absence, the opposite of spirit) of such times into an honor and a duty—the spirit of moral incompetence, the dishonor

22. Nohl., p. 213.

23. Nohl., p. 224.

to be trampled upon; self-contempt and contempt of others were all of a sudden declared to be the highest virtue and glory.²⁴ And yet, even in its perversion, Reason is never extinguished. Any 'objective' or 'positive' revelation which is not founded in Reason, is like a sermon to the fish; on the other hand, a pure rational religion would be a sermon to the fish if brought to sectarians.²⁵ It is the task of our own days to vindicate to man, to restore to him the treasures which were squandered to a heaven; and to abandon the dogma of total depravity, projected into Adam and Satan.²⁶

A private sect, a small and intimate religious society which becomes a state-church as large as the Roman empire must necessarily produce hypocrisy. A sect is voluntary, one may enter it or leave it. Its members, if they are equal in a common bond of love, may have all things in common. But if they become universal and transform their religious feeling into enforced laws, the actual practice of those laws becomes impossible. Man is split into professed religious ideals and opposite practices. A private religion cannot be a *Volksreligion*. The heart cannot become a state, and the state cannot coerce the heart.

Towards a Dialectical Understanding

What is the philosophical meaning of this passionate historical phenomenology of the Christian-religious consciousness? Hegel took his manuscripts to Frankfurth, and after re-reading them answered this question himself in a new introduction and new appended notes. Without

24. Nohl., p. 229.

25. Nohl., pp. 146-150.

26. Nohl., p. 362.

anticipating his own deepened reflection we may gather some results which are already implicit in the Bernese texts.

'Jesus', we saw, is for Hegel the individual representative of an unconditional and universal ideal. This ideal is somewhat veiled by the Kantian language, which is foreign to Hegel's own real intentions. He intends to think the living unity of a personal subject which is certain of its own ultimate reality, and which wants to awaken in all others the same sense of: "I am" real in a loving relation to "you are". This loving relation of I and you is reality. The finite and the infinite life are not related like an abstract general concept is related to the particular instances subsumed under it; it is rather a concrete and living unity in which their difference and their identity are equally present and preserved. This unity of a living individual-subjective "I am" in a concrete and differentiated universal reality is imaginatively apprehended and logically clarified—this ideal is no other than the ideal of what to Hegel was the essence of Greek tragedy and the Greek *polis*, condensed in the metaphysical depth of an ultimate subjectivity. The "I am" in me is the same "I am" in you—Being appears as infinite totality in this I-Thou relation.

But this truth of the "I am" is at the same time inseparable from the "it" the Non-I of the world-course. Abstraction, isolation, external objectivity are unavoidable. But they are judged by the ideal of Reason. The ideal and its necessity are revealed through that which denies it. Human finitude is both affirmed and negated in the ideal: Affirmed because Jesus is an individual, suffering the fate of all finitude to become 'positive,' negated because man in isolation and abstraction from a living whole cannot reach truth and beatitude.

Reality is a dynamic, process in which I and Not-I, subjectivity and objectivity, heart and head, sensuousness and reason, virtue and happiness are both interwoven and distinct. "Positivity" is fixation and isolation of externality, of an objective "it", disrupting the living interplay of all faculties. But even the greatest disruption still carries the ideal of Reason within itself, just as the ideal of Reason, on the other hand, having to appear in finite individuals, necessarily is infected by "positivity", the beautiful "A" passes into the ugly "Non-A".

What is "positive", posited, *vor-gestellt*, is at the same time also negative, "thrown into the silent river of time". Life condenses and reveals its metaphysical reality in the individual subjectivity, in this "I am"; on the other hand, this individual subjectivity is also that which must appear to others as their own "I am"--but inevitably in external and private exclusiveness. One must love, to feel isolation and solitude as unhappiness. But without the unhappiness of separation, alienation, externality the value of unification, recognition of "I-you" would not be known as value. Positivity is negative and negativity is positive. In summary: *Hegel discovered a dialectical reality in Christianity. Christianity thus, in turn, was bound to appear as one special symbolic expression of the universal truth that the whole of reality is a dialectical structure and process.* The struggle to assimilate Christianity to philosophy, to cancel as well as to preserve its "alienation" is, at least on principle, won. That some such conclusion was implicit in Hegel's thorough and repeated reflections on the same problems, is beautifully explicit in the famous poem "Eleusis,"²⁷ which he sent to friend Hölderlin shortly before he left Bern in the fall of 1796.

27. Dok., p. 380.

anticipating his own deepened reflection we may gather some results which are already implicit in the Bernese texts.

'Jesus', we saw, is for Hegel the individual representative of an unconditional and universal ideal. This ideal is somewhat veiled by the Kantian language, which is foreign to Hegel's own real intentions. He intends to think the living unity of a personal subject which is certain of its own ultimate reality, and which wants to awaken in all others the same sense of: "I am" real in a loving relation to "you are". This loving relation of I and you is reality. The finite and the infinite life are not related like an abstract general concept is related to the particular instances subsumed under it; it is rather a concrete and living unity in which their difference and their identity are equally present and preserved. This unity of a living individual-subjective "I am" in a concrete and differentiated universal reality is imaginatively apprehended and logically clarified—this ideal is no other than the ideal of what to Hegel was the essence of Greek tragedy and the Greek *polis*, condensed in the metaphysical depth of an ultimate subjectivity. The "I am" in me is the same "I am" in you—Being appears as infinite totality in this I-Thou relation.

But this truth of the "I am" is at the same time inseparable from the "it" the Non-I of the world-course. Abstraction, isolation, external objectivity are unavoidable. But they are judged by the ideal of Reason. The ideal and its necessity are revealed through that which denies it. Human finitude is both affirmed and negated in the ideal: Affirmed because Jesus is an individual, suffering the fate of all finitude to become 'positive,' negated because man in isolation and abstraction from a living whole cannot reach truth and beatitude.

Reality is a dynamic, process in which I and Not-I, subjectivity and objectivity, heart and head, sensuousness and reason, virtue and happiness are both interwoven and distinct. "Positivity" is fixation and isolation of externality, of an objective "it", disrupting the living interplay of all faculties. But even the greatest disruption still carries the ideal of Reason within itself, just as the ideal of Reason, on the other hand, having to appear in finite individuals, necessarily is infected by "positivity", the beautiful "A" passes into the ugly "Non-A".

What is "positive", posited, *vor-gestellt*, is at the same time also negative, "thrown into the silent river of time". Life condenses and reveals its metaphysical reality in the individual subjectivity, in this "I am"; on the other hand, this individual subjectivity is also that which must appear to others as their own "I am"—but inevitably in external and private exclusiveness. One must love, to feel isolation and solitude as unhappiness. But without the unhappiness of separation, alienation, externality the value of unification, recognition of "I-you" would not be known as value. Positivity is negative and negativity is positive. In summary: *Hegel discovered a dialectical reality in Christianity. Christianity thus, in turn, was bound to appear as one special symbolic expression of the universal truth that the whole of reality is a dialectical structure and process.* The struggle to assimilate Christianity to philosophy, to cancel as well as to preserve its "alienation" is, at least on principle, won. That some such conclusion was implicit in Hegel's thorough and repeated reflections on the same problems, is beautifully explicit in the famous poem "Eleusis,"²⁷ which he sent to friend Hölderlin shortly before he left Bern in the fall of 1796.

27. Dok., p. 380.

V

Eleusis

To Hölderlin, August 1796

About and within me is tranquility—busy mankind's
uneasy worry sleeps, they give me freedom and
leisure—thank you my emancipating night!
The moon with pale white mist outlines the shape of distant
hills; kindly gleams the light-stream from over the lake
—the day's monotonous noises distances remembrance, as
if long years lay between it and now; your image, beloved
friend,
and the delight of vanished days move before me; but soon
she (remembrance) yields to sweet hope—
Already I yearn with pain, for the fiery embracing scene,
then for the questions, upon the mysteries of the observed
mutual presence, which by the attitudes, expressions, and
dispositions of a friend are changed since that time—
the known pleasure of old comradship, which no oath seals,
only to live eternal truth—peace never, never penetrated by
the law which regulates opinions and impulse.
Now with the inert barrier wrangles desire which carries
me easily to you over mountain and rivers. —But this
discord soon forces a sigh, and with it flees the sweet
fanciful dream.

My eyes rise to the eternal heavenly dome, to you,
O glimmering spangled night, and all desires, all hopes
to forget drift down from your eternity;
sense (Sinn) looses itself in intuition (Anschaun);
what mine I called vanished; I gave myself to the infinite,
I am in it, am all, am only it.
The reappearing thought alienates.

he is frightened before the infinite, and amazed by
the deep view, which he does not comprehend.
The mind (Sinn) approaches the image of eternity, blending
it with shape (gestalt)—I welcome you sublime spirits, high.
He fears not—I feel: it is my home-aether, the seriousness.
the splendor, which surrounds you.

Ha! If now the doors of your own sanctuary opened
O Ceres, you enthroned in Eleusis!

I yet feel the intoxicating spirit, the thrill of
your nearness, understand your revelation,
I perceive the image of high meaning, I hear the
hymns played by the Gods, the great verdicts of your
councils.

But your temples are silenced, O Goddess!
Fled are the Gods! circle back to Olympus from
the blessed altars,
flown from the profaned grave of humanity is the innocent
genius which conjured you here!

The wisdom of your priests is silent, delivering not a
tone of the holy initiations to us—and researcher's
curiosity seeks in vain—more than love of wisdom
(the seekers seem to possess it and despise you)—
In order to master it they dug after words in which
your higher meaning seems coined. In vain!
They caught only some dust and ashes, to which
your life, your eternity never returns for them.
Yet under fashion and death the eternal dead ones
please themselves! the frugal!—in vain—there
remains no sign of your festive life, no trace of your image.
To the son of consecration was the high wisdom filled
with unspeakable feelings, much too holy, than that
dry signs should satisfy him of your worth.
Thought did not bind the soul, which sunk in the
infinite presentment of its infinity forgot itself, and
now awoke again in time and space to consciousness.

Who would speak to another of all this, though he spoke
with angel tongues, would feel the poverty of words;
He is horrified that the gods are so little remembered,
though words have become so small that to speak of them be
sinful, so that he must live with closed mouth.

What the consecrated himself forbade, a wise law to the lowly
spirits forbade, that there be no desecration of what he
saw, heard, felt in the holy night—
that their disorderly noises should not disturb the better
contemplation—that their hollow word trade should not
tempt him to hate the Holy itself, this must not be dragged
through the dirt, entrusting it merely to memory—it shall
not be sold for playthings by a sophist, shall not become
the eloquent hypocrite's coat, or a rod for happy boys, and
so become empty at last, that its life finds roots only in
the echo of strange tongues. Your sons, O Goddess do not
peddle your praises in lane and market, but await you in
the inner sanctuary of their breast.

Therefore, you do not live by their lips. Their lives honored
you. In their works you yet live. Also in this night,
holy Goddess, I understand you. You reveal often to me
your children's lives. I feel the soul of their deeds!
You are the high meaning, the true faith,
A deity, which, though all sinks, is shaken by nothing.

The first twenty lines express the contrast between the
contemplative peace and freedom of the soul at night and
the tiring cares and busy practicalities of the common
day.

The beloved image of the friend and the certainty of a
reunion is opposed to any external convention, which may
rule opinions; distance in space and changes in time may
merely serve to deepen our mutual love and our deter-
mination to serve the truth that sets us free.

In lines 21-46 the majestic and moonlit landscape and

the heavenly vault are felt as a symbol of the eternal and infinite reality, in which all subjective hopes and desires are as nothing. Remembrance of the ALL is oblivion of the finite and relative. Reason (in the ordinary sense of formal logic) is inadequate to exhaust the depth of this intuition. To approach the eternal Being, thought needs concrete imagination, sublime shapes and shades of life, each expressing the perfection of the whole in its limitations. The unity of tragic seriousness and aesthetic splendor is our home. Mere thought estranges, imagination reflected in thought, truly unites me with reality.

In lines 47-57 these concrete shapes of life are identified with the Gods of Eleusis, the Greek mystery-religion. Enthusiastic devotion to the gods is necessary in order to interpret the meaning of their incarnations: without divine hymns no understanding of divine counsel ("vernähme," the verb to "Vernunft").

In the end 'positivity' overtakes the gods. Externality reigns, a reign of death, materialism and self-contempt. Empirical scientific curiosity in vain tries to approach living reality and eternal truth by studying the desouled "dust and ashes". Empty words, dry signs, rationalistic methods pretend to replace philosophy.

The tragi-comedy of object-thinking and object-language is an abortive attempt to understand the soul, whose eternal reality transcends space and time; whereas the intellectual object-consciousness lives only within the cleavage of object and subject, past and future. Its "hollow verbiage" (hohler Wörterkram) is unfortunately tempting us to take those playthings of sophists too seriously. We are infected by their negativity in having to fight them. The divine life revealed in deeds must not be allowed to be forgotten in mere traditions and memory-exercises; we

must faithfully preserve this inner life in ourselves.

This poem is not a "hymn of a mystical pantheism", as Dilthey²⁸ called it. It is a careful poetic condensation of Hegel's dialectic. The Absolute cannot be approached directly, but only through the mediation of concrete shapes of life: it is both infinite life and eternal death (ewigtot): both self-affirmative Being and self-annihilating destruction; both itself as subject and not itself as appearing externally to others; both freedom to be and to show itself and alienation, constantly posing the task of re-integration; both action and practice, and reflection and contemplation; its subjectivity is both highest value and abstract isolation from others. Concrete "Reason," the All, is at once universal, particularized in shapes of life, and individualized or existential in the individual. The closing lines of the poem contain a solemn pledge to be faithful to this tragic optimism.

Diary

In August 1796, Hegel returned to Stuttgart. He took a detour and wandered via the Bernese Alps, the Gott-hart and the lake of Lucerne. A diary records his impressions.²⁹ They are accurate and realistic. He pays as much attention to the people as to nature. On account of a festering heel he had to walk with his foot on the outside of his shoe. But he did not take the advice of his companions to quit. He stuck it out.

He is mostly impressed by the impersonal brutality of the powers of nature. He admires the good-natured and

28. W. Dilthey: *Die Jugendgeschichte Hegels. Gesammelte Schriften*, IV, p. 37f, Berlin, 1921.

29. Dok., pp. 221-224.

patient bravery of the hardy mountaineers, and their hard struggle to wrest a scanty livelihood from a nature which does not yield anything without human effort; this nature is at best indifferently tolerating it, but is mostly hostile and forbidding. The "endless heaps of dull stones, eternally dead masses" and the "monotonous roar of water-power" speak to him of the mechanical "must" of nature. The learned theologians with their physico-theology of a kind, benevolent nature made for the use of man would have a hard time to hear their own words in the midst of thundering avalanches.

The aesthetics of the Alps is an entirely different story. The majestic "spectacle"³⁰ and lovely moods of nature are *for us* and change with our perspective. "The graceful, irregular, free play of the floating waterdrops is lovely. One does not behold power or great force because the thought of the coercion, of the "must" of nature is kept out; a living, eternal process and activity, dissolved into a gentle spray and individual diversity and not collected into a mass, produces the image of a free play³¹ . . . the eternal life, its everchanging activity in definite contours and equal formations³² are aspects of this moved image of eternity.

"The philosopher must have as much aesthetic sense as the poet."³³

Appraisal

"Man has no unity", is one saying in the so-called 'Life of Jesus'. It might well be the motto for this period in

30. Nohl., p. 231.

31. Nohl., p. 234.

32. Nohl., p. 232.

33. Hegel's quotation from Schelling, Dok., p. 220.

Hegel's life. The injustice of the old aristocratic regime in Bern is just as evil as the terror of the French Revolution. He is torn between ever-growing conflicts between spiritual life and dead externality: there is a very hard struggle to find meaning in a world, which presents itself mostly in meaningless 'positivities'. His studies in 'sacred' history are what now would be called studies in psychopathology! According to his sister,³⁴ he had returned to his home in Stuttgart embittered, morose and alarmingly quiet.

34. Ros., p. 80.

Tutor in Frankfurt

1797 - 1800

Hegel and Hölderlin

After a vacation in his father's house in Stuttgart, Hegel took up his new position, again as a tutor, in the family of a banker Gogel in Frankfurt. There, Hegel and Hölderlin celebrated their reunion. They resumed their common reading of Greek authors, hiked and swam; but an intense and loving struggle went on between them; Hegel fighting a losing battle to preserve his friend's sanity.

Hölderlin had fallen in love with his employer's wife and therefore lost his position as tutor. The romantic passion of this love, felt to be unconditional, involved Hölderlin in an intense tragedy, which ended in complete despair and was the beginning of his loss of reason.

Hegel tried to help his friend, but found that he was helpless. Hölderlin on the one hand clung to his friend's guidance and council, but on the other hand bitterly resented Hegel's 'cold reason', and is envious of 'the quiet man of reason'. Thus, there are many poetic reflections of Hegel's personality, positive as well as negative evaluations of his personality in Hölderlin's notes, in his play *Empedokles* and in his novel *Hyperion*. And there are many profound reflections on the "beautiful soul", the aesthetic man and his tragedy in Hegel; it is the tragedy

of the "powerless beauty" and of romantic aestheticism.

Hegel writes on the "beautiful soul," which tries to keep its unity and harmony immaculate and free from compromises with this world; this, he says, necessarily involves a "fate" (*Schicksal*) of self-destruction. If you refuse to co-operate with the world, because you want to preserve your purity and to avoid guilt, then this pure and guiltless withdrawal becomes guilty of abstract isolation; the "guilt of guiltlessness" destroys you, because a pure and guiltless life is not possible on this earth. A human life cannot be lived in isolation.

Hölderlin's romantic tragedy *Empedokles* could be a perfect poetic version of Hegel's understanding of it. *Empedokles* lives in harmony with a divine and infinite life. But as soon as he professes this, as soon as he makes his blissful innocence known to others, and as soon as others believe in him and cling to him as a divine seer or prophet, he has lost what he lived; he inevitably comes in conflict with the fixed, established, priestly religion. This is the theme of Hegel's reflection in comparing pure religion with its 'positivity'. But whereas Hegel in Frankfurt went on to find the solution to this problem, in understanding the necessity of the 'positive' and in reconciling it in 'love', Hölderlin on the contrary has his *Empedokles* shrink back from his own experience. He regrets that he has stepped out and down into the world and pays for his mistake with his suicide—hurling himself into the abyss of the Aetna.

This 'Aetna' is the image for the romantic Absolute, in which all differences, contrasts, discrepancies, dissonances of the world evaporate. Hegel later on in Jena, saw the same fallacy of abstract isolation in Schelling's romantic Absolute, in which "all cows are black."

There is a poem by Hölderlin in which the Dionysos, the god of wine and enthusiasm, who coming from India, awakens peoples from the sleep of dead routine. Hegel comments: Art creates a world for spiritual intuition; she is the Indian Dionysos (*Bacchus*), who is not a clear and self-knowing god, but an enthusiastic (*begeistert*) spirit, enveloping himself in images and feeling, under which is hidden something dreadful, awesome, threatening (*das Furchtbare*). Beauty is form, the illusion of being alive throughout, seemingly self-sufficient, seemingly complete and perfect in itself—but this is only a veil; and this truth is not evident to the ‘beautiful’ soul’s thought.

Hölderlin, the aesthetic man, the poet, may formulate the tragedy of life, which ruins him; but this poetic purification is not sufficient to overcome or to cope with the negativity of existence.

Hegel’s *tragic optimism* affirms all dualisms and struggles of life as necessary for the unbroken life of the whole and for a whole-some and active personality. This stand-point is very close to what is best in Nietzsche!

Poems

Hölderlin had stimulated Hegel to write poems, as Hegel had stimulated Hölderlin to write philosophical reflections.

Of the six extant poems¹ four continue in the free verse form of *Eleusis*; one is in rhymed stanzas, another one in hexameters. They are impressive in their strong unity of feeling, perception and reflection, although they lack the musical charm and rhythmic splendor of Hölderlin’s imitable verses. There is a curious contrast in Hegel, on

1. Dok., pp. 380-388.

the one hand a very sensitive appreciation of poetry, on the other hand his own attempts to write poetry are failures; he never gets away from prose. "*To His Poodle*" lets us see master and dog on a walk; it is nice to know that Hegel—like Agrippa von Nettesheim and Faust, like Beethoven and Schopenhauer—had a poodle. The unexpected playfulness of the animal in external perception of a total situation is described. He is in between his animal instincts and loyalty to man. Disobedience is overpowered by command. Have you ever *seen* what 'must' means? Here you see it. "His return are we." This closing expression is the core of the poem: "We" are together one life, "we" share and are this struggle between irrational nature, compelling instinct and obedience to command. Playful freedom, natural necessity, estrangement from self and return to self, this all "are we." Animal nature is part of human nature, and human nature is part of a 'dog's life'.

To Nature sees nature lifeless, aged, wrinkled—an external crust; this image of externality corresponds to death and mourning: "Your friends are mourning, o nature." They mourn because they are shown a dead mask, which frustrates this love for nature. They know that the real nature is life itself, a thousand-shaped Proteus, whose life is mutual interchanges of activity (*Wechselkraft*), enjoying itself in creativity. Life in its external estrangement cannot be loved by us, only by a god. The earth is loved by the undiminishing splendor of the sun, "the eye of the world." He smiles friendly to his bride.

Here "dead positivity" is embraced and re-enlivened. Mere physical perception is confined to the physical external aspects of life. But its 'deadness' is only a necessary illusion of what in reality is life and actuality; it appears through its 'dead', external appearance to the all-seeing divine vision.

Spring on the contrary, begins with the surprising words "spring threatens" (Der Frühling droht). Here "natural vitality" tempts man to lose himself in the "loud and wild" turbulence of the senses in tune with the budding life of nature tempting them. Man has a higher life in mind and spirit; heightened image of art, present only to his inward imagination surpasses the transitory, fugitive welling-up of natural impulses. *Geist* must indeed find unity and harmony with the natural life, but not in violation of his own higher and truer self. Freed from natural life for his own human value, man finds this harmony and this happiness in a love, which reconciles man and nature. She then is goddess, queen, mother and priestess.

Spirit and nature, we comment, are both opposites and in unity, each holding its own, each necessary for the other, each meaningless without the other, both united in comprehensive love.

The solemn and enthusiastic form and tone of this poem is reminiscent of Schiller. The content also, imagination and art as mediators of the life of nature with the life of spirit in man, is the central theme of Schiller's Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man,² which we found Hegel reading in Bern.

Moonlight-Bath condenses one theme of *Eleusis*. I plunge into the stream and struggle to maintain myself against the encompassing fluidity. Strengthened by my efforts against the elements I regain the riverbank, dripping wet. Luna, blushing, unveils herself to us mortals, permeating nature in caressing light "for the immortals, without impoverishing or lowering themselves give themselves to the earth and live with her . . ."

2. An English translation was recently published by the Yale University Press.

Here the struggling life of mortals, encompassed by nature but maintaining themselves against her, is eternally posited and affirmed in the eternal presence of the whole. This eternal is the inescapability of temporality; we cannot will not to be temporal and striving. The divine whole is present in *every* movement; and is transparently present in *poignant* moments of experience.

Hegel has written his own comment on this poem in the *Spirit of Christianity*³ in speaking on the meaning of baptism: "No feeling is so homogeneous with the desire for the infinite, the longing to merge into the infinite, as the desire to plunge one's self into the sea. To plunge into it is to be confronted by an alien element which at once flows round us on every side and which is felt at every point of the body. We are taken away from the world and the world from us. We are nothing but felt water which touches us where we are, and we are only where we feel it. In the sea there is no gap, no restriction, no multiplicity, nothing specific. The feeling of it is the simplest, the least broken up. After immersion a man comes up into the air again, separates himself from the water, is at once free from it and yet it still drips from him everywhere. As soon as the water leaves him, the world around him takes on specific characteristics again, and he comes back strengthened to the consciousness of multiplicity. *Moonlight-Bath* is the poem of individual life in a whole, of unity and multiplicity."

In *Festive Poem* (*Festgedicht*) the beautiful soul is firm and secure only when it is anchored in a religious sanctification of life (*Weihe*). The depth dimension of the eternal permits and leads to the celebration of existence. The dignity of human existence is shown in the dialectical

3. Kr., p. 275.

unity of time and eternity, of individual existence and concrete universals. I translate two passages:

They vanish, the hours, out of whose change
The life of mortals is linked together;
As the course of the sun, the light ascending
in night descending;
thus life is elated in joy
and depressed in sorrow until
it reaches the silent well of its striving.
One hour replaces the next,
in daily rounds life forgets itself
and has flown before one thinks that it was.
Few hours are elevated above the common
in which man feels a greater Being than he is.
In them he feels that God is nearer
in them the soul has felt the breath
the fullness of its eternal source;
in such God's spirit has floated down.
They remain companions for the whole life
with their highness they enliven every moment
with their beauty every deed.

In these lines, temporality and eternity meet in the filled moment, "Kairos", separate yet united, together constituting the concrete and essential, temporal and eternal human nature. In the following lines the same dialectic is seen in the relation of individual existence and its concrete-social whole:

All believe in their rulers' right
If the rulers will recognize themselves
as children of our universal father
and prove this in the goodness and nobility
of the spirit . . .

A sense for the living in the heart
has every man,
Not a single man's life is indifferent . . .

The last poem *Resolution* expresses dialectic as growth. Life is self-directed. The perfect human existence is one which is always ready to overcome past achievements in itself as well as in its social environment. Life is war against stagnation. These four lines are Hegel's best poem formally considered:

Entschluss

Kühn mag der Götter Sohn der Vollendung Kampf sich
vertrauen.
Brich denn den Frieden mit dir, brich mit dem Werke der
Welt!
Strebe, versuche du mehr als das Heut und das Gestern! so
wirst du
Besser nicht als dir Zeit, aber aufs Beste sie sein.

Resolution

Boldly the son of the gods entrusts his worth to the battle.
Break then the peace with yourself, break with the work of
the world.
Strive! Attempt much more than today and yesterday brought
us.
Better not than your time—but be time at its best.

The poems show how existential Hegel's philosophizing is. The categories which he had developed in his philosophical reflections on the meaning of religious-historical documents, are also the categories with which he comes

to self-knowledge and self-mastery in his concrete situation. They are dialectical polarities, each balanced and united with its own opposite: Universal life-isolated externality or death, unity of life-fission of life, guilt-purification, freedom-necessity, self-preservation-destiny, joy-sorrow, time-eternity, self-alienation-self-reintegration . . .

They are all both universally human and intimately personal relations and problems.

A Black-eyed Dove

Nanette Endel, a milliner, died an old maid. And all of a sudden some lovely and clumsy love letters by the young Hegel to her in Frankfurt came to light. They had been her secret treasures all her life.

In these letters we again see a man in discord with himself and with his world, but longing to achieve harmony. There is a discrepancy between his outer position and his inner and growing power. On the one hand he fears to succumb to the temptation of self-satisfied and material mediocrity and 'happiness', on the other hand he is in danger of rebelling against his 'fate' or of losing himself in a Rousseau-Hölderlin mood of resentment of culture and withdrawal to the bosom of nature. Some passages sound like quotations from his early writings: "The satisfaction enjoyed by the ego which opposes itself to everything and has thus brought everything under its feet, is a phenomenon of the time . . . and this solitary self-satisfaction would be man's worthiest and noblest achievement, if the union with the time were ignoble and ignominious."⁴ But we know already from his poem *Resolution* that his own dialectical solution calls neither for an abstract time-

4. Nohl, p. 351.

less eternity nor for a self-abandonment to a meaningless time.

A few quotations from the letters may further illustrate the same situation: "An envious fate (he means his job at the banker's house), limits me, but I overcome it through imagination." Speaking on the easy-going comfortable life of his businessman-employer he concludes: "After mature consideration I have decided not to want to improve these people: Saint Anthony of Padua was more effective in preaching to the fish, than I would be; but I have decided to howl with the wolves . . . here in Frankfurt I again become more like the world. I go every week at least once to the theater—saw recently the *Magic Flute* . . . tomorrow *Don Giovanni* will be given; I am anxious to hear this music . . . (speaking on the pure mood engendered by "free beautiful nature") . . . I must confess, it took me some time, before I could purge myself from the boredom, which society, city life and its diversions fill us with . . . *in the arms of nature I used to find reconciliation with myself and with people, now I often seek refuge with that faithful mother, in order to disunite myself with those people, with whom I live in peace*, in order to preserve myself under her shield from being influenced by them and to prevent my union with them." Nanette is a Roman Catholic, and Hegel jests with her like Faust does with Margaret. "Since you are no longer here to admonish me to piety I have lost it completely; churches are bypassed." He apologizes for his long words and his intellectualism, as if a higher power had awakened me calling: wake up, you sleeper, only in friendship is life and light!" He thanks Nanette for a wreath of flowers which she had sent him. "The flowers are dry, life has abandoned them: but what life is there in the world, if

the spirit of man does not enliven it: and everything is mute, to which he does not lend his language. This little wreath will always whisper to me: somewhere there exists a black-eyed dove, who is your friend." He sends her a story book for her entertainment. This story can be read again and again; that decides the beauty of a work of art, that one likes to come back to it and to feel pleasure in repeated experience. In this story, naturalness is contrasted with affectations. An impure mood of the soul insults us through its contrast to the quietude of nature; less noticeable in the city where one is surrounded by unnaturalness, where one cannot concentrate and hence cannot ask quietude from others. Hegel describes the prejudice of the bourgeois against actors and actresses: "Pretended love of justice among people who are so strict in their judgment on the virtue and perfection of others, I am inclined to see as a feeling of weakness in themselves, which prevents them from seeing the pure and the beautiful in others. The best treasure which man can acquire is to know good, pure souls among our fellowmen, to preserve their image in the heart and to be faithful to them."

This contrast of love with moralism as symptom of an inner weakness also is reminiscent of his *Early Writings*: This subordination of living souls under a concept present in the (moral) law may be called a weakness, on the ground that the judges are not strong enough themselves. Moral censorship does not unite but divides. The judge is not strong enough to understand the others as whole personalities, but judges them under an abstract law which he himself can not fulfill either. His irritation with himself is projected into others. This splitting of life is healed in a loving relation, in which faults are not minimized, but are taken together with that which is good. The uncon-

ditional acceptance of the whole of a struggling life is this good.

Politics and History

We turn our attention now from Hegel's enamored "subjective mind", to what he later would have called "objective mind", by which he means reflection on, and participation in, social, political and historical conditions and issues of one's time.

His first anonymous publication in Frankfurth was his translation of the *Confidential Letters on the Previous Legal Relation of the Wadtlandes (Pays de Vaud) to the City of Bern. A Complete Disclosure of the Former Oligarchy of the State of Bern. From the French of a Deceased Swiss Translated and Annotated.* Frankfurth am Main. 1798.

Invited by the disgruntled French-speaking subjects of Bern, the French revolutionary armies had come to 'liberate' them. Bern gained one victory against the army coming from the West, but lost against a second army from the East. The victors went on occupying the rest of Switzerland, which had remained neutral in the vain hope that the French would be satisfied with the conquest of Bern. They abolished the old federation of Swiss states and united them in a centralized 'Helvetian Republic' on the French model.

Hegel's annotations are in complete sympathy with the revolutionary grievances of Cart, the author of the *Letters*, who in the meantime had been guillotined in Paris, presumably because he had not foreseen that the 'liberators' would turn into conquerors and terrorists.

Hegel's publication is meant as a warning to his own

compatriots, since the half-feudal conditions in the German states were no less arbitrary and intolerable than were the conditions under the Bernese oligarchy. His comments on the *Internal Affairs of Württemberg*, which remained unpublished at the time, contain general criticisms analogous to those of Cart against the Bernese aristocracy. Hegel in his introduction to his translation of Cart's book says: "For a great many people an utterance of sentiment is necessary because thereby they are awakened to the importance of the issue, which they would not have felt had they been presented merely with a dry enumeration of facts and circumstances; either because they have never been in such conditions, or because they live in a fool's paradise: they are of the opinion that one could not lose patience over certain things."

Against the argument that Bern was a well administered and prosperous state with the lowest taxes in Europe, Hegel comments that material prosperity is no standard for the political value of a state. England, he says, under that criterion would be one of the worst states, because the English enjoy the privilege of freedom to tax themselves.

To Cart's complaints he then adds from his own intimate experience with conditions under the now defunct Bernese regime some points of his own.

In a state where legislative, executive and judicial powers are all concentrated in one small hereditary clique of aristocratic families, a suspicion of disloyalty is equivalent to guilt and punishment. The positions of power and government are in no relation to merit or knowledge. And the intrigues and anxieties to be among the select few are grotesque: "Among the 92 members who were elected to the Grand Council in 1795, only one was said to have

had any merits as contributing to his choice. To realize the busy-bodiness and the intrigues that precede this ballot, the complexity of combinations, in order to link the many (private) interests; the passions involved, or the feelings resulting from the successful or unsuccessful outcome—of the violence of hopes, fears, anxieties, of the strength of joy and desperation—to get a picture of all this together, one must have seen it close with one's own eyes. There are examples of men who . . . after reaching their goal were outside themselves for days—but those who have been excluded in spite of all their worries and cares became melancholic forever. . . ; to the noble Bernese this is the only way of life, and if he is not lucky on it there is nothing else that can satisfy his heart.”

For the younger sons of the ruling caste the career as ministers of the state-church is available. There is a theological seminary in Bern. But it is not necessary to actually absolve the prescribed three years of study. It is only necessary to be registered and wait for three years, at the end of which the family connection will provide the well-paying position.

The subjects tremble in abject fear of their ‘gracious lords’, because if they are accused they have only the semblance of legal council and defense, provided by the government lawyer. Hegel tells the story of a girl who was condemned to death because she was accused of abortion. On the way to the gallows she confided to the accompanying minister that she was only sorry on account of the child with which she was pregnant. Asked why she had not told that to the court? she replied that she did not dare to contradict her gracious lords.

“It is my conviction that to my knowledge there is no other country where in proportion to its size there was so

much hanging, breaking on the wheel, beheading and burning than in this Canton. I know that I have no proof for this, since the executions are not made public. A published list of executions for the last ten years alone could refute my contention."

From this outlet of his pent-up memories of a corrupt aristocracy Hegel turned prophetically to the equally corrupt despotism in his native country Würtemberg in *The Internal Affairs of Würtemberg*.⁵

"It is time that the people of Würtemberg stopped wavering between fear and hope, expectation and disappointment. . . . The quiet contentment with what is, the despondency, the patient acceptance of an all-powerful fate has been transformed into expectancy, and into courage for something different. The image of better, more just times has vividly entered the souls of men, and the nostalgia, a longing for a purer, a freer state has begun to agitate all minds and has divided them from the given reality. . . . The feeling is in general and deep that the governmental structure as it still exists is untenable. The anxiety is very general that it will collapse and will hurt everybody in its fall. Should fear, as a result of this belief, be allowed to become so strong that it is left to good luck, what is overturned, what maintained? Should one not want to abandon what cannot be maintained? To investigate unexcitedly what is untenable? Justice is the only standard for such an evaluation. The courage to apply justice is the only power which can honorably remove what is shaky, and produce a secure state.

How blind are those who believe that institutions, con-

5. *Über die neusten innern Verhältnisse Würtembergs, besonders über die Gebrechen der Magistratsverfassung*. 1798 ed. Lasson, Meiner Verlag, pp. 150-154. Part of this in English, Carl J. Friedrich, Modern Library, pp. 523-526.

stitutions, laws which do no longer correspond to the mores, the needs, the opinion of the people, from which the spirit has fled, could continue to exist, that forms which neither mind nor feeling is any longer interested in are strong enough to provide the bond for the people!

If the necessary reform is delayed, smoothed over by "big-mouthed botching" then "the clever manipulators" prepare a more terrible explosion. In such an outburst, revenge becomes associated with desire for reform, in which the long-deceived and suppressed multitude (*Menge*) metes out punishment to such fraudulence . . . anxiety which is compelled, ought to be distinguished from the courage which decides." Those in power "are weak and want to keep everything they possess, like a wastrel who ought to cut down his expenses, but who finds every article essential which might be eliminated . . . until finally the essential is taken with the unessential . . . he who suffers injustice should demand its removal, and he who possesses unjustly must sacrifice it voluntarily."

This strength to rise above one's little interest and be just is required no less than the sincerity to want it really and not merely to pretend. "And not only to want justice as long as it coincides with our own interests."

Far from this hypocrisy, each estate, each individual ought to start with himself, before making demands on others or seeking the source of trouble elsewhere, weigh its situation, its privileges, and if it should find itself in possession of unequal privileges, it ought to strive to achieve a balance with the rest."

He goes on to show how the 'principle' of a despotic monarchy is continued in the irresponsibility of the officials, who are "anxious for the private salvation of their souls but indifferent to their political duties in behalf of the welfare of the people."

In editing the *Letters* of Cart he sided with the author who defended the "good old laws" of the Pays de Vaud against their destruction by the despotic rule of Bern; here on the contrary he fights against the mass and tangle of old laws and institutions. The philosophical thought and attitude in both cases is the same. What he wants is a free community, in which the welfare of the whole is at the same time the free participation of all. He is against what is fixed, not moving with the time, what has gained a separate or privileged position; he is for measure, for balance, for justice, for a Golden Mean and he is against one-sided and exaggerated interests. He is against an abstract moralism which wants justice regardless of emotions and factual preconditions, but he is also against a mere vitalistic appeal to mere feelings, sentiments such as anxiety and revenge. He moves with the time, but actively, not passively. He is against a fatalistic waiting what 'fate' may bring, but he is also against a utopian individualism which disregards the power and necessity of social cohesion and historical traditions. In short, we find in his political-social philosophy the same dialectical balance of opposites which we found in his subjective-personal philosophy of existence.

His reflection moves on to a still larger scale in his book on the *German Constitution*,⁶ which he began in several sketches in Frankfurth and finished in his first year at Jena (1801). His first sketch is dated: "Congress of

6. The best edition is *Die Verfassung des Deutschen Reichs. Eine politische Flugschrift von George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel*. Edited by Georg Mollat, Frommann Stuttgart, 1955. But this edition omits the most personal and in that sense most interesting Frankfurth versions which may be found in Hegel's *Schriften zur Politik und Rechtsphilosophie*. Ed. by Georg Lasson, Leipzig. Meiner, 1913. Fragments in English in *The Philosophy of Hegel*, ed. by Carl T. Friedrich. Modern Library, N.Y., 1953.

Rastatt," which took place in 1797. It is the time when France was overrunning Europe, establishing puppet states in Italy, Switzerland, Belgium, and Holland. In Rastatt the German Reich ceded the left bank of the Rhine to the French who completed their conquest which they had begun by annexing Elsass and Lothringen under Louis XIV. This arrangement was ratified later in the treaty of Lunéville in 1802. In a letter to Nanette Endel of May 25, 1798, Hegel describes the devastation of war around Mainz: "This spring I was in Mainz and there I have seen the Rhine in its quiet mild greatness: In Schaffhausen I had marveled at its wild brutal power. How round this tranquil river everything is devasted and ruined! No village on its banks, half of which does not lie in rubble, no tower or castle which would still have its roof and more than its bare walls."

In his notes he asks himself: "Should the only political results of the pernicious war, which the German Reich had to conduct with France, be for Germany the loss of some of the most beautiful German lands and several millions of its children, a great burden of debts prolonging the misery of war into peace, and several states losing their qualities as states?"

As a patriot Hegel is moved by sorrow, as Leibniz was before him in view of the aggressiveness of Louis XIV. But unlike Leibniz he approves of the political principles of the military enemy; the principles of the French Revolution are vastly superior to the feudal anarchy and backwardness of the German Reich. "The political set-back suffered by Germany necessarily hangs together with its Constitution."⁷ In Napoleon he sees a man of destiny, a "world-historical individual," bound to triumph over the

7. Lasson, p. 137.

traditional "legitimacies" of petty princes. At the end of his book he even expresses the hope that a conqueror may bring about a united and modern Germany, which he could not hope to see realized out of its ancient feudal anarchy. *His patriotism is in conflict with his political philosophy.*

His reflections move both towards the past and towards the future.

"The thoughts contained in this brochure, can have no other purpose and effect for the public, than to further an understanding of that which is, and thereby also further a more moderate sufferance of it, *not that which is, makes us impatient and sore, but that it is not as it ought to be*. If in knowledge we recognize how it came about as inevitable results of causes, that it is not due merely to caprice and accident, then we recognize that it is as it ought to be. It is difficult, however, to rise to such a habit of thought, which thinks and recognizes necessity. Private purposes expect that the world-course should be agreeable to them. And since this is, without a doubt, rarely the case, those opinions are enraged, as if the world events were merely accidental, but our private notions necessary. Those perspectives are as limited as the whole world-view is, which is oriented only in isolated experiences and not in their system which is the embodiment of a spirit. In suffering from those experiences or in finding them contradictory to their notions they find in them the right to blame bitterly whatever happens."

This reconciliation of the individual with the cruel historical world, in which he finds himself involved and disappointed, is a reconciliation through philosophical comprehension. This is not fatalism or quietism; it does not exclude but includes critique. Hegel's tragic optimism has

and demands the courage to face the negative as a necessary ingredient of that which IS. Only if we face ourselves and accept ourselves as we are, can we also hope to find our redemption or re-integration. To accept the wholeness of life as an inevitable struggle between ideal and vital tendencies is as applicable to personal existence as it is to social-political wholes.

Lack of wholeness is felt as suffering, and is conscious in thought. Both suffering and thought demand re-integration. If suffering and thought meet, the movement of overcoming the negative and given condition becomes irresistible: Thinkers who long to see their idea realized in life "can not live alone, and man is always alone even if he presents his nature for himself in thought and enjoys himself in his image: he must find his idea as a living reality. The situation of man, whom this time has driven into his own inner world, dies either a perennial death, if he wants to keep himself in this isolation; or he must want to see the negative of the present world overturned, in order to find and to enjoy himself, in order to live truly. His suffering is known to him as being connected with barriers, which prevent him from identifying himself with conditions as they are given, thus he affirms his suffering; whereas the suffering of people without reflection on their fate is without a will; they honor the barriers and take them for granted as insuperable and sacrifice themselves and others to meaningless facts of brute power." The feeling that human nature is in contradiction with a given state of affairs results in the need that such a contradiction be cancelled, and this will be the case when the given life has lost both its power and its worth, then it has become purely negative. All manifestations of this time show, that there is no satisfaction in the old regime. It

is a completely cowed, small world of abject servitudes and plenty of dominance and property, compensated for by a grovelling self-abdication and hope for heaven. The dry rot of intellectualism (*dürres Verstandsleben*) is correlated with a false idolizing of property-titles. But conscience has awakened and suffering has increased. A better life is breathing, nourished by the deeds of great character (Napoleon?), by the movements of entire peoples, and by the presentation of nature and destiny through great poets (Schiller?). *Metaphysics sees through the limitation of the old barriers and sees them in their necessity in the continuous movement of the whole.*⁸

This dialectical unity of moving whole and isolated part, of concrete universal and concrete individuals, of living value and dead shells of former value, of suffering and idea, of self-alienation and self-restoration, of destiny endured as a blind fate and destiny revealed as freedom and participation—is both developed out of and applied to the German historical situation.

“Germany is no longer a state.” The lawyers have given up to find a concept which would define that conglomeration of secular and ecclesiastic, municipal or regional territories with different laws, which altogether “retain only in memory of a former bond a semblance of association. Germany has experienced in its war with the French Republic that it is no longer a state. What can no longer be understood has ceased to exist. This is the first formulation of the later: “What is comprehensive is actual, and actuality is comprehensive.”

Externally Germany is not a state, because it lacks the will and the ability to defend itself as a whole.⁹ It only

8. Lasson, pp. 139-40.

9. Mollat, p. 18.

has an abstract theory on paper to do so. *What is merely thought is abstract and not actual.* Internally “the dissolution of a state is to be recognized primarily by everything going differently than the laws provide.” Effective unity of power both externally and internally defines the state. Germany lacks both. It resembles the state of nature “unfathomable in extension and inexhaustible in details.”¹⁰

Empirical details, not inwardly organized by a comprehensive (*vernünftig*) idea, are real only in the sense in which fruits are real which have fallen off a tree to rot there. “They are recognized to have belonged to the tree because they are lying under its crown; but neither their position under it nor the shadows covering them, can save them from rotting away and from the might of the elements to which they now pertain.”

These rotting apples under their former parent-tree may be the origin of the later expression “rotten reality” (*faule Wirklichkeit*). What is sundered and isolated from its own organizing whole is turning into a mere object, alien multiplicity, dead other. Seen from inside it is extreme subjectivity, “being for itself”, insanity. “If the social nature of man is disturbed and is forced to throw itself into its own idiosyncrasies, such a deep perversion enters it, that it spends all its energy on persevering in this self-alienation from others, and thus in preserving its own perversion continues until it terminates in insanity.”¹¹

The political term for this independence and lack of coherence of independent parts is *anarchy*. “To the effect anarchy is the supreme and basically the only crime against a state . . . the state has no higher duty than to preserve its viability.”¹²

10. *Ibid.*, p. 9.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 121.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 97.

We shall see, however, that Hegel also combats the other extreme, that of a centralized totalitarianism, a rigid and exaggerated unity at the expense of a manifold and organic life and freedom of its members.

Germany is heading towards that complete anarchy, which has already prevailed in Italy, which, after losing its unity became a prey of foreign powers, the theatre of war of foreign interests, while at the same time officially at peace.

Hegel describes with a sarcastic humor and wit ("the project of the French to conquer America and India in Hannover"¹³) and meticulous detail this German political anarchy. The German Constitution and the Reich are mere words, are things of thought (*Gedankending*)¹⁴, the more piously adhered to and hypocritically upheld, the less real they become. The German emperor on his coronation still wears Charlemagne's scepter and even his clothes. "This stubbornness in clinging to a mere formality cannot be understood except as a resistance against the admission that the real union is lacking; the unchangeable form is substituted for the pretended unchangeable reality." One is reminded of Goeth's Faust:

For just where comprehension fails
a word steps promptly in. . . .

"What is merely thought cannot be loved." "This is deeply founded in human nature that one can be interested only in that in which one has a stake, for which one can act, with which one can participate and decide, where one's own will is engaged."

13. *Ibid.*, p. 49.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 71.

"If Germany is looked upon as a state, her political situation would have to be considered a legal anarchy: Political power and privilege are not governmental offices which are designed in relation to the organization of the whole, the contributions and duties of the individual are not determined in relation to the organization of the whole, but each member of the political hierarchy, each princely house, each estate, each town, each guild, etc. . . . everyone who has right or duties in relation to the state, has himself acquired them. The state has in view of this reduction of its power nothing else to do but to confirm that its power has been torn away. If thus the state loses all authority and yet the possession of the parts depend upon its power, then . . . these possessions necessarily must become very unstable, since they have no other support except one equal to zero. German constitutional law is not a science according to principles, but a collection of the most diverse public rights acquired like private ones. Legislative, judicial, ecclesiastical, military powers are intermingled, divided and conjoined in the most irregular way and in the most varied amounts, just as if they were private property. . . . It is, if not a reasonable, still in a sense a noble trait of German character that the law as such, whatever its basis or consequences, is sacred for the German. If Germany, as seems probable, perishes as an individual, independent state, and the German nation likewise, it is some consolation to discover the awe for the law among the destructive spirits . . . Germany is a state in thought, but its non-being as a state is its reality.¹⁵

What Hegel expresses in prose Goethe's Faust says in verse:

15. *Ibid.*, p. 49.

Es erben sich Gesetz und Rechte
Wie eine ewige Krankheit fort;
Sie schleppen von Geschlecht sich zum Geschlechte
Und rücken sacht von Ort zu Ort.
Vernunft wird Unsinn, Wohltat Plage
Weh dir, dass du ein Enkel bist!
Vom Rechte, das mit uns geboren ist
Von dem ist, leider! nie die Frage.

All rights and laws are still transmitted
Like an eternal sickness of the race,
From generation unto generation fitted,
And shifted round from place to place.
Reason becomes a sham, Beneficence a worry:
Thou art a grandchild, therefore, woe to thee!
The right born with us, ours in verity,
This to consider, there's alas! no hurry!¹⁶

Goethe, who had studied law and was a member of the Federal Reich's Court in Wetzlar, had a first hand experience of how jurisprudence 'worked' under the 'German Constitution'.

After showing the legal-political anarchy the next chapters extend the same theme to the military and financial chaos of the so-called Reich.

It is one of the greatest insights of Hegel's ethics, that the sphere of private morality is inapplicable to public, historical conditions; in other words, it is meaningless to blame individuals for something no individual can be held responsible for. Blaming individuals for what they have not done to improve the world-course is like the inquisition blaming Galileo for moving the earth around the sun.

16. From *Faust* by Johann Wolfgang von Goethe translated by Bayard Taylor, Oxford.

No, the German misfortune must be understood historically. Hegel looks back to the preceding centuries to find the reason for the present conditions.

One root he digs up is in the 16th century Renaissance period, so vividly portrayed in Goethe's play *Goetz von Berlichingen*. "The organization of this body which is called the German political constitution was formed under very different living conditions than afterwards or now prevail. The justice and violence, the wisdom and bravery of past times, the honor and the blood, the well-being and the needs of long-dead generations and of their mores and conditions are expressed in the forms of this body politic. The passage of all-conquering time . . . have severed the destiny of that age and the present one. The structure wherein that destiny dwelt is no longer supported by the destiny of the present generation; it stands . . . isolated from the spirit of the world. If those laws have lost their old life, the present vital concerns have not known how to shape themselves into laws . . . the whole is dissolved, the state no longer exists."¹⁷

The structural dialectic of opposite values of spirit and 'blood' is here united with the dynamic dialectic of time. The following reads like a paraphrase of Goethe's *Goetz*: "During that time of the old German freedom, the individual depended upon himself in life and activity. He had his honor and his fortune, depending upon himself, not upon a class. He belonged to the whole as a result of mores, religion, an invisible living spirit and a few major interests. For the rest he did not allow himself to be restricted by the whole."

From this self-centered activity, which alone was called freedom, spheres of powers were formed according to ac-

17. *Ibid.*, p. 58.

cident and force of character, without regard to any general interest and little restricted by what one calls political authority. . . . The parts of the general political authority were attached to a manifold of mutually exclusive properties, estates which were distributed without rhyme or reason and were independent of the state. This manifold property formed no system of rights, but a collection without a principle."

From the sixteenth Hegel moves to the seventeenth century which sealed the German anarchy in the treaty of Westphalia, concluding the ruinous thirty years of so-called religious wars.

"The German character threw itself into the most inward core of man, religion and conscience, confirmed here its particularism, and this outward separation of states appeared as a consequence . . . Religion, instead of achieving its separation from the state, brought on the contrary its own sectarian fission into the state, making civil rights dependent on denominational confessions . . . thereby tearing up the most inward bond which had formerly united the nation . . . the idea of religious grace became institutionalized in political laws . . . thereby obscuring its religious meaning . . . both protestant and catholic religions were equally intolerant and fanatical . . . but while religion thus completely tore up the state, it miraculously (he means ironically, against its own intention) brought about the feeling of principles on which the state might rest. By separating men religiously it indirectly demonstrated that they may remain united nevertheless in a political union; a union which became the principle of modern states . . . The sameness of religion has not prevented wars, and the difference of religion has not prevented peaceful coexistence.¹⁸

18. Mollat, p. 20.

This historical experience must bring about a new dialectical conception of the relation of church and state, religion and patriotism. Man can not be torn into a man of the state and a man of the church, because man is a whole man in both. The whole of practical life, present to him in thought of laws and constitutions, is differently present in religion through imaginative symbols.¹⁹

The evil of legal anarchy is one caricature of the true state; another is the opposite extreme of centralized totalitarianism, as practiced in the epoch of terror of the French Revolution, and in the Prussian state of the 18th century. It is a central prejudice that the state is a machine with a single spring, which gives motion to all the remaining wheels; that all institutions, which constitute the nature of society, stem from the highest political authority, to be regulated, commanded, supervised and directed.²⁰

The pedantic passion to determine everything in detail, the unfree jealousy which wants to order and administer everything oneself . . . this ignoble fussing over any self-activity of the citizens, even though it has no general relation to the state's authority, had been the embodiment of *rationalism*. (italic mine) Not a cent of ordinary expense . . . is to be spent without being commanded, controlled, inspected by the highest authority. Out of concern for education, the appointment for every village teacher, the expenditure of every penny for a window-glass in the schoolhouse, the appointment of every secretary and policeman, of every village judge is supposed to be the emanation of the highest political authority. In the whole state every bite should be taken from the soil which produced it to the mouth in a straight line which state and

19. Dok., p. 281f.

20. Mollat, p. 26.

law and government have investigated, calculated, corrected and demanded . . .

Nothing should be more sacred (to a government) than to leave to the free action of the citizens all these matters and to protect it without regard to utility . . . freedom is sacred in itself . . .

The mechanistic, rationalistic hierarchy dedicated to its noble purposes bestows no confidence on its citizens and therefore can expect no confidence in return . . .

The difference is enormous between a situation where the political authority so arranges things that everything it can count on is in its hands, but where it cannot count on anything else—and the situation where it can count also upon the free loyalty, the self-confidence and the initiative of the people: an all powerful unconquerable spirit which that bureaucratic hierarchy would chase away, because it only stays alive where the highest political authority leaves as much as possible to the self-help of the citizens. By contrast in a modern state . . . where everything is regulated from above . . . a dull stupid life will result from the pedantic approach to government . . . We therefore consider that people happy to which the state leaves much freedom in the subordinate, general activities, and that political authority infinitely strong which will be supported by the free untrammeled spirit of its people.”²¹

Freedom and law must form a dialectical unity of opposites. Each isolated and exaggerated conjures up the equally untenable extreme of itself. “The misery of Germany . . . as well as the madness of French terrorism are sufficient to bring us to the realization of the truth, that freedom is possible only within a lawful unification of the people of the state.” It is clear that as a result of the

21. Mollat, p. 95.

ten years of struggle resulting from the French Revolution, and the misery of terrorism, people have become resistant to blind cries of freedom. In this bloody game, the cloud of freedom has dissolved. The clamor about freedom will no longer have effect, anarchy has not been distinguished from freedom, and the deep conviction has become settled that a firm government is essential to freedom, equally deeply, however, that the people must participate in legislation and in the most important affairs of the state.²²

Power must limit freedom and freedom must limit power. Both are ruined if either is exaggerated and isolated. The state is free from external and internal disruption, if it has the strength to back its unifying law. This in turn depends on the voluntary participation and free activities of its citizens and professional groups. Freedom and power are distinct but inseparably linked.

Hegel concludes in asking how such a reasonable and free German state may be accomplished? "The Germans did not succeed in finding the Mean between . . . despotism and complete dissolution." If this should be remedied it "should be remembered that such an event has never been the fruit of reflection, but only of force, even if it corresponded to the general insight (*Bildung*) and the need were felt deeply and sincerely. The common multitude of the German people together with their provincial states, which are only conscious of their separatism, must be gathered into one mass by the force of a conqueror, they must be forced to consider themselves as members of one Germany. Such a Theseus ought to have generosity to give the people, whom he has created out of little tribes, a share in what concerns all."

Those were prophetic words. Napoleon's conquest of

22. *Ibid.*, p. 113.

Germany and the following war of liberation began the unification of Germany.

It is characteristic of Hegel's dialectical style that every problem points beyond itself to another sphere of life, without which it could not be what it is, although on the other hand, it can be what it is only in contrast to this its own other. The theoretical problem of a viable state and the practical problem of how to realize it in Germany, is only one sphere of life within the process of history and within the wider sphere of ethics, which also contains the spheres of personal morality and of the economic business society. The *Constitution of Germany* contains hints in all those directions.

Historical Reflections

Rosenkranz tells us: "In Switzerland Hegel had repeatedly studied Kant's *Critique of Practical Reason*. Excerpts and comments therefrom, like the ones on the *Critique of Pure Reason* written in the Stift, are still preserved. But when Kant published his *Philosophy of Law* (1797) and his *Metaphysics of Morals* (1798) Hegel subjected both works to intense scrutiny. After restating their contents in general and in detail he simply contrasted Kant's principles with his own. He strove to unify the *legality* of positive right and the *morality* of personal inwardness knowing itself as good and evil in a higher concept which he called life, later on *Sittlichkeit*. (Concrete Ethics) He protested against Kant's suppression of Nature and against the dismemberment of man . . . in their uninhibited powerfulness his comments are of the unintentional charm of artists' sketches."²³

23. (Bos., 86f reprinted in *Dok.*, p. 280f.)

Stimulated by the business-interests of his immediate environment, Hegel also threw himself into the study of economics. "Concerning the problems of acquisition and knowledge he was mainly fascinated by England's constitution as ideal, partly because in no other European country was found such a manifold development of economic forms of life corresponding to an equally rich manifold of personal relations. Excerpts from English newspapers prove his intense interest with which he followed the debates in the House of Commons about a proposed taxation in behalf of the poor, alms with which the moneyed aristocracy hoped to calm the impetuous demands of the have-nots . . . All thoughts of Hegel's on the essence of the business society, physical needs and labor, division of labor and inherited property and police, taxes, etc., were concentrated in his comments on the German translation of Stewart's *Staatwirtschaft*²⁴ . . . which is completely preserved. There are grandiose visions of politics and history in it, together with much finesse in detail. With noble pathos and an abundance of relevant illustrations, Hegel combatted that which is dead in them in order to save the value of the soul and heart (Gemüt) in the midst of the mechanism of labor and business competition."²⁵

It is most regretable that those decisive encounters with Kant's ethics and the beginnings of Hegel's philosophy of economics and the business society have been lost since Rosenkranz saw them. Preserved are some hints in the

24. Sir James Stewart, Baronets: *Untersuchung der Grundsätze von der Staatswirtschaft als ein Versuch über die Wissenschaft von der inneren Politik bei freien Nationen aus dem Englischen übersetzt Cotta, Tübingen, 1769-1772.* From *Inquiry into the Principles of Political Economy*, 2 vol., 1767. Dok. 466.

25. (Ros., pp. 85, 86.) Dok., pp. 278, 280.

German Constitution and in 18 *Fragments of Historical Studies*.²⁶

On the relation of state and business he says: In contrast to the free republics of antiquity "safeguarding of property in recent times has become the pivot of legislation . . . how much the disproportionate wealth of a few citizens may endanger even the freest forms of constitutions and may be capable of destroying freedom itself, history shows in the examples of Periclean Athens, of the Roman patricians, whose downfall proposed legislation by the Gracchi and others tried in vain to prevent, of the Medici in Florence—it would be an important inquiry, how much of the strict property right should be sacrificed in behalf of the enduring form of a republic. Perhaps one has done injustice to the system of the French revolutionaries, if only greed was interpreted to be the source of their intention for a more equitable distribution of wealth."²⁷

For his concept of the state Hegel discusses two statesmen, in theory Niccolo Macchiavelli (1469-1527) and in practice Richelieu (1585-1642).

He defends *Macchiavelli* against the usual moralistic criticism. He must be read against the background of his time. He tried to save Italy from the ruthless particularism of its various princes and city-states. This internal particularism had made it a victim of foreign aggression. To restore its sovereignty and power, powerful measures were necessary, just as cancer needs surgery. Macchavelli speaks not with malice or frivolity, but with "the truth of seriousness"—notice that Hegel does not say "seriousness of truth"! A political reality is a form of consciousness of a

26. Dok., pp. 257-277.

27. Dok., p. 288f.

subject of action and of thought; such "political seriousness" has its own truth. "In the deep feeling of a situation of general misery, of hatreds, of dissolution and blindness, this great Italian statesman conceived in cool reflective moderation (*Besonnenheit*) the necessary idea of how Italy could be saved by uniting in a state. He prescribed in strict consistency the way, made necessary by this corruption and blind fanaticism, how to get out of it."

What Macchiavelli conceived in theory, Richelieu realized in practice.

Richelieu had the rare luck to have been considered the greatest benefactor both by the state to whose true greatness he laid the foundations, and by the one at whose expense this happened. Both France and Germany had the same possibilities of inner dissolution. In France he destroyed it and in Germany he furthered it.

In France Richelieu²⁸ subdued the protestant Hugenots and the nobles! in Germany he subsidized the protestants and feudal interests in order to secure German dismemberment. "They did not succumb to his personal ambitions, but to his genius, which tied his personal interests to the necessary principle of a unified state . . . And therein consists political genius, if an individual identifies himself with a principle."

Hegel discusses various other aspects of European history, especially the mirage of *medieval empire*, which he rejects as a political monstrosity, because it does not do justice to national individualities, and does not allow of a proper system of representation. This mirage was inherited from the glamour of Rome. European history is only a segment of this history of human culture (*Bildung*). This culture moves from Oriental despotisms and the world-

28. Mollat, pp. 67-70.

ownership of the Roman patricians to the Germanic peoples as they replaced the Roman empire and founded the modern state; the meaning of this process is a gradual progression of the consciousness of freedom. The political golden Mean balances the authority of leadership with the active participation of freemen, in a representative government.²⁹ "Whether the supreme political authority is exercised by one or by many, whether he or they are born to the office or elected is unimportant to the concept of the state. Neither need we mention the inequality of nature, of talents and energies of the soul, which bring about a greater inequality than do social relations (*bürgerliche Verhältnisse*)."³⁰ Yet, while this form of representative government has originated from the Germanic nations, Germany itself had lost it together with its dream of the medieval 'holy Roman empire of the German nation.'

This conception of the Germanic world as having matured the political concept of the state is the nucleus and first statement of Hegel's philosophy of political history. Notice that "Germanic" is not identified with "German."

The ethical Golden Mean emerges in *history* as the dialectical unity of world-historical opposites; as it emerged as the principle of the *true state* in Hegel's political reflection, and as it emerged as the moral principle of personal existence, in Hegel's personal reflections. In his Berlin lectures on Aristotle, Hegel still interpreted his 'Mean' in this original sense of a dynamic dialectical, ever-renewed effort to achieve balance. Extremes which isolate and exaggerate themselves inevitably lead to disastrous consequences. Life, whether political, historical or personal is

29. *Ibid.*, p. 74.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 16.

the dialectical struggle to achieve balance and harmony without disrupting and negative extremes.

In the *Fragments of Historical Studies* some further features of his future philosophy of history begin to emerge. Five pages on the Spirit of the *Orient*³¹ prelude the theme of *Master and Slave* of the *Phenomenology*. The Oriental character is fixed and undialectical. There is no desire and no ability to recognize another in its otherness; it is either completely ignored or is an enemy. Either I can overpower and manage it, or it will overpower and manage me. There is no reconciliation with the other through a loving union with him. The law of coercion is the abstract external relation of masters and slaves. And since the master can never be sure whether he will not be enslaved by one more powerful, the relation to this Law of his existence is also one of fear and awe. This is his concept of a God as inscrutable will. "On this ruling weaver's loom are woven all events and out of the wellspring of his command flow into the abyss of his power the rivers of time and of centuries."

"Where the unity of life becomes an isolated object stripped of its living manifold, there it can only be something thought, a general concept."

The Oriental quietism flows from the unalterability of his character, which cannot be moved and cannot transform itself through loving contact with the manifold of experiences. The paucity and seriousness of his speech refers in parables to an invisible and inscrutable Beyond. On the other hand, Oriental imagination adorns the brutal and naked realism of his factual existence by an overabundance of glittering imagery; corresponding to the Oriental taste in dress and personal adornment whose

31. Dok., pp. 257-277.

gaudiness is in no relation to a personal expression of the human beauty and grace. Orientals swear by the holy beard of their prophet, staging riots over the possession of one hair of it.

Turning to classical *Greece*, Hegel points out the difference between a small and organic free state, in which whole men can express themselves wholly, with the large modern national states, in which men only can *represent* the idea of the whole, which is still there but not in a visible and immediate expression of itself. This difference is illustrated by the contrast of style in Thucydides, the historian of the *polis* and David Hume, the historian of England.

In contrast to the Jews, the Greeks were free nations which did not let themselves be governed by laws given by a god. When Lycurgus' legislation was praised by Apollo's oracle in Delphi, he did not therefore go around and preach his political 'gospel' to other Greek states.³²

The beautiful *polis* was superceded by the *Hellenistic-Roman empire*. The memory of classicists is "the gallows on which hang the Greek gods . . . the wind of wit blows them around in grotesque configurations"—classicistic poetry!

In the Hellenistic—Roman *decadence* the unity of human nature is lost. There is a corrupt multitude whose world-view is a *sensate objectivism*, an irresistible whirl carrying them to oblivion; there is an *abstract subjectivism*, withdrawing from the meaningless world of dead objects into the sanctuary of the private self; there is *superstition*, which on the one hand feels that the objective conditions are not as they ought to be, but, lacking the courage to transform them, seeks refuge in an imagined

32. Dok., p. 263.

world of transcendent ‘saviors’; within this superstitious tendency the *Christians* “hear speaking” of a man, who is at the same time the reconciler of this cleavage between a meaningless world and a divine nature. Against the *deification of the Caesars*, which was a crude worship of a nature, which ceased to be divine, beautiful and free—“in this separation of nature and the divine, a man became the uniter of both, the reconciler and savior.”

The *Germanic peoples* bring a nobler, more spiritual conception of love—disfigured, however, by an exaggerated sentimentality and by witchcraft. The latter contrasts unfavorably with the Greek Bacchanalian revels, in which women were allowed to rave—“these explosions of female emotionality were sanctified by the state and transformed into public rituals, whereby they were incorporated in normal life and became innocuous.”

This last reflection brings us back to one of the most important ethical insights of Hegel: That human nature must not be suppressed, but must be accepted as an ever-open, problematic struggle: “Sorrow becomes objective when it is uttered. Thus a balance is restored between the subjective, which in sorrow is all-dominant, and the objective, which to sorrow is as nothing. Through uttering it, it becomes conscious of itself, and what has become conscious is a past . . . But since sorrow is entirely subjective, it is most reluctant to go beyond itself. Only the highest need may drive it to relief . . . when sorrow has become desperation, it is most beneficial to lure it out. This cannot be done by something heterogeneous to it; only in giving it a chance to be given to itself, can it remain what it is and yet objectify itself in its own image . . . speech is the purest form of objectivity for the subjective.”

Compare this Hegelian principle of psycho-therapy with his own sighs in one of the first sketches for the 'German Constitution': "The following pages are the voice of the heart (Gemüt), which only reluctantly takes leave of its hope, to see the German state restored and brought back from its insignificance. It wanted at least to compensate in an image its waning hopes, its weakening desires and its feeble faith."³³ The categories of the mind (Geist) pervade existence, politics and history alike.

Theological Reflections Continued

Hegel returns to his old reflections on the meaning of Judaism in relation to Christianity and to Greek culture and philosophy. The contents are the same as before, but their philosophical appropriation is deepened.

Those theological writings might just as well be called anti-theological writings. There is still a sharp and painful conflict between his "yes" and his "no"; but the decisive significance of his renewed effort in Frankfurt is that he finds the dialectical solution of the conflict.

Hegel's preponderant reaction to the *Jewish Bible*, whose interpretation is much expanded is negative. Their repulsiveness amounts to nausea—and this feeling makes him one-sided and unjust. This is particularly evident in his loaded comparison between Greek literature and myth, which is read with tenderness and reverence, and the Biblical literature which is read with suspicion, resentment and disgust. In the late Berlin lectures, particularly on the psalms and the prophets, he has corrected his bias and found a more adequate appreciation of the meaning of the Jewish Bible.

33. Meimer, ed. Lasson, p. 138.

He even speaks of a fever paroxysm, a crisis. Either this fever will succeed in burning out the deadly poison of an alien substance; or assimilate from it what can be assimilated; or it will be a sickness unto death. This Hegel does not only see as his own problem, but also as an historical process of the Western mind; Europe must expel and re-state on its own terms, what originally was alien Orientalism forced upon its culture.

His feeling is close to that of Nietzsche who says that coming from the Greeks to the Jews and Christians is like stepping down from the open vistas and the noble beauty of the Acropolis into a dark hole, lighted by smoking torches, smelling unaired and unwashed, filled with the grovelling, wailing and halleluia shouting of the culturally disinherited masses—the beginning of the dark ages.

But unlike Nietzsche, Hegel does not simply register his dislike. It is balanced by a profound sense for the supreme value and dignity of religion, for which Nietzsche is blind. Further, he meets and engages his dislike—just as he did when he delved into the commercial-economic mentality of his banker-employer. Traditions as powerful as the Jewish and Christian ones *must* have values. The philosopher is obliged to do justice to reality, regardless of his likes or dislikes. Negative aspects of reality are no less real than positive ones. All forms of self-alienations are comprehended as necessary aspects of that which eternally is.

Hegel already is practicing a method of reflection, which later he calls phenomenological. This method consists in asking: What sort of object is evident to what sort of subjective consciousness? What kind of certainty is aware of what sort of truth?

His analysis of the Jewish and Christian literature is

mainly phenomenological, but it is also mixed up with an historical-factual account. I shall confine my interpretation to some phenomenological correlations.

Phenomenology of the Jewish Bible

In the Jewish Bible there is a correlation between a national will and a practical deity, called Jehova. This God manages, plans, decrees, plots and makes a contract with his chosen people. His will substitutes for a lacking natural reliance on land. The Orient consists mainly of sandy deserts.

Righteousness consists in obedience to given decrees or negative commandments; if they do not murder, and steal, and sleep with their neighbor's wife, they are promised earthly rewards. This innumerable progeny will inherit the earth and "possess the gates of their enemies." If, on the contrary, they disobey the written and posited laws, God will punish them with national extinction. It is the world-view of self-alienation. An abstract unity of will governs a reality alien to it, the "foot-stool of his glory."

Is this analysis fair to the documents? The answer is yes, considering the documents selected; and no, if we consider other documents in the same book, from which could be derived an entirely different interpretation.

Hegel's intention is to overcome an abstract dualism of subject and object, of general law and individual life; it is the same problems which we see in his other writings of the period. The Jewish text is only an occasion to practice phenomenology. Often when he says 'Moses' he means —'Kant'.

In the meantime he has mastered Kant, both in the sense of understanding and also in the sense of having

gone beyond Kant. He does to the whole of Kant's philosophy, what Schiller has done to his aesthetics in the Critique of Judgment: for Schiller, the Kantian systematic formulation of the meaning of art, the symbolic interplay of all faculties of the mind, is transformed into a concrete way of life—for Hegel, the whole of Kant's philosophy is seen as operative in the manifestation of historical humanity, their categories emerge out of those concrete historical manifestations of man and are re-applied to their comprehension. Life, in this very unrationalistic sense, is comprehensive and comprehensible; and its comprehensiveness is actuality, that which acts and produces itself as historical temporality. The result of Kant's three critiques: The reflection on the meanings of human existence is an ontological totality is the center of philosophy. This ontological anthropology was gained by Kant with great difficulty and long efforts. He had to overcome the arrogance of scientism, as if true knowledge were confined to factual sciences. This result of Kant, having man as the center of all philosophical, systematic reflection, was natural and indigenous to Hegel from the very beginning. Kant merely helped him to become for himself, what he already was in himself, to use his own language.

The Spirit of Judaism

In the *Spirit of Judaism*³⁴ Kant's categories merge with Jewish sources. Kant limits object-thinking to the knowledge of external appearance and declares an "infinite object" or 'thing-in-itself' to be knowable. Hegel applies this logical structure to the Jewish Bible. "Object" is that which is over against you, independent of your thinking;

34. Nohl, pp. 243-260; Kröner, pp. 182-205.

it is a strange world of external phenomena. On the other hand a deified 'absolute object' is an abstraction from all concrete thinking. The abstract Jewish thinking moves at once in both directions of self-alienation and self-estrangement. The intellect (*Verstand*) remains outside of the details whose abstract formal unity it is; this is the concept of 'law' which merely unites in the sense of a negative concrete unification. A mere negative 'thou shalt not' not only is never fulfilled, but also declares that the agent is not as he ought to be. Likewise an abstract rationalism sets itself over-against the world, which becomes a dead physical object.

But the intellect remains a necessary function of life, an unavoidable aspect or moment of the totality of human existence. We must face its reality as our own with the intention to see its limitation, its "positivity" (give-ness) and to re-integrate it within a more adequate comprehension of the whole of life.

Hegel reads the stories of the Jewish Bible, with such modern philosophical categories in mind.

The story of *Paradise Lost* begins with a break of man with nature; man becomes subject, nature object. His naïve animal-like unity with the subconscious natural life is broken.

False solutions are all those who either want to return to nature, which is childish or senile, or those who harden the split into an absolute dualism; or those who want to absolutize one side at the expense of the other.

Such an attempt is a *finite pragmatism*, which Hegel saw in the Jewish story of 'Nimrod.' Man endeavored so far to master nature that it could no longer be dangerous to men. He put himself in a state of defense against it, a rash man and one boasting in the strength of his arm. In

the event of God's having a mind to overwhelm the world with a flood again, he threatened to neglect no means and no power to make an adequate resistance to Him. For he had resolved to build a tower which was to be far higher than the waves and streams would ever rise and in this way to avenge the downfall of his forefathers. He persuaded men that they had acquired all good things for themselves by their own courage and strength; and in this way altered everything and in a short time founded a despotic tyranny! He united men after they became mistrustful, estranged from one another, and ready to scatter. But the unity he gave them was not a return to a cheerful social life in which they trusted nature and one another; he kept them together indeed, but by force . . . elements, animals, and men had to endure the law of the stronger.

This finite pragmatism is an illusion, because death which it fights, is always stronger than the mights of any finite creature; and it implies a totalitarian coercion. Coercion presupposes an estrangement and an unconfirmed fear of ultimate failure which it cannot escape, but can merely suppress in a spurious monolithic unity, the peace of concentration camps.

"With Abraham . . . the history of his people begins, i.e., his spirit is the unity, the soul, regulating the entire fate of his posterity."

The phenomenological essence of Hegel's 'Abraham', then, is his "all-exclusive heart". His was "the spirit of self-maintenance in strict opposition to everything—the product of his thought raised to be the unity dominant over nature which he regarded as infinite and hostile." "He was a stranger on earth, a stranger to the soul and men alike. Among men he always was and remained a foreigner." His alien and hostile world-as-object is "sus-

tained by a God who also was alien to it. Nothing in nature was supposed to have any part in God, everything was simply under God's mastery."

"Abraham wanted not to love, wanted to be free by not loving . . . Love was beyond his power; even the one love he had, his love for his son, even his hope for posterity . . . the one mode of immortality he knew and hoped for—could depress him, trouble his all-exclusive heart and disquiet it to such an extent that even this love he once wished to destroy; and his heart was quieted only through the certainty of his feeling that this love was not so strong as to render him unable to slay his beloved son with his own hand."³⁵

"In the jealous God of Abraham and his posterity lay the horrible claim that He alone was God and that his nation was the only one to have a God." This exclusiveness and hostility to the world and to other peoples compensated for by an equally exclusive legal contract or 'covenant' with this one national God introduces into the Greek and Roman world the spirit of fanaticism and persecution. The Greek and Roman gods were also national, but the Greeks and Romans recognized in the gods of other people the similarity with their own; they were, therefore tolerant, "Instead of reserving the immense to itself and banishing others therefrom it grants to others equal rights." The Romans, in tolerating and inviting this intolerant and totalitarian God into their midst did not know that, in doing so, they invited their own destruction. "Outside the infinite unity in which nothing but they, the favorites, can share, everything is matter (the Gorgon's head turned everything to stone), a stuff, with no rights, something accursed which, as soon as they have power

35. Nohl, pp. 243, 247, 248.

enough, they treat as accursed and then assign to its proper place if it attempts to stir." The most horrible of Greek myths and sculpture, the Gorgon, is equated with the highest in Judaism.

In Hegel's 'Moses' tradition the same categories are at work as in the 'Abraham' tradition. Moral, legal, ritualistic laws are imposed on a passive people, the suffering servant of this self-projected Jehova, the passive slave of their 'Lord'. These laws are negative: if you abstain from breaking them, if you commit no crimes, then you are righteous. This negative obedience or righteousness of a passive people is the condition under which God guarantees to them material prosperity as reward, at the expense of other people who are projects of this exploitation. The aesthetic life in images, the festive enjoyment of beauty is frowned upon. "They despise the image because it does not manage them, and they have no inkling of its deification in the enjoyment of beauty or in a lover's intuition." "The human body, which was only lent and did not properly belong to them, must be kept clean, just as the servant has to keep clean the livery given him by his master." The "infinite object", the God over-against men manages and masters their historical fate. He is an empty thing-in-itself, a vacuity, symbolized in the holy of holies which was a dark and empty room. To fall away from this strict observance of righteousness as condition of the 'Lord's' favor, for example to mingle with other people or enjoy life, was a crime which the "Lord" savagely punishes. It is a religion of misery for misery, "born of misfortune and made for misfortune."³⁶ Again a contrast with Platonism: "Truth is something free which we neither master nor are mastered by; hence, the existence of God

36. Nohl, pp. 173, 244, 251, 254.

appears to the Jews not as a truth but as a command. Truth is beauty intellectually apprehended; the negative character of Truth is freedom" (Hegel means freedom from identifying truth with that particular form of truth which is dependent on given independent objects). But how could they have an inkling of beauty who saw everything only as matter? How could they exercise Reason (*Vernunft*, total comprehension) and freedom who were only mastered or masters" (over dead and alien objects, means of animal gratifications).

The laws, as positive, divine decrees, remained fixed and unalterable, setting the Jews forever apart, "just as in any despotism the question about a constitutional law is contradictory."

After the destruction of the Jewish state the people clung only the more tenaciously to the Law; again, as in the beginning, this service substitutes and compensates for their impotent hostility to the rest of the world. Nothing parallels "the stubbornness with which they fought for their worship when it was attacked . . . no force could have made them consciously transgress them at another's order. And since Life was so maltreated in them, since nothing in them was left undominated, nothing sacred, their action became the most impious fury, the wildest fanaticism . . .

The greatest tragedy of the Jewish people is no Greek tragedy; it can arouse neither tragic fear or compassion, for both of these arise only out of the destiny which follows from the inevitable slip of a beautiful character; it can arouse horror only. The fate of the Jewish people is the fate of Macbeth who stepped out of nature itself, clung to alien Beings, and so in their service had to trample and slay everything holy in human nature, had at

last to be forsaken by his gods (since they were objects and he their slave) and be dashed to pieces on his faith itself.”³⁷

Logically speaking the categories at play here are those of a finite dualism between subjects and objects; and of an infinite dualism between a finite self and an absolute other-than-self. The fallacy in all dualisms is the same: each side is abstractly absolutized against the other. Idealism, which wants to absorb the object is just as false as realism, which wants to absorb the subject in the object.

Ethically speaking the situation is that of alienation, egotism, exclusive hostility, held together by external and conventional Laws. In Hegel’s *Philosophy of Right* (*Rechtsphilosophie*) some of the categories recur and are applied in the sphere of “abstract legality” (pp. 34-40). Exclusive property right of abstract and finite owners in perennial conflict among themselves, are managed by abstract and external rules and regulations of positive laws.

Karl Marx picked up this relation between Jewish spirit and the spirit of private ownership and impersonal legality. In his powerful essay on *Jewish Question*³⁸ he emancipates himself from his own solid Jewish background, as Hegel had emancipated himself from his protestant Biblicalism. The Jewish spirit, Marx says, is the spirit of egoistic acquisition at the expense of everybody else. But this is identical with the haggling-spirit (*Schachergeist*) of “bourgeois capitalism”. Therefore the emancipation of the Jew from himself is identical with the abolition of capitalistic exploitation. Marx, nevertheless,

37. Nohl., p. 260.

38. *Die Judenfrage*. Gesammelte Schriften von Marx und Engels. Stuttgart, 1913, vol. I, pp. 399-431.

remained a Jewish prophet (in the sense of Hegel's use of the term), who transferred the idea of a chosen people to the proletariat,—unconscious puppets being managed by an all-powerful object, called "The Law of History." This genius of hatred wanted to drown his own hated Jewishness in the blood of a world-revolution.

It might be mentioned in passing that Hitler's fight against Marxist communism and against the Jewish religious nationalism was prompted by a similar religious nationalism in himself; jealous of other chosen peoples, the Jews on the one hand and Marx's 'Proletariat' on the other hand, he wanted the German people to be the chosen one—chosen by "all-powerful God and Historical Destiny".

The Spirit of Christianity

Again, as in Bern, Hegel takes up the *Spirit of Christianity* in contrast to the *Spirit of Judaism*. He studies the Gospels as phenomenologist. His empirical, factual-historical insight and research concerning an historical Jesus is abandoned. It is now declared to be quite irrelevant to the understanding of the religious meaning of the Christ of the dogma. "To consider the resurrection of Jesus as an event is to adopt the outlook of the historian, and this has nothing to do with religion." The phenomenological question is: How does Jesus become the Holy Christ to the writers of these documents? What is the relation of the Christian consciousness to the essential image of its 'Savior'?

Between his *Life of Jesus* of the Bern period and this new understanding, that Christ was a myth in and for the religious imagination of the Christian community, which

became dogma, lies the critical study of and emancipation from Kant's philosophy. In the *Life of Jesus*, 'Jesus' was seen as a personified image of Kant's practical reason, its autonomy and its universal categorical imperative: To respect every other human being as an end in himself and not merely as a means; as citizen in an ethical community that ought to be. This ethical concept now becomes a subordinate aspect in the mythical Christ. The all-pervasive soul of religion reconciles man with the insufficiency and incompetence of his morality; later Hegel's "objective mind", will analogously be surpassed but nevertheless retained in the "absolute mind" of religion, art and philosophy. What remains confusing is Hegel's sloppy use of terms; only the context can give a clue whether he uses an historical Jesus or the Christ dogma.

"Over against commands which required a slavish obedience without joy, without pleasure or love" (this is a reference to Kant's duty without or against inclination), 'Jesus' set their precise opposite, an all-encompassing love, the most holy and beautiful of all things; religion is our endeavor to unify the discords necessitated by our development. Christ exhibits this unification in the *ideal* as fully existent. It expresses the dialectical concreteness of all reality.

When moral duty is declared to be all-sufficient, when it is substituted for religion, then it becomes *moralism*. "Since laws are unifications of opposites in a *concept* which thus leaves them as opposites, while it exists itself in opposition to *reality*, it follows that the concept expresses an *ought*."

"For the particular impulses, inclinations, pathological loves, sensuous experiences, or whatever else it is called--the general concept is necessarily and always something

alien and objective . . . and a specific duty contains the contradiction of being restricted and universal at the same time." As universal, duty requires that anyone else should act in the same way, if he were in your position; but this position is restricted to particular historical situations, which implies that really no one else can be in your place. Morality is a mere demand of unity and harmony. But its imperative: Be good, do not lie, etc. . . . shows that in reality we are not what we demand of ourselves. We set one part of ourselves, our consciousness of law and of universality against another part of ourselves, our individual peculiarities "necessitated by our development". Or, the same situation observed from the outside, the demand for unity appears to one party in the form of a command, issued by another party. This becomes tyranny, because we detect in the commanding party not pure goodness, but particular interests and individuals which we know to be as fallible as we are ourselves. Whereas in the ideal and holy Christ, we have unity not merely in the form of a promise or a demand, but as concretely present and fully realized. To live religiously is to live in the consciousness of this ever-present perfection of life, which is divine. God is this unity of value and being, of reality and ideality, which is always contradicted by our moral experience in which there is always a falling-apart between what we ought to be and what we factually do. Moralism therefore, as an illegitimate absolutization of our moral situation, is essentially anti-religious. To confess, on the contrary, the insufficiency of moralism, is the confession of 'sin', and this is the condition of the forgiveness of 'sin'. Human nature as a whole is thus affirmed as a problematic nature, eternally in struggle with itself, affirmed in the unconditional love or religious faith. "Only the feeling for

the whole, love, can be the redemption of man's essence."

The living whole in which all finite conflicts between values, or oppositions between 'ought' and 'is', are eternally posited, cancelled and preserved—embraced in religious faith and love. The Absolute is in spite of the tragic and morally insufficient character for all participants. Religion, thus, is the same truth which is also present in beauty. The living whole of a work of art needs both villains and heroes, shadows and lights for its completeness; it also is, in its form of perfection, as it ought to be; in it also life is reconciled through aesthetic love with its own imperfections appearing in its perfect mirror. Hegel sees in 'Christ' the analogy to the Greek 'religion of beauty'.

The distinction and dialectical relation between morality and religion is a decisive progress, a discovery and an achievement. Morality in its various personal, professional, political and historical forms is autonomous; it excludes religion. But the all-embracing heart of religion includes the moral man together with his weakness and crimes; and is just as actual in his enemy as it is in himself.

If the criminal suffers his punishment and accepts it as just, he restores his world integrity as a citizen. But religion affirms his whole total being regardless of merit or demerit.

This systematic subordination of the mundane, political concern of how best to handle our daily affairs, under the absolute spirit, helps Hegel now to solve the problem of "positivity".

Again, he makes a decisive progress. Religion is the relation of spirit to spirit through the mediating myth, through which the community of the faithful is assembled in 'His name'. The religious community is established through recognition of a holy image. In the Christian reli-

gion ‘Christ’ is this image. Christ assembling all individual believers in the spiritual community is the spiritual actuality of a trinitarian movement . . . Christ is what he is in and for the faith of his church. The historical Jesus, on the other hand, and a ‘belief’ in him is merely ‘positive’, by which expression Hegel means something negative. If the mundane language, such as ‘father’, or ‘son’, or ‘kingdom’, etc. which religion must use, is taken literally, factually, then religion becomes an assemblage of dead objects, a rationalistic intellectual game with agreed-upon dogmatic formulas.

Hegel’s indignation against the ‘positivism’ of the church is undiminished. We need not go into further details of his scathing criticisms. The insight that this ‘positivity’ is unavoidable does not make it better. We simply have to accept the fact, whether we like it or not. We have to “reconcile ourselves to our fate through love”, as the title of this part of the manuscript reads. Our fate is, that we must first be in time, as temporal beings, before we can link ourselves back to Eternity; I cannot have the eternal apart from its own temporal self-alienation. We have, then, after distinguishing religion and morality, the following dialectical square of opposites:

Christ-Dogma

Religious Church



Historical Jesus

‘Positivity’

Christ is the individual as well as unconditional spirit of religious love; and wherever the unconditional sacrifice of selfishness for another regardless of his moral merit, is practiced there this holy spirit of the church becomes real. The mythical symbol is actualized there and unifies the church; the religious imagination creates and works at the sacred image.

If Christ becomes 'positive', a given, single, historical fact, then he also becomes a corpse, vanished in time, as all mere facts of immediate experience do.

This mere historical 'belief' corresponds to the literal-minded, dogmatic, fundamentalistic biblical sects, which persecute each other.

We cannot have one side (AB) without the other (CD).

The reality of the Christian religion is a concrete dialectical unity of opposites of Absoluteness and its own self-alienation in time. And this truth is, at the same time recognized in symbolic form in its own essential dogma. A is non-A: The Absolute maintains its own unbroken unity in and through its finitude, its suffering, its death. God becomes *this* unique individual, in order to reconcile our moral-immoral struggle and moral incompetence with his own eternal will. We may accept ourselves in our frailty if God himself has made us as we are; has showed himself to share in our guilty humanity.

Having discovered dialectic in religion, Hegel now begins to see this dialectical structure in religion as a sample of the dialectical structure of reality as such. If this were so, then religion would be one modification of Truth. Hegel thus arrives at his mature definition of religion:

Religion is the Absolute in the form of mythical representations. (Vorstellung)

Hegel is the philosopher of the crisis of Christianity,

which for faith does not exist, because it is unaware of the 'positivity'; and which for the Non-Christian does not exist, because he sees nothing but 'positivity'. Hegel is both passionately engaged and coolly aloof. What he calls the deepest urge of religion, the longing for peace, harmony, friendship and love, is the deepest level of his own existence. Existence without religion would not be worth living, as he confesses at all periods of his life. He cultivates truth in all dimensions of life, in order to overcome the one-sided cultivation of truth in the scientific reason. Reason transcends itself, in making itself its own object of criticism. Kant's *Critique of Reason* is transformed and enlarged, it becomes a universal dialectical self-criticism and self-overcoming in all spheres of life and of consciousness.

One source for his understanding of Christianity is the classical Greek tragedy. Jesus is the last of the Greek tragic heroes; the greatness of soul necessarily arouses the hostility of a petty world; the tragic hero affirms this fate as his own; he triumphs over it even in succumbing to it. This—again—is Hegel's own tragic optimism.

And also again: What he sees written in the large script of history of religion is the counterpart of his own existential struggle. If we cannot successfully appropriate our past, it will either crush us with its dead weight, or leave us rootless, empty, without self-knowledge, easy victims of infantile or atavistic instincts.

Hegel's intense study of all sorts of pathologies and historical atrocities is at the same time a quiet and growing power of 'light', clarity, wisdom and joy. In boldly stating the limitations and uncertainties of all possible positions of the mind, there is an unlimited presence and certainty of truth. This then, what he lives, practices and IS, this

philosophical self-education in comprehensiveness is what counts—not the correctness or incorrectness concerning this or that matter or content.

The Philosophical Breakthrough

In Frankfurt Hegel breaks through to philosophy and philosophy breaks through in Hegel. This is the historical hour of decision. Hegel all of a sudden knows *what* he is going to be, and *that* he is going to be it. He knows that he is 'condemned by God to be a philosopher', a favorite saying of his.

The dialectical truth of the Christianity is now seen as one concrete modification of the dialectical structure of Being itself.

Hegel begins to write his first purely systematic reflections on philosophy.

Love

The first of these systematic fragments is entitled *Love*,³⁹ and was probably, judged by the handwriting, earlier than the *Spirit of Christianity*. In it, Love is understood as the ontological model of Reality; and reality as the ontological ground of love.

The individual subject, the 'I am' is just as irreducible and ultimately real as its opposite, the partner, the 'you', the other 'I am'.

There are three and only three possible relations between I and other-than-I. I oppose myself to the rest of the world. I am "the pride of being the center of things". The other becomes a dead object of mastery and manipulation. This is absolute egotism, subjectivism, or idealism,

39. Nohl., pp. 357-381.

a completely illusory form of an unhappy consciousness, to anticipate first a title from the later Phenomenology. The second possible attitude is to surrender completely to the other. For a "man without the pride of being the center of things, the collective whole is supreme, and being, like all other individuals, so small a part of that, he despises himself". He is being managed by the all-powerful causality in whose presence he feels his nullity.

Against these extremes of absolute dependence and absolute independence, Love is the dialectical Mean and thus the true model of all reality. Love is this ontological model, *firstly* because *reality is reciprocity*, mutual interchange of living functions, of action and reaction, where everything determined is also determining and vice versa. Reality is co-union. "Nothing is unconditioned, nothing carries the root of its own being in itself, each is only relationally necessary; the one exists only for the other, and hence exists in and for itself only on the strength of a power outside itself." Love cancels the alienation of Being, present both in idealistic subjectivism and in realistic objectivism. Love existentially is and represents this metaphysical or ultimate nature of reality to be a living, dynamic unity of opposite functions.

Love, *secondly*, is an ontological model because it is the manifestation of the dialectical *unity of one and other*. Love is actual in that partner gives, loses himself to the other, and in thus losing himself is recognized, received and gains himself. Love—this communion and communication between partners that are alive, active, functional. All reality is loving, dynamic, active reality, there is no such thing as a dead reality; what we call death—the disappearance of an appearance from sight—is a function of the total life. True union, or love proper, exists only be-

tween living beings who are alike in power and thus in one another's eyes living beings from every point of view; in no respect is either dead for the other. Love neither restricts nor is restricted; it is not finite at all. It is not a private single feeling. A single feeling is only part and not the whole of life. This whole life is not contained in love in the same way as it is in the sum of many particular and isolated feelings; in love, life is present as a duplicate of itself, as a single *and* unified self. Love is not only a model of reality, because it is this reciprocal interactivity of give and take, enriching both sides; but also because it is, as this living and concrete relationship, a whole which is more than the individual partners, without whom, however, the whole also would not be. Love is an ontological token of reality because it is a concrete universal, reconciling concrete individuality with an equally concrete wholeness of a common and shared life. In love the separate individuals still remain, but as something united and no longer as something merely separate and problematic.

Love, *thirdly*, is the ontological model for all reality, because it furnishes the key or ingress to the understanding of the *true relation between living reality to its physical or natural appearance, between eternal presence and external mortality*.

Life is individualized. To every individual modification of the whole, to every unique self, everything appears in form of being externally given, as physical object. This lack of love or mutual alienation produces what we call dead. The appearances, which appear to our senses are called physical things or 'it'; this merely means that our communication to 'it' is reduced to a mere external handling. The 'positive' natural sciences dissect and isolate in the external and objective image elements and other end-

lessly divisible fragments, out of which they hope in vain to restore the whole living reality. "To say that salt and other minerals are part of the make-up of a plant and that these carry in themselves their own chemical laws governing their operation is the judgment of external reflection and means no more than that the living plant may die and rot". In the living and existential community of love, this external physical aspect of one lover to another is known to be merely external, is understood to be the mortal side of love; to overcome this barrier of spiritual estrangement enhances the intensity and genuiness of love which draws the mortal bodily appearance of life into this its own immortality. "To say that the lovers have an independence, peculiar to each, means only that they may die. But love strives to annul even this distinction, to annul this possibility of ultimate separation as a mere abstract possibility within their full and concrete actuality, to unite even the mortal element and make it immortal. Love is indignant if a part of the individual is severed and held back as private property. This raging of love against exclusive individuality is *shame*. A pure heart is not ashamed of love; but it is ashamed if its love is incomplete. Love gains in the exchange of every thought, every variety of inner experience, for it seeks out differences for a more intense exchange; it turns to the whole manifold of nature in order to drink love out of every life. *Love thus becomes the comprehensive (Vernünftig) principle of a loving communion with the life of history and nature.* Hegel at this juncture quotes from Shakespeare:

My bounty is as boundless as the sea,
My love as deep. The more I give to thee
The more I have.⁴⁰

40. *Romeo and Juliet*, II, I.

Love, *finally*, is the ontological model of reality because it shows reality as that Being which eternally changes and renews itself; it is the *dialectical unity of Being and Becoming*; negatively, there is no form and shape of life which is not both real and transitory at the same time. "The mortal element, the body, has lost the character of separability, and a living child, a seed of immortality of the eternally self-developing and self-generating Being has come into existence. The seed breaks free from its original unity, turns over more and more to opposition, and begins to develop. Each state of its development is a separation, and its aim in each is to regain for itself the full riches of life. Thus the process is: Unity, separated opposites, reunion."

This does not mean "Thesis, antithesis, and synthesis"; it means, that Reality of Being can enact its character as intercommunication of reciprocal activities and re-activities only through an infinite individual self-modification and self-differentiation as process. Or seen from the point of view of the individual: it begins in complete dependence on a whole of life, goes on to separate independence and finds fulfillment and his true being in a differentiated interdependence.

Faith and Being⁴¹

From some 'modern', psychology we are told that this 'love', Hegel reflects on is impossible and that individuals are 'nothing but' a bundle of pathological complexities.

But this is no refutation, because Hegel understood the infinity of pathology and the infinite degrees of alienation just as well as any existentialist.

41. Nohl., pp. 382-385.

In a profound fragment of three pages, which Nohl has entitled *Faith and Being*⁴² he considers levels of alienation is not only a concrete unity of inter-activities and inter-dependences of opposites, but life is also externalized in many levels, degrees and kinds of organizations.

That which I have in my opinion (*Vorstellung*), in my factual belief, in religious faith or in my thought, is a one-sided aspect of reality, something that points beyond itself in order to be itself what it is. What is merely thought or believed in, is not identical with Being. "Being does not follow from being thought", "reality in the form of being-thought is incomplete", it is only one of the poles in a whole of reality which is presupposed and from which it is abstracted or isolated. Isolation, abstraction, sickness, death are just as real as the whole.

It is meaningless to base the reality as the unity of all opposites on a mere belief or subjective conviction. It is likewise meaningless to confuse one limited kind of polarity, a finite unification of opposites, with Being itself. 'I think that what I think is real', or 'I believe that what I believe in, is therefore real' are mere analytical tautologies. Reality is that which it is—a dialectical community of differentiated members—without my having it also in my reflection and consciousness. On the other hand, if I do have this dialectical concept in my consciousness in the forms of feeling, reflection or faith, then I do not only grasp reality, but I am *grasped* by it; I then exemplify its unification of opposites in my self. The ontological presupposition becomes explicit in me in communion with it. Reality includes my approaches to it in itself.

Mere "intelligibility does not imply Being"—because mere intelligibility is opposed to that of which it is the

42. *Ibid.*, p. 40.

rational form. Only in knowing itself at the same time as not being that which it knows about—only in and as self-transcendence of thought is Reality present. But it is equally self-contradictory to say that in order to have faith in Reality, Reality must first be ascertained—because Reality is not itself what it is, if it would exclude my faith in it as a constitutive aspect of its dialectical unity.

Reality proves itself by breaking down any one-sided attempt to identify it with one aspect of its oppositeness. Positively: Any genuine sample of a dialectical unity of opposites, such as love, is a small model of the dialectical constitution of Reality or Being. As the nature Hegel puts it: "The contrast of idealistic and realistic philosophies is of no importance; such expressions as subjectivity and objectivity, reality and ideality are simply bare abstractions."

A dialectical situation is genuine, if the partners are as ultimate and as irreducible as their union.

The Fragment of a System

Two tiny fragments from a long essay are preserved and edited by Nohl under the title *Fragment of a System*, dated 14, September, 1800.⁴³ Hegel briefly resumes his philosophy of religion. Religion is the elevation of finite to infinite life which is at the same time the action of the infinite life in us.

But there is also the first definition of dialectic. "Philosophy has to disclose the finiteness in all finite things and require their integration by means of comprehension" (*Vernunft*). Philosophy as dialectical comprehensiveness knows itself as a sample, in which all other dialectical samples of reality are known and collected as samples.

43. Nohl., pp. 345-351; Kr., pp. 309-319.

Rationalistic philosophy, on the other hand, does not transcend intellectual reason (*Verstand*) and is in its one-sidedness below the insight enjoyed in art, religion and philosophy.

Dialectical reflection limits itself and in knowing its limitation transcends itself. Reality as a dialectical whole is that which appears through that which it both is and is not, in this dialectical reflection of itself. The logic of self-knowledge or dialectical reflection is at the same time the logic of the living contents of conscious beings.

"The *relation* between the separated, is not more important than is the *separation*." Everything is what it is in itself, as well as in relation to that which it is not, which is excluded from it. Thus a manifold excluded from an organic whole nevertheless remains connected with the living whole which is excluded from it.

"A human being is an individual life insofar as he is distinguished from all the elements and from the infinity of individual beings outside of himself. But he is only an individual life in so far as he is at one with all the elements, with the infinity of lives outside of himself."

Reflection sees nature as the unity of "relation and separation, of the self-subsistent particular restriction and the unifying universal." Kant's definition of nature as synthesis a priori of irrational perceptual contents and logical and mathematical forms is seen as a special theoretical kind of a dialectical unity of opposites.

Against a "mystic pantheism" (Schelling?) for which every individual life is merely an organ in a naturalistic super-organism, Hegel objects: "Life can not be regarded only as union or internal relation, but must be regarded as opposition as well. If I say that life is the union of opposites and relation, this union may be isolated again, and it

may be argued that union is opposed to non-union. Consequently I would have to say: Life is the Union of union and non-union." Being is both the identity of identity and difference, as well as the difference of identity and difference.

Within the living whole there are posited at the same time death, opposition and reason (*Verstand*, the power of abstraction and fixation), because there is posited a manifold that is alive and that, as alive, can posit itself as a whole. By doing so, it is at the same time a part, i.e., something for which there is something dead and which itself is something dead for other such parts."

From Frankfurt to Jena

After finishing this essay Hegel felt that he was ready to enter the philosophical battle of his time in public. From his sister he had received the following note:⁴⁴ "Last night, a little before twelve o'clock, father died quietly and painlessly. I am not able to write more. God be my help. Your Christiane." (15, January, 1799)

This sad event brought Hegel a small inheritance. Together with what he had saved, it enabled him to apply for the academic position of *Privatdozent* at the University of Jena, which was at that time the cultural and philosophical center of Germany. Friedrich Schiller, Fichte, Schelling and a group of romantic poets and writers had made the place, under the guidance of his Excellency, the minister of culture, Goethe, very lively indeed. Hegel wrote his old friend and schoolmate from Tübingen, Schelling, renowned professor of philosophy at the university, a remarkable letter of application. The letter is

44. Briefe I., p. 58.

dated November 2, 1800, six weeks after finishing his systematic essay:

I have watched your great public career with admiration and joy. I assume you exempt me from speaking about it in a humble way or from attempting to show you that I too can do something myself. I will avail myself of the middle course and say that I hope we will meet again as friends. I look to you full of confidence that you may recognize my unselfish efforts, though their sphere be lower than yours, and that you may acknowledge some value in them.

In my scientific (he means philosophical) development which began with the more subordinate needs of man, I was compelled to proceed towards science (philosophy), and at the same time the ideal of my youth (Volksreligion?) had to be transformed into the form of reflection, into a system . . . now I ask myself while engaged in this, how I could return to take an active part in the affairs of man?

The sentence which I underlined, is a riddle. Nowhere did we see Hegel occupied with "subordinate human needs". Those, his college duties or his educational tasks are completely ignored, even in his letters. He is, on the contrary, concentrated on the highest, most important values of history and personal existence. The expression is rather typical for his personal over-modesty and also for his habitual understatements. But a second interpretation is equally plausible: in the light of the second part of the sentence, *all* human concerns, no matter how important for the participants *become* subordinate, when they are seen in the light of the Absolute, within which and towards which they contribute. And further: this Absolute

can be present *only* in the form of "systematic reflection", which reflects impartially on the reality-value of all essential values of human existence.

It is the new discovery of the primacy of philosophy in and beyond all one-sided pursuits of man and the corresponding views of reality, compared with which even the most brilliant moments of history become mere episodes.

Schelling went to see his Excellency and Goethe gave his Olympian nod. Now, before we accompany Hegel to the "hubbubble and whirl (Saus und Braus) of Jena, let us look at the philosophical situation as it had developed since Kant. It is mainly a development of dialectic into which Hegel fitted as if he had been the product and result of it, although he had worked out the idea stubbornly and privately in his very own way.

Appraisal

Frankfurth is perhaps the most decisive period in Hegel's development. From now on he knows what he is.

This double process of the individual giving himself to the OTHER and the OTHER gaining in the individual its subjective organ and expression, is the basic form of what soon will be called DIALECTIC. His long struggle with religion has led to a successful solution: Religion is one symbolic form of the truth, that Reality as a whole has a dialectical structure, maintaining its unbroken unity in the many particular spheres or dimensions of Being, and in their infinite individuations. The Absolute is mediated by its temporal self-alienations, which is both is and is not, i.e. which both produces and cancels.

The meaning of human existence is an ever-renewed attempt to find and to restore a lost wholeness and unity

in historical, ethical and personal existence.

The supreme value as well as the tragic insufficiency of a pure aesthetic existence (Hölderlin) has become a basic and lasting insight of Hegel's aesthetic, which can never become an aestheticism, because it too, in spite of its absolute values must learn to respect its limitations.

Hegel's 'resolution' (his poem of this title, written before his departure to Jena) to take his place in the public battle of philosophy, will plunge him into a most intense and thorough study of the history of philosophy.

Most important will be his alignment with the tradition, which leads from Plato⁴⁵ and Aristotle to the Neoplatonists, to the mystics (Meister Eckhart) to the Renaissance (Cusanus, Bruno) and to Leibniz.

Hegel finds his own personal philosophy to be one with the history of philosophy.

The next chapter will have to take up his dialogue with his predecessors and contemporaries.

AN INTERLUDE

Hegel's Relation to His Predecessors and Contemporaries

Again there is a radical change, a 'qualitative leap'. Hegel in Frankfurth has found his mission and his calling. Now he throws himself with his usual power and thoroughness into the history of philosophy. His new writings will constantly refer to it; not in the sense of a report, but rather in the sense of a dialogue. To understand him better, it seems advisable, at this point, to see how he saw the philosophers with whom he most frequently converses.

45. C.f. Gustav E. Mueller, *Plato. The Founder of Philosophy as Dialectic*. Philosophical Library, N.Y., 1964. Chapter: Plato in Hegel.

Plato he already had appropriated. His dialectical dialogues had forever contributed their insight, that all forms of non-being (me on) such as that which ought not to be; lies, errors, illusions on the theoretical side; misdeeds, failures, crimes and insanity were *real* no less than more desirable or ideal features of the whole.

A second dialectical principle of *Plato's* appears prominently in Hegel's ethical writings and in the Preface of the *Phänomenologie*. It is this, that man can achieve nothing, if he does not limit and determine himself, even though he implies the sacrifice of diversions which he must exclude to become and find himself.

In Jena Hegel for the first time studies *Aristotle*. Again there are two points which fascinate him. The first is Aristotle's ontology where he continues what *Plato* began, as Hegel puts it. There is a Being in all beings, a whole beyond its provinces, its natural or historical regions; the whole has categories of its own, all-pervasive ones such as Being and Becoming, One and Many, Appearance and Reality, being in itself and being for others, etc. Aristotle's metaphysics is one historical root for Hegel's *Logic*.

A second point was Aristotle's *psychology*. The book *On the Soul* showed the soul or existential subject rooted in universal-natural life, awaking and emerging, taking part in it consciously. As active Mind, finally, substance becomes conscious of itself, becomes subject or 'Concept'. I think this peculiar use of the term 'Begriff' stems from Aristotle's definition of *Psyche*, Soul, as a "ousia katà tóv λógov", a living essence of all life, according to a 'true' thought; or which is essentially intelligible to itself.

Hegel's essay on *Skepticism*¹ proclaims it as a necessary and integral part of all true philosophy. Platonic skepti-

1. *Verhältnis des Skeptizismus zur Philosophie*, I, p. 168ff.

cism is one with a negative Socratic dialectic, which points out the insufficiency, in any abstract merely rational definition or position. Empirical skepticism of the Alexandrians on the other hand points out the untruth in the certainties of immediate experience. What the senses show is evident and certain. But at the same time it is relative to the organization of the infinitely many perceivers. And the percepts are relative among themselves, they appear 'big' or 'small' according to their environment. This subjectivity and relativity of all immediate experience the object-sciences such as physics, try to eliminate in a system of general laws. But these laws remain empty and alien to the immediate contents of experience. They are valid for and within limited abstractions, which cut out, arbitrarily, that which they select for measurement. And frequently they confuse their measuring with the thing measured. Reason strives for a unity of all their special laws, without ever achieving it.

The Hellenistic-Roman philosophy furnished to Hegel categories to understand isolation, despair, withdrawal and, in general, the categories of the 'unhappy consciousness'.

Descartes, the father of modern philosophy, is of decisive importance to Hegel, both negatively and positively. On the negative side Hegel rejects Descartes' rationalism: the world is not a system of rational laws. He rejects Descartes' confusion of mathematical measuring with logical thinking. Mathematics is irrational (*begrifflos*), and is the worst possible method to think philosophy. His principles are basic for all mechanical physics, but this science isolates the physical appearance of life and treats it as if it were 'deadstuff'. This dualism of dead object or extended substance and a thinking subject with nothing (no life)

in common, is radically rejected. "Against Descartes' philosophy, which had formulated and was spreading dualism in Europe, every side of living nature, and especially philosophy, had to seek remedies."²

On the positive side, Hegel appreciates Descartes' *Meditations* on the 'cogito ergo sum'. Here Descartes has transferred the ontological argument of Christian theology to man.³ Here, in the 'I think' = 'I am' is grasped, not as a conclusion of formal logic,⁴ but as an ontological presence and truth, that thinking and Being, or truth and reality are inseparable. The subject in doubt and despair is ontologically real; his truth is the clearance of Being in consciousness. It is the purely philosophical truth, which the Christian religion expresses in its dogma, that 'God' has revealed himself in this suffering individual, his 'Son'. I exist as human subject, when I know that I exist in uncertainties and in unfinalities. This dubitability of human existence is ultimately certain, final and indubitable.

We find the same ambivalence in Hegel's relation to *Spinoza*. On the one hand Hegel deplores, that Descartes had 'seduced' him to confuse the mathematical methods of measuring externalities with understanding comprehension. He thereby was further 'seduced', to confuse metaphysics with physics. This rationalism is incompatible with philosophy, both in form and in content.⁵

On the other hand all true philosophy is one with Spinoza in knowing that nothing less than the one and all-comprehensive reality, Spinoza's 'Substance' is the true goal of philosophy. One must have "bathed in this ether", in order to have seen through and overcome the pettiness

2. Page 18.

3. XVI., p. 217f.

4. VIII., p. 170.

5. XVIII., p. 112.

of mortal cares and mere finite perspectives. This is not 'pantheism', on the contrary, it prevents one to identify any given finite objects or worldly phenomena with the whole absolute, concrete unity.

In this concrete unity, to which is correlated loving comprehension, 'amor intellectualis dei', Spinoza has overcome Descartes' dualism. Life and its physical appearance are attributes of the same reality. He thus sees reality as a "concrete unity of opposites".⁶

What Spinoza lacks, however, is to understand that life, activity, power, energy is revealed in the 'subject'; and that the physical appearance of this one reality is only appearance. Physical sciences may measure the behavior patterns of the phenomenal aspect of the world's soul, as if they were real in isolation and abstraction from the energies whose embodiments they are. But philosophy must remember this 'as if' as an abstraction of scientific reason. In other words, Spinoza failed to see that his 'modes' were ontologically just as real as his 'Substance'. For Spinoza, the individual is merely a reasoning machine. His thinking is confined to general concepts of reason, which are admirable instruments for object-sciences, but do no justice to the existential, concrete and unique individual.

This defeat is corrected by *Leibniz*. Spinoza's 'Substance', Hegel says, is Oriental; the finite 'modes' are merely like disappearing ripples on its ocean. "Against this Leibniz states and defends the European principle of individuation".⁷ The individuals are ontologically just as real as the whole, and the whole consists in these its own individuations. Hegel accepts Leibniz term, 'monads',

6. XIX, p. 372.

7. VIII, p. 339.

and understands them as centers of cosmic energies or life. The monad is, like Aristotle's *psyché*, the principles of all activities. They not only represent the universe each from its own angle, but they are also *appetitive* or striving. The physical world is their embodiments. They appear to each other as mutually estranged or physical. The mathematical sciences order them in space-time locations. The factual sciences describe the pattern of their behavior. Leibniz, in his logical calculus of propositions has sharpened reason. But at the same time, this formal reason has no metaphysical value. It is based on and is a partial function of those monads, which in man are conscious minds. The bodies are 'aggregates' in which the life of the monads organize their organs for external communication. Leibniz' term for the whole, which comprehends both the phenomenal world of external experience and formal sciences and the world of individuated and infinite monads is the 'Pre-established Harmony'. It replaces the monistic, rigid Spinozistic 'Substance'. It is absolute and concrete unity, in which every monad is eternally 'in order', in contrast to, 'man-established harmonies', which are only partially successful, promises without fulfillments, postulates or demands in combat with the deficiencies of finite and external experience. "The best of all possible worlds" is the world seen from the point of view of the Pre-established Harmony, but not from the point of view of sharply limited monads, who represented the whole but individually, each according to his own possibility.

The distinction of inorganic and personal-cultural life, is not a distinction between 'things'—there is nothing dead in reality—but distinction of subconscious and conscious life. They are degrees of monadological simplicity and complexity.

Hegel blames Leibniz,⁸ that he accommodated his profound metaphysics to Christian theology and, in his *Théodicée*, confused Christian and philosophical language, wishing to be "popular." His "God is the gutter into which all difficulties flow". Leibniz' *Théodicée* confuses moral and religious categories and thereby produces that "pious optimism"⁹ that "edifying twaddle", which is "boring", it rightly called for and deserved Pierre Bayle's criticism when he used the Epicurean argument against it: God either can do nothing against evil, in which case he is not 'Almighty' but impotent; or does not wish to do something against evil, in which case he is satanic. Also deserved, Hegel says, is Voltaire's bitter satire.

He adds: It is like going to a store to ask for a shaving knife, and the slick salesman says: this is a very poor knife, it will not shave you, but merely scratch you—but it is the best we have!

Leibniz philosophy of Life in its individuation coupled with his skeptical limitation of reason dominates from now on German philosophy and literature. Lessings' 'genius', law-giver of art, Schiller's philosophy, before he turned to Kant, Herder and Goethe are unanimous on those two principles.

Hegel's friend Jacobi, on whom we shall see him write a careful essay, Schleiermacher with his individual feeling, its dependence on the living whole, each in his own way, Herder and the whole Romantic movement endorse this Leibnizian triangular union:

8. XIX, p. 472.

9. XIX, p. 464f.

Pre-established Harmony



Appearing Body
aggregate, object
of rational and
factual sciences

Monads infinitely
individuated in
degrees of organization.

Herder's Philosophy of History breaks with the enlightenment idea of 'progress', and considers each people and each culture as an individual, unique contribution to the idea of humanity, as a whole, each also has its own trouble and its own defects. Hegel's philosophy of history is in agreement with this, although he misses in Herder, that he does not distinguish enough between mere life and the life of the spirit. For Herder natural life and 'God' seem often one and the same.¹⁰

Hegel agrees completely with all those religious, ethical, artistic, and metaphysical philosophies of life, but he differs from all of them in showing that it is always the logical form of self-reflection that is used to proclaim the truth of non-rational values of life.

About *Kant* I have already used so many quotations, that the complete relation of Hegel to Kant and how he understood could be constructed from them. We have seen that his first encounter with Kant already occurred when he was a high school student in Stuttgart. Every new publication by Kant was immediately studied, criticized and appropriated.

I shall, then, confine myself to three distinct develop-

10. I, p. 353; VIII, p. 308.

ments which led from the three *Critiques* of Kant to Hegel.

The *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781) presented two unresolved dualisms. There was the dualism between perceptual data or immediate experience in space and time and a priori logical concepts, which were universal and necessary, and *were not* located in space and time.

The second dualism concerns the limitation of scientific knowledge to that segment of reality, which appears in space and time; reality in the form of being scientifically known is never identical with reality itself. It left out the subject, which did the scientific research and which could never be an object among other given objects. It also was limited like an island by an ocean, by the totality of possible experiences compared with which 'Idea of Comprehension' (*Vernunft*), scientific reason (*Verstand*) was known to be a limited province of reality as a whole. Scientific knowledge of given phenomena further, leaves out the *moral* subject in care of and responsible for the future. What ought I to do? is not a scientific question.

Reinhold and Schulze, the teacher of Schopenhauer, who wrote under the pen-name Aenesidemus (the name of one of the Skeptics in the Alexandrian Skepticism) on the one hand unified the first dualism but arrived at a skeptical conclusion about *all* knowledge. The unifying term was consciousness (*Bewusstsein*), Perception, conception, comprehensive ideas of totality were all functions of and within consciousness; but did not yield any *true* knowledge, but only knowledge of phenomena, which was tainted with the uncertainty, relativity and subjectivity of immediate experience.

Consequently, the vacuum created by this limited reason could be filled by any pious fancies, or feel-

ings or practical desires all of which were safe from rational criticism. Hegel makes this unifying *consciousness*, the hero of his phenomenology. He points out that its object knowledge (factual sciences) are only one small segment of its range of possible experiences. Secondly he points out that if scientific knowledge is *known* to be limited, then this is true and valid knowledge. Knowledge, therefore, cannot be confined to its scientific application to given facts.

The second theme from Kant stems from his second main work, *The Critique of Practical Reason*. Already *Salomon Maimon* had shown that the knowledge of the totality, which transcends the factual knowledge of the given constitutes human consciousness as a citizen of two worlds. He is just as legitimately oriented by his transcending idea of Being as a whole, as he is by his reaction to that which hits him in everyday experience.

Fichte develops from this his central Idea of the 'I am'; as a citizen of the intelligible Being as a whole he strives to realize it in his imperfect and fragmentary life. Man is this struggle between what ought to be and what factually is the case. Man is thus a living, existential dialectical unity of opposite poles of his orientation. Nature, the given, the Object for this moralism merely is the obstacle, the resistance, the Not-I, which must be overcome, belabored, transformed, brought in line with the moral postulates of culture. Nature is nothing but a material of my duty! Philosophy is a matter of moral responsibility. "What philosophy a man has depends on his moral character". Fichte is as strongly influenced by the Swiss philosopher Pestalozzi;¹¹ his concept of life as an educational process

11. On Pestalozzi see my chapter in *Origins and Dimensions of Philosophy*, Pageant Press, N.Y., pp. 324-373.

is the center of Fichte's rightly renowned *Addresses to the German Nation*. Historical culture is an educational process of man making himself human.

Hegel accepts Fichte's description of the moral dialectic, but points out that this is only one special case of dialectic; incapable of doing justice to nature, art and religion. Dualism is an insufficient, one-sided abstract 'ism', no less so than Spinoza's objective realism or substantialism.

Schiller puts Kant's aesthetics into life. Aesthetic existence is absolutely essential and necessary for a whole and wholesome human existence. The symbolic fusion of the natural, sensuous side of human nature and his problematic, struggling moral nature liberates man from both, and creates a harmonious interplay of all of his faculties.

Hegel accepted this without qualifications. Aesthetic reality or beauty whether in nature in art or in the festive celebration of human existence is a classical instance of a concrete dialectical unity of opposites. Kant's third work *The Critique of Judgment* deals with symbolic interpretations of reality in art, in the mythical language of religion, and in teleology. In the latter, man interprets the world *as if* he knew its design, plan, purpose—or the lack of them.

The aesthetic idea, that beauty is the symbolic fusion of object and subject, of the human soul and the given image of nature is vigorously developed by the dramatist Friedrich Schiller in *Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man*, which we saw Hegel reading in Bern.

But when Schelling exaggerated a good thing, in declaring that *only* art is the organ of the absolute unity of man and nature, Hegel protested against this aestheticism. Philosophy of art is a logical, reflective comprehension of

art; it must not be an esoteric "intellectual intuition" of some privileged aesthetic geniuses.

Schleiermacher's Discourses on Religion, were sympathetically reviewed by Hegel. Schleiermacher developed Kant's position, that religion uses mythical language, imaginative tales of gods and men. From this he concluded that all dogmatic creeds were symbolic; that religion engaged or involved the whole man as an individual, in his felt dependence on the Absolute. Schleiermacher combined Kant's theory of the mythical nature of religious communication with Spinoza's 'intellectual love of God', the finite creature finding himself posited in the infinite life of the whole. Hegel's later criticism of Schleiermacher does not change their early agreement, but hinges on their different Christology.

Hegel's central criticism of Kantianism as a whole is this, that Kant was driven from Critique to Critique by a logic of philosophy, which is dialectic. But he did not know that he practiced dialectic in order to make a totality explicit and to make every dimension of it aware of its limitation; and the formal limits of logic, which he showed to be operating in the sciences, and which he declared to be the only valid logic, he did not practice.

The following diagrams show some of the major influences on Hegel and how they begin to be systematically structured:

<i>Plato-Aristotle</i>	<i>Descartes</i>	<i>Spinoza</i>	<i>Kant</i>	<i>Religion</i>
Dialectical Ontology, Anthropology	Dubitans Sum Subject	Substance	<i>Ethics</i> <i>ought</i> versus <i>'is'</i>	<i>Aesthetics</i> Beauty symbolic
		<i>Leibniz</i>	<i>Science</i>	<i>'God'</i> mythical language mystics <i>Schleiermacher</i>
Stoicism			Consciousness	
Skepticism		Philosophy of Life		
Unhappy			Unity of Opposites	<i>Maimon</i>
Consciousness			of rational form	<i>Pestalozzi</i>
Christianity		Lessing	irrational data	<i>Fichte</i>
		<i>Herder</i>		<i>Schelling</i>
			Skeptical	
		Hamann	Positivism	<i>Solger</i>
		Jacobi	<i>Reinhold</i>	
		Romantic Movement	<i>Aenesidemus</i>	

LEVELS	THEORETICAL	PRACTICAL	TOTAL
NON-BEING NEGATIVITY IRRATIONALITY IMMEDIACY IN ABSTRACTION FROM BEING	INFINITE EVENTS QUALITIES RELATIVITY OF THE EMPIRICALLY CONCRETE MORTALITY THEORETICAL SKEPTICISM	MOMENTARY INTERESTS SUBJECTIVE DESIRES, ILLUSIONS, BIAS, INSANITY, DESPAIR NATURAL SOUL PRACTICAL SKEPTICISM.	ENDLESS AND GROUNDLESS PROCESS IN WHICH EVERY APPEARANCE IS ITS DISAPPEARANCE; “ALL FINITES ARE THE ABSOLUTE” PANTHEISM, FINITISM, EMPIRICISM “BAD INFINITY”.
BEING/BECOMING ONE/OTHER FINITE/INFINITE QUANTITY/QUALITY IN ABSTRACTION FROM AND AS APPEARANCE OF ESSENCE	FORMAL LOGIC AND MATHEMATICAL SPACE-TIME ORDER AS BASIS OF NATURAL SCIENCES. ABSTRACT GENERALITY AND GIVEN CONTENTS NATURE AS MECHANISM, CHEMISM. REASON AS INTELLECT (VERSTAND)	ORGANIZATION OF LIFE INDIVIDUATED ACTIVITIES, ENERGIES, FORCES. DISCREET ORGANISMS IN LIVING CONTINUUM DURATIONS IN CHANGING FUNCTIONS NATURE AS TELEOLOGICAL EVOLUTION “SUBJECTIVE MIND” PRAGMATISM	WORLD AS APPEARANCE OF INNER OUTER PSYCHOPHYSICAL PARTICULARITIES IN PARTIALLY SUCCESSFUL STRUGGLE FOR UNITY. RATIONALISTIC AND MORALISTIC DUALISMS “UNHAPPY CONSCIOUSNESS” OF THE ABSOLUTE IN ABSTRACT SEPARATION FROM WORLD.

LEVELS	THEORETICAL	PRACTICAL	TOTAL
ESSENCE (WESEN) UNITY OF IDENTITY/ DIFFERENCE UNIVERSAL/INDIVIDUAL DIALECTICAL RECIPROCITY AWARE OF ITSELF IN	OBJECTIVE SHAPES OF LIFE (WELTGESTALTEN) AS SEEN IN HISTORY, CONCRETE UNIVERSALS, DETERMINING INDIVIDUALS, INDIVIDUALS IDENTIFYING THEMSELVES WITH OBJECTIVE CONTENT	ACTUAL PARTICIPATION IN LIFE OF PEOPLES: MORAL-PERSONAL; LEGAL-PUBLIC; SOCIAL-PROFESSIONAL VALUES, IN BATTLE WITH THEIR CONTRADICTION (EVILS) ETHICS “OBJECTIVE MIND”.	PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND UNITY OF INDIVIDUAL, ETHICAL AND HISTORICAL SELF-MANIFESTATIONS AND DEVELOPMENTS OF MIND. CORRELATIONS OF WORLD-VIEW AND WORLD-VIEWED.
COMPREHENSION (ABSOLUTE IDEA OR “BEGRIFF” OR “VERNUNFT”) “SUBSTANCE IS SUBJECT” “TRUTH IS THE SELF-KNOWLEDGE OF ALL BEING IN THOUGHT”.	ART: CONCRETE UNITY OF MIND AND NATURE, CONTEMPLATED, ENJOYED. BEAUTY: “THE ABSOLUTE IN SENSUOUS APPEARANCE”	RELIGION: PRACTICAL RETIE OF THE WHOLE MAN TO ABSOLUTE. MEDIATED BY MYTHICAL LANGUAGE. TRINITY, CHRISTIAN SYMBOL OF DIALECTIC: “A IS NON-A”.	PHILOSOPHY: UNITY OF ART AND RELIGION IN COMPREHENSION, SELF-UNDERSTANDING OF ALL LEVELS AND VALUES OF CONSCIOUSNESS. “THE TRUTH IS THE WHOLE”.

Privatdozent in Jena

1801-1806

Friendships

Hegel arrived in Jena in January, 1801. He lived together with his friend Schelling who soon afterwards married Caroline Schlegel, then wife of August Wilhelm von Schlegel, translator of Shakespeare and Calderon. Caroline inspired Schelling to his best work. She was a remarkable letter writer and was the social center of the whole romantic group.¹ Her premature death coincided with Schelling's decline soon after he left Jena in 1803.

This first year in Jena is the one and only time in Hegel's life when he deviated from his own steady course of independent thinking. He was under the spell of Schelling's fascinating and brilliant artistry and did not immediately see through this dazzling performance. After Schelling left Jena, Hegel recovered his balance and stated in monumental clarity that Schelling's so-called philosophy of nature was a 'swindle', 'close to insanity', a shallow and artificial formalism without cognitive value.² That Michelet, editor of the fourth edition of Hegel's *Encyclopedia*, inserted many passages from this time when Hegel was imitating Schelling's so-called philosophy of nature, was

1. Ricarda Huch: *Carolinens Leben in ihren Briefen*. Leipzig. Insel, 1914; Ricarda Huch: *Die Romantik*. Leipzig. Haessel, 1916.

2. *Denkgeschichte*, pp. 173-176.

a great disservice; those arbitrary constructions established Hegel's reputation as a charlatan among natural scientists in the 19th century.

Up to this time Hegel's language was a straightforward and pure German. Under Schelling's influence strange Latinizing jargon creeps into his language. This, too, he knew to be a sign of weakness. In a letter to Johann Heinrich Voss in Heidelberg, the translator of Homer, he said that philosophy cannot be genuine if it cannot be expressed clearly in honest and natural words. "I shall try to teach philosophy to express herself in German. If this can be achieved, then it will be much more difficult to dress up flatness in the semblance of profound speech. This mischief of formalism is so handy for ignorance; hiding behind a foreign terminology is a cheap device to impress the laymen."³

Schelling, for his part, saw in Hegel a disciple whom he had helped come to Jena to bolster his own fame. His over-confidence and Hegel's initial willingness to admire made up the first act of an inevitable philosophical tragedy. In 1807 Schelling received from Hegel the first copy of the *Phenomenology of Mind*. In the famous *Preface* he read the death sentence of his own romanticism: vague feelings are no substitute for clear concepts; arbitrary images cannot replace scientific knowledge of nature; personal genius and aristocratic exclusiveness need the discipline of understandable communication in order to philosophize in behalf of all; philosophy is reflective comprehension and must not try to be edifying; the Absolute is not merely an ineffable Beyond, cut off from the rich contents of the world; these contents must not merely evaporate in the 'indifference' of the Absolute, but must

3. Br. I., p. 99f.

be demonstrated to be its own manifestations.

The depth of emotional passion in those ringing passages betrays Hegel's personal involvement; there is an act of repentance, an overcoming of a temptation to which he had momentarily succumbed. Nevertheless he did not mean to be 'personal'—he spoke for truth; and truth to him was not only the basis for any true friendship, but also a shared ground capable of moving friendship to a higher level provided the friend would be willing to enter the dialogue. Schelling was not willing. He simply broke off all communication. It was the same childish petulance which he still showed when he was seventy.⁴

After Hegel's death a reactionary and pious Prussian government called Schelling to Berlin in order to stamp out the atheistic 'dragon's seed of Hegelianism'—this is the reputation which the alleged 'philosopher of the Prussian state' had in Berlin! In this invitation Schelling was informed that 'God himself calls you to this position'. Notes from his lectures on the *Philosophy of Mythology and Revelation* were published by the theologian H. E. G. Paulus together with devastating criticisms. Paulus was a colleague and friend of Hegel in Jena; he preceded him to Nürnberg and again to Heidelberg. His main work is a four volume philological-critical commentary on the New Testament (1800); in Heidelberg he edited the complete works of Spinoza for which he paid the production costs. Schelling went to the courts to protect his philosophy against Paulus' criticism and he lost. Paulus⁵ said that

4. Ernst Benz: *Schelling. Werden und Wirken seines Denkens*. Zürich. Rheinverlag, 1955, p. 62f.

5. In Heidelberg still circulates an anecdote about this Paulus. One night he helped a drunk theology student to find his way home. On parting, the student asked the name of the rescuer. On hearing "Paulus" he stammered, "Oh, then you can tell me. Have the Romans ever answered your letters?"

Schelling always wanted the police to protect his Absolute.

Although Hegel lost the friendship of Schelling, he gained the life-long intimate friendship of *Immanuel Niethammer*, then professor of philosophy at Jena. Together with Fichte he had been involved in the atheism controversy; but unlike Fichte he had not thrown down the gauntlet. Fichte had said in his lectures that the term 'God' meant a moral world-order, which statement drew the wrath of the preachers upon him. This 'atheism' controversy cost Fichte his position. Best of all, Hegel gained the confidence of *Goethe*, which later developed into a lifelong union. What only seemed to be true in the case of Schelling was really true in the relation of Goethe and Hegel. What Goethe expressed in the medium of poetry, Hegel did in the medium of thought.⁶

Disappointments

In Jena Hegel had hoped for relief from his solitude. Of the 52 professors, constituting the faculty of the university, 12 were Professors or *Privatdozenten* in Philosophy. Besides Hegel, J. Fr. Fries and K. Chr. Krause were among those to achieve eminence later. Krause's philosophy, "el Krausismo", became the philosophical background of a strong anti-clerical movement in Spain and Latin America. But after Schelling's departure, Hegel felt more lonely than ever. "Philosophy thrives in solitude" (*Philosophie ist etwas Einsames*⁷), he wrote. "What drew me to Jena, after I surrendered to philosophy, was the presence

6. On this relation of Goethe and Hegel cf. Gustav E. Mueller: *Philosophy of Literature*. N.Y. Philosophical Library, 1948, pp. 149-154. J. Hoffmeister: *Goethe und der Deutsche Idealismus*. Leipzig. Meiner, 1932. Joh. Schubert: *Goethe und Hegel*. Leipzig. Meiner, 1933.

7. Br. I., p. 137.

of a community in which art and science is actual, where everyone cultivates them with zeal and self-activity; such an actuality has the power to elevate a striving spirit and to give to him a higher and truer comprehension of his enterprise. This free interchange of activities, its reality and presence, gives confidence to try oneself and to do one's share" (Hand anlegen).⁸

His second disappointment was his failure as a teacher. Hegel at best had an enrollment of around thirty students. Some semesters he had none at all. Already his reputation of being abstruse and hard to understand began to spread.⁹ But he was also intensely admired and loved by a few students who were able to follow. Also, his power of finding striking expressions was already noted. Sometimes his thought would hit like lightning followed by an awe in the audience. After hearing a lecture on the history of philosophy in which every system was overtaken by its dialectical limitation, a student broke out at the end: "Hegel is like death itself."¹⁰

A story illustrates Hegel as the proverbial "absent-minded philosopher." Thinking it was three o'clock (his regular hour of lecturing) while it was only two, he started lecturing. He became so completely absorbed in his notes and their content that he did not notice it was not his own class before him. The colleague, whose class and hour it was, came a little late; but hearing Hegel's voice, he concluded (since Hegel was known to be punctual) that it must be three o'clock and that he had overslept his afternoon nap, and withdrew. When Hegel's own class showed up at three, Hegel opened his repeat-lecture with the

8. *Ibid.*, pp. 95, 97.

9. Br. I., p. 139.

10. Ros., p. 217.

words: "Gentlemen! The last time we spoke on the certain uncertainty of all sensuous consciousness. I have just verified this with a little experiment."¹¹

In his *personal* life he soon became a recluse and saw of the world only the daily walk between his room and the classroom. As in Tübingen we again hear of drowning his despair in wine. To his wine merchant in Erfurth, where he got his regular keg of wine, Hegel wrote, "Send me your best quality; my regular consumption makes me believe me to be worthy of your best."¹² He also sought solace in the intimate company of his chamber maid. A natural son was born to him. This Karl Ludwig Fischer was later taken up into his family and brought up together with his other two sons. When the "Kleine Hegel" left Jena, Goethe wrote the following verse in his album:

Als kleinen Knaben hab ich dich gesehn
Mit höchstem Selbstvertraun der Welt entgegengehn;
Une wie sie dir im Künftigen begegnet,
So sei getrost von Freundes Blick gesegnet.

I saw you as a little boy
To meet the world in trust and joy:
However she will treat you—try!
Find solace in a good friend's eye.¹³

The life of this Karl Ludwig Fischer as a young man was not known until 1960 when the fourth volume of letters from and to Hegel appeared.¹⁴ He was an unhappy lonely youth who complained bitterly that his father was unjust,

11. Ros., p. 218.

12. Br., p. 68.

13. Fischer II., p. 1214.

14. *Briefe von und an Hegel*. Vol. IV. Meiner Verlag, Holmburg, 1960.

cold and cruel to him. This was the sad psychological background and explains why Karl sought service in the Dutch Foreign Legion. Hegel recommended him to his friend van Gheert in Holland, asking him to assist his son in this transaction. Karl Ludwig Fischer died of tropical disease in the Dutch East Indies.

If we look back on his social and paedagogic failures, the break with Schelling, his loss of philosophical integrity, his unintelligible scribbling, his sorry love affair, and his wine, we see a desperate young man who kept himself from total bankruptcy only by means of his indefatigable work which went on day and night. He described his condition at Jena in letters. In 1810 he wrote to Professor Windischmann, who was working on what was called Aminal Magnetism or Magic, "I am eager to see your work on *Magic*. I confess that I would not dare to delve into this natural spirit or spirit of nature in us . . . what is needed more than anything else for a work of this sort is mental health and a serene, firm disposition. I am convinced that this work of yours has an affinity with your depressed mood—this descent to the obscure region of the soul, where nothing is precise, certain and dependable, where momentary illuminations are next to abysses, all the darker through those flickering hunches and will o' the wisp reflexes—every path broken off in an indeterminable indefiniteness leads us astray and makes us lose direction and self-determination. *I know this psychological condition from my own experience* where our rational nature (*vernunft*) has lost itself in sentiments and interests, in a chaos of appearances; and, although inwardly certain of a goal, nevertheless, it has not reached clarity and has not yet achieved an articulate consciousness of the whole. *I have suffered this melancholic depression*

(*Hypochondrie*) for several years to uttermost exhaustion. (italics mine) Every man may have such a critical moment in his life, the *nightly point of contraction* of his whole existence (*Wesen*), through whose *anxiety* he must be pressed in order to reach a self-assurance by a wholesome reliability of daily work; or, if he has spoiled himself, a satisfaction with his daily duties may at least help him to reach the assurance of an inwardly confirmed and more noble existence in himself.”¹⁵

There are, as usual, numerous passages in Goethe which are very similar to this confession; for example: “I, too, may speak, for I have suffered as anyone; tumbling from highest intuitions of super-earthly essential powers (*Wesen*) to the most complete despair, the unbelief in myself.” (Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre, VIII.)

*Diary*¹⁶

Again Hegel philosophizes with himself in aphorisms confided in his diary. Those notes and aphorisms are important for the historian of his thought. “Philosophy is to say to everything what it (essentially) is.” “Empirical sciences are like the prodigal son at his husks.” Schelling’s romantic naturalism hugs crudest empiricism decorated with formalisms and ‘polarities’, reasonless analogies and drunk thought-lightnings. “A thought-lightning merely imitates the heavenly fire but has no life.” “If the Absolute slithers and falls into water it becomes a fish; but if it falls into thinking, then it becomes so putrid that one should be ashamed of it . . . they should not deny that there is such a thing as logic.”

15. Br., I., p. 314.

16. Dok., pp. 353-375. (All quotations in this section are from this reference unless otherwise noted.)

"Conscience is a moral lantern, proudly carried around on good ways; on evil ways it is blown out." "To copy the trivialities of general culture"—a danger in philosophy. 'Ora et Labora' should be translated as 'Pray and Curse'—labor is a curse of the world and is cursing the world." "The first subjective requirement in the study of philosophy is honesty towards yourself. It is horrifying, how men not only lie to others but to themselves." In studying philosophy "one must have the trust that it is a good thing, better than the consciousness about it. The most harmful snare is the fear that one might fall into errors, which is itself the smug error of indolence; creative growth is the truth." "Comprehension (Vernunft) without reason (Verstand) is nothing, reason without comprehension, something."

Nature is neither to be idealized, personalized, or spiritualized as the Romantic 'swarming-spirits' (Schwärmer) attempt to do; nor must it be seen as a lost and undivine 'fall', or emanation away from the Absolute, as Jakob Böhme, for example, sees it. Against the romantic fairy-tales, nature must be recognized in its otherness or alienation from the spiritual-personal reality of life, and against the mystic attempt to get away from nature. Hegel asserts that the individual is, as such, natural itself and one modification of the life of nature. This natural individual is *potentially* spiritual, which it can prove only by improving or educating his natural self. This process of education, or elevation of the natural self beyond itself, is at the same time the process of the Absolute which enters this painful self-alienation and self-realization in all individuals. "Spirit becomes an alien 'other' to its own self and regains itself in and out of this its own self-estrangement." "Not only the insight that the individual is de-

pendent on the whole is essential; equally essential is also the opposite, that each individual is independent of the whole and is this whole itself"; the whole is wholly in each of its individual manifestations.

It is futile to follow the Stoics who ignore the battle with all the evils and incomprehensible foolishness of this world, because they are 'beyond our power'; it is equally futile to follow the Epicureans who sever their relation with the life in the world in order to eke out a quiet and idyllic happiness in a safe corner. It is equally impossible to *submit* to a blind and brutal world-course which is unquestionably accepted as irresistible power and necessity, or to *rebel* against it in lamenting desperation. The philosopher's dream is to unify "the discord between heart and intellect, heroism and crime, prudence and insanity, force and sighing submission; (to comprehend) the whole society with its miracles and follies, miseries and advantages—but—is that enthusiasm not more than the dream of a ghost-seer?" Can it be justified? "The spirit of nature endowed its favorite children with illusion, which hides from them the concatenation of flourishing and wilting, thriving and destroying." If they live in and with this spirit of nature, they are rewarded, those children, with happiness. "But man can not close his eyes to those torturing questions which are staring at him when he is drawn, willy-nilly into the turmoil of life. The great Why returns. The bold and restless battle with nature is the life of philosophy which regains its wholeness through being torn to pieces."¹⁷ "Not *that* life which shuns its death and preserves its purity from devastation, but that which stands it and preserves its purity in it is the life of

17. Dek., p. 387f.

the spirit. The spirit gains its truth only in finding its own self in the absolute self-fission.”¹⁸

What the deluded children of nature have in their naïve happiness, the wakeful and conscious man regains in his philosophy:

Ja! Dem Gedanken bin ich ganz ergeben
Das ist der Weisheit letzter Schluss:
Nur der verdient sich Freiheit wie das Leben
Der täglich sie erobern muss.

Yes! To this thought I hold with firm persistence
The last result of wisdom stamps it true:
He only earns his freedom and existence,
Who daily conquers them anew.¹⁹

Lectures and the History of Philosophy

Hegel filled hundreds of pages with his lecture notes on ‘systematic philosophy’. They are probably the most abstruse and unintelligible prose ever penned; if we had nothing but them, Hegel would be completely unknown. He never published them. We lose nothing by ignoring them. But he also did something else which was his discovery: that the history of philosophy was philosophy itself. The mature Hegel puts this thought as follows: “The origin and development of philosophy as history is represented in a peculiarly *external* shape of this Science. This shape imparts to the levels of this development of the idea a form of *accidental* sequences and of *merely different* principles and their execution in their systems. But

18. *Phen.*, Preface.

19. *Faust*, II. V. 4 Trans. B. Taylor.

the work-master of all this labor of thousands of years is the One living spirit whose thinking nature it is to make himself conscious of that which he is; in making himself to be his own object, he is at once elevated above that which he was and thus has reached a higher level in himself. History of philosophy, then, shows in part (in its different appearing philosophies) only One philosophy on various *levels* of self-expression; and in part it shows that these particular principles are merely *branches* of one and the same whole, although each principle may be the ground of exclusive systems. The philosophy which is the last one in time is the result of all preceding philosophies and therefore ought to contain the principles of them all; it is, therefore, the richest, most concrete, and most developed, *if it is genuine philosophy.*²⁰ (italics mine.) He began working to appropriate for himself, in patient labor, the wisdom of the past. Goethe formulated the same thought in his Faust:

Das Wahre war schon längst gefunden,
Hat edle Geisterschaft verbunden:
Das alte Wahre, fass es an!

Original, fahr hin in deiner Pracht!
Wie würde dich die Einsicht kränken:
Wer kann was Kluges, wer was Dummes denken
Das nicht dis Vorwelt schon gedacht!

The truth already long since found,
Has noble minds' communion bound:
This ancient truth—appropriate!

20. VIII, pars. 13, 59.

Go hence, magnificent Original—
What grief on thee would insight cast!
Who can think wise or stupid things at all,
That were not thought already in the Past!²¹

Before Hegel came to Jena, he knew Plato well. Now an intense study of Aristotle convinced Hegel that Aristotle was one of the greatest teachers of mankind. He saw in him not only the father of formal logic, but also the father of a dialectical, or ‘speculative’ logic, which allows the comprehension of all possible ultimate or metaphysical standpoints and systems. Hegel is the first great philosopher after Thomas Aquinas, who proclaimed the first-rate importance of the Stagirite.

Publications

Hegel published his first book in July, 1801, six months after arriving and getting settled as well as unsettled. This book was *The Difference Between Fichte's and Schelling's Systems*. After this book was out, Hegel and Schelling published their *Journal of Critical Philosophy* for which Hegel did almost all the work. The *Journal* was to present their ‘speculative’ philosophy and to combat all one-sided ‘isms’ such as empiricism or rationalism, idealism or realism, subjectivism or objectivism. “Our weapons will be called scourges, whips and harlequin’s swords—but all this for the good cause and the glory of God.”²² The term “speculative” is derived from the Latin ‘speculum’ (mirror) and expresses the dialectical conception that mind is the “living mirror of the universe”, as Leibniz had called

21. *Faust*, II, II. I. Trans. by Taylor.

22. Br. I., p. 65.

his monads. In mirroring each individual representation in its unique perspective, the universe is at the same time expressing its own life in and through its own inadequate representations. 'Speculative' philosophy had at long-last found its own logic, which made it a 'Science'. 'Schools' apart from this Logic, henceforth, would be as antiquated as 'schools' of chemistry or physics. The chaotic lawlessness of philosophizing was to cease.

This is the meaning of the opening essay on *The Essence of Philosophical Criticism*. This is followed by a gay skirmish on *How Common-Sense takes Philosophy*, as exemplified by the works of Herrn Krug. The third piece, *On the Relation of Skepticism to Philosophy*, contends that the skeptical doubt is one with every true philosophy, since no true philosophy can rest securely on any fixed or dogmatic position—not even on the fixed and dogmatic position of skepticism. *Faith and Comprehension* summarizes the results of Hegel's long wrestling with the religious problem: religion and philosophy envisage the same Absolute in different media or methods of consciousness. *On Scientific Methods of Natural Right, its Position in Practical Philosophy and its Relation to the Positive Sciences of Law* is the first published outline of Hegel's *Ethics*, later called *Philosophy of Right*.

The last contribution is a plan for a new *Journal of German Literature*. This had a practical background. The *Journal for German Literature*, published in Jena, had been lured away by better financial offers from the Prussian University of Halle, and Goethe was planning a new Journal in Jena to replace the old one. Hegel provided the prospectus. Altogether the 400 pages of his essays are the best introduction to Hegel's crowning achievement of the Jena period, *The Phenomenology of Mind*, which was

written in a few months; the second half in a few weeks under the most trying and pressing circumstances.

While Hegel was writing on the *Phenomenology* in the summer vacation of 1806, the relation between Napoleon and Prussia became more and more strained. On the seventeenth of September Hegel wrote to friend Niethammer who had left the university to enter the Bavarian ministry of education and church-administration, of the all-encompassing worry and anxiety that war may be imminent. "This deviltry (der Gottseibeius) will knock us scholars the hardest." This presentiment was all too correct. On the thirteenth of October the old autocratic Prussia was vanquished in the battle of Jena. The town would have burnt down had not the absence of wind saved it. Hegel was plundered;²³ even his pen and writing papers were taken. Threatened with murder, he noticed the 'cross of honor' on one of the soldiers. Appealing to it, he said that the honor of a French soldier should also protect the honor of a German scholar—an act which saved his life. From his window he watched the French soldiers camp in the streets of Jena and saw the parks trampled down by their horses. The best his government could do for him was to give him ten dollars to save him from immediate starvation.

And all during this time he was frantically trying to finish his *Phenomenology* and get the manuscripts safely to his publisher in Bamberg. He had a promise from the publisher that half of his royalty on a thousand copies would be paid after receipt of the first half of the manuscript. But the publisher reduced the number of copies in view of the strain and stress of war-time to 750, and he refused to pay on the grounds that he did not know

23. Br. I., p. 123.

whether that which he had received was half of the complete work or not. Hegel needed the money most desperately since the rest of his savings had been used up and his annual salary as assistant professor, which he had received after five years as *Privatdozent* and unpaid assistant professor was—"say and write it down"—100 dollars. Friend Niethammer had warranted to the publisher the full amount for the edition if he would pay Hegel the first half of the royalties, and if Hegel would send him the second half by the eighteenth of October (this was on the sixth of October); but the last part was not even written yet: "it will infallibly be done, worthiest friend." On the thirteenth Jena became the theater of war. Hegel wrote feverishly day and night in "this hour of anxiety, night of horror," and sent the rest of the manuscript on the 20th. "If this part should get lost, I could hardly help myself; it would be difficult to restore it."

In all those tribulations his political attitude remained the same as in Frankfurth. As a German patriot he resented the weakness of Germany; as political thinker he saw the superiority of Napoleon over the Prussian system. "Napoleon is a man whom it is impossible not to admire . . . I saw the emperor, this world-soul . . ."

The university "pretends to open in November", but it was bankrupt; and Hegel was without means to support himself. The immense accomplishment of his *Phenomenology* was not the beginning of a secured academic career, but marked ironically the end of one. Hegel became editor of a local newspaper in Bamberg, where he could at the same time see his *Phenomenology* through the printing process. "Those guys have treated my pages like lots in a lottery; to straighten out this perfect mess will give me the greatest trouble." Before accompanying

Hegel to his new position as a newspaper editor, let us look back on the main results in those publications, in relation to his philosophical development.

*De Orbitis Planetarum*²⁴

According to the custom of German universities, Hegel had to submit a work to receive the permission to teach, the *venia legendi*. Following a suggestion of Schelling, he submitted a Latin treatise on the Planetary System: *De Orbitis Planetarum*. This comes as a surprise, although in his notes we hear occasionally of studies in physical and mathematical sciences. Nevertheless he shows himself in possession of accurate knowledge of Kepler's and Newton's systems. He became a member of the Natural-Scientific and the Mineralogical societies in Jena. He also offered courses in mathematics. It is, therefore, not a rash excursion into foreign territory, but a competent first public statement of natural-scientific interests. At the same time it is an experiment. Can the dialectical method, developed in and reflecting on cultural and historical problems, be applied to nature? The dissertation is Hegel's first attempt to see in nature a mirror for his dialectical unity of opposites; and in the life of nature the analogy to the life of the spirit.

The planetary system is understood as a whole in which every member is both defining the whole and is defined by it. Thus understood, the system is an *analogy* of an organic-living whole, where all organs in mutual independence as well as interdependence define the organism and are defined by it. Hegel found this (originally Greek) philosophy of nature in his Suabian countryman Kepler;

24. The following quotations are from I., pp. 3-29.

he defended it against Newton, because in Kepler the qualitative character of this unique planetary system is preserved in its individual qualitative members. The Newtonian method overlooks this qualitative uniqueness of the system in favor of a purely mathematical and quantitative relation of fictitious bodies in general. Mathematical physics abstracts quantitative relation of quantitative magnitudes (mass, distance, motion) from this unique qualitative whole, which is perfectly legitimate and successful provided these relations are not confused with the actuality of the system or believed to be the 'reason' for the existence of the system.

Hegel preferred Kepler to Newton because Kepler saw the planetary system as the expression of living energies which are in mutual interaction; whereas Newton speaks of abstract laws of attraction and of repulsion, formulating forces working ab extra on dead or 'inert matter'. Mathematical hypotheses describing the patterns of behavior between the planets are confused, Hegel thinks, with prescriptions of how they *must* behave. But mathematical descriptions are no reasons of existence since they are external to the facts they describe. Only that can be real which acts or exerts effects on others in reciprocity. Furthermore, reality is not, as Newton assumes, dead or physical. Living energies appear as physical images when perceived from the outside. The sun and the planets are active-reactive agents, both in themselves and for each other. Nature is analogous to life whose reality is always identical with being active and reactive. Nature can *appear* 'dead' only to a 'blind science' which describes externally those sensuous images present to the senses (*Caeco studio simulacrum verarum philosophiae notionum quaerens*) which, in abstraction from their activity, are

indeed that which we mean by 'dead'; Newton's 'inertia' thus expresses the perfect passivity and indifference of his mathematical materialism. This is the background for the chapter on 'reason' and its 'laws' in the *Phenomenology of Mind* which express the mathematical behavior of forces.

In a footnote on the last page of *De Orbitis Planetarium*, Hegel added a remark about the planetary distances which has "nothing to do with philosophy" (ad philosophiam nullomodo pertinet). In it he says that if the hitherto observed distances of the planets is *assumed* to be factually correct and show greater distance between Mars and Jupiter than between the other planets, then the old Platonic-Pythagorean geometrical series *would* be more fitting to describe proportional distances than an arithmetical progression. This hypothetical and philosophically irrelevant footnote has become one of the most darling items of the Hegel Legend, which alleges that Hegel had "construed apriori the impossibility of a planet which was already discovered." This legend belongs "to that peculiar manner which rejoices in finding something depressing in outstanding men." The astronomers, not Hegel, 'speculated apriori' that there 'must' be another planet between Jupiter and Mars in order to 'obey' their assumed arithmetical 'law'; and the planet Ceres, observed by the astronomer Piazzi in Palermo, seemed for a moment to favor the astronomer's hypothesis which was perfectly in accord with Hegel's statement that facts must be sought "ex experientia et per inductionem". But later on there was another planet, Neptune (and still later, hundreds of tiny planets, and the planetoids or asteroids) which messed up the neatness of the conception that planets *must* follow the dictates of mathematical reason.

Hegel's philosophical concept of nature comprehends this irrationality or 'messiness'. Dialectical nature is 'rational' or understandable *and* irrational or not understandable, partly organic or organized, or partly inorganic and poorly organized. In Hegel's dissertation this irrationality, later called "bad infinity", of experience is that obstacle which a 'nothing but' quantitative approach can never completely rationalize. The indefinite number of stars is compared with a 'rash breaking out all over the skin in innumerable red dots' or with 'swarms of flies'.

Both in Hegel's study of man and in his study of nature, the dialectical concrete comprehension comprises both the rational order as well as the irrational disorder, the qualitative-organic whole as well as its quantitative-mechanical aspect. This comprehension, and not the empirical distances of planets, is the Thesis of *De Orbitis Planetarum*. In it Goethe found a welcome succor for his identical fight against Newton. Goethe, like Hegel, defended a qualitative, expressive world of real colors against a reduction of them to prism-angles, wave or corpuscle theories, all of which had nothing to do with the living experience and meeting of the colors except that the latter may indeed be subjected to Newton's abstract quantitative analysis. Goethe characterizes the affinity of a purely quantitative calculation with a dead nature (physicalism, materialism, sensate empiricism which are also argued against in *De Orbitis*) in the following verses:

Daran erkenn ich den gelehrten Herrn!
Was ihr nicht tastet, steht euch meilenfern;
Was ihr nicht fasst, das fehlt euch ganz und gar;
War ihr nicht rechnet, glaubt ihr, sei nicht wahr;

Was ihr nicht wägt, hat für euch kein Gewicht;
Was ihr nicht münzt, das meint ihr, gelte nicht.

By that, I know the learned lord you are!
What you don't touch, is lying leagues afar;
What you don't grasp is wholly lost to you;
What you don't reckon, think you, can't be true;
What you don't weigh, it has no weight, alas!
What you don't coin, you're sure it will not pass.²⁵

25. *Faust*, II. I, 2. Trans. Taylor.

The cool and skeptical attitude of both Hegel and Goethe towards Newtonian physics is in complete disagreement with Kant's uncritical admiration of it.

A Thesis

According to a hoary medieval tradition, Hegel had to offer some 'theses' and defend them publicly against any opponent's in order to complete his *Habilitation*. Hegel's theses were an odd assortment: obvious nonsense from Schelling—for example, "quadratum est lex natura, triangulum mentis," (the square is the law of nature, the triangle is the law of the mind); the 'definition' of the magnet as a *natural pendulum*, (again in Schelling's manner), and the like. More serious was "the idea is the synthesis of infinite and finite, and the whole of philosophy consists in such ideas." This is a transformation of Kant's saying that philosophy is coextensive with synthesis a priori. Kant himself worked out this 'idea' in the case of the synthesis apriori of logical form and of perceptual material constituting scientific knowledge, reason applied to what is given in experience. Hegel had Kant in mind

in his dialectical statement that all philosophy consists of such unities of opposites.

The most important thesis is the first one, a paradox: "Contradictio est regula veri, non contradictio falsi." We may imagine the discussion to have gone approximately as follows: *Opponent*: Help heavens, I am near fainting! Contradiction is the rule of truth, not the refutation of falseness! The rankest heresy! The most shameless sophistry! That undermines the whole of common sense and all science! How can we think at all if our concepts are not clear, distinct and identical? A concept cannot stand for or mean something and at the same time stand for or mean that which contradicts it. A predicate cannot be predicated and also not be predicated of the same subject! A proposition cannot be true if it contradicts itself or is contradicted by another proposition claiming to be true about the same content. And where are we if we rule out the contradiction against what is false? This thesis is the principle of madness and of absurdity! What is contradictory must be excluded from truth. Contradiction can not be 'the rule of truth', and must remain the rule to detect and to refute falseness, error, inconsistency. *Hegel*: I have learned all this in high school. I do not deny that the law of identity and non-contradiction is the formal principle which is valid as long as you think finite objects. Philosophy, in other words, understands quite well how finite reason (*Verstand*) proceeds when it wants to clarify an unclear given situation. And as long as this formal logical thinking does not claim to think reality, we are in agreement. Notice: Your will to be correct and not incorrect is a real striving *towards* a unity or harmony which contains in itself its own opposite, namely, unclarity, uncertainty, non-unity, from which you want to get away!

As a real process, you are a living contradiction yourself; your struggle to be logical, to achieve a formal non-contradiction, shows that you *are not* and *do not have* this formal perfection which would be the death of all striving. Contradiction as this struggle, therefore, is the law of real knowledge, of living reality. And notice further that in your effort to keep contradiction out, in the very act of forbidding it, you practice contradiction; you practice what you want to keep away from you.

I do not say that 'white is black' or that 'right is wrong'; that would be sophistic indeed; but I do say that 'white' is what it is by being at the same time 'not black'. The one is not known for what it is in itself without also knowing what it is not; this negative relation is essential to each side, for their being what they are and what they are not. And 'right', likewise, would not be known as 'right' if at the same time it were not also related to its opposite, 'wrong'. In reality such opposites form many types of concrete struggling wholes.

In the isolating abstraction of reason, concepts are contradictory and mutually exclusive. But concrete reality is not made up of abstract concepts, although they play an analytical part in a concrete and complex whole. All life and all reality is the unity of such opposites; they become incompatible contradictions in the thin and artificial, isolating thought of intellectualism and rationalism.²⁶ In its domain and for it, the law of identity and non-contradiction is valid; this implies that rationalism is untrue to the concrete and infinite whole of reality.²⁷ Dialectic has no quarrel with formal logic. If I say that reality is a con-

26. See a similar comment in *Rosenkranz*, pp. 156-157.

27. Compare pars. 66-71 in Ency. of 1817, my ed.: Hegel. *Ency. of Phil. Phil. Lib. N.Y.*, pp. 117-119.

crete totality of its own opposites, then it is false to say that this is not the case. Reason retains its legitimate function also in philosophy. Reason (*Verstand*) is the principle common to all and every 'ism', because reason is the principle of abstraction, isolation and fixation. It is the function of the negative dialectic to show that every 'ism' runs into self-destructive antinomies if it tries to represent the whole; and it is the function of 'speculative' or comprehensive dialectic (*Vernunft*) to tie reason back to that concrete and living whole within which it has its legitimate role of analysis to play.

The Difference Between Fichte and Schelling²⁸

The center of Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason", Hegel points out, is a dialectical synthesis of opposites. There is a strict and essential correlation between perception and that which is perceived between the mathematical pure intuition of space-time relationships in which perceived appearances appear and are located or measured and between the logical forms of the reason which orders phenomena of nature in the categorical forms of unifying concepts and their relations. It is therefore philosophically irrelevant whether nature is described idealistically through those unifying functions of the soul, or realistically through structures or perceived and thought objects.

But this whole sphere of object-thinking, or nature as the infinite problem of scientific research, is not identical with reality. It is limited by the true and ever-actual infinity or totality of life. Reality as 'substance' or totality of

28. The following quotations are from I., pp. 33-168, unless otherwise indicated.

all functions is also the *subject* of all its own functions in which the scientific reason is one. The dialectical essence of reality breaks open and is present in the human subject where actuality and self-awareness together with *being* this conscious self are inseparable.

Fichte grasped this truth, not primarily in theoretical reason, but rather in the moral-practical struggle. I am not what I *ought* to be. He shares with Kant the error that this practical reality is something beyond logical self-comprehension. Kant limited logic to the formal logic of object-sciences and object-constructions. He did not see that in doing this he followed a philosophical logic which limited the logic of object-thinking as only one of logic's possible spheres. In sharing this error Fichte thinks of the subject as merely practical, that is, as opposing the given nature as something that had to be handled, manipulated, overcome, cultivated—as a *Not I*. He thus confuses the absolute subject which is just as present in the unconscious world of nature as in the Conscious world of man, the practical-moral subject; he sees self-activity only in contrast to nature. The point to realize is, however, that the Absolute as dialectical unity of subject and object, as othering or objectifying itself and yet remaining itself in this its own self-manifestation, is just as present in nature as in history, just as present in the scientific struggle with objects, just as present in the moral struggle within oneself. In seeing the Absolute revealed only in the moral-practical self or subject, Fichte unduly over-emphasizes the moral side of reality thereby producing an unbalanced idealism. In confusing the practical-moral and human subject with the absolute whole, the latter is placed in the ridiculous position of always striving to realize itself without ever being able to accomplish what it ought to accomplish.

Fichte's self *ought* to become itself, but this very form of a moral ought forever is in its own way; it is a self-contradiction. If the self would become what it ought to become, then it would cease to have a task; yet, having a task to perform according to Fichte's moralism, it is the essence and nature of being a practical subject.

Schelling, then, is credited with having corrected this error and having rescued a living and organic nature from its being relegated to a mere material of intellectual or moral duties. Nature is not only an object of human manipulations, but it is a manifestation of the one encompassing reality which is just as present in it as it is present in human culture. The dialectical structure of reality, being a living unity of opposites and of levels of its self-manifestations, is the one and the same in all that is. To work out this essential dialectical structure of reality which pervades all spheres of natural and social or individual reality is the task of the logic of philosophical self-knowledge, and this is dialectic.

The sphere of human practice is no less limited than the sphere of scientific object-construction. Philosophy comprehends them both in their limitations but cannot be identified with either. If it is identified with finite practice, it sinks to the level of a futile and hectic pragmatism and moralism; if it is identified with the logic of empirical scientific methods, it becomes an empty logical formalism or logical positivism, the standpoint Hegel sees in Reinhold.

The spheres, in which the dialectical totality of reality gains a clearance and a self-conscious existence, are the spheres of art, religion and philosophy, which three together define the absolute spirit. This spirit appears in both historical epochs of the human development and in

e analogous individual experiences of consciousness in the individual—a correlation worked out in the *Phenomenology of Mind*.

Art is a creative activity. On one hand, it is objective; the work of art is a natural object which seems to speak the language of nature; on the other hand, it is subjective, an expression of a self giving shape to itself. Both sides fuse into a perfected totality, symbol both of life and of the absolute totality. Further, the work of art is not only individual, but as production of genius it is universal and belongs to all mankind. It is a concrete universal.

Religion intuits the eternal process of God becoming human and at the same time cancelling his finitude. Referring to Schleiermacher's *Discourses on Religion* (1799), Hegel sees with Schleiermacher the elevation of the individual to the absolute totality in such a way that the whole is wholly present in each of its individuations, and at the same time transcends all in its own eternal life; religion is this "living intuition (*Anschauung*) of the absolute life."

The Absolute (the dialectical totality of universal truth and individual life, of spirit and nature, of subject and object) is present and breaks through both in art and in religion; but both these forms of the Absolute are leaning toward or emphasizing one side of the whole more than the other side: Art leans toward the objective side, and consciousness is absorbed in the work of art; religion leans more toward the subjective side, and the eternal dialectical life of God is felt in the innermost core of the heart as its own eternal story. *Philosophy* is the self-comprehension of both as well as of lower levels of understanding and of reality. Philosophy discovers and proclaims itself.

Philosophical comprehension, like nature or art or re-

ligion, produces itself in plastic shapes of life in which it recognizes its own life and power. It is neither a sum of objective informations (Kenntnis) which can be learned nor an interesting peculiarity of some odd originals. Its 'object' is the one and only reality itself, which is neither object alone nor subject alone but a concrete and full infinity, a totality which necessarily includes and requires living participation. But this true infinity of reality sinks, becomes its own 'other' in visible historical appearance. It becomes 'positive'. It may be taken as the given and external opinion of historical philosophers who translated their vision into words and actions. Taken externally, the inner life of truth is hidden, and history becomes a collection of mummies in a museum. Intellectual object-thinking or reason looking at philosophies thus finds its own essence which is fixation, death, abstract externality. Such externalizing knowledge sees itself in the symbol of a straight line of perfectability and progress ad infinitum, as if philosophy were one of the 'mechanical arts'. But the masters of philosophy are not merely predecessors for successors. If philosophical comprehension is the appearance or self-manifestation of the Absolute, which it indeed is, then every philosophy is and contains this self-realization and self-knowledge; it expresses this in philosophical truth which remains eternally the same although the historical manners and statements differ.

The personal life, the living-individual shape of comprehension, is the building material of an age; and this dedication which has the courage to sacrifice itself for philosophy, the true living individuality of philosophy, must not be mistaken for empirical peculiarities. Of course, only one who is aware in himself of nothing but psychological peculiarities can see nothing else in the his-

tory of philosophy. Everyone sees what he deserves to see.

The bottomless abyss and groundlessness of mere finite peculiarities is the very ground of philosophy. "In the groundlessness of limitations and peculiarities, philosophy grasps its own ground in itself." This is like Faust saying to Mephisto: "In your nothing I hope to find my All." (What appears as death and negation for a finite consciousness wishing to cling to some favorite "ism" or pastime) is precisely the true infinite which is always present and which takes those toys out of philosophical childish hands.

History of philosophy is the practicing of love. In every true philosopher philosophy itself recognizes her own flesh and blood and spirit, her essential existence; every true philosophy has the infinite totality in its system, like a work of art. Every true philosophy wants to be reborn in congenial minds not in order to be surpassed, but to be saluted—just as Shakespeare does not surpass Sophocles, because in both the tragic world-view is equally, but uniquely and differently, expressed in the material circumstances of different cultures.

Philosophy emerges out of the experience of discords and incoherences. The absolute harmony of the infinite totality, felt by the heart, is not present in experience. Present in experience are, on the contrary, dualisms of intellectual form and given content, of moral 'ought' and factual 'is', and the incompatible claims of practical parties which crowd each other off the scene. The naïve consciousness has a touching faith in the concrete reality of its immediate surrounding neighbors and concerns. It is living concretely and is thus in immediate touch with the same reality which is philosophy's ultimate and encompassing vision. But the immediate consciousness of com-

mon-sense hates to be reminded of these incomprehensible discrepancies of experience: they would necessitate its coming to realize the necessity of philosophy.

The power of the scientific intellect needs philosophy for its own good; it has produced an artificial world out of its own artifacts and specializations, a world in which the harmony and wholeness of a personal spiritual existence is threatened with extinction. The dumb longing and desperate boredom in this scientific world shows the need for spiritual freedom. "When the power of unification of life is disappearing from it, and opposites have lost their living relation of give and take (*Wechselwirkung*) and are fixed in independence, the need for philosophy emerges."

The service of philosophy, on the one hand, makes the opposites more articulate, states them in their radical and general form; but, on the other hand, philosophy also shows their incompleteness and overcomes their artificial isolation from one another. Such opposites as spirit and matter, soul and body, faith and intellect, freedom and necessity, and so on, are to be shown as necessary aspects of the one and identical life which can be itself only by producing such polarities. Once they are seen to be nothing by themselves and in isolation against each other, the harmony of life is restored in this, its own self-comprehension. "The firmer and the more dazzling reason builds its edifice of civilization, the more anxious becomes the longing of life, imprisoned in its own production, to regain its freedom. As self-comprehension, life steps back and overcomes its particularities, sees them all as related to the Absolute, and thus comprehended and posited as partial appearances of the whole." Intellectualistic specialists in their secret feeling of emptiness (*Gehaltlosigkeit*) are

afraid of philosophy and will hate and ridicule her. But since they cannot live without her either, they will try to debase philosophy into the handmaiden of their particular interests.

Philosophy's worst enemies are her false friends. To remain engaged in a critical, dialectical battle with them belongs inextricably to her life and task. This task will be forever oriented in her own ultimate and metaphysical vision: to unite the opposites of finitude and infinity, of time and eternity, of being and nonbeing, of yes and no; the mediation of such opposites is not only the life of philosophical reflection, but it is also the life of reality itself. To abstract from such contradictions is to isolate the real self from its real life. "The Absolute produces itself in philosophical reflection for consciousness. It becomes through this (dialectical battle) an objective totality, a whole of knowledge, an organization of cognitive spheres. In this organization each part is at the same time the whole because it subsists only through its relation to the Absolute. As a part which has other parts outside of itself, it is limited and is what it is only through this non-being the others; isolated and limited, it is defective; meaning and significance accrue to it only through its connection with the whole." For those who refuse to enter this process of dialectical self-limitation and self-transcendence, the infinite totality of the real is like a vast night with surrounding points lighted up by a momentary consciousness. "Through philosophy, this night of the fixed intellect becomes the noonday of life."

If one finite manifestation of the Absolute is treated as key to reality, we have a philosophical *dogmatism*. A finite manifestation can never be absolutized; it is what it is only because it is also conditioned by that which it is not.

The Absolute is never identical with its appearance, and it is never anything apart from its appearance. The Absolute cannot be fixed and isolated as a mere negation in which all concrete differences simply disappear and evaporate; this would treat the Absolute again with the intellect which always fixes and isolates. Appearance is no less real than the reality whose appearance it is. The non-being of the Absolute also absolutely is. This is a first warning against Schelling's conception of the Absolute as a mere indifference, in which all empirical differences vanish. Idealism, which absolutizes subjectivity, is no less dogmatic than realism which absolutizes reality apart from the subject. "If unity of a world-view is accomplished only by denying one of the opposites then it is irrelevant whether we deny the subjective as real or whether we deny the objective as real. Their oppositeness is in our consciousness, and the reality is thereby just as much in one as in the other. The pure subjectivity is no less an abstraction than pure objectivity." "Thinking is the spontaneous relation of such opposites, and this relation consists in positing both as equally real. If idealism stresses the unity of consciousness, then realism may just as well stress the duality. Both propositions have the same rank."²⁹ The same must be said about the opposition of rational form and living content or of time and eternity. The true concept of time is not an indefinitely prolonged process; eternity is at all times its timeless presence.

29. W.I., p. 88. Hegel slipped once—but that was sufficient for the Hegel legend to grow on! In paragraph 45 of the second edition of his *Encyclopedie* the absolute totality, in which all finite or one-sided realities have their ground and their Nothing, is termed IDEA and its philosophy, "absolute idealism." Oh joy! Since then all textbooks are quite sure that Hegel is an "absolute idealist." That dialectic precludes logically the possibility to absolutize any 'ism', whether 'idealism' or 'realism' or 'Hegelianism', has escaped those pigeonholes!

Nature and human historical culture or spirit are not two realities since there is only one and the same reality present in both; nor must their dialectical unity be misunderstood as an uncritical mixture: the Absolute is not a juxtaposition of nature and mind (*Nebeneinander*). Personal and teleological categories should not interfere in the sciences dealing with physical phenomena; and physical explanations for the teleological reality of mind, such as "fiber theories of consciousness," are equally misplaced. If nature is seen (as it is in Kant's *Critique of Judgment*) as a living and active energy full of imaginative creativity, or as inner energies producing outer, perceptible effects, then nature is understood in analogy with the mind. If it is seen merely externally from the point of view of scientific constructions, then such rational object-constructions remain as arbitrary and external to nature since nature remains irrationally contingent or indifferent towards such partial and relative identities. Arbitrariness and contingency (*Willkür* and *Zufall*) are categories which negate the illusion of *rationalism* that the world as object for reason is necessary and rational.

Materialism is the dogmatic standpoint which absolutizes physical external appearance, regardless of the life or activity whose appearance the physical-external aspect originally was. This standpoint may draw its energy out criticizing a false spiritualism, an *ideology*, and may express an indignation over such false idealizations. In this energy which refuses to accept dead masks for life or call that which is dead dead, materialism may be superior to an empirical idealism or psychologism which wallows in mere subjective and private feelings without scientific or philosophical worth and significance. The French materialism of the eighteenth century is in that sense more

valuable and significant than the German pietistic psychologism of the same time.

In *ethics* Hegel criticizes Kant's and Fichte's *moralism*. If the moral law is construed as a general rule and the moral ought as a command, then the infinite individuations of life and the concreteness of social and historical wholes, in which individuals act, are disregarded. Moralism is a perennial self-contradiction because one side of the moral life is absolutized at the expense of the other, although it surreptitiously appeals to the same individuality and concreteness of life which it tries to suppress. Morality becomes a party against other parties; this means that it is not a true absolute at all, but a relativity which exaggerates its partial function. The end of such moralistic ethics can be only in a totalitarian police state in which there is no end of suspicious supervision and rules and regulations. This is indeed shown to be the case in the consistency with which Fichte constructs his socialistic police state. All forms of merely formal reason promise more than they can fulfill. Against this endlessness of a process of ruling and being ruled Hegel raises his old ideal of a living and beautiful community of self-active and interdependent members.

Philosophy emerges, ethically speaking, out of the corruption of its own time, in order to restore man to his own integrity and to preserve the ideal of a harmonious totality of life, which has been torn to shreds.

The significance of Hegel's first book, *De Orbitis Planetarum*, should now be sufficiently clear. In it Hegel discovered that philosophy has its own logic according to which it inevitably and always proceeds, but on which it has rarely reflected. Once discovered, however, philosophy cannot go back to the chaos of "schools" and abstract

"isms", for it has become what Hegel calls '*Science*'. Reality is a concrete unity of contrary and contradictory opposites or self-distinctions without which it could not be alive and could not become conscious of itself. All those opposites are such that one cannot be what it is without distinguishing itself from that which it is not. Negatively stated: *if philosophy is to render an account of reality through logical reflection on the essential insights in art and history, religion and myth, mathematical and empirical sciences, practical and moral activities, all of which help to make reality articulate, then she could not accomplish this if she were to identify her own encompassing Logic with the procedures of any one of those particular contents of human consciousness.*

The Essence of Philosophical Critique

Hegel's essays in the *Critical Journal* introduce us to his philosophizing better than his later works, for here he crosses swords with his enemies and critics. What has been said against him later on is taken care of by him in his polemics.

The Absolute is the idea of an all-comprehensive reality. It is always a dialectical identity of essential opposites, of which one side by itself alone is nothing without its own opposite sides. If those abstract and one-sided aspects become fixed in standpoints or 'Isms' they produce formal-logical self-contradictions. The power of such one-sided fixations or abstractions is the intellect or reason (*Verstand*). If they are understood as complementary aspects in their concrete whole, they are preserved as opposites, but they lose their rationalistic isolation. The Absolute, then, is the dialectical unity of ideality and factuality, of

subject and object, of universality and individuality, of Oneness and Manifold, of Time and Eternity, of contrary spheres of its life and of contradictory struggles within each of those spheres. Thus, for example, the aesthetic and the practical life of the spirit are contrary spheres, yet they are manifestations of one and the same human mind, and in each of these spheres there are struggles of more or less perfect self-realizations appearing as contradictory values of good and bad, beautiful and ugly, and so on. Reality as a whole, the Absolute, called 'God' in Western religions, or Nature by philosophers like Spinoza, is akin to mind because both mind and reality have an analogy or similarity in being both dialectical: this is the meaning of calling the Absolute 'Mind' (*Geist*). This does not absolutize the finite human mind which is known in its limitation. Reality as a whole must be thought as dialectical totality if the presence of dialectical structures in nature and in history are to be intelligible.

The finite mind believes this idea of philosophy threatens to annihilate its false certainties, so it fights back. Philosophy is thus plunged into a tragic conflict. If the Absolute manifests itself in all finite spheres of nature and history, then its *form* must be '*science*' or '*system*'. 'Philosophy must be scientific or systematic' means that it has found its own logic. It can neither be an abstract logical formalism, nor can it consist of personal hunches or 'schools' or 'authorities'. This idea is the center of the opening essay of the Journal: *The Essence of Philosophical Critique*.

"Philosophical critique is based on the faith that true philosophical knowledge is possible." That there is Reality is not an arbitrary or hypothetical assumption, but an absolute and apodictic presence, the denial of which is

absolutely meaningless. Reality *is*, regardless of whether we affirm it or deny it; it is beyond 'realism' or 'idealism'. Truth is the ontological presence or clearance of Reality in us; it is its own self-affirmation across any hypothetical finite 'standpoints' or 'isms'.

"Critique requires a standard which is as independent of the judge as well as of that which is judged. Without this idea of philosophy as its own condition and presupposition it would be condemned forever to be nothing but opposition of one subjectivity against another subjectivity." For those who do not see this, such an *assumption* inevitably seems to be a *presumption*, a dictate of a party. But in defending their subjectivity by calling the other merely subjective, they contradict themselves; they condemn what they are—a mere party against another mere party. Such is the irony in trying to evade truth.

Truth is not outside concrete comprehension (Vernunft) or apart from reality whose life becomes transparent in it. Philosophy is self-knowledge of reality in us. And as reality and comprehension are one, so philosophy is one. The many historically conflicting 'schools' of philosophy are modifications of the one living reality which expresses its fullness and richness in gradual self-manifestations. Reality is too rich to be coined out all at once. It is life and process, and so its conscious self-realization is life and process. Reality is individuated, and philosophy therefore appears in unique and individual shapes of its life. But it is not the possession of any individual; there are no property rights in philosophy; and it is improper, therefore, to give it proper names, like Kantianism, etc. The individual appearances of the Idea, furthermore, must not be confused with peculiarities or psychologistic subjectivities; it is one of the most important functions of philo-

sophical system, to emancipate us from the temporal dross of circumstances and psychological barriers. It is possible to understand the essential contribution which a thinker has made to the unfolding process of philosophy better than he understood himself. It is also possible to enjoy and appreciate philosophy in 'beautiful souls' who naïvely but honestly express reality in their genuine and individual work without being reflectively aware of what they are doing. There is philosophy in the world, which may be much better than that found in 'schools' and learned professors of philosophy who are no philosophers. A 'philosophy' which does not know that its intentional object is always reality-as-a-whole is no philosophy, but a special science or one-sided interest.

Philosophy as critique, or *criticism*, admits the Absolute but claims that truth and reality are beyond our human weakness. The whole is only made for a God; we have to be content with modestly chewing on empirical husks. This standpoint has the advantage of being able to appeal to Kant. Kant remarks in the Preface of the first edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, that he had to limit knowledge to empirical sciences in order to make possible faith. This, Hegel maintains, is a misunderstanding of Kant's metaphysical intention; it creates a vacuum which is promptly filled by revelations, ecstasy, feeling, prophecies, and ghost-seers. Philosophy is logical reflection, even if it expresses an irrational or supra-rational reality as philosophy. The *dualism* between finite minds and the infinite reality presupposes and uses an absolute knowledge which it at the same time denies. How can it contrast the finite and the infinite if it does not know the infinite to exist? To distinguish is to relate. An empty Absolute outside and apart from this relation is

no Absolute at all, but a relative ‘other’ made finite by excluding the infinite from it. On the other hand, the finite ceases to be a finite and becomes a pseudo-absolute if it is not known in its limitation in the whole. The finite can neither replace the Absolute, because in trying to expand to a whole it explodes. Nor can it keep the Absolute outside and apart from itself; the more it keeps itself apart and in isolation, the more its finitude, its mortality, its non-being, becomes apparent to itself. Critical dualism thus, against its own intention, helps to make the dialectic of opposites articulate.

But if non-philosophy does not recognize the idea of philosophy at all, what then? What if non-philosophy proclaims its disinterest in truth and reality as its truth and reality? In that case, Hegel says, the philosophical critic can merely repeat and nail down that this is, indeed, not philosophy. We take those who deny philosophy by their word that philosophy is indeed no good for them. This rottenness, then, *is* what philosophy is *for* them. Since, on the other hand, even the most worthless position still *is*, the most ‘positive’ non-philosophy must be seen as belonging, in its negativity, to the life of comprehension. The combating of that which is evil, untrue, and negative is, and belongs to, the life of truth which cannot keep alive apart from its struggle with that which denies *Geist*.

The second essay, entitled *How Common Sense takes Philosophy—exemplified in the works of Mr. Krug*, shows Hegel’s ruthless sarcastic power as a critic. Professor Krug had demanded that Hegel should “deduce his writing-pen from the Absolute.” Hegel replies that Mr. Krug’s writing-pen is sufficiently deduced by pointing out that nonsensical sentences concerning the Absolute were written by it. And if he wants to describe empirical “facts of conscious-

ness" as an empirical metaphysics, then the eight volumes planned by him will not be sufficient because he will need an innumerable number of volumes. His pen will be kept busy till doomsday. The name "Krug" in German means "jug", and Hegel was afraid that this jug will go to its empiristic well until it burst!

Philosophical criticism in the form of sarcasm, Hegel admits, is going below the level of a philosophical critique because it has to meet the opponent on his own sub level. This low-level business is forced upon philosophy if the one criticized does not recognize the idea of philosophy as a common court of appeal; then the judgment appears to be an external dictation to him. The meaning of the judgment remains, nevertheless, to convert him to philosophy by treating him with his own medicine: what to be estranged from philosophy really is and looks like. Let him see his own 'flatness' objectively—let us 'rub it in'.

Sophistic twaddle, which looks like philosophy without being so, throws around fashionable terminologies in order to bluff a gullible public which is awed by big words. Eclecticism binds its picked-up flowers into its wreath of vanity. Another trick is, on the contrary, the false ambition to appear 'original', as if philosophy were anything apart from serving truth. *Twaddle* still has an inkling that philosophy is a common human enterprise; *false originality* is a caricature of self-think as a pre-requisite for philosophy. The one does not break through the fetters of authorities and their terminology; the other is oracular, but only reflects a peculiarity without knowing it. Philosophy can never be 'popular' although it is done in behalf of the people and must hope to elevate the people to itself. 'Popularity' is in philosophy what 'positivity' was in religion. If it tries to be popular, it either flattens the

content or it takes fashionable trends and dresses them up as latest revelations. "There is nothing more nauseating than this transformation of the seriousness of philosophy into flatness, and philosophy must do everything to prevent this misfortune." The Marxisic reduction of Hegel to "thesis, antithesis, and synthesis" is a typical example of popularizing twaddle. But seriousness of philosophy must again not be taken to mean a dreary dullness. This boredom and dullness is associated with the sciences of that which seems dead—an outcome of the Cartesian rationalism of exact sciences; it is time to see that Reality is alive, and its interplay of opposites is both the sublime delight of a divine game as well as the only true seriousness. The idea of philosophy and the idea of aesthetics are closely akin. To break through fixed forms is both pure formlessness and highest form.

This reminds one of Nietzsche's conception of philosophy as *Gay Science*: his world-play unites supreme seriousness and supreme frivolity, tragedy and comedy, always being and seeming—a kingdom of dance where one falls who comes tied to crutches; now one goal comes into view and light, now another—we are mixed in!

Skepticism and Philosophy

The third critical round of *The Relation of Skepticism to Philosophy* deals immediately with Hegel's contemporary, Aenesidemus Schulze,³⁰ who was the influential

30. *Kritik der theoretischen Philosophie* von Gottlob Ernst Schulze. Hamburg, 1802. I. Vol., 728 pages. II. Vol., 721 pages. His first book came out under the pseudonym *Aenesidemus oder über die Fundamente der von dem Professor Reinhold In Jena Geliferten Elementar-Philosophie. Nebst einer Verteidigung des Skepticismus gegen die Annassungen der Vernunftkritik*. 1792. Hegel's first sentence refers to this earlier work.

teacher of Schopenhauer. His contemporary skepticism is compared with the Greek skepticism in Plato and the Alexandrians and, as the title of the essay suggests, leads to a consideration of truth in skepticism as a dialectical moment of the whole truth.

The 1400 pages of Aenesidemus Schulze hardly jibes with the professed modesty of the skeptic who does not dare to affirm that philosophy can be successful after so many worthy minds have failed to win general approval and are quarrelling among themselves; as if popularity, in the sense of a general acclaim, were a criterion of its truth. On the contrary, it is always the weakness and errors of great philosophers that become popular slogans. Schulze caters to the flatness of popular twaddle in this argument. The so-called quarrel among great thinkers is no quarrel at all; it can only appear so to the outsider. For those who can penetrate to the eternal depth of philosophy, it is, on the contrary, a joy to see how profoundly great philosophers are one in their ultimate concerns. The Greeks punished a non-participation in the life of the *polis* with death; the philosophical non-participation of the skeptic in the highest human concern is a self-inflicted private hobby, or a sickness of the soul—a consolation for all those whose “intellectual chemistry is so unfortunately organized as to find affinity only to what is morbid in others”! Schulze wanted to confine his skepticism to theoretical truth only, an arbitrary limitation of thought; but the non-theoretical values of life are of no less importance to dialectical self-reflection than the scientific-theoretical ones.

In this theoretical part, then, Schulze belabors a fictitious problem: proving, namely, that from the sense-data of consciousness there is no bridge to the things-in-them-

selves which lurk like wild animals behind the bushes of sense-experiences. We are reduced, according to this new skepticism, to facts of consciousness on the one hand, and to mathematical and analytical propositions on the other: the former uncertain, the other empty. If the skeptic would have looked at 'facts of consciousness' in great philosophers, he would have discovered instead the presence of reality and truth. At least such are *their* 'facts of consciousness'. Whether they were mistaken in having such facts of consciousness is, of course, not something which a skeptic has any right to decide.

The trouble with Schulze is that he is not skeptical enough. He stops where the true skeptics, the Greeks, started: doubting their facts of consciousness. Plato is the intellectual skeptic whose dialectic dissolves all fixed and static propositions of Schulze's analytic intellect. Plato's dynamic, living, and dialectical reality is a Being which eternally becomes and a Becoming which eternally is what it is; it is a universe whose unity is nothing apart from a living and plastic manifold, and from a variety of levels and values which nevertheless are as nothing if they are isolated and fixed as if they were real in and for themselves apart from the Absolute. But Plato also shows in his *Parmenides* that the whole cannot be made articulate if it is not analyzed; the function of the analytical reason is as necessary as the vision or 'Idea' in which its abstractions are corrected. If any one of Plato's essential opposites, such as being and becoming, one and many, and so forth, are isolated as if they were real in themselves, they necessarily produce self-contradictions. To show these inevitable self-contradictions of finite fixations is the skeptical business of philosophical comprehension. In this sense skepticism is the necessary and critical aspect

of every true philosophy. The principle of noncontradiction governing formal reason contradicts itself. The rationalist demands, "Thou must not contradict," and in saying this he practices what he wants to avoid.

Platonic skepticism is complemented by the Alexandrian skepticism from which Schulze has borrowed his pen-name, 'Aenesidemus'. But the original Aenesidemus is the refutation of the pseudo-Aenesidemus. The pseudo-Aenesidemus entrenches himself behind empirical 'facts of consciousness'; the real Aenesidemus, on the contrary, dissolves all certainties of immediate experience. According to the ten "Tropoi" or "points" of Pyrrho and Sextus Empiricus, immediate 'facts of consciousness' are always uncertain because of the difference of the experiencing organism, of age, climate, education, and according to the ever-changing positions and movements in space and time. In immediate experience one can never say that something is such and such, but only that it seems or appears to him in his present situation in regard to its present situation in change. And one appearance has no more right than another appearance. The truth of skepticism is the universal uncertainty of all finitude, that which the new skepticism wants to save against this philosophical truth of the skeptical critique. Greek skepticism "anticipated in the individual that which is stretched out in the endless finitude of time. What seemed fixed, one and the same, eternally and everywhere the same—time—is snatched away from an unconscious people. Hence the acquaintance with other peoples, other *mores*, other ages, is a wholesome school of skeptical experience."³¹

The skeptical arguments are insuperable against any

31. This essay on Skepticism is the source of the first movement of the *Phenomenology* on the dialectic of immediate experience.

dogmatism of finitude. Dogmatism is the certainty of uncritical and ill-founded opinions; Skepticism is its dissolving truth. "The essence of dogmatism consists in positing as absolute a finite which is afflicted by an 'other' over against it. Critical comprehension, on the contrary, demonstrates that any one distinguished aspect of reality exists only in this relation to its own other. Comprehension not only reflects on but also is this relation—it has no opposite over against itself, but always includes that which is mutually exclusive." This is the absolute and positive side of skepticism, which the Greeks expressed as *ataraxia*, being beyond trouble although practically living in trouble. But if we fix and isolate the negative side of skepticism, we fall back into the very dogmatism which we want to criticize. "This purely negative attitude which wants to stay with what seems and appears only ceases to be philosophy; whoever wants to cling to the idea that all only seems or appears to *him*, but who at the same time disclaims any objective responsibility for his thinking, one must leave to his own devices; his vain subjectivity is of no interest to anyone else, let alone to philosophy."

Later in his *History of Philosophy* lectures, Hegel says of the skeptic that his condition is like that of a paralytic: to drive him out of his subjective 'nothing' is like forcing a man to stand who is paralyzed in all his members. A man can always become a castrate, but a castrate can never become a man again.

The essay ends with a defense of the genuine ontological argument against the pseudo-ontological argument; the pseudo-ontological argument was criticised by Kant, and this is rehashed by Schulze: the genuine ontological argument demonstrates the Absolute by showing the inevitable inadequacy of any human formulation of the

Absolute; the pseudo-ontological argument pretends to derive or deduce the Absolute Reality out of an empty rational concept. Leibniz stated the genuine ontological argument in the form of an analogy. The analogy of the finite monad to the infinite monad in Leibniz is such that both maintain themselves as subjects, inseparable from their own objectifications. The appearance of the invisible soul or monad in its visible, organic embodiment is analogous to the appearing, physical world in its relation to the living 'pre-established harmony' of the whole, the 'monad of all monads', or God. World is to God what the appearance in physical bodies is to the soul.

Philosophy, Hegel concludes, has nothing to do with things beyond comprehension, but has everything to do with reality's self-comprehension. That side of reality which is not known empirically *is* just as real as that side which is known empirically; just as in the soul that vast realm of subconscious motivations *is* just as real as that side which is consciously present or known to consciousness. The contention that reality is 'beyond comprehension' is still one of the main problems of the next essay.

*Faith and Knowledge*³²

In this essay of 252 pages (lesser men would call it a book) Hegel returns to the religious reflections of his early, unpublished writings, but now from the point of view of his dialectical or speculative Logic. The first sentence is typical for Hegel's habit of disguising his own existential problems in historical situations! "The old com-

32. The complete title: *Glauben und Wissen oder die Reflexionsphilosophie der Subjektivität, in der Vollständigkeit ihrer Formen als Kantische, Jacobische und Fichtesche Philosophie*. Kritisches Journal der Philosophie. Band II. Stück I., 1802.

flict between Reason and Faith, between philosophy and positive religion, has been overcome by the culture of recent times; the conflict has gained a new meaning and has now become a conflict within philosophy." This 'now' means both the 'now' of Hegel in 1802 and the 'now' in the history of philosophy since Leibniz. What he might have said would have been: I have solved my old conflict.

Reason in the sense of an abstract object-thinking intellect probed into the alleged "facts" of positive religion and dissolved their plausibility on the grounds of natural-scientific and historical criticism. Reason declared them to be irrational productions of superstition and credulity. Such is the competence of scientific reasoning. But this competence is merely a negative one. It is its function to throw everything *given* (the 'positive') into the questionable status of a more or less probable uncertainty. Reason points out the historical unreliability of hearsay, stories, falsely believed to be factually given. This destructive and negative criticism has been so thoroughly successful that it is hopeless to save those 'saving facts'. Kant's (and Hegel's former own!) attempt to revive such 'facts' by interpreting them morally was unsuccessful, not only because Kant misinterpreted the texts (as Hegel also did in the 'Life of Jesus'), but mainly because they were no longer deemed worthy of such an honor.

But this triumph of enlightenment-reason over 'positive' religion is a double misunderstanding. What the abstract intellect identified with religion, a 'positive' dogmatic system or alleged facts, was not religion. To understand 'positivity' as religion is to misunderstand religion. The competence of reason with reference to objects is at the same time its incompetence to comprehend religious faith. This misunderstanding is the creation of the abstract in-

tellect itself, whose function it is to posit and fix externalities. In undoing them, in declaring them to be non-absolute, it undoes itself. First, the enlightener believes that to assert, posit, or believe in facts is identical with religion; in discovering that such external and fixed assertions are not absolute, he denies his own belief and assertion of facts as absolute. Reason undoes itself. Without understanding what it is doing, reason reduces itself to a mere finite critique of finite objects. The Absolute thus becomes a 'Beyond' beyond reason's comprehension. The religious fundamentalist and the intellectualistic enlightener believe the same thing, that positive facts, external data, are absolute; the former believes it positively, the latter negatively. Cleaning the stable of pseudo-absolutes is a good thing; but if reason is reduced to do nothing but that, it ceases to function in an absolute comprehension, and it ceases to be the master of the stable. What great philosophers have always considered the death of philosophy (namely, that comprehension should be excluded from truth and reality)—that attitude now is declared to be the highest achievement of philosophy. But "philosophy is the Science of comprehension insofar as comprehension becomes aware of itself as one with the dialectical nature of all Being." Kant reduces reason to a methodology of positive sciences and leaves the Absolute as a Beyond to *faith*, and Jacobi reduces the Absolute to a mere subjective *feeling* and longing of the heart without fulfillment, and Fichte transforms the Absolute into the practical-moral demand that man *ought* to become absolute without every being able to be it.

Liberal protestantism found in this scientism and finitism of the enlightenment its own philosophy.

Hegel criticizes the inconsistency of a religion, which

on the one hand abhors the individual and flees to an empty beyond; on the other hand "builds its temples and altars in the heart of the individual." If these opposites are not dialectically united, then its highest form is the infinite subjective passion and an incurable sorrow in being alienated from the Absolute.

In practical philosophy the decay of Christianity results in despair and in "crudeness and vulgarity". The idea of a blessed life 'ever-after' is transformed into a fanatical zeal of mastering the manifold of object-experiences by scientific techniques, or into a sensate hedonism which substitutes for a blessed life the ephemeral and deceiving pleasure of momentary physical goods. Philosophy as 'Lockeanism' is a clever calculation for the profit of mortal individuals. The same situation of factual particularism also operates in the orthodox protestantism which does not want to listen to the enlightenment critics. It is falling apart in innumerable sects like a rotten fish.³³ Such particularities have little to do with the philosophical comprehension of the religious mystery.³⁴

What Hegel states cautiously in general and objective terms, Nietzsche has put more bluntly. For example in paragraph 343 of his *Gay Science* he describes the effect which the disappearance of the Christian credit must have on Europe. "The greatest recent event that 'God is dead', that the belief in a Christian God has become unworthy of belief, begins to cast its shadow over Europe . . . a sequence of demolition, destruction, decline, revolution are to be expected . . . a darkening of the atmosphere . . . we, like seers on mountains between yesterday and tomorrow . . . we feel a new kind of light, happiness, alleviation,

33. Dok., p. 353.

34. Dok., p. 370.

elevation, encouragement, morning glory about us . . .”

Nietzsche’s “darkening” corresponds to Hegel’s “crudeness and vulgarity”. The smugness of all self-complacent dogmatisms disappears. The all encompassing totality in its seriousness must be resurrected as the ground of the gayest and most serene freedom.

Pascal’s saying: “la nature est telle, qu’elle marque partout un Dieu perdu dans l’homme et hors de L’homme”—is a moment, but only one moment within this highest idea. The sorrow and passion of finitude is one in the Absolute with the joy of our eternal participation in its dialectical wholeness.

This speculative, dialectical self-realization and self-knowledge is the blessed life which is one with philosophizing; it is both without a longing for an empty, absolute Beyond and without a sinking into the mire of an illusory finite hedonism. Finite man contains no absolute wisdom, but neither is he without access to it. Man is not like a bat, belonging neither to birds or mice, neither to night or day; he is not a composite or aggregate, part eternal and part temporal. He is both, wholly and inseparably, because the whole which he expresses is both wholly eternal and wholly temporal. “In the idea finite and infinite are one; if, therefore, the finite is posited as having truth and reality in and for itself, then something that is disappearing and is negative is falsely posited as not disappearing. Its true affirmation must negate its negativity. To maintain ourself as finite is pure egoism. It means losing our true self. To lose ourself, on the contrary, is to gain our true self.”

This is the general idea of this essay on *Faith and Knowledge* which ties the introductory and the concluding pages together. In between are three long chapters

on the philosophies of Kant, Jacobi and Fichte. They are masterpieces of pains-taking presentations and constructive, immanent criticisms. The Kant chapter is particularly the most lucid and condensed account of Kant's whole system, together with Hegel's objections which grow out of the Kantian system itself. I have already reproduced the contents of the chapters in my previous chapter on the development from Kant to Hegel, as Hegel understood it.

Summary

A few systematic perspectives pervade all three essays. One is that art, religion, and philosophy envisage the same Absolute as opposed to formal logic valid for empirical sciences. "Every other knowledge, except the philosophical, is knowledge of finitudes or is a finite knowledge, where the subjective reason presupposes a given object in which it does not realize its own self." The second is that every genuine way of life and of experience is real and true as long as it practices its value; and it becomes false when it is isolated in an artificial, one-sided abstract standpoint or "ism"; Hegel's term for this is "Reflexionsphilosophie."

The theory of knowledge valid for art, religion and philosophy is the reversal of the scientific empirical logic and of the moral-practice procedure. The scientific or moral worlds are understood as a partial manifestation of the dialectical totality whose dialectical structure is present in them. Thus when Kant characterizes scientific knowledge as an inseparable togetherness of rational logical form and non-rational perceptual material, he states a dialectical synthesis of opposites where logical form without non-logical content is empty, and non-rational per-

ceptual content without logical form is blind. This insight, however, is itself no scientific-empirical knowledge, but it is an absolute and a priori philosophical knowledge which does not change with the regresses or progresses of scientific information. It is, further, characterized by Kant as only one dimension of philosophy. Empirical science is restricted to be a knowledge of the appearing, given world, and presupposes subjects of knowledge which are not a part of that which they know. This insight practices a philosophical knowledge of the absolute whole in the light of which scientific knowledge is known to be a limited aspect.

Likewise Fichte's knowledge of the practical moral situation as an essential tension between that which factually is and what ought to be is a true characterization of the moral-practical situation; but since truth as a philosophy of practice is not practical, but states a dialectical unity of opposites as essentially and perennially true of the moral practical world. Both the scientific and the practical situation are thus seen as different modifications of the dialectical structure of the Absolute.

The finite intellect is true to its nature when it naïvely practices its intention to get hold of and master a given object. It becomes a false scientism when this mode of knowledge does not know its limitation and identifies itself with all knowledge. "This manufactured crudeness, having enclosed itself in an absolute limit, despises the unlimited nature . . . tears up the world into concepts and things lying around outside, a business without relief from any comprehensive idea, without imagination, without happiness, going on in a monotonous, boring, depressing, befogging tone."³⁵

³⁵ W.I., p. 275.

This one-sided scientism or rationalism of the finite intellect is opposed by various forms of irrationalism. Again, if the feeling heart, the imaginative genius, the infinite subjective passion and sorrow, express and practice what they are without philosophical pretensions, they have the right and reality of all genuine life. But as soon as they theorize and declare their immediate experience to be the one and only source of truth, they become false because they are known and can know themselves only by means of the dialectical self-comprehension which they discredit. Irrationalism cannot express itself without appealing to the truth of propositions which, as such, are always more than the irrational contents which they undialectically try to absolutize.

As it is with rationalism and irrationalism so it is with the emotional, feeling 'philosophies' of optimism and pessimism. Against the glib optimism of the eighteenth century enlightenment, which admired the wisdom and goodness of God in the conveniences which nature offers to man, or in the hope that volcanoes gradually will explode with less violence and inundations will gradually become less wet, or that wars will gradually become more agreeable—against all this the mocking pessimism of a Voltaire was a sign of maturity pointing out that every evil is a necessary frustration of the desire to see finite ends and wishes fulfilled. But it would now be equally pedantic to make of this corrective another positive 'ism' and only look at the seamy sides of life as if life itself were nothing but frustration.

The philosophical virtue of all such reflexive philosophy is that it makes a concrete and dialectical situation articulate. The one always brings about its opponent as its own corrective. So even the most abstract "ism" testi-

fies, against its will, to the philosophical truth that reality is always a dialectical unity of a One and an Other.

Ethics

In the last essay of the Critical Journal on *Natural Law*³⁶ and in the similar unpublished sketches for his lectures, *The System of Ethics*, Hegel gathered the harvest of his earlier reflections. The wealth, the depth, originality and beauty of those essays are a delight to the reader and a despair to the reporter.

Hegel's *Plato* studies influence his writing on ethics, as for example when he demands a "government of old men and priests" who have died to the vital involvements of the moment and see all moments in the light of death and of eternity. The intimate correlation of the individual soul and the soul of the state as the state of the soul is reaffirmed. The "ethics of the individual is not only a pulse-beat of the whole system of ethics, but is the whole system in himself". "To live truly in the concrete unity of the infinite whole is the true ethical life of the individual who is neither subjected to a unity nor is an abstract isolation apart from it, which would be ethical death." The three levels or functions of the soul are externally embodied or become visible in the three "estates": the first is made up of the worker and farmer who sacrifice themselves to the life of work of nature. The second estate is made up of the manufacturer, trader and businessman, who prepare and mediate the goods of life for private consumption and pleasure; to this second estate also belongs the admini-

36. W.I., pp. 437-537. Ueber die wissenschaftlichen Behandlungsarten des Naturrechts, seine Stelle in der praktischen Philosophie und sein Verhältnis zu den positiven Rechtswissenschaften; 1802-1803.

strator and lawyer who regulate the spheres of property and economic transactions. The third estate is the estate of concrete ethics (*Sittlichkeit*) which knows itself to function as a member of an organic whole of professional tasks; man fills his station of life in a concrete dedication to duties which are at the same time ways of self-realization and self-fulfillment. The model of this sphere of concrete ethics is the family in which vital needs, personal relations, and the affirmation of an unconditional devotion and dedication in mutual love, are practiced and affirmed. "The eyes of the flesh and the eyes of the spirit coincide."³⁷

The state, like the family, is the unique and individual unity of an historical people, the members of which test their loyalty in war; the willingness to die for the whole, which is at the same time known to be your own life, is the moral affirmation of the Absolute in time. From the point of view of social ethics the good life is to participate in, and live for, the infinitely unpredictable and always renewed social whole which the individual fully represents.

But social ethics is not the whole of ethics. Man is more than a member of a given social situation. Man is *Geist*—that is his eternal ground as well as his goal to realize. '*Geist*' means that the dialectical nature of all reality breaks open and becomes a conscious problem in man. The dialectical structure in nature is unconscious; it is dialectical in itself, but not for itself. The shapes and organizations of inorganic nature are appearances of their organizing energies; their activity or life is one with their physical embodiments in which it is perceived externally.³⁸ *Geist* is the "sunflower of the solar system; what a

37. Lasson, p. 465.

38. Lasson, p. 484.

clearance is in a primeval forest".³⁹ It takes several sentences in English to explain that one word "zusammengeschlagen". If the emphasis is on "schlagen" it means what lumber-jacks do: they fell trees and make a clearance; only here the clearance makes itself; consciousness does its own clearing; in doing it, it seems to ruin nature and to disturb her naïve and unconscious balance. If the emphasis is on "zusammen", then it means to be together in concord (hearts 'schlagen zusammen'); or it means to collect different functions into one collective whole (flames, different fires 'schlagen zusammen' in one incendiary). The life of nature, the living universe, collects itself into one consciousness of itself; but in doing so, at the same time it distances itself from its former life. Man has to make, has to become himself in overcoming nature; thus he reveals the purpose of nature to become more than she is in herself. Nature is man's reality, man is nature's ideality. Nature is potentially man; man actualizes the potentialities of nature.

"In concrete ethics the individual knows itself as an eternal modification of the absolute life (*Geist*) which is actual in it. The view of philosophy according to which all things of the world are in God, i.e., essence and significance of what we think, do and are, is grounded solely in the whole . . . To *intuition* this idea of ethics *appears particularized* in the unified whole of a people . . . this intellectual appearance must not be confused with the abstract concept designating what a multitude of singular or private subjectivities may have in common—for example, the name of their nationality. Such private individuals are not authentic or ethical individuals⁴⁰ but merely reflect

39. W.I., p. 508f. (So ist in dem Systeme der Sittlichkeit die auseinandergefaltete Blume des himmlischen Systems zusammengeschlagen.)

40. Lasson, p. 466.

what "one" thinks "in general"; they constitute not a nation but mobs. The authentic ethical individual is one on whose responsible self-activity the wholesome life of a whole can depend; the spurious, unauthentic individual is one to whom the whole only appears in the threatening form of coerced conformity "which is despotism and the destruction of civic liberty". Both naturalism and humanism overlook the absolute whole which has its own categories of dialectical structure pervading nature as well as man.

What, we ask again, is Hegel's conception of the good life? *His principle of ethics is the unconditional acceptance and affirmation of life as an eternal dialectical problem and struggle.* "The power of ethics as such (überhaupt) lies in beholding (Anschauung) all opposites, differences and individual determinations as constituting a whole and absolute presence." All ethical standpoints or "isms" are justified in that they make articulate these opposites in which the concrete ethical situation of man unfolds itself.

Ethical empiricisms, naturalisms, realisms emphasize the individual infinity of life, its positive and negative relations of pain and pleasure, sympathy and antipathy, love and hate, isolation and sociability. Empirical ethics is inconsistent as life itself is inconsistent—that is, its strength and virtue is against any formal rationalism, whose rigid consistency is untrue to life and therefore always impotent to deal with concrete individual situations.

Ethical idealisms, moralisms, formalisms on the other hand emphasize the moment of ideality, unity, moral law and duty. Its imperatives subsume the opposite moment of plurality of real interests and inclination, appetites, preferences, and the like, to its universal form of unity

and harmony. But this intention to form, mold, cultivate, educate, and subject one side or function of life to another side and function of the same life creates a dualism, an inconsistency of a higher order. In demanding truth, consistency, universality, purity, the soul posits that which it wants to overcome, untruth, inconsistency, particularly, impurity as evil or as negative.

Both the empirical immoralism and the rational moralism and formalism together, both with their own dialectical oppositeness, are the concrete ethical situation whose eternal God-given and essential nature is to be affirmed theoretically and lived through practically. Two selected examples will illustrate what is meant.

Kant had illustrated his formal moral law by the example of a deposit. If I would steal a deposit, the consequence would be that if everyone would steal deposits there would be no deposits. What contradiction, Hegel asks, is there in thinking a world without deposits? It is not this legalistic and formal reflection which makes embezzlement bad. The concrete ethical reason is not this, but the affirmation of holding on to a concrete trust and relationship constituting a common ethical life between you who trust me and myself who is trustworthy; and this is not a general or generalized situation but a concrete, unique and individual one in which it is *this* deposit which is to be preserved. This is the ethics of fulfilling one's concrete station in life, freed from the idea of fixed and static 'social stations' prevalent in the scholastic conceptions of ethics.

The second illustration is of the family. Neither natural affections nor legal contracts, neither economic purposes nor purposes of bringing up children, are ethical justifications of marriage. Each of these points taken in abstrac-

tion may just as well lead to the annulment of marriage. It is again the unconditional affirmation of a living and individualized whole of ever renewed and changing problems which is the ethical basis of marriage.

The concrete ethical situation of man emerges from nature in a series of processes, each appearing as a qualitative leap, each contained and preserved as an abstract aspect in the whole. Man emerges from his immediacy of vital appetites and sensual lusts (which destroy themselves together with their objects)⁴¹ through the economic activities of belaboring nature and producing the means of living through his industry and commerce and ordering those activities in legal-administrative rules,⁴² to the world of concrete ethics in which the dialectical unity of eternal wholeness and totality with temporal fragmentariness and partiality is unconditionally affirmed and organized.

What philosophy thinks in its reflected intuition of life, *poetry* presents in and for imagination and feeling. The Absolute in its ethical manifestation is a divine *tragedy* and comedy which it plays with and for itself. In its tragedy it eternally gives birth to individual *gestalten* and sacrifices them to suffering and death and resurrects them from their ashes to glory. In its *comedy* it plays empirical shadows against other shadows, the eternal joke of finitudes who take themselves seriously and fight against imagined destinies and nonexistent enemies, the farce of faith and undying illusions. In this intuition of the whole of life in philosophy and art as a tragic and comic spectacle, mind rises above its concrete engagement and involvement to the level of the absolute mind for whom reality is a divine interplay of opposites.

41. Lasson, pp. 421-424.

42. Lasson, pp. 424-434.

System and Phenomenology

What Hegel *published* in Jena is only a small fraction of his *writings*. His main work lay in his lecture notes in two volumes, only recently published under the title *Jenenser Logik und Metaphysik* and *Jenenser Realphilosophie (Natur und Geistesphilosophie)*. Theodor Haering has shown in detail how Hegel's system is budding here. Hegel intended to publish this system but was not satisfied until ten years later when the first part, entitled "Logic", finally appeared. The different versions show him in restless agitation, changing, adding, contracting. Then, all of a sudden, this whole systematic effort was suspended and in 1806 the Phenomenology of the Mind was hurled on paper in one flow—one thinks of a bronze casting where the molten metal is poured into plastic shapes. Rosenkranz calls it "the phenomenological crisis of the system."

How a system can experience a 'crisis' is clear only to a 'Hegelian'; 'Hegelians' are more than ordinary mortals. What Rosenkranz probably means is that Hegel in desperation gave up and was thrown into the convulsive act of writing the *Phenomenology*. The first attempt at the 'system' is such a pitiful heap of unintelligible gibberish that it is rather amazing that out of it, through incessant effort, finally emerged the clear structure of the *Encyclopedie*.

The *Encyclopedie* contains Logic, The Phenomenology of Mind, the Philosophy of Nature, the Philosophy of the Objective Mind in theoretical and ethical culture and philosophy of the Absolute Spirit. Each part contains or expresses the whole in its own way; each is, therefore, a full introduction to Hegel's whole philosophy. One part

of philosophy he calls *Logic*. It is the logic of philosophy and of nothing else. All essential and possible world-views are stripped down to their essentials and stated as perennial possibilities of the human mind to give account of what it means or what it intends to be real. These human concerns of what is held to be of ultimate reality and importance are the hard logical cores of what is called traditionally metaphysics. Hegel's *Logic* is inseparable from metaphysics. This fusion occurred in Jena. Originally he offered a course in logic and/or theories of knowledge on the one hand, and in metaphysics on the other hand. There he came to understand that what is believed to be real and important is simply the correlation of different orientations or kinds or levels of the intending consciousness.

The one *reality* is a systematic all-comprehensive whole. As all-comprehensive it must contain all essential standpoints of philosophy in which it becomes logically articulate. And since these standpoints are different, contrary and contradictory opposites, to think them as such opposites and nevertheless contributing to the concrete unity of the whole requires the logic of philosophy to be one with *dialectic*. Being as a self-differentiating, self-manifesting whole remains this one and same quality in all of its essential modifications of itself. But it also must become aware *for itself* what is *in itself*. This is the last part of Hegel's *Logic* called 'Begriff'—'Concept' is the existential appropriation of world in the subject reflecting on what it is doing it. It is reality in process of self-discovery. 'Being in Mind' moves to demonstrate its fluid and living character in the fluid and living apprehensions of itself.

If reality is not conscious of its own living and dialectical character, it is nature; nature is dialectical in itself,

but not for itself. Out of the 'natural soul' emerges 'objective mind'. This process of the emerging conscious-being (*Bewusstsein*) in over-coming gradually and in decisive steps its own finitude and freeing itself from its own natural fetters is the theme of individual education and of human *history*, "the progression in the consciousness of freedom" as the later *Philosophy of History* will say.

The *logical-dialectical* idea of the whole is the whole in abstraction from its concrete manifestations in nature and in history. *Nature* is the same whole in abstraction from the universal dialectical-logical whole of Being and also in abstraction from the various levels of Mind or of human consciousness in which nature becomes articulate. 'Objective Mind' or consciousness is again the same whole but in abstraction from and in self-engendered opposition to nature which is now transformed into an externally given object. In the Preface to his *Logic*⁴³ which appeared ten years after the *Phenomenology*, Hegel points out these systematic relations between logic, history, and nature.

How do we *reach* the systematic-dialectical world-view of the whole whose categories are unfolded in the *Logic*? The *Phenomenology* is the answer. In it the philosopher looks back on the way which has led him to the 'system'. But the stations of individual experience are at the same time stations of the historical experience of mankind. These theoretical human stations of awareness, levels of practical and theoretical, aesthetic and religious life contain essential positions of becoming aware of the world. The whole process of human culture, then, is not merely an introduction or pedagogical ladder to a mature phi-

43. IV., p. 18.

losophy; but this mature philosophy in turn is, and perennially demands, all of its own essential phases of life as belonging to and in part constituting the whole. The whole of reality would be as nothing without this way of the human adventure of discovery of it and in it; but on the other hand all those essential approaches, discoveries and adventures of the human *Geist* also would be as nothing, would be 'much ado about nothing', if they were not remembered, retained as essential to a mature vision or 'Science' of the whole.

Another approach to the whole of philosophy also discovered and formulated in Jena, also worked out in detail later in Berlin, is the approach to philosophy through its history. The *history of philosophy*, Hegel was the first to discover, is Philosophy itself in process, action in gradual self-discovery. None of those breakthroughs are lost or superfluous.

Appraisal

The six years in Jena are both the most unhappy and the most creative time in Hegel's life. His great essays are his best writings and the most enjoyable introduction to his world-view. All his original early writings are condensed in the 'foaming chalice of the spirit', in the incomparable 'Phenomenology of Geist'. In meeting his critics and philosophical adversaries he shows that everything that has been said against his philosophy is known to him and is answered. In Jena he has conquered the history of philosophy and has understood it as the one philosophy in the process of self-discovery and self-knowledge. And in stark contrast, Jena is also the time of his very worst writing, abstruse and unintelligible. His friend-

ship with Schelling ended in tragedy. As a teacher he was a failure. His hope for community faltered. For the first time he is so uncertain about himself that he writes in a Latinizing jargon, imitating Schelling. He is thrown into a desperate loneliness and a desperate sexual affair. The amount of his production is unbelievable and probably saved his life and his sanity. "To be estranged from yourself is the origin for the need of philosophy."⁴⁴

44. *Ibid.*, p. 44.

Newspaper Editor in Bamberg

1807 - 1808

After the high tide of Jena, the low ebb of Bamberg; the author of the Phenomenology becomes editor of a local newspaper which he refers to as a 'laboratory in empiricism'. "Recently a Mister von Haller shot himself in the head; Mrs. Senator von Strömer has carried the baby of her Miss daughter into the water and sits in prison; tomorrow a man will be broken on a wheel who has committed incest with his daughter; the latter will be beheaded because both of them have also killed the child; other Misses are still pregnant; a fourteen year old girl has eloped with a comedian, a few days later a second woman followed him; here and there one finds corpses in the river; not to mention many natural deaths; we have concerts where we only miss a good singer; comedies, too; to say nothing of organizations and disorganizations which are sometimes hard to distinguish. In short, we have no lack of incidents, accidents, and variety."¹

"Let us seek after room, board and clothes—and the kingdom of God will take care of itself."²

Scholars³ have scanned Hegel's newspaper and have found nothing except straight news and straight local

1. Br. I., p. 40.

2. Br. I., p. 186.

3. Rudolf Haym, *Hegel und seine Zeit*. Berlin, 1857, p. 270.

gossip: battles and peace treaties, troop movements and court parties. Crimes and accidents are not interfered with by any editorials, let alone by anything in the least resembling philosophy. "I have entered my business; there is nothing difficult about it. I have a free lodging and, if things don't change, 1300 florins income. What more of temporal goods should I want in this world? Now this accursed peace! Which is for a newspaperman what a clear monolith and a good policeman is for thieves. To preserve this clear and impartial mirror in its purity I have contributed my share.⁴ This vegetating newspaper-life can hardly be called work. I find that I should bring more spirit into my occupation and ask you to help me to this end by sending me a coffee boiler, which can only be bought in München."⁵

There is a feeling of discrepancy between his power and his station in life. He knows that it must be provisional—only two or three years.⁶ In the meantime he fills out his post conscientiously, for the time being making the journalist's view his own. He practices what his ethics demands—dutifully to fill his station and task in life.

To steer the *Bamberger Zeitung* between the sensibility of the occupying French army and the Bavarian government demanded a colorless factuality. There are anxious moments not only for the responsible editor of the paper, but also for the printers and their families, whose existence is threatened if the publication is suspended. "I am longing to be freed from my newspaper galley. Only recently we had an inquisition again. The money of the owner, my income, and the income of two married workers and other persons are in jeopardy because a single

4. Br. I., pp. 176-187.

5. Br. I., p. 193.

6. Br. I., p. 167.

article was found obnoxious; I was the one who had accepted it, and I am completely in the dark about what could have given offense. A newspaper man grasps around in darkness." In a long and 'most devoted' explanation and apology to the 'royal general commissioner', Hegel defended an article which he had explicitly declared to be a 'rumor' in the paper; which was accepted because it had appeared before in other papers, and had been passed by various censors.⁷ "Every minute in my newspaper business is a lost and spoiled life."⁸ "What I dig up today is no longer true tomorrow or else is forgotten."⁹

The gay front, the chumminess and the folksyness, the jovial descriptions of masquerades which he visited in the guise of a servant, the lively and deeply felt portraits of unhappy widows, became ~~unendurable~~ towards the end of the second year. "Philosophy cannot lose its heart to such temporal things."¹⁰

As in Tübingen, Frankfurth and Bern, Hegel is split into an apparent versus an essential personality. The apparent Hegel worries about fitting columns so that they will fill out the paper and "further his reader's digestion".¹¹ The essential Hegel supervises the printing of his *Phenomenology*, works at night on his *Logic*, and watches grimly the academic situation where position after position opens and is filled with some mediocrity.

First Reactions to the Phenomenology

Due to the war, the *Phenomenology* cannot even be bound; its sheets are merely stitched together. A few

7. Br. I., pp. 240-258.

8. Br. I., p. 245.

9. Br. I., p 248.

10. Br. I., p. 181.

11. Br. I., p. 187.

copies received merely a paper cover. The first copies go to Goethe, to Hegel's friends Niethammer, Knebel in Weimar, and Schelling in Munich. Goethe's copy is accompanied by a letter dated March, 1807, asking for a leave of absence from the university. Knebel answers in September—also in the name of Goethe: "We believe that you are one of the leading thinkers of our time, but we wish that you had given your spiritual power more bodily shape, more graspable for our dull eyes." The old complaint again, pursuing Hegel since his college days!

He replies on November 21. "Your desire for greater intelligibility and clearness I would have liked to fulfill, but this is the hardest task and would be perfection if the content were at the same time substantial (*gediegen*). There are other contents where neatness goes without saying, as those which I am treating here; that prince N.N. has passed through, that his majesty has been boar-hunting, etc. . . . although an abstract matter does not allow the same distinctness as the next best toilet, which shows the object distinctly expressed and in clearest outline; I nevertheless find your blame just and can only counter with the complaint (if it is permissible to complain) that I have been hindered by a so-called fate from producing something through my labor which would satisfy men of insight and taste, like yourself, and which would then give the satisfaction to myself to dare to say, 'For this I have lived.'

In a letter from Professor Windischmann,¹² Hegel had the pleasure to read, "Your work is seen as the elementary book of human liberation, and as the key to that new gospel prophesied by Lessing."

12. Br. I., p. 307.

He must have felt a little uneasy when he sent, after a delay of about two months, a copy to Schelling. In his letter of May 1, he first replies at length to Schelling's communication concerning "animal magnetism". Schelling, like most of the other romantics, was interested in so-called occult sciences, which dealt with somnambulism, hypnosis, suggestion, telepathy, and telekinesis. Hegel understands those phenomena by analogy to spiritual-personal love, as a man falls under the influence of the ideas of another man. It is almost a postscript when he adds, "My book is finally out. I am curious to see what you will think about the idea of the first part, which was supposed to be an introduction. That I worked in the details (of the second part) has damaged the over-all view of the whole; it is such a complex weaving back and forth, that it would cost me considerable time to work it out more clearly and perfectly. For the greater lack of form (*Unform*) of the last part, kindly take into consideration that I finished it at midnight before the battle of Jena. In the *Preface* you will not find that I have done too much to that flatness, which has wrought such havoc with your forms and lowered your science to a bald formalism."¹³

It took Schelling six months to get over this shock. On November 2 he answers that he has read the *Preface*, but that he has found no time to read the rest of the book. "Given the just measure of opinion which I have of myself, I would have felt it below my self-esteem to be touched by that polemic. It may touch my imitators and their misuse, although in your text this distinction is not made." This was the last philosophical exchange between the two former friends.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 159.

Relation to Politics and Church

In his many letters to Niethammer, Hegel expressed those political opinions which the readers of his *Bamberger Zeitung* would not even have suspected. They are unalterably the same which were already formed in Bern and Frankfurth. In the turmoil of events and marching armies of the Napoleonic period, the philosopher always watched the fortune of the cause of freedom with intense inward participation. What counts and what is to come about is "the freedom of the people, its taking part through elections, decisions for which the government must give account publicly, appealing to the people's insight."¹⁴ "This open language of the government to the people about their mutual concerns is the greatest source of strength in England and France."¹⁵

Also his old resentment of 'positive religion' finds a powerful expression. When he was asked to teach Sunday school class in the new Protestant church in the predominantly Catholic Bamberg, he replied that "Writing on my Logic and at the same time giving theological instruction is like asking me to be a whitewashing chimney sweeper. I, who dwelt for years on free crags with the eagles and was used to breathing the pure mountain air, should now learn to feed on the corpses of deceased or modern still-born thoughts in the leaden atmosphere of empty twaddle! To develop my theology at a university would be a different matter, and I would have come around to do it in my lectures anyway. But to be at the beck and call of the Protestant church here! The mere thought of this contact has given me a shock throughout my nervous sys-

14. Br. I., p. 197.

15. *Ibid.*

tem, as if the Christian church were a loaded electric battery.”¹⁶ This whole passage as well as the mountain and eagle simile is again amazingly close to many sayings by Nietzsche.

The Call to Nürnberg

Finally, Hegel’s good angel Niethammer, having advanced to a leading position in the Bavarian ministry of education, could officially invite his friend to become director of the old *Gymnasium* in Nürnberg, with the mission to reform it and also with permission to introduce philosophy into its curriculum. Hegel is “overwhelmed with gratitude and joy” to “throw off his yoke”¹⁷ and to return to his own calling. Words fail to express his happiness. He is determined to make his philosophy communicable—even to children. Vistas far beyond his new modest beginning are revealed in lightning flashes. “Your institution will harbor the whole extent of spirituality in this Reich.”¹⁸ “Theoretical work brings more about (*zustande bringen*) in this world than practice; if once the world of ideas is revolutionized, then no reality can withstand its transformation.”¹⁹ Referring to his Logic: “Nothing could be more desirable than to elevate one’s philosophy to dominance in the country” (Reich).²⁰

After having patiently arranged for the orderly transfer of the newspaper business to a successor, he left Bamberg in November 1808. His last letter dated from there is a letter to Herzog Karl August in Weimar asking to accept his resignation as professor of the University of Jena.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 196.

17. Br. I., p. 239. Oct. 28, 1808.

18. Br. I., p. 229.

19. Br. I., p. 253.

20. Br. I., p. 229.

Die Phänomenologie des Geistes

Already the title of this richest and most obscure book in the history of philosophy is untranslatable! ‘Mind’ is too intellectual, too rational; and ‘spirit’ in English has a too very narrow, too ‘spiritual’ meaning, to render Hegel’s *Geist*. It means a living and concrete whole of reality, which is a unity of all its own opposites; its dialectical character becomes revealed in all levels of conscious existence (*Begriff*), not only in the theoretical mind not only in practical reason, but in living nature and in the history of historical culture (*Welt-Geist*). How this living whole appears in human consciousness, how it is ‘mediated’ in and by it, is the theme of the *Phänomenologie des Geistes*.

This successful ascent of the soul from natural immediacy, through scientific rational world-views corresponding on the practical side to personal-moral, professional, and political orders in the state (which is the organic unity of all functions of *Geist*, guaranteeing to each level its right and due), culminates in self-comprehension (*Vernunft*) where each individual recognizes in the other the same ultimate dignity as human *Being*: In the successful mutual I-thou recognition “the I has become a We, and We are present in each of us.”

Hegel’s *Phänomenologie des Geistes* has been commented upon many times. The reader who wants to find a lucid and complete commentary on all parts as they appear in sequence may find many reliable guides. I will mention just a few. The first one is by Kuno Fischer in his two volume work on Hegel. He selects out of every chapter the few lucid passages and strings them together in such a way that the reader has the impression of a

lucid and understandable book. When he turns to Hegel's text, Fischer leaves him helpless because most of the text is not lucid. *J. E. Erdmann* in the 7th volume of his History of Philosophy, reprinted in 1931, develops the *Phänomenologie des Geistes* as a dialectical movement and is therefore working more in the spirit of the book than Fischer.

Recently *Hermann Glockner* in his 2 volume work on Hegel devotes 200 pages to the *Phänomenologies des Geistes*. This masterful essay is very close to my enterprise here, in that he also shows the *Phänomenologies des Geistes* as a culmination of the previous studies of Hegel, most of which were not published, but all of which streamed into the Ph.G. The fact that almost all of the materials that were used in the Ph.G. were not known to the public explains a great deal of the obscurity of the book. Whereas now, since we have access to those writings which were only published in this century, a great deal of the Ph.G. has become more understandable and accessible than it used to be.

Recently two French philosophers have published extensive and penetrating analyses of the Ph.G. One is *Alexander Kojève* in *Introduction à la Lecture de Hegel* (580 pages) all of which is based on the Ph.G.; *Jean Hyppolite* —*Etudes sur Marx et Hegel* and *La Structure et Genèse de la Ph.G. de Hegel* shows how the philosophical core of Marx who sees man as a battle or struggle to make himself free from nature and from servitude to other men by his work; and how Heidegger's reflection on death on all things finite as a source of self-knowledge stems from Hegel's alienation and 'negativity'. What all these commentators have in common is that they follow Hegel's sequence of chapters as if they were an apostolic success-

sion. Hegel's own reaction to his book is much more critical. He says there is no order (*uniform*), that themes criss-cross back and forth. I am inclined to believe that his spontaneous and unmeditated reaction to his *Ph.G.* is more reliable than his professorial assertion that there is a necessary, 'logical' sequence of the chapters.

No, Hegel has written and mixed two different books, and he has also written two introductions to these two books. One is called the *Preface*, the other the *Introduction*. Both may be considered as concluding the series of essays published in the *Critical Journal of Philosophy* in Jena. The *Introduction* was written first and sent to the publisher with the first half of the manuscript. The *Preface*, which is first in the book, was written after the book was written. The *Introduction* expresses the original intention to describe the experience which human consciousness makes with itself in reaching the comprehensive standpoint of philosophy. Hegel, then, lost control and plunged into a bitter critique of human-moral incompetence as revealed in all of European history.

In my last chapter I have described how Hegel wrote this book. It can be compared to nothing less than an eruption of a volcano. After writing about half of it, he lost his original plan and began to pour all kinds of historical and pressing personal problems into the flow of his writings, including the most recent publication of Goethe, a translation of Diderot's *The Nephew of Rameau*. No wonder the book needed a new introduction.

The first part of the *Ph.G.* is systematic; it shows the glorious rise of the soul from theoretical and practical immediacy or natural being, through rational and dualistic struggles, to the comprehensiveness of self-knowledge and wisdom. On the other hand, the major theme in the

middle part of Hegel's book is the grim and pessimistic critique of the incompetence of man. This theme begins most ironically with comprehension (*Vernunft*). The reader expects a triumphant chapter after all his trouble to get 'up there'. In principle ('in itself') comprehension understands reality as a beloved and loving, organic whole, in which all individuated forms of life would be known in their contribution to this "we that is I". But, alas! in practice comprehension (*Vernunft*) fails most miserably. It only 'observes' vague analogies to itself in external teleological relations (polar bears adapted to polar climate—the one not implying the other); or in equally vague interpretations of physical appearance, body types, bone-structures as clumsy expressions of soul or life. The opaqueness of the physical "other than I" baffles and frustrates comprehension to find itself in it.

But this irrevocable failure of comprehensive 'observation' is still a harmless affair compared with all the enormous failures of practical reason. This practical-moral misery begins historically in the dialectic of slave and master. The master risks his natural life; the slave prefers servitude to death. The Greek city-states and Rome were states of masters engaged in wars of prestige or 'recognition'. The lack of recognizing *work* as a form of enforming and ennobling man himself was the ruin of this world of slaves and masters. In this ruin various forms of despair and of escape develop: the Epicurean idyllic privacy; the Stoic indifference and formal duty for duty's sake; and the Skeptical nihilism. All these deficiencies gather in the Christian 'unhappy consciousness', having lost trust in world and in man, and having the Absolute only in the form of an unattainable 'Beyond'.

But this moral incompetence continues unabated in

the 'modern world'. The *Faustian* man ventures out to conquer the world and establish his unity with nature. But his 'Law of the Heart' turns into the 'Frenzy of Self-Conceit'. Gratification of private happiness and moral integrity fall apart; the world-course does not regard virtue, and virtue does not improve the world-course. Man finding himself 'good by nature' is in reality a beast deceiving himself and others, a hypocrite.

In the history of the church there is a perennial battle with the justice of the equality of all citizens in the state; the church makes its own laws the conditions of citizenship. The rational mind takes revenge by attacking the alleged objective certainties and saving stories as so many superstitions designed to camouflage social injustice; reason wins this fight, but does not understand that it has attacked its own belief in objective facts as ultimate. Reason is no less superstitious than the superstitions it attacked.

The bloody terror of freedom and of revolution turns into the cold terror of the new party to maintain its power. Capitalism and political power denounce each other as corrupters and praise themselves as benefactors. This confusion enjoys its own vanity and takes pride in being confused; the hope that we can escape from this sorry scheme entire is the illusion of 'beautiful souls' and the helplessness of aesthetics.

The finishing touches are applied when Hegel shows the self-contradictions in the moralism of Kant and Fichte, prepared by the essays in the *Journal*. One contradiction of moralism is this: if the world would become as I think it ought to be, then I would have eliminated myself as moralist; there would be no longer the pleasure of being morally indignant at other people's pleasures.

Another contradiction holds between the abstractness of reason in its moral law and the individual agents with their concrete interests. The two sides are not mediated. No individual value-content is capable of becoming a general law for all. The impersonal moral law depends on the same individual agents which it wants to eliminate from its consideration. The moral law can do nothing but convince man that there is no escape from his incompetence. He has to learn to accept it and live with it.

This is the beginning of the absolute spirit in its three-fold modification in art, religion, and philosophy. Only when one sees Hegel as this merciless and ruthless critic of all moralisms and their deceptions, can one also begin to understand what he means by the Absolute Spirit as 'the infinite sorrow' which is the last part of the *Ph.G.* The Absolute Spirit is rooted in the truth that there is no absolute wisdom in this world. Hegel's *Ph.G.* is the philosophy of a latent human-moral crisis which has become actual in the 20th century.

Seeing the *Ph.G.* as a whole and at the same time understanding it as a document for the biographical development of his world-view, one can easily detect this desperate struggle with himself which we have seen so many times thus far. It is the life of the spirit not to shun his devastations, but to face them with absolute honesty.

One also may see the *Ph.G.* as a great work of art, an immense world-historical stage-play. On the stage appears one form of human consciousness after another, each together with what it believes in, its value. Each makes a disappointing experience with its certainty and is replaced by another one which enjoys and suffers the same fate. At the end all these various characters will have contributed their share to the whole play. The audience at

the same time becomes aware that all these roles are its own roles. They see their own fable before their eyes and minds.

Or to put it in Aristotelian terms, man is the material, the stuff, the potential *Geist*. At the same time he is also the brick layer, the worker, working at himself. Thirdly, he is the architect and planner. But he comes to know only at the end what he was really planning. While he is building his destiny, he is constantly changing himself together with the plans of his construction, just as the author did in writing this book.

When Hegel wrote the *Preface*, he was looking back over his finished work. He tried to say what he had done and what he had been producing. He looked back on concrete historical realities not only as facts, but also as realizations of the perennial possibilities of being human. Man cannot find out what he is apart from finding out what he has done, what experience he has made with his hopes and projects. His human possibilities are essentials which are never apart or outside of this world of work and anguish and suffering; Hegel's *Ph.G.* is just as *essential* as it is *existential*. Man is essentially temporal or mortal; this truth and its knowledge is absolute and not merely temporal. In this truth man has reached the absolute dimension of *Geist*.

Man is what he does. In doing he reveals to himself what he is. In doing he becomes what he is; his becoming is, on the other hand, the unfolding or emanation of what he is essentially. Essential Being is not outside of what it becomes in temporal existence. Becoming is eternally the becoming manifestation of the Being which eternally is what it is.

If one understands what Hegel is trying to do in his

Preface and *Introduction* one is really ‘introduced’ to his thoughts. I shall therefore comment on them in detail.

THE PREFACE

*Philosophical Maturity*²¹

Hegel defines the ‘world-historical individual’ as one after whom the world is no longer what it was before him. This definition applies to himself: “Those meaningful (*besonnen*) natures do nothing but enunciate the word, and the people will adhere to them. Great minds who are capable of this must be completely purged from the peculiarities of the preceding epoch. If they can bring about a new totality, they must be totally saturated with it themselves. *They must have lost all fear of the world*; the fetters of customary mores, all alien crutches and all confidence of finding fixed supports in the world, must have left them; *that is, they must be educated by philosophy*. Former shapes of life that can be seen as limited are antiquated, and the new shape of life reveals life anew.”²²

The Preface to Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Mind* quietly proclaims no less than a world-revolution; post-Christian ‘modern’ man announces his presence and is sure of his future. This self-assurance is, however, not at all personal. It is not Hegel’s personal arrogance or lack of modesty. His pen is rather something like a seismographic needle. A global consciousness is awakening; the whole earth is explored, all the past; the history of man is an open book. Humanity, indeed, can no longer be held in any antiquated system with only a provincial validity.

21. II., pp. 11-22.

22. II., p. 18 (italics mine)

In distinction from Schelling who had made philosophy an esoteric privilege of a few geniuses, endowed with 'intellectual intuition', and in distinction from Fichte who had declared that one who did not accept his extreme moralism must have a bad character, Hegel philosophizes on behalf of *human consciousness* which is universal, historical, and individual. There is nothing in heaven or on earth which could refuse to render account of itself, or which could evade the question of its own *truth*. Whatever man can experience is in his consciousness and can be understood in its limitations. The philosophical consciousness has reached maturity, Hegel proclaimed. To put it negatively, no previous world-view, no one-sided standpoint, no 'ism', is sufficient or can hold out against philosophy. "It is not difficult to see that our epoch is a birth-time, and a period of transition. The spirit of the world has broken with the world as it has hitherto existed and with the old ways of thinking, and is about (im Begriffe sein) to let them all sink into the depths of memory and to achieve its own transformation. Spirit is indeed never at rest but is like a stream of continual movement. But sometimes this movement is suddenly accelerated, as in a waterfall. Such is now the case."²³ Hegel compares this 'modern' consciousness to the birth of a child: "After a long period of nutrition in silence, the continuity of the gradual growth in size, in quantitative change, is suddenly cut short by the first breath drawn; there is a break in the process, a qualitative leap, and the child is born. In like manner the spirit of this time, growing slowly and quietly, preparing the new form it is to assume, loosens one fragment after another of the structure of its previous world. That it is tottering toward its fall, is indicated

23. II., p. 18.

through symptoms here and there. *Frivolity* and again *boredom*, which are spreading in the established order of things, the vague fear of something unfamiliar, all these are hints foretelling that something very different is approaching. The gradual crumbling, which did not alter the general look and aspect of the whole, is interrupted by a *crisis*, which like a flash of lightning, at once brings to view the form and structure of the new world.”²⁴

The new world-view must be understood out of all previous stages and experiences of human consciousness that have prepared it. A “real whole is in itself only together with its having become what it is. The beginning of the new spirit is the outcome of many transformations of manifold forms of culture; it is the reward which comes after many devious detours and many struggles and efforts.”²⁵

The new philosophical maturity is no longer comprehensible in terms of previous phases of culture. Its consciousness is neither pre-Christian, nor Christian, nor anti-Christian (like the French and English enlightenment); the ‘modern’ man is neither empiricist nor rationalist, neither replacing philosophy with romantic feeling, intuition and inspiration of a vague infinite, nor reducing it to the intellectualistic prose of scientific-factual finitudes.

All those previous *gestalten* of the spirit have contributed to his maturity; they are all preserved in him, and they are all also overcome in the dialectical vision and reflection of an absolute totality. Logically speaking, all ‘isms’ are one-sided possibilities and perspectives; morally speaking, they are other souls appealing for sympathy; historically speaking, they are past phases of human ex-

24. *Ibid.* (italics mine)

25. II., p. 19.

istence, crowding one another off the scene; individually speaking, they are matters of personal experience. Falsely intellectualized or abstractly isolated, each of these positions would exclude the truth of his opponent. "The more the standpoint of opinion takes the opposition between true and false to be fixed, the more it is accustomed to expect either agreement or contradiction with a given philosophical system. It does not conceive the diversity of philosophical systems as the progressive evolution of truth; rather, it sees only contradictions in that variety. The bud disappears when the blossom breaks through, and we (if we are abstract formalists) might say that the former is 'refuted' by the latter; in the same way, when the fruit comes, the blossom may be explained to be a 'false' form of the plant's existence; for the fruit appears as its true nature in place of the blossom. These stages are not merely differentiated, they supplant one another as incompatible with one another. *But* the ceaseless activity of their own inherent form (Aristotle's entelechy, purpose organized) makes them at the same time moments (from "movimentum," phase of movement) of an organic unity where they not merely do not contradict one another, but where one is as necessary as the other; and *this equal necessity of all moments constitutes the life of the whole.*"²⁶ Hegel then applies this analogy of a living organism to the history of philosophy. Every true philosophy has realized the truth in its own formerly limited visions and existences. "We must recognize in what seems conflicting and inherently antagonistic systems the presence of mutually necessary moments."²⁷

This analogy between organic nature and human-phil-

26. II., p. 12 (italics mine)

27. *Ibid.*

sophical existence is based on Hegel's own 'Concept' (*Begriff*). The 'Concept' is a concrete whole of many movements or activities which are all equally necessary. The abstract concepts of reason, on the other hand, are general formulas which are always different from the contents which they define. The abstract concept of 'water' is H₂O. The concrete 'Concept' water is a world-view of a universal 'fluidity'—the beginning of Greek philosophy. The ocean gives rise to clouds, the clouds come down as rain and snow and swelling rivers, and return to father Okeanos.

Every 'speculative Concept' is a whole which is a universal for its own individual members—life is always individuated—but at the same time the same concept is not a universal but a particular sphere, dialectically related and limited by other Concepts which it is not. Thus when morality is defined as not art, both Concepts know their own essence by not being the Other.

'Concepts' i.e., living and individuated wholes, function in nature as well as in history. The *Phenomenology of Mind* takes One Concept, 'Mind' (*Geist*), in order to explore how it relates itself to that which it experiences (Object-Consciousness) and how it relates itself to its own experiencing of the world (Self-Consciousness).

Phenomenology thus is the explication of the worldly consciousness or the consciousness of the world in the equal necessity of each of its essential shapes of experience. The term which Hegel chose to express philosophical maturity beyond all one-sided 'isms' could not well be more confusing and misleading: it is the term 'Science' (*Wissenschaft*). This leaves all factual sciences without a term and makes the impression that philosophy is in competition with them. Negatively he means by 'Science'

only that philosophy is not merely a personal display of arbitrary opinions, oracular revelations, or edifying sermons; and, positively, that its medium is a logical reflection on all its living value-contents, which makes them clear and available to all who care to think.

The Task of Philosophy: "In my view—a view which the developed exposition of the system itself can alone justify—*everything depends on grasping and expressing the ultimate truth that reality is not only Substance but Subject as well.*"²⁸

"Substance" is reality as such, world itself, Being in all beings, eternal presence in all temporal processes, One in its infinite manifold, the same Identity in all self-differentiations, the 'unmoved mover' and concrete unity in all its own activities and movements. These ontological categories define 'substance' as it is '*in itself*.' As expressed and as known, 'substance' also actually has become that which it is '*for itself*'. As being for itself what it is in itself, substance is 'subject'. As totality, it is both "*in and for itself*"; Being is in man before he can become conscious of it; and Man comprehends Being in himself. This "*whole is the truth.*" Hegel here unites Kant's philosophy of the transcendental subject (I think) with Aristotle's ontology (Being in all beings).

Hegel's terms '*in itself*' and '*for itself*' translates Aristotle's 'potentiality' and 'actuality' into German. Man as embryo is potentially man. To become what he is, to actualize himself, is his own work and responsibility. He can become only what he is, but he only is what he makes or does with himself.

The 'substance' is potentially man; it carries man in its 'womb'. Without man Being would not be what it actually

28. II., p. 22 (italics mine)

has shown itself to be. If we call Being the One and Man its own 'Other', then Being 'others' or alienates itself from itself. Being is thrown into its own human self-estrangement or self-alienation which is mortal and transitory. If we call man the One and 'Being' his 'Other', then man as Spirit or consciousness must give 'form' or meaning to Being. Man longs for the lost unity with the world from which he is alienated. This is the long, painful, arduous process and labor of maturing. "The life of God and of divine self-knowledge may be compared to divine love sporting with itself; but this (religious-aesthetic) form of the Idea sinks to edification or even insipidity if it lacks the seriousness, the suffering, the patience, and the labour of the Negative."²⁹

If we call Being the 'Positive', that which eternally affirms itself in all of its own alienations, then the "I am" in the finite and subjective form of "I think" is the 'Negative'. I distinguish myself from all others; I am as this self-distinction. In order to overcome my isolation and emptiness I must relate myself to that which I am not, to the Other. Man as thinking distinguishes and relates himself to Being, and Being also in this self-estrangement distinguishes and relates itself; but Being is present inadequately. Being, 'substance' is meant to become subject. Subject belongs eternally to that which is; nothing that is can ever drop out of the universe. And what *has* become is eternally that which it is; it is posited, cancelled, and eternally preserved. These three meanings are expressed in the one verb '*aufheben!*' The I, this individual self, remains itself in its own doings, in all its functions. The I am, I think, I act, I do, I remember and anticipate and so on—this "I am" is the unity and totality of all and in all

29. II., p. 23.

of its functions. In self-comprehension the soul or spirit relates itself to itself through the unity of its logical self-reflection. Hegel terms this conscious unity 'Concept' (*Begriff*). The undialectical knowledge of object-sciences, on the contrary, forgets itself in the 'other', the object. It can, of course, also become philosophical by reflecting on what it is doing when it studies objects; this is the dialectical counter-movement (*Gegenstoss*) or 'checking-itself' (*Hemmung*).

"The truth is the whole, but this whole perfects its own essential-living nature only through the process of its own unfolding. It contains a self-alienation which must be taken back. The living substance is that Being which is truly subject (not only in itself but also for itself) or, what is the same thing, is truly realized and actual in the process of positing itself or in mediating its own self-alienation with itself."³⁰ Man becomes philosophical and philosophy becomes human.

The Task of Phenomenology³¹

Hegel expands Plato's saying that 'the state is the individual writ large'; the individual soul repeats in miniature the historical life of humanity, and the historical life of the humanity is composed of individual efforts and origins. The conscious-being develops itself in its naïve and immediate, theoretical and practical certainties; to every certainty or subjective outlook, perspective or world-view there corresponds an objective world-viewed which is taken, or rather mistaken, to be the truth for this particular standpoint. This correspondence between a certainty and its truth, or *Geist* in its subjective and ob-

30. II., p. 24.

31. II., pp. 30-37.

jective poles, is an essential relation recurring and reproducing itself (both historically and individually) in many levels of different realms of experience. Each of them has its own inalienable right and significance for the growing consciousness of an all-embracing certainty and truth (which is philosophy as 'Science') of the "complete worldliness of consciousness in its necessity".³² We, the phenomenologists, observe how human consciousness grows towards this actualized goal which is already present in the goal as its potential or unconscious ground. Seen from the end, every movement or phase on life's road is an abstraction from the whole; seen from each of the stations or phases through which the movement passes, the whole is the annihilation or critique of the insufficiency of every 'moment'. The whole is nothing apart from its particular phases, and these particular shapes of life are nothing apart from the universal life which they modify.

"This becoming of 'Science' is what this Phenomenology presents. Knowng, as it is found at the start, is sensuous consciousness which is *Geist* in its immediacy without knowing that it is *Geist*. To become for itself it must work itself through a long journey. The task of conducting the individual from his uncultured standpoint to Knowledge was to be undertaken both in a general and individual education. We had to contemplate the human culture (*Bildung*) which is conscious of itself in and through individual minds. In those minds which stand higher than others, the lower form of existence has become a subordinate moment; what was a substantial, objective value-content (*Sache selbst*) has become simply a trace or shading in an enriched, more complete culture. This more developed phase passes through these past forms; like one taking up a higher science having gone through prepara-

32. II., p. 30.

tory forms of knowledge which he has long made his own, he brings back the recollection of them without stopping to fix his interest on them. The particular individual enriches himself with historical content. He too, has to go through the stages through which the general mind has passed, but as gestalten once assumed by mind and now laid aside like the stages of a road which has been worked over and smoothed out. Hence, in the case of various kinds of knowledge we find that what in former days occupied the energies of men of mature mental ability sinks to the level of information, exercises, even pastimes for children; and in this educational progress we can see the history of the world's culture delineated in faint outline. This bygone mode of existence has already become an acquired possession of the general mind which constitutes the substance of the individual and, by thus appearing externally to him, furnishes his inorganic nature (we would now say his sub-conscious background). In this respect culture or development of mind, regarded from the side of the individual, consists in acquiring what lies at his hand ready for him. He makes its inorganic nature organic for himself (appropriating subconscious inheritances consciously) and takes possession of it for himself. However, looked at from the side of universal mind qua universal and spiritual substance, culture means nothing else than that this substance gives itself its own self-consciousness, brings about its own inherent self-becoming and its own reflection in individual selves.”³³

‘Science’ (as Phenomenology) lays before us the

33. Frederik Adama van Scheltema: *Die Geistige Wiederholung. Der Weg des Einzelnen und seiner Ahnen*. Bern. A. Francke, 1954, is an empirical verification of this principle, comparing prehistorical cultures with phases of the development in modern children. Also C. G. Jung's psychology of the collective ‘archetypes’ works out the Hegelian principle of spiritual recollection.

morphogenetic process of the cultural development in all its detailed fullness and necessity, and at the same time it shows it to be something that has already sunk into the mind as a moment of its Being to become a possession of the mind. Impatience asks for the impossible and wants to reach the goal without the means of getting there. The length of the journey must be endured, for every moment is necessary; and again we must halt at every stage, for each is itself as a complete individual form and is fully and finally considered only so far as its determinate character is taken and dealt with as a rounded and plastic whole, or only so far as the whole is looked at in the light of the special and peculiar character which this determination gives it. The universal humanity at work in the world (*Weltgeist*) has had the patience to go through these forms in long stretches of times and to take upon itself the prodigious labor of the world's history. Since the all-pervading mind needed these efforts to work itself out and to become conscious of what it is in itself, the individual mind cannot expect to grasp without toil what its own substance contains.

Critique of Rationalism and Irrationalism

Hegel's 'New Man' has found his philosophy, and philosophy has found her 'Man' with the wisdoms of their past; they have furnished and kept what is still alive and relevant to them. They also have acquired a vast domain around their mansion. They now visit their neighbors on this domain, who also happens to be their tenants, the 'positive' arts and sciences. This movement of the *Preface* is something of a '*scherzo*' or comedy.³⁴

34. II., pp. 38-45. (All following quotations from this section.)

For they visit a couple who are known to live in an unhappy marriage "like oil and water which do not mix but are merely united externally". His name is *Dogmatism*, her name is *Skepticism*. He is a sucker for empirical securities, pseudo-absolutes, and fake realities. His wife constantly takes him down, lays him low, and is always nagging. So he seeks consolation elsewhere, forgets himself on his sprees, and comes home drunk with certainties and neat answers.

After this experience with an unhappy consciousness, man and philosophy next visit a proud mistress inhabiting a many-storied but ever unfinished palace. Her name is *Mathematica*. She "plumes herself and proudly struts before philosophy", ignorant of how empty her palace is. She "proffers her delectable treasures of truth which consist of space and numerical units", shows their quantitative relations and measurements of 'equal' and 'unequal' magnitudes. She serves "fixed lifeless propositions" for dinner and is very clever and exact in handling the abstract traces of motion in a 'dead element'. She complains bitterly about her neighbor, *Physics*. 'Do you know what Physics did!' she says. "She borrowed from me my nicest and cleanest tools and brought them back soiled and warped. She constantly mixes up my pure quantitative relations of points and lines and distances with the behavior of physical bodies, with masses and forces, as if I were responsible for their existence and behavior."

After a brief visit with *Physics* who is chewing the husks of the externally given, philosophy and man also visit *descriptive sciences*, humbler folks living in modest dwellings. With them, "being and knowing are always in opposition." Their favorite tools are shovels; they like to dig up rare specimens from graves which they proudly

show to one another. They employ an army of lawyers about property rights and about who has found what first and who has copied what from whom. "There has to be a good deal of comparison and looking up of the books." They artificially carve out "spheres of particular experiences" and fill their dwellings "with a content in its contingent and arbitrary aspects" and with "features that have no necessity". A lot of "naked facts" are seen running around in nudist camps. And there are even sinister characters; one who is better than they "cannot escape the fate of being killed . . . his skin flayed and paraded about".

To their great grief, Man and Philosophy also discover quacks and imitators of philosophy who call themselves wise without being wise; "*speculative philosophers of nature*", teaching that "understanding is electricity" and such. Or they mix categories of philosophy with common images taken from everyday life. Of course, they have their admirers and make a living from them. "All this sort of thing may strike anyone who has no experience with admiration and wonder." We also find knowledge-preserves "standing like rows of pots sealed and labelled in grocery stores". Apart from having fun, Hegel also makes an important and serious point in the midst of satire. This whole realm is the realm of scientific reason governed by formal logic. Facts and mathematical figures are either so or not so. *The laws of formal logic are valid.* They are as valid as are mathematical equations of empty magnitudes which is not *thinking*, but the *measuring* of equal and unequal units of space-time relationships.

This whole sphere of reason becomes *false* when it declares itself to be the one and only *truth*. It is a necessary aspect or moment of truth which has to think the infinite whole in which all spheres and aspects are concrete op-

posites, which posit and limit each other, and which become aware of themselves in comprehensive thought (*Begriff*). In this comprehensiveness of philosophical self-reflection there is no vision that is simply, abstractly false; it becomes false only when it wants to stay fixed, when it isolates, abstracts, absolutizes itself. "The process of substance is an unbroken transition into outwardness, into existence or being for one another; and conversely the coming into existence is at the same time a going back into the living essence, self-realization. The movement is the twofold process in which the whole becomes existential, and existence 'enwholes' itself and is such that each at the same time posits the other; and each on this account is both in its two aspects. Together they make the whole through their resolving each other and making themselves into moments of the whole. Appearance is the process of arising into existence and passing away again, a process that itself does not arise and does not pass away but constitutes both reality and the life movement of truth. It is a bacchanalian revel wherein no member is not drunk; but because every member no sooner gets detached than it is dissolved in its immediacy, the revel is just as much a state of transparent unbroken calm."

*The Method.*³⁵ The dialectical method of comprehensive philosophy thus comprehends the formal logic of rational and factual sciences within its wholeness. This whole is too rich to be expressed in any one-sided 'system'. The various 'isms' (rationalism as well as irrationalism, subjectivism as well as objectivism, idealism as well as realism) must be educated to realize their limitations and their value within their limitation. Thus they should real-

35. II., pp. 45-66, is the source of the following quotations.

ize at the same time the supremacy of human philosophy and philosophical humanity.

"In all spheres of science, art, skill, and handicraft it is never doubted that, in order to master them, a considerable amount of trouble must be spent in learning and in being trained. As regards philosophy, on the contrary, there still seems to reign a prevalent assumption that, though everyone with eyes and fingers is not on that account in a position to make shoes if he only gets leather and a lathe, yet everybody understands how to philosophize straight away and pass judgment on philosophy simply because he possesses the criterion for doing so in his natural reason as if he did not in the same way possess the standard of shoemaking in his own foot. It seems as if the possession of philosophy lay just in the want of knowledge and study. It is commonly held to be a formal kind of knowledge devoid of all substantial content. There is a general failure to perceive that, in the case of any knowledge and any science, what is taken for truth, even as regards content, can only deserve the name 'truth' when philosophy has had a hand in its production. Let the other sciences try as much as they like to get along by ratiocination or reasoning without philosophy, but they are unable to keep alive without her, or to have any spiritual (*Geistige*) significance and truth in them."

Against this un-philosophical rationalism stands the equally unphilosophical irrationalism of feeling. All true philosophy is a philosophy of life, especially of cognitive, ethical, aesthetic, and religious life. *These self-distinctions within the cultural life are also the systematic disciplines and contents of philosophical self-knowledge.* These living contents or values must be thought. "If the man of common sense appeals to his feelings, to an oracle within

his breast, against cultivated critical reason, then he is through with anyone who does not share his feeling. He must explain that he has nothing to say to anyone who does not share his feeling. In other words, he tramples the roots of humanity under his foot. For the nature of humanity is to insist that men agree with one another, and its very existence lies simply in the explicit realization of a dialectical community of conscious beings. What is sub-human, the condition of animals, consists in keeping within the sphere of feeling only and in being able to communicate only by the way of feeling-symptoms."

"Thus I, too, may hope that this attempt to vindicate and to wed 'Science' to Comprehension and to present it in this its own speculative medium will manage to make a way for itself by the inherent truth of its objective as well as subjective process (*Sache selbst*). We should be convinced that it is the nature of truth to penetrate when its time has come."

"At a time when the universality of Spirit has become stronger, and singularities have become, as they ought to, of less importance; when, too, the concrete universal holds the entire range of its substance and in it the full measure of its own wealth . . . the share in its total work that falls to the activity of any particular individual can only be very modest. Because this is so, the individual must all the more forget himself; he must, however, do what he can."

Philosophical knowledge is both living its cultural activities and at the same time knows them all to contribute to its own unity or to be a modification of it. The 'Concept' is thus itself in its utterances or 'otherings' (*Anderssein*). Comprehension (*Vernunft*) is inseparable from life in which it is involved; but it is also constantly making its

rhythm articulate by thinking and saying what it is and does. The content or values of philosophy come "from the seriousness of a filled life". It is not merely reasoning or theorizing. It experiences the resistance, the countermovement (*Gegenstoss*) of living-reality; reality forces itself to our philosophical attention. Such dialectical meetings of I-thou do not leave me free to handle you according to a rational plan or conceptual pattern (*Hemmung*). The speculative or dialectical proposition contains both the I who perceives, thinks, wills, fears, etc., and the contents that are evident to its activities or functions. The contents thus become subjective; they become articulate in me, and the subject loses its own identity in them in order to identify itself with them. The rhythm of life, knowing itself, needs both the rational metre or measure (setting limits) and the interplay of emphasis or 'accents' which articulate what is important.

*The Introduction*³⁶

The long *Preface* of the *Phenomenology of Mind* is followed by thirteen pages, now called *Introduction*, which contains sixteen sections. I shall quote them by number. The manuscript had no title for this piece; it followed immediately after the title which was not *Phaenomenologie des Geistes* but *Wissenschaft des Bewusstseins*. These pages are something like a long subtitle explaining the meaning of the title which is still meant to be the title of the book in paragraph XV. After the book had developed into the *Phaenomenologie des Geistes*, the long *Preface* was added, but the explanatory subtitle of the

36. The following quotations are from II., pp. 67-80. This chapter is indebted to Martin Heidegger's Hegel interpretation.

first title was retained. In it we have an early and condensed version of Hegel's initial intention.

The literal English translation as *Science of Experience of Consciousness*, would be rather misleading, because *Wissenschaft* is not Science, *Erfahrung* is not *Experience*, and *Bewusstsein* has in its 'sein' an ontological weight which the more psychological "consciousness" lacks.

This English translation would suggest that there is an object, such as mental processes, of which there is a science. But Hegel's title contains no such object-reference. The subject of the title is not *Wissenschaft*, but *Erfahrung*. This word is taken in its literal meaning: a venturing out, an adventure (*fahren*) which arrives somewhere, comes to rest or achieves a result (*er-fahren*). This result achieved is *Bewusst-sein*. What I am, I learn in risking myself. *Bewusst-sein* is constituted in the process of my own *Er-fahrung*. And the *Wissenschaft* is the wisdom in which that which I am is expressed and formulated. This wisdom is constituted by a desperate struggle and painful process of *Erfahrung* whose stations are various forms of consciousness. That this *Erfahrung*, which the soul makes out of itself and with itself, is the central term of the original title is also indicated in the Heraclitian quotation which is used as motto on the title page of the Phenomenology: "The soul's meaning is self-augmenting."

I shall now try to state the sixteen theses of the Introduction as briefly as possible.

I.

Philosophy is real, actual, or existential (*wirklich*) knowledge of truth and Being. Being is in truth; that truth is actual in us. In a word, Philosophy is self-explication of the Absolute.

Philosophical knowledge, then, is neither a practical tool by which the Absolute could be handled, nor a formal medium through which it could shine. Both these forms of empirical knowledge postulate a separation, an estrangement between an object known and empirical subjects knowing it. The Absolute is in us and wills to be born into our consciousness. It is both in itself and for itself. Philosophical knowledge is not only like a prism in which the ray of truth is broken, but also is that ray itself; truth is the consciousness of Being in us. Truth is ontological consciousness, the clearance of Being qua Being in becoming aware of itself in many beings.

II.

What Philosophy has to fear is fear of truth. Our fear of error and untruth, on the other hand, is false. Our true, responsible existence is inseparable from our absolute commitment to truth, which in turn is inseparable from unmasking errors.

III.

The Absolute is the only truth, and only truth is absolute. To posit the Absolute as ground of all other kinds of truth is a “presupposition” (*vorausgesetzt*), the meaning of which must be developed. The ground of philosophy is at the same time the goal of its self-development. (As to doubting, negating, or fearing this presupposition see II.)

IV.

However, this absolute contention of philosophy appears as one position among others. In this historical situa-

tion in which one kind of knowledge seems to compete with other kinds, philosophy can not withdraw to an inner certainty, a sentiment, a voluntaristic choice, an arbitrary faith or an intuitive hunch. It has to go through the other positions of consciousness and show them their own truths in developing their own limits.

V.

One might see this way through the stations of the appearing consciousness as an *itinerarium mentis in deum*, as a pilgrimage towards the Absolute. This Platonic image of the ascent of the soul is misleading if it is not remembered that each station of this passion-way is in itself an appearing phase of the Absolute; in that which seems to be nothing but fixation or one-sidedness, the Absolute's own negations must be recognized.

VI.

For the varieties of the natural or empirical consciousness this realization of their own concept is less an edifying than a horrifying and desperate experience. This thoroughgoing skepticism of philosophical experience is not to be confused with that kind of doubt which merely sees riddles and which returns to its position unscathed after the riddle has been figured out.

VII.

This self-realizing (sich vollbringend) skepticism must not be identified with the particular position of skepticism as one of the one-sided forms of consciousness. That one-

sided skepticism is merely the negative result of having seen through the impossibility of sense-certainty and object-realism of natural consciousness. It remains negatively tied up with the dogmatic assumptions from which it abstains.

VIII.

The dialectical process is on all levels a living dialogue between the absolute and the relative consciousness in us. Every finite fixation is secretly aware of death as that power which overwhelms it. Against this feeling of being overwhelmed (*Gefühl der Gewalt*—the ‘rationalist’ Hegel) and against the anguish in the omnipresence of the Absolute, the finite positions cling all the more stubbornly to their comforts. This is the misery of unauthentic existence, which can be cured if existence is willing to appropriate its own death as means of bringing itself into its true Being.

IX.

There seems to be, then, in all levels of consciousness or existential knowledge a discrepancy between absolute truth as measure and the certainties of standpoints as that which is measured, of Being in itself beyond consciousness and Being for consciousness, transcendence and immanence.

X.

But this contradiction is the essential nature of consciousness itself. Every consciousness distinguishes that

which it intends and its own awareness of that intention. That which is intended as the *Being-in-itself* is *truth*; the *appearance* of that truth *for* consciousness is its *certainty*.

XI.

We who know consciousness as this existential dialectic are involved in the same dialectic which we seem to be observing. Philosophy is self-knowledge.

XII.

Philosophical knowledge therefore distinguishes itself from all other types of knowledge in which its observed object is the same sort of thing as that which does the observing. In apprehending the other I characterize myself. Empirical, natural consciousness intends to know objects as if they were independent of this consciousness. In understanding this kind of object-consciousness we understand a mode of existence which we are if and when we practice it. Our "object" (empirical consciousness) exists in and for itself as that which it is for us in philosophy. Truth and certainty, that which consciousness is in itself and that which it is for itself, are one and the same appearing dialectical process.

XIII.

Consciousness itself is this process of comparing its own two sides—that of which it is aware and its being aware of it. Philosophical 'Science' is the pure *theoria* (Reines Zusehn), the contemplative formulation of this process. Consciousness is thus seen to probe itself, to know and to criticize itself.

XIV.

This dialectical movement in which consciousness is forced to take one position after another in the correlations of knowledge and its intentional object is the experience (*Er-fahrung*) which it makes with itself. Consciousness constitutes itself in and by this experience.

XV.

The unity and coherence of the process itself is the ontological truth ("on") of the limited ontic positions ("onta"). The absolute whole establishes itself in the build-up and breakdown of all of its own limited positions. To reach this *Wissenschaft*, consciousness is forced through a series of conversions (*Unkehrung*). The dialectic of absolute and relative, infinite and finite, eternal and temporal, and so forth, is the mature notion of *Geist*, the result of the phenomenological development. To develop those ontological categories will be the task of a logic of philosophy; but since the result can not be thought apart from the process, the "*Wissenschaft der Erfahrung des Bewusstseins*" is itself a necessary category of the Absolute.

XVI.

The realm of truth is inseparably one with our tentative and provisional trials of existence; there is not a moment of truth which is not also a shape of living consciousness. The last words of the *Phenomenology* tie back to this last paragraph of the *Introduction*. Without the dialectical unity of absolute truth, of mortal or finite certainties and the self-overcoming actuality of *Erfahrung*, the Absolute would be nothing but a lifeless abstraction, *der leblose Einsame*.

Gymnasium-Director in Nürnberg 1808 - 1817

Marriage

One great event of the Nürnberg period was Hegel's marriage with Marie von Tucher, a girl with a "temperament of benevolent gaiety and naturalness of feeling and good sense."¹ On April 18, 1811 Hegel confided to Niethammer, "Since the day before yesterday I have the certainty that I may call a dear heart my own." But he is afraid that the father of Marie von Tucher, as head of an old Patrician family of Nürnberg, may not give his consent to a Suabian 'foreigner' and penniless school-master. He should at least be a university professor. Niethammer replied, "Frankly speaking, I think this is both an unfortunate as well as unfounded timidity on your part. In a time in which even kings need no ancestors to marry princesses, in a time in which personal merit and self-achieved rank without any noble ancestry is more ennobling than all heraldic proofs, such a marriage need not shun publicity. Besides a director and professor at one of the most renowned royal *Gymnasia* is not below the line which would have opened the door even in the former and now dissolving social order. Don't let yourself be deterred by such worries which even border on vanity

1. Br. I., p. 379.

least appropriate for a philosopher".² Two beautiful letters and two poems to Marie during their courtship will speak for themselves:

Nürnberg,
Summer 1811

Dear Mary!

In thoughts I have written to you almost throughout the whole night! It was not this or that particular detail between us about which I was thinking, but it necessarily concerned the whole thought . . . shall we make one another unhappy? From the depths of my soul there was a voice . . . this can, this shall, this may not be!—It will not be!

Marriage is essentially a religious tie; love to be complete needs something higher than it is in itself and for itself alone. What we call perfect satisfaction or happiness only religion and the feeling of duty can complete, because through them the particularities of the temporal self are made less important. They make trouble in empirical reality which always remains imperfect and must not be taken as a finality, but in which, nevertheless, lies that which is called earthly happiness. Have we not agreed together last evening that what we shall be content to call that which we are certain to reach, peacefulness or satisfaction (*Zufriedenheit*)? There is a *blessed* peacefulness which, contemplated without illusion, is more than everything which is merely called happy.

When I added on your letter to my sister those

2. Br. I., May 5, 1811.

words to which you certainly have given too much significance, but whose meaning is very precious to me—You see from that how happy I shall be for my whole remaining life with her, and how happy this gaining of her love already has made me, a love which I almost had given up hope to find in this world—then I added, as if this expression of my happy feeling had been too great in comparison with that which we had agreed on, '*In so far* as happiness lies in the destination of my life.' I don't think that this should have hurt your feelings. I remind you, dear Mary, that your deep spiritual sense, the cultivation of something higher in you, has taught you that in souls not superficial all sentiment of happiness is not without a sentiment of sadness! I also remind you that you have promised me to be my healer for that in me which would still doubt . . . that I am really satisfied, a reconciler of my true inner self with the manner in which I all too frequently am set against the real; and that this view-point gives a higher sight to your mission; that I have confidence that you will have this strength; that this strength must lie in *our* love—your love to me, my love to you—expressed separately would bring a distinction into our relationship which would separate *our* love. and this love is quite ours—only this unity, only this bond; turn away from reflecting on this separation, and let us hold fast to this one in which alone lies also my strength, my new joy of life; let this confidence be the ground of all, then everything will be truly good.

Alas! I could write so much more, also perhaps about my melancholy pendartry with which I so in-

sist on this distinction of peacefulness and happiness—maybe quite unnecessarily—I have sworn to myself and to swear it to you that your happiness shall be the most precious good I have. There are many things which pass, are forgotten, and undone if one does not touch them.

And finally, I was long in doubt whether I should write to you, because everything written or spoken again depends on how one interprets it; but I have overcome this fear also, and I hope everything from your heart as it receives these written words.

Live well until we see one another today untroubled, *dear Mary*. If I only could say this to you with feeling, how much, my existence, what there is to it, lies in these words . . . *dear Mary*.

Thy Wilhelm

Nürnberg,
Summer 1811

I have hurt your feelings with some things I said. This pains me. I have hurt you by seeming to discredit some principles of your thought and conduct which are views of morality which I must discredit. I only want to explain to you now that, on the one hand, I discredit those views in so far as they seem to cancel the distinction between that which seems agreeable or pleasant and duty, or rather which would quite destroy the latter and with it morality. But, on the other hand,—and this is the main issue between us—I beg you to believe that I do not ascribe those views to you. I see them only as lying in your reflection and that you do not know them in their logical consequences. They serve you to excuse others

(to justify something is another matter, because one may excuse another's things which one would not permit in oneself; what one can justify is valid for all, including us). In regard to me and my way of explaining, do not forget that when I condemn maxims, I too easily lose the sight of the manner in which they are actual in a unique individual—here in you—and that they stand all too seriously before my eyes in their consequences and vast applications of which you are not aware, still less that you would approve of them. You also know *that*, even though characters and intellectual insights are sometimes different, it is not indifferent under which maxims the insight is judged; but I know just as well that if maxims are contradictory to the character, that this in women is less important than in men.

You know there are naughty men who plague their wives in order that their patience and love may be constantly renewed before their very eyes. I do not believe myself to be so naughty; but if such a darling creature as you should never experience chagrin, I would almost feel sorry not to have caused you that chagrin; because I feel that the inwardness and profundity of my love for you has been increased by this deeper experience of your soul which I have thereby gained; this gain may be also a consolation to you because in it everything is absorbed which may have seemed to be unsoft or unlovely in my words: I constantly feel and recognize you ever deeper as through and through lovely, loving, and love-worthy.

I must go to my lectures. Farewell, dearest, dearest, graciously angelic Mary.

Thy Wilhelm

Besides these two letters there are also two poems to his bride. In those poems, as well as in the letters, Hegel's old philosophy of love now becomes concrete experience and immediate expression. Translated into prose, these verses are seen to contain the same meaning which we found in Hegel's fragment on love of the Frankfurt period. I quote the last two stanzas of the poem of April 13, 1811. The second poem is dated April 17, 1811, after the engagement.

Denn das Leben ist nur Wechselleben,
Das die Lieb in Liebe schafft;
Der verwandten Seele hingegaben,
Tut das Herz sich auf in seiner Kraft,

Tritt der Geist auf freie Bergeshöhen,
Er behält vom Eignen nichts zurück;
Leb' ich, mich in Dir, Du Dich in mir zu sehen,
So geniessen Wir der Himmel Glück.

For life is only mutual life
Which love creates in love;
Abandoned to a kindred soul,
The heart is opened in its strength.

Spirit steps on mountain peaks of freedom,
Nothing of its own is left behind;
If I live to see myself in you and you in me,
We enjoy the happiness of Heaven.

Du meinl solch Herz darf mein ich nennen,
In Deinem Blick
Der Liebe Wiederblick erkennen,
O Wonne, o höchstes Glück!

Wie ich Dich lieb', ich darf's jetzt sagen;
Was in gepresster Brust
So lang geheim entgegen Dir geschlagen,
Es werd', ich darf nun, laute Lust!

Doch armes Wort, der Lieb' Entzücken,
Wie's innen treibt und drängt
Zum Herz hinüber, auszudrücken
Ist Deine Kraft beschränkt.

Ich könnte, Nachtigall, Dich neiden
Um Deiner Kehle Macht,
Doch hat Natur die Sprache nur der Leiden
Missgünstig so beredt gemacht!

Doch wenn durch Rede sie dem Munde
Der Liebe Seligkeit
Nicht ausdrücken gab, zum Bunde
Der Liebenden verleiht

Sie ihm ein innigeres Zeichen;
Der Kuss die tiefre Sprache ist,
Darin die Seelen sich erreichen,
Mein Herz in Deins Hinüberfliesst.

You minel Such heart I may call my own,
In your glance
Recognize the echo glance of love,
Oh Joy! Oh Highest Fortune!

How I love you, now I may say it;
What in my repressed heart has
Secretly yearned to meet you,
Now may become loud jubilation!

But poor word—your power is limited
To express love's exaltation;
And how it drives and draws
From one heart to the other.

I could envy you, nightingale,
For your power of song;
We, disfavored in the language of our nature;
Only the sorrows are eloquent.

But if she has refused
To give to our mouth
The power of expressing the blessedness
Of love in words,

She has bestowed more intimate signs;
The kiss is deeper language
Wherein the souls may reach themselves.
My heart flows into yours.

Love, as present in those poems and letters, is both a dialectical comprehension which is real and a real movement of the soul which is a dialectical unity of one and other. It is a mutual, natural attraction and immediate feeling, but it is also a feeling of duty and moral obligation or constancy; it is a self-transcending elevation of the soul, Eros, but is also a sacrifice of the Ego and is gratefully received as a miracle or religious grace (Agape). All those moments are to be distinguished and appreciated in their separate values, but they are also to be related as mutually necessary "moments" of the whole movement.

The marriage took place in early October. Hegel almost had to postpone the date because his salary had not been paid for six months.³ Niethammer offered his credit,

3. Br. I., 384.

but Hegel replied that another friend in Nürnberg had already advanced a loan. Hegel wrote to Niethammer, "Above all, worthiest friend, let me tell you how much your participation in the happy change of my situation has gladdened me. I have to thank you for more than this participation, for you are the author also of this part of my happiness. With it I have on the whole (some desirable modifications notwithstanding) reached my earthly goal; for with a profession and a dear wife, one is settled in this world. They are the chief articles of what one has to desire and achieve for one's individuality. What remains are no longer special chapters but rather paragraphs and footnotes."⁴

Hegel's marriage turned out to be, and remained what he had called it in his letter to Maria, "a blessed satisfaction". Three children were born in Nürnberg, of which the first, a girl, died; two boys followed. They were later joined by Hegel's natural son, the 'little Hegel' from Jena.

G. H. von Schubert writes that those who knew Hegel only from his lectures or writings had no idea how charming he was in personal circles, how tender and considerate as father and husband; in society his objective judgment was informative and his wit hilarious.

Rosenkranz describes Hegel's family as follows: "Hegel supervised his whole home life with a loving carefulness. No irritation, no negligence concerning the inevitable contact with the pettiness of life is visible. He treated his economic affairs with precaution, without anxiety, and without levity. Like Schiller, he always kept a large household book. In it he puts down all expenses for rent, clothes, wood, wages, furniture, pleasures, wine, etc. . . . At the end of each month, the remainder was put aside. Each

4. October 10, 1811.

child received a saving box. One might say of Hegel that his genius was so great that it also allowed him to be a 'philistine'. This home economy continued until his death. In his books of the Berlin period one can also see how frequently he returned to students their fee for his courses. Money for necessities, for emergencies, and for celebrations were always kept in order. For festive surprises on family birthdays, he always took a tender care.

First came what was useful and solid, then came elegance. In his habits a simple frugality prevailed which at no time had to shun visitors. Apart from the times of child-bed or sickness of his wife he preferred to have only one servant girl; and still in Berlin when he was well-to-do, there was no pretentiousness.

He liked to make little excursions with his family when he rested from his labors. He and his wife visited the Niethammers in München, and they were also visited by them in Nürnberg. Their mutual friendship was confirmed when Niethammer became a god-father of Hegel's younger son. There was great joy and jubilation when Hegel's sister spent a time in Nürnberg in his house. The modern craze to be stimulated all the time and to make of a so-called vacation a hectic business was utterly foreign to him.⁵

The Director

When Hegel set foot in the new building for his school, he discovered that the toilets had been forgotten. This excess of spirituality started him off on a series of administrative troubles. The worst of them was a never-ending fight for salaries, which, mainly due to the war-times, were almost always in arrear—once for two years.

5. Ros., p. 266.

On the whole he was well satisfied. "The teachers are diligent and there is an easy-going congeniality between them; there is a fine order without harshness. Among the youngsters there is no crudity or insolence. They respect the cause (Sache) and show much zeal and willingness to learn and are good-natured."⁶

One of the first acts under his administration was to free the teachers from compulsory church-attendance, to cancel "the previous subordination of the teaching profession to those ecclesiastics (Pfaffenstand)."⁷ For "religious freedom consists in this: that I am not coerced to confess religious myths (Vorstellung) or to do religious performances; positively, that there be only such contents (Bestimmungen) in religion which I can appropriate as my own. A religion which is forced on me, or in regard to which I do not conduct myself as a free being, is not my own but remains an estrangement."⁸

His conscientious and painstaking care for his faculty and for the students individually was gratefully acknowledged by them as well as by his superiors. His public impartiality does not prevent him to have his private critical opinions. "There is much dead wood on which the pupils are crucified."⁹ "I experience the nuisance of a combination of business with a learned profession."¹⁰ "Our superintendent (Kreisschulrat) has no other notion of education than that it consists of the misery of indoctrination, memory-learning (not to really know something by heart but in the sense of mere external repetition), compulsions and coercion, spoon-feeding and rumination. It is incompre-

6. Br. I., p. 280.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 310.

8. III., p. 44.

9. Br. I., p. 340.

10. Br. I., p. 296.

hensible to him that youngsters also may enjoy self-activity in their learning.”¹¹

Clemens Brentano, the arch-romantic poet, tells of a visit to Hegel’s office. “I found him reading the *Nibelungen Lied*, which he had translated for greater enjoyment into Greek.”¹²

As director, he gave five addresses on graduation day. These addresses together with his *Philosophische Propädeutik* for his high school students now form the third volume of his works.¹³ Those simple speeches as well as the confidential reports and advices to Niethammer are not only beautiful, human, personal documents, but also a classical statement on the educational values of humanistic education. The following quotations and abbreviations condense the paedagogical message from those addresses.

On the Values of Humanistic Education

“We are living in the midst of an immense historical crisis. Being occupied we are deprived of our own independent public life. We are threatened with hopelessness and indifference, evils of the soul which are greater than the sight of ruins and the corpses of cities. Under such circumstances it is elevating to observe the enthusiastic response with which the citizens rally around the great project of saving and renewing our educational institution.”¹⁴

11. Br. I., p. 288.

12. Fischer, II., p. 1209. The language of this epic is middle-high German.

13. Sämtliche Werke III: *Philosophische Propädeutik, Gymnasialredon und Gutachten über der Philosophie*. Unterricht, Stuttgart, 1829.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 264.

"Rightly so, for it is the young generation who must be prepared to meet the challenge of the new situation. What has gone is gone irrevocably. It is vain to miss it or to wish it back. What is old is not preferable because it was adequate or perfect for its own time. The young generation must not be troubled through futile regrets and fond memories; it must be prepared to shoulder the new tasks and to make itself worthy of a happiness in the new world of the future. It is up to them that good things may come out of many years of troubles and deprivations."¹⁵ This new life, however, would not be possible if we would succumb to the temptation to take too seriously the ups and downs, the external successes and diversions of the world-show. To orient our youth merely in the momentary and transitory changes of the world would give them a 'false concept of the value of things'.¹⁶ "Have we not recently seen that states which neglected or even despised to cultivate such an inner core of the soul in their members and only trained them to mere utility, degrading the spirit to the function of a mere means, were caught in dangers without fortitude and were brought low in the midst of plenty of their useful supplies?"¹⁷

* * * * *

Having thus firmly sized up the historical situation, Hegel then turns towards the function of the school in this situation: "The *school* is a transition from the life in the family to the life in public; and it mediates between the past achievement of mankind and its hoped-for future. From the point of view of the pupil school-time is the time

15. *Ibid.*, p. 297.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 296.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 238.

of growth, learning, expansion, progression; from the point of view of the educator, school-time is the time of recurrent cycles of learning and of generations; from the point of view of itself, its temporal interest is to endure as an ideal whole throughout the slow changes of historical times.”¹⁸ “Education cannot understand itself merely as an experiment.”¹⁹

“The life in the family consists of personal, private relations. The family relates through love, feeling, natural piety and mutual confidence. This relation is not an objective bond of common causes but a natural bond of blood. The child is recognized here because it is the child of the family. It meets the love of its parents without merit and has to stand their tempers without recourse to right.

“In public life, on the contrary, a man has validity through that which he is, does, and represents; he has value only insofar as he has earned it. He is receiving little out of love and for love’s sake. The cause which he represents, not his *private* personality, is that which makes him valuable. Public life goes on independent of his peculiar subjectivity, and he has to make himself fit to enter one of its many objective spheres of activity. His *whole* personality becomes an organ of his calling.

“The school, then, in order to effect this transition from private to public existence separates the adolescent from his immediate family background. Education leads the child from the life of feeling and restricting needs to the freedom of thought and of intellectual self-activity. Learning strengthens his power to become master over immediate impressions and shifting externalities.”²⁰

18. *Ibid.*, p. 281.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 232.

20. *Ibid.*, pp. 268-269.

"On the one hand, the school still continues in tendering personal-individual guidance and care; on the other hand, it already prefigures the public, adult world of serious activities. The pupil gets used to strangers as equals in a competitive game of competitive efforts."²¹ "The feeling of the child's dependence is changed gradually to a feeling of self-activity, integrity and independence. This is brought about not through external discipline or obedience, but through the means of personal interest and love in connection with the joy of objective learning."²²

* * * * *

The school which Hegel was instrumental in transforming was an institution for the teaching of Latin and Greek. The new curriculum contained (besides Latin and Greek) the mathematical and physical sciences, history, modern German literature, and three introductory courses in Philosophy taught in three successive semesters by Herr Direktor Hegel himself.²³

Hegel said that the old type of Latin school had its justification in a time when the ancient languages were the only means to acquire culture and when practical skills could be picked up in practical life itself. This separation of life and culture was "most unfortunate" (*unselig*); but there now was an equally extremist tendency to do away with classical culture altogether; it is said that a people which is not able to express the treasures of knowledge in its own language cannot call itself cultured. The intimate mastery which we enjoy of our own language is lacking in any other which is merely acquired. But against this

21. *Ibid.*, pp. 272-273.

22. *Ibid.*, p. 271.

23. *Ibid.*, pp. 239-436.

criticism, true as far as it goes, it must be said that it contains the danger of triviality, for practical every day experiences do not contain the power of cultivating and elevating the mind. We must therefore distinguish; there must be a general education, enabling every member of the people to learn things which are essential to us all as human beings as well as special skills; but there remains and persists nevertheless a higher education for those who will be scholars in the true and ancient sense of the word. And they too have a right to receive an education proper to their high calling.

For two thousand years, Hegel argues, European culture has grown in the soil prepared by Greece and Rome. And each renaissance of Western humanity was connected with a new and deeper understanding and fertilization by principles discovered in our own beginnings. It would be a suicidal, a disastrous superficiality, if we were to surrender to the utilitarian educators who think that humanistic education is superfluous because its fruits are not immediately convertible into cash. The humanistic education is reformed and new organization must be preserved. Any true reform must preserve, as well as transform, the principle of its own former self.²⁴

The differentiation of higher education in various branches and the differentiation of scholarly education in the departments of classical languages, history, literature, and philosophy are, compared with the undifferentiation of older forms, a spiritual progress. For the nature of the spirit and spiritual freedom are realized when they are present in different forms (departments) of their own organization, each form representing completely the same goal from its own point of view; thus each of the contrib-

24. *Ibid.*, pp. 232-234.

uting departments can do its own work wholeheartedly because each knows that it is a moment of the whole and in and for it as necessary as the other departments. Only that which concentrates itself around its own principle can become a consistent, definite somebody; the whole which it wholly represents thus gains depth and the fertile possibility of a many-faceted expertness. Continuity of the whole process and perfection in each phase is opposed to a bargain-counter variety of many things ending in mastery of nothing.²⁵

This passage is very instructive. It clearly shows what Hegel means when he says spirit or freedom. Spirit rests on the freedom where each particular sphere of life and their individual representatives may pursue their own interests according to the law of their own concerns; freedom, conversely, rests on an idea of organic wholeness which differentiates itself but which holds its differentiated organs together in its protective unity. We now turn to the values of classical studies.

* * * * *

That culture, arts, and sciences of a people should stand on their own feet does not imply that the study of the Greeks and Romans are merely learned an antiquarian curiosities good for an idle few,²⁶ nor are they playthings for children. We are not merely inspecting a nursery when we come to grips with the "ancients". There are values in those original and founding cultures of Europe, which it would be perilous for us to bypass.²⁷

"I believe I do not contend too much if I say that one

25. *Ibid.*, p. 236.

26. *Ibid.*, p. 236.

27. *Ibid.*

who has not known the works of the ancients has lived without knowing perfection and beauty.”²⁸ Therefore, if we care for perfection, the study of the Greeks primarily, and then of the Romans, must remain a foundation.²⁹ The soul imbibes from their glorious masterworks and unforgettable flair of taste and reason—a profane baptism, as it were. But to be truly initiated into this mystery, external “survey courses” or general acquaintance is insufficient. “We must take up room and board with them, absorb their atmosphere, their ideas and manners, even their errors and prejudices, in order to become citizens of their world—the most beautiful that ever existed. If the first paradise was a paradise of natural man, then this second and higher paradise was that of the human mind which steps forth here in its finer naturalness, freedom, depth and serenity, like the bride out of the bridal chamber . . . but this serenity is not a childlike play; it is spread over a melancholy (Wehmut) which knows the hardness of destiny, but nevertheless is not beaten by it and maintains its freedom and its dignity . . . If we make ourselves at home in this element, all the faculties of our soul are stimulated, developed and trained; and in appropriating it we are enriched and become substantially improved.”³⁰

“Formal training is not indifferent to the content . . . the content, when it is grasped by the soul, must not be only an occasion to develop formal powers and faculties, but it must be at the same time its nourishment. Sensuous and useful stuff, given in immediate experience, does not have this evocative value. Only a spiritual content which has value and interest in itself can strengthen the soul

28. *Ibid.*, p. 237.

29. *Ibid.*

30. *Ibid.*

and give it that inner independence, that substantial fortitude, which is the matrix of a wakeful, attentive openness and self-control. Only this spiritual core of absolute meaning and independent value of life can serve as a foundation for everything useful and reliable in all walks of life . . . This spiritual nutrition in the most noble form, golden apples in silver bowls, are offered us in the work of the ancients, incomparable to those of other nations and periods. I merely remind you of the grandeur of their attitudes, of their plastic excellence and patriotic virtue which are free from repressive moralistic ambiguity, of the great style of their deeds and characters, of the rich variety of their experience and manners and constitutions: All these justify the proposition that no other culture unites so much that is admirable, original and many-sided.

But this wealth is tied up with language: "Translations are like artificial roses without the tenderness, loveliness and softness of life, or like stale wine. Language is a musical soul, the element of inwardness, which disappears in imitations."³¹ So much for content of "substance"; it is inseparable from *form*. The study of language has both a moral and a logical value. "Progressive education (*fortschreitende Bildung*) is not a natural process in which one cell is added to another . . . but cultural education must make its own previous self or achievement into a resistance which it belabors and re-forms. The world of antiquity is not only something which we acquire to possess, but also that in working with which, in contrast to which, we become what we are. Anything natural or spiritual which becomes an object of our labours must stand over against us, must have the appearance of estrangement or alienation. In the immediate world of feeling such an

31. *Ibid.*, pp. 237-239.

estrangement is felt as unhappiness; unhappy is he who is estranged and torn away from that which his heart (*Gemüt*) held dear, venerable, unquestionable and sacred. This pain and sorrow of the heart, however, is inevitable in life, but is softened and sublimated in that education which requires us to occupy our memory and our thought with a mediated and strange world . . . And this is precisely what youth intensely desires for its own good. There is an inevitable illusion in youth that happiness must be sought elsewhere. It desires to escape its familiar and immediate environment and to find fulfillment in a wider horizon . . . The depth and power which we attain is measured by the expanse into which we have dared to adventure and by the energy by which we find and maintain our center to which we return. The self thus restored is a hardened, an experienced, an enriched and proved self. To find ourselves by losing ourselves is the universal nature of the spirit.”³²

This is the *moral* or spiritual meaning of learning a language immediately not our own. The *logical* value is equally great: grammatical rules in abstraction or isolation are a lifeless mechanism. Mechanism is a necessary aspect of the mind, but the whole and living mind has the task to digest it and make it a free and mastered side of its life. The mastery of grammar is thus the beginning of logical thinking. In the grammatical structure of languages the intellect deposits its forms or categories through which it makes the life of the world articulate. The mind, in studying them in their linguistic sound and expression, becomes intuitively (*anschaulich*) acquainted with its own functions. What the mind immediately or potentially *is* becomes its conscious possession.

32. *Ibid.*, pp. 240-241.

In learning to master the grammatical rules of the ancient languages we are forced to think whether we want to or not. We do not have the immediate habit which brings about the right word-order without reflection in our own mother-tongue. We must consciously reflect on the meaning of the different parts and particles of the sentences and must remember the rules to fit them correctly. This thinking constantly exercises the logical method of subsuming the particulars under universals, and of analysing parts in meaningful wholes. Thus reason becomes a second and trained nature in us.”³³

The danger of this training is that it gets stuck in the abstract and dead mechanism of a mechanical intellect or in a mere word splitting without intuition or philosophy.³⁴ “If this humanistic training is done right, however, young people enter their profession with an indestructible sanctuary in their souls. In our modern world of practical specializations and complexities it is more necessary than ever that we have a concrete comprehension of life as organic whole. Untrained and undisciplined, the ideals of youth are measureless. They lose themselves in a vague and ‘bad infinity’ of demands and expectations, in the light of which they find the present sad and unsatisfactory. Humanistic education teaches them to find wholeness and perfection in measure and limitation. And all real achievement and greatness needs concentration and concrete unity. As men we are based on an infinite and ideal ground, but we are also mortal and finite. If we create in ourselves the comprehensions of a concrete and perfect whole of life, we are calmly fortified both against losing ourselves in merely finite particularities and excite-

33. *Ibid.*, pp. 241-243.

34. Page 302, *Letter to Niethammer*, Oct. 22, 1812.

ments of the moment as well as against a deedless and pointless longing for utopias, a bad and abstract infinity. We have a spiritual home in the world.”³⁵

Much of the five addresses pertains to administrative matters. I conclude by quoting a passage in which Hegel acknowledges the receipt of funds for the support of poor students. These funds were partly collected through their classmates who organized singing parties in the town, and partly through gifts of citizens:

“How many of parents without means were thus enabled to lift themselves above their station, to cultivate their talents which might have remained dormant on account of poverty or which might have taken an evil course! How many honorable and famous men owe the happiness of their lives, their usefulness for the state and for their fellow citizens to such charity which they will bless forever.”³⁶

The Teacher

With considerable hesitation³⁷ Hegel undertook to teach philosophy to his teen-agers. He would have liked to assign philosophy (and the reading of classical authors such as Cicero, who he says are ideally fit for introducing philosophy for the *Gymnasium* level) to his philosophical colleagues. But, alas! The students had such trouble getting the grammatical stuff, and the teachers were such grammatical formalists themselves, that the living and human content of classical literature escaped between them. Hegel, on the other hand, absorbed at night with

35. *Ibid.*, pp. 286-287.

36. *Ibid.*, p. 259.

37. Br. I., p. 418.

work on the three volumes of his *Logic*, doubts his ability to be elementary, popular and easy, and also to be satisfied with what he can offer in that fashion. "I cannot be speculative and satisfy my hearers, and I cannot be non-speculative and satisfy myself."³⁸ But "I am a school-man who has to teach philosophy, and as such I believe that it must be possible to make it teachable; philosophy must become a teachable discipline no less than geometry. I have to invent a scientific form and at the same time work at its educational presentation (*Ausbildung*)."³⁹

When one of their teachers was sick, the students were painfully surprised to find director Hegel substituting for him and continuing his instruction in Greek, Latin, differential calculus or literature. When new books were acquired for the library, such as Herder's work on *Philosophy of History* or the Indian drama *Sakuntala*, he announced and explained those acquisitions, and dropped stimulating hints on the romantic or Hindu *Geist* represented by such books and authors. If he was asked what to read in philosophy, he advised Plato and Kant; and warned against the tediousness of professorial textbooks as well as against the superficial glitter of so-called popular philosophy.

Towards mechanical-formal slips and errors he was lenient, passing slightly over them as "mere externality"; but in moral issues he was uncompromising and severe. He discouraged the premature aping of student fraternity life, and sermonized against the "dirty habit of smoking" while he littered his desk with snuffing tobacco.⁴⁰ The result of his brave attempt to present philosophy to his

38. *Ibid.*, p. 428.

39. *Ibid.*, p. 332.

40. Ros., p. 250.

pupils is the *Propaedeutik*. He dictated its short, dense, and numbered paragraphs as basis for oral explanations and discussions. Karl Rosenkranz, who discovered those notes after Hegel's death and edited them as the third volume of the *Works*, says about them: "If one gazes on such a page and sees how it is worked over and over with pencil, black and red ink, eliminating, inserting, rewriting, one is reminded of the digging 'old mole' which emerges here and there from his darkness into light. This turmoil of a restless laboring and improving is admirable. His intention seems to have been to achieve a maximum of preciseness and clarity."⁴¹

"In this respect I believe that Hegel has here achieved a masterpiece of presentation. It combines the greatest simplicity and mildness with the highest degree of preciseness (Bestimmtheit). What he says about morality, right, and religion is so beautiful and explains itself so completely that this introductory part can be studied as an example of a truly popular exposition."⁴²

The Propaedeutik

The *Propaedeutik* is a link between the *Phenomenology* of 1806 and the first version of the *Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences* of 1816. In comparing those different formulations of his system, we find that "Hegel has remained the same in the basic conceptions of his system, while at the same time treating it in the freest and varying manner, constantly improving and growing."⁴³

If one had studied the *Propaedeutik*, Rosenkranz says

41. W. III., p. 5.

42. Ros., pp. 11, 12.

43. *Ibid.*, p. 16.

it should have been impossible to be in doubt about Hegel's various 'Beginnings.' The objective 'Beginning' in his *Logic* is one of them. The *Logic* begins with the most abstract and simple concept 'Being', which is progressively revealed as an abstraction from a concrete and dialectical Whole. The second 'Beginning'; that of the *Phenomenology*, begins with our subjective consciousness from an abstract and sensuous immediacy to a filled and concrete vision of reality. The third 'Beginning,' in the *Encyclopedia*, is the idea of the whole, mediating its real manifestations in nature and in the human mind. A fourth 'Beginning' is the *history of philosophy* in which the systematic dimensions of philosophy break through in their historical origins. If this is understood, then it is possible to start philosophizing from anywhere expanding from the chosen point both "forward" and "backward"; the total circular movement remains the same.⁴⁴

* * * * *

Having listened to Hegel's friend Rosenkranz, let us now sit in on some of his classes. We can follow his courses through the three parts of the *Propädeutik*.

We wake up in a world of immediate experience. It is a world of outer or physical, and inner or psychical perceptions. These perceptions are functions individualized life, ways of activity by means of which we adjust ourselves to our environment and treat or change it in the direction of our desires. To this naïve or immediate living which is natural (we share it with animals) corresponds a world of finite things (both animate and inanimate) and events or happenings which we meet in hostile or friendly

44. III, p. 18.

relations. This is the experienced world-course, empirically concrete.

Having made this experience, unexpected shocks such as death may shake us and may cause us to step back and reflect. We stop to think. And if we reflect on the essential character of this empirical reality or immediate concreteness of living, we make some inescapable discoveries. We discover on our own, on the subjective side, that things and events appear to us according to our standpoint, position, interest; if impressions are 'far' in space and time they seem to be small and unimportant; if they are close to us in space and time they loom large and seem important. And since every perceiver is equally entitled to his image, perspective, and living-organization, there is an endless or indefinite number of confused and contradictory experiences. Our inner experiences of ourselves are equally shifting and unreliable.

To this subjectivity of perception corresponds on the objective side the everpresent mortality or temporality of things and events. There is nothing absolute or final in experience. Further, an indefinite number of innumerable relationships make all things relative to one another. Everything in this concrete empirical reality depends on something else, both spatially as well as temporally; what is next to what or what comes after what always makes a difference to both. Man in comparison with an atom is infinitely large, but compared with the stellar spaces he is infinitely small.

Nothing in outer or inward experience is certain or reliable. The world-course can teach us no 'standpoint', offer no 'point' on which to stand since every conceivable or inconceivable contradiction may be found in it. Likewise the world of inner experiences shows us an infinite

variety of differences which would become contradictions if we would fix them and maintain them as true or good.

But *this* insight, children, this reflection which we just have made, is *not* an immediate or object-experience; but it expresses the *essential* nature of its ever present uncertainty. Underscore the word *essential*—essential knowledge is not factual empirical knowledge; it is knowledge of its truth, its true nature, which is always the same and universally verifiable. Philosophy is and expresses truth.

Once man is awakened to truth he becomes dissatisfied with the fleeting realm of death and uncertainty. He compares the fugitive and confused experience with standards of logical consistency. He tries to discover order, reliable laws, and general patterns in experience. He compares his infinite variety of impressions and tries to retain what he finds in common between them, or the abstract general features which can become predicates of classes of things. When he does this he becomes scientific; he develops a theoretical consciousness.

Or he produces out of himself concepts of a practical moral order. As he is practical, he does not merely observe and think what is given to him in experience. He changes it. He subjects experience to demands which he produces himself. When he builds a house, for example, he must have his purpose and the geometrical pattern in mind, which remain the same when he has made it objective and external. On the other hand, to build the house he must change the materials so that they will obey and fit his plan. Practical life is both an inward conception made external and objective and an objective material which becomes appropriated and made subjective.

If the material with which man works is other human beings, then this 'material' reacts to my action and we

have an interactivity, a mutual life. Its success depends on whether we can agree on common causes and objectives for whose common realization we do our part. Those common concerns we call in the higher levels of practical life, morality, right, and religion. Those ideals are objective in the sense that they are valid or obligatory whether we like that or not—but we had better like it. If we make them our own, we rise over the mere passivity of natural appetites; we cease to be blindly driven by a chaotic nature in us. If we subject ourselves to the objective demands of scientific or practical ideals, we lose our natural selfishness but gain a higher self of becoming self-determining, self-corrective or free. The essence of all moral life is to gain your freedom by self-discipline and work, and to further and respect this same freedom in others who practice it in their own individual ways.

But now, in this our third and last course, step back again, reflect again. If you do not acquire this attitude of reflection, you will never understand philosophy. You must not only be and do something, you must also know what you are and do. What you are *in* yourselves you must also realize *for* yourself. You must not only be in process and movement, but you must also see and think this process and movement.

We have studied the sciences and have seen how they transform immediate experience into logical organizations of scientific knowledge called scientific objects. For example, what Newton described in his physics is such a scientific object, a mathematically formulated mechanism. But there are many sciences and many corresponding objects. If the scientists now would proclaim that they have or know reality in their abstract segmentations of reality, they would cease to be good scientists and would become

poor metaphysicians. They should study Kant, particularly his antinomies of reason. Every limited view of reality as object (that is the meaning of Kant's antinomies) proclaimed as a final truth about reality necessarily involves a self-contradiction—The scientist forgets that an abstraction of or from reality is never identical with the concrete whole in which scientific conceptions emerge and which they ignore, as if they had a "standpoint" outside of reality and were merely looking in. The scientist also forgets the irrational nature of the empirical world, about which we studied in our first course.

We have also studied morality, the duties towards ourselves and our neighbors, and law, the duties or obligations which we have to fulfill in our public transactions with others in an organized community or state. But morality and law may come into conflict with one another; and lawfully organized communities may come into conflict, as for example states in war. And in both the moral and legal spheres of practical life we have the same perennial educational struggle with our natural selves and our natural and social handicaps and inheritances.

Again, if we see this essential nature of the scientific and of the practical consciousness of man, we have grasped a truth which is neither struggling nor problematic. Those spheres and dimensions of life are what they are, always and indubitably the same.

Once we see and think this truth clearly, we have arrived at a mature philosophical comprehension (*Vernunft*). We must fully live and participate in those spheres and activities in order to be human. But we must also know them in their limitation, as they are in truth. "Comprehension (*Vernunft*) is aware both of an objective spiritual content and also that I am aware of this content. It

lives in this certainty that the essential nature of experience is at the same time our own thought. It is the unity of essential Being or objectivity with creative thought or subjectivity. Or, that which we comprehend is both in and for itself; as an objective, essential content, it exists in itself but not as a factually given thing estranged from myself, but penetrated, appropriated, and recreated in the participation of self; thus it exists both in and for itself.”⁴⁵ Think, for example, of a poem. “The poet does not imitate a factually given nature. It has a higher truth. The poet is a profound mind who sees through the others and expresses what they substantially are. The poet is a seer. The magnificence of nature is united in a whole, a symbol of the higher reality of mind. The poem then exists in itself, objectively; if this does not become evident for us also, it is our weakness, just as the lackey may not know the hero whose lackey he is.”⁴⁶

Such comprehensive actualities of life are modifications or self-differentiations of what I call *Geist*. *Geist* is fully realized and at home with itself in three pure shapes: in art, in religion, and in philosophy where he thinks for himself what he is in himself. We have practiced this dialectic on all levels on our way up from immediate experience through mediated, objective experience and complete, total self-comprehension or *Geist* is present in all those levels of experience; through self-knowledge. The Absolute becomes aware of its own dialectical structures and processes.

In *Art* concrete individuality is presented, purged from the irrational flux of muddy immediate experience. The work of art is both suggestive expression and objective

45. W. III., p. 112.

46. W. III., p. 209.

image of life. It is *Geist* enjoying itself in the form of finite perfection.

In *religion* the infinite life of the Absolute is united with the temporal finitude of human existence. If you separate them abstractly, you would have on one side an abstract religion as a specialty of monks or of 'positive' churches versus an abstract worldliness which would be fanatical and hectic because worldly causes, in and for themselves, can never be absolute and final. The worldly life without religion lacks the quiet background of eternity.

"The moral law in us is the eternal law of Reason which we cannot but respect; this ties us together; we feel united by an indissoluble obligation. But we also have an immediate insight of our inadequacy with regard to it. In this comparison it is acknowledged as something essentially higher, independent from our subjective whims, and independent or objective and absolute in itself.

"The elevation from our finitude recognizes that our finitude is something negative; at the same time we negate this negativity. As knowledge of the Absolute in itself this movement is an absolute knowledge which is not based on empirical-positive evidence or brought about by a rational proof. It cannot remain mere immediate feeling or faith but must be thought through. This thinking is not above Reason (*Vernunft*) because Comprehension is the reflex of the Absolute; but it is above reason (*Verstand*) which is the science of what is finite and relative.

"God is absolute *Geist* because he is essentially and purely that which can project itself, but who sees his own self-activity in his own projection; in othering itself it returns from its alienation to itself, remaining eternally One and the Same in and for itself, mediated through its otherness.

"God is *holy*. He is as he ought to be; being and value are coincident. He is absolute *power* insofar as his comprehensiveness is realized and maintained in all individuals, *wisdom* insofar as his power is one with his holiness, *goodness* insofar as he relinquishes his freedom to actual individuals, and *justice* insofar as He draws them eternally back into His own universal life.

"*Sin* is the estrangement from God insofar as the individual pretends to exist separately and exclusively for itself, regardless of the whole."⁴⁷

"But this freedom of individuals, their self-agreement or autonomy, is at the same time the affirmation of the essential nature of Being in them or is their divine nature. This truth that human nature in its freedom is not alien to its divine nature assures man of divine grace which man can grasp and whereby God and World are reconciled and their alienation is cancelled. Religion is truth as it exists for all mankind; the essence of true religion is *Love*. It is an essential attitude of mind knowing and actualizing the ultimate truth of the human will. Religious love is not only a natural affection or moral benevolence, not a vague sentimentality, but proves its existence in absolute self-sacrifice. Religious love is the absolute power over all finitudes of Spirit, even over evils, crimes and positive laws. Divine love pardons sin and makes deeds undone in repentance. It transcends morality. The ground of love is consciousness of God and of his essential nature as love and is therefore also humility. In His love I forget myself. The substantial relation of man to God seems to be a *Beyond*, but the love of God to man and of man to God cancels this separation of a 'here' and a 'beyond' as a

47. III., pp. 219-227.

form of representation (*Vorstellung*) and *is* the eternal life" . . .⁴⁸

"Reflect again on what we have done. We have made an essential distinction of art and religion. But this distinction is not merely our human and arbitrary way of thinking. It is not merely a subjective, merely an abstract conceptual distinction. Life itself makes those essential distinctions, and philosophy *is* this life in its truly logical necessity. Philosophy is Life in the universal and necessary form of truth."⁴⁹

Philosophy unites the imminent absoluteness of art with the transcendent absoluteness of religion in its own dialectical comprehension of the necessary unity of all levels and of opposites of Being, of conscious life and of *Geist*.

Soon you will graduate from this school, gentlemen! You are eager to enter the world as the world is waiting to receive you. The world is rich. It is full of Gods, as Thales said. It is your fault or your misfortune if you don't find it so. You must make a choice and limit yourself. Fill your soul to the brim with a worthy cause, an objective spiritual content, so that you may forget your petty self, and so that your cause may receive brilliance, life, and light through you. God be with you in all your worldly professions.

Liberation

In 1812, Napoleon was defeated by the Russian winter. Russian armies liberated Europe, joined by their Prussian, Austrian and English allies of the Holy Alliance. Feudal reaction hoped to restore the conditions previous to the

48. III., pp. 97-98, 225.

49. *Ibid.*

French Revolution. A rabid, stupid, and resentful nationalism swept Germany; those proto-Nazis said *Deutschtum* (*Teutonism*) (Hegel spells it *Teutschdumm*—German stupidity).⁵⁰ This upsurge of a blind feeling of national pride and revenge against liberal, humane, and historical wisdom is the background or forerunner of the “national socialism” of the twentieth century. Hegel fought against it all his life.⁵¹ “This bestiality which pretends that it alone can save us all (alleinseligmachende Bestialität) in their noise of infamy are like swine mixing intelligence and stupidity, ignorance and insolence, criminality and cowardice, shrewdness and platitude, East and West, without any respect, and produce such a chaos of morass and stench that those who would do anything about it must dull all their sensibility.”⁵² “In these times of liberation, barbarism must be on top.”⁵³ “Those liberation-beasts,”⁵⁴ this colorless, insipid mediocrity governs the world.”⁵⁵

The nationalistic reaction against European culture which dreamed of reintroducing the Germanic Walhalla as a proper and native ‘religion’ Hegel calls a “symptom of a senile childishness relishing cadavers of long ago and trying to force this taste on others. The pretension of taking those defunct deities seriously again has a completely insincere hollowness and is a foolish self-deception.”⁵⁶

No wonder the proto-Nazis of his own time and the Nazis of the twentieth century hated Hegel! For exam-

50. Br. II., p. 43.

51. See for example the vigorous footnote of paragraph 258 in *Philosophy of Law*, 1827.

52. Br. I., p. 303.

53. Br. II., p. 14.

54. *Ibid.*, p. 29.

55. *Ibid.*, p. 61.

56. XIV., pp. 349, 476.

ple Franz Böhn, Nazi 'philosopher' at the University of Heidelberg, warns against Hegel as a dangerous seducer of 'national youth'.⁵⁷ He is "in everything the philosophical opponent of our time." Since it seems highly improbable that Hegel's influence can be broken by philosophical arguments, and since it is hopelessly dangerous to get entangled in his Logic, it is simpler to bury him alive in silence. One must 'live him dead' (*totleben*). What is the worst accusation against Hegel is that "he believes in the absolute value of truth as well as in the validity of the universal message of the Christian religion." Hegel is also a 'pacifist' because he said "for in Europe each people is now so limited by all others that it ought not to start a war against any other European nation."⁵⁸

About the coming triumph of feudal reaction Hegel speaks of the "sour dough hoping to flower back to its old sweet pastry-glory." (I am paraphrasing here the untranslatable "wenn die hiesige Pastete zur alten Herrlichkeit zurückerblühen sollte.")⁵⁹ He wrote a witty, grotesque, and nasty satire on the Vienna Congress, glittering with feudal brass and washed in holy waters like a scene from Goethe's *Reineke Fox*—with hypocritically dignified animals.⁶⁰ (The 'geistige Tierreich' of the Phenomenology.)

After telling stories about liberating Russian soldiers who had plundered their hosts in Nürnberg, Hegel had a vivid dream. He dreamt that he was in a great debating society in which two parties quarreled about the greater merit of swine versus monkeys. A clumsy fellow named

57. Franz Böhn, *Deutsche Philosophie im Widerstand*. Leipzig, 1938. The following quotes are from the first part, "Hegel and we."

58. W. XIV., p. 355.

59. Br. II., p. 15.

60. *Ibid.*, p. 43.

Pippel tried to remind the company of human rights and dignity, but he never got any attention until finally someone remarked that this Pippel would be a very useful 'guy', especially if one would warm up his 'guts', for then he would gladly give his pants and his sweater so that the aristocrats could use him as a fool in their game, and that would serve him right, in the devil's name.⁶¹

Political reaction was to be expected, Hegel wrote, "but I hold on to my faith that the world-spirit has given the command to advance. There is no turning back. Such an essential movement (*Wesen*) advances irresistibly and imperceptibly like the sun. Innumerable light troops swarm around this armored phalanx; don't know what they're doing and get shocks as if from invisible hands. All retarding twaddle (*Gefeunker*) and sophistic airiness is to no avail. It may soil the shoe-strings of this giant, but it cannot deprive him of his winged soles. It will be safest to keep one's vision on this advance, while at the same time pretending that one is with those busybodies throwing mud on the giant and helping them in their serious futility."⁶² Hegel uses in this ironical sense the required expressions: he "is dying in most devoted reverence and most abject servitude" at the feet of royal highnesses—which he calls in private "bed-bug personalities". "The good Lord has destined them to be jokes."⁶³

After Napoleon's final fall and banishment to St. Helena, Hegel wrote, "he honored philosophy by fearing and persecuting her." "Great events have taken place around us. It was an awesome and uncanny spectacle to see how such an enormous genius was destroying himself. This

61. Br. II., p. 17.

62. *Ibid.*, p. 86.

63. *Ibid.*, p. 87.

is the *tragikotation* (the utmost degree of what is tragic). The whole mass of the mediocre, with its absolutely leaden gravity, presses and continues to press incessantly and without reconciliation until the higher is first leveled down and then lies low. The reversal in the whole tragedy, the reason why the mass gains this power and remains as a chorus, is this: that a great individual must give it a right to rebel and must thereby destroy himself.”⁶⁴

The Holy Alliance brought at least, and at last, peace to the bleeding and torn continent. The universities could now recover also. And Hegel began to look hopefully for a new academic position. The Great Liberation was to bring him his own small liberation. Several possible academic positions were filled with people who had done nothing remarkable in philosophy, but who made up for that by being more ‘patriotic’ than Hegel.⁶⁵ Finally, after the last part of his *Logic* had been published (“I should have spent another year on it, but I needed some money to live”⁶⁶), the ice broke, and Hegel accepted a call to the University of Heidelberg as professor of philosophy. A few days later he read in the newspaper that the King of Bavaria had appointed him professor at the University of Erlangen; and about the same time he also received an invitation to come to the University of Berlin.

Logic

In 1812 the first volume of Hegel’s *Logic* appeared; the second volume was published in 1816. His school and his new family life kept him busy during the days. The *Logic* is the work of his nights.

64. *Ibid.*, p. 141.

65. Br. I., p. 388.

66. *Ibid.*, p. 393.

We see that the same pattern of a double life was continued as it was in Tübingen. During the day Hegel is an ordinary schoolmaster and at night a philosophical demon!

The *Logic* is, like the *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, a new creation, a miracle of achievement. And, as in the case of the *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, there are a number of long and careful comments, notably those of the orthodox Hegelians Kuno Fischer⁶⁷ and Johann Edward Erdmann.⁶⁸ But those elegant reproductions of Hegel's *Logic* are no less artificial than the original; their sequence of categories is not less arbitrary, and many transitions are just as forced. Fortunately, I do not have to join their company.

Within the framework of this biographical development of Hegel's 'Vision and Work' we ask what the Logic meant to Hegel? What was his intention? It was, clearly, to develop Logic as ontology. He intended to unfold the categories of Being itself, present in and pervading all beings, and all of its regional dimensions such as nature and history. He kept working on this theme to his last days. The Logic never satisfied him. In spite of a life-long effort he never felt that he had succeeded. It is like an unfinished symphony, like a quarry with some perfect pieces of masonry or sculpture lying around.

Hegel apologized because his table of contents gave the reader a false impression of a perfect whole. These titles are merely 'provisional' products, or an external reflection, "of no systematic value, but of an historical interest" only.⁶⁹ From all this it follows that one cannot

67. Kuno Fischer, *System der Logik und Metaphysik*, 3 ed. Heidelberg, 1909.

68. Johann Edward Erdmann, *Grundriss der Logik und Metaphysik*. Halle, 1864. And in his *History of Recent Philosophy*, vol. VII, p. 435-475.

69. IV., p. 52.

read Hegel's Logic as if the sequence of the chapters were a necessary, logical, coherent development, let alone a machinery of 'thesis, antithesis and synthesis'. The book shuts up like a clam, is mute like a fish, if you approach it that way. Hegel sighs in the Preface about a total revision which he had planned before his sudden death—that it *would* be desirable to have a logically coherent development of logic, but that he had to give it up. (IV. 32)

Hegel frequently uses a mythical, personifying language, borrowed from Christianity, which does not fit his Logic but muddles it up. For example, when he says that his Logic describes the thought of God before he created a world;⁷⁰ or when he says that the absolute spirit decides to leap into Nature or to create a world.⁷¹ Erdmann puts it this way: "If Hegel had kept the impersonal term 'the Absolute' instead of personifying it, then he would not have muddied the clarity of thought with mythical images."⁷² If one looks twice, one can clearly see that nature is not a 'product' or a 'creature' of the 'IDEA', but that it is reality-as-a-whole, world-itself, in one of its dialectically limited attributes or manifestations.

Another defect of Hegel's Logic occurs when he loses sight of his ontological intention and studies categories of only regional validity and applicability.

And finally, his language sometimes is so abstruse and obscure that whole sections border on unintelligibility. I say they *border* on it! A reader who has the necessary patience and is used to this grief may be able to figure out what Hegel may have had in mind.

70. IV., p. 46.

71. IV., p. 75.

72. J. E. Erdmann, *Geschichte der Neueren Philosophie*. Stuttgart, 1931. Vol. VII, p. 475.

All those defects put together detract from, but do not destroy the incomparable value of this immense work. A grandiose vision is carried out through dialectical masterpieces in every part. In the Prefaces the *Logic* as the logic of philosophy is seen to emerge from other meanings of the term, and it is distinguished from these other meanings.

Pragmatic logic in everyday use is embedded in a dense matrix of practical needs and technical manipulations. It is after this logic of practical existence has done its work, helping man to a more comfortable standard of life, that a higher level of thought emerges.

This thinking which is no longer merged with immediate practical interests is described by Aristotle's formal logic. General classes and formal relations, obtained between them, are distinguished from the perceptual data of immediate experience; technical applications are now seen to be applications of general theories. This is the logic of reason (*Verstand*) which is valid for analyzing finite and given objects. It is the logic of object-thinking.

The personal tone of the first Preface of 1812 is surprisingly similar to the one of 1830. The logic of philosophy, Hegel says in 1812, can never be popular. It is necessarily confined to a few lonely or solitary souls (*die Einsamen*) who are exiled from the world, sacrificed by their own people, in order that there be in the world the service of truth, the contemplation of the Eternal. The dialectical logic of philosophy takes the place of what formerly used to be called metaphysics in which man has gathered the treasures of what was and still is and must be that which is of ultimate reality and importance to him. Every category in the history and in the logic of philosophy is a definition of the Absolute, both in its affirmative

or creative as well as in its annihilating, negative aspects or manifestations. Every other logic is the logic of utility and of object-sciences, which is intimately interwoven with survival and practical success in manipulating objects for subjective interests. But without the logic of philosophical contemplation, without metaphysics, these finite situations and interests are like a market place around a temple which is empty, is without the *Holy*.

Similarly in the Preface of 1831, Hegel speaks of the excited and accelerated modern civilization, absorbed and pre-occupied by the troubles of political and economic dangers. He doubts whether the loud noises of the day and the stunning twaddle of imagined importance will still leave open the possibility of participation in the passionless calm of thinking contemplation. Serving the truth is an absolute, a religious imperative, which must be obeyed regardless of whether this service is popular or not. It is done in behalf of all and is a 'blessing' (*Segen*) for all.

In the first Preface Hegel also clearly states how he sees his *Logic* in relation to the *Phänomenologie des Geistes* and to the coming *Encyclopædia* which came from the painful lecture-notes in Jena and the simple *Propädeutik* in Nürnberg.

In the *Phänomenologie des Geistes* the whole philosophy is discovering itself in the voyage and adventure which human consciousness undertakes. Every step and phase of this human consciousness discovers in itself a perennial human possibility, both in ascending, as well as in descending directions. Its failure and incompetence is just as real and important as its triumphs and achievement. At the end, human consciousness has gained the absolute self-understanding that all of its shapes or forms belong

to its remembered life and recur as fighting mutually limiting positions and standpoints within its totality.

The *Logic* develops the same 'Concept' of reality in the form of thought. Every possible world-view that has emerged in the history of metaphysics has grasped a truth which can be stated as such without the factual flesh and blood of its historical or temporal appearance. Each standpoint calls forth, and is limited by, its own *opposite* truth. To think the whole of Being as this concrete and living whole of opposite aspects, grasped in the various philosophical standpoints or "isms", is the total *vision* of Hegel's *Logic*. It is the unity of identities and differences.

In the *Encyclopaedia* he again develops *the same* whole in the *many* 'circles' or dimensions of itself, of which consciousness (Ph.G.) is one and which *Logic* is another. But in principle each of these 'circles' or disciplines of systematic philosophy is capable of being the focus or medium which develops the whole in contrasting itself with the other 'circles'. Hegel's *Aesthetics*, for example, introduces the reader no less to the whole of philosophy than his *Philosophy of Religion*, his *Philosophy of Religion*, his *Philosophy of History*, or even his *Philosophy of Nature*.

Hegel's dialectical *Logic* of philosophy carefully appreciates the logic of reason as valid in all sciences. These sciences think finite objects in their selection and abstraction from the whole. As soon as reason tries to think this whole by its formal logic of identity and excluded middle, it gets entangled in necessary contradictions or antinomies; for the whole cannot be thought in abstract either/or isolations. It is not either eternal or temporal, either finite or infinite, either qualitative, individual or quantitative-mathematical, either only appearance or only

a 'thing-in-itself', either object apart from subject or subject apart from being real. All those and many more necessary opposites can only be thought together, both in their difference and in their validity as well as in their necessary complementariness, so that one alone makes no sense without its complementary other; as for example the negative pole is a magnet is nothing apart from its positive pole. Abstractly isolated they are *antinomies*.

Hegel distinguishes many types of oppositeness, such as difference, complementary contraries, and contradictions; and consequently develops many types of dialectics with two or more participants.

His *Logic* as a whole moves through four levels in which the Absolute (Being) manifests itself. The first part, called *Being*, shows itself as that sovereign self-determination which is both free and necessary. It is necessary because it is what it determines itself to be, knowing nothing outside of itself; this necessary self-determination is identical with its freedom.

Qualitatively it is infinitely individuated, or it is finite and infinite at the same time. Its individuation is also *alienation*, so that all life appears to itself externally or physically. This is the ontological category preparing the philosophy of irrationalism in nature. If this qualitative Being is treated *as if* it were nothing but externally given, we then see it as mathematics sees it, as quantitative. This struggle between the living qualitative Being and its quantitative externality, establishes Being again as the omnipresent, concrete unity of such opposites. This unity of quantity versus quality Hegel calls 'measure'. Being is thus the identity of identity and difference as well as the difference of identity and difference; such is its dialectical *Essence*, the second part of the Logic.

Reality appears. Reality is not identical with its appearance but is nothing without it. Appearance, likewise, is also disappearance. But in spite of this negativity it is not the appearance of nothing, but of reality.

Essence exists. And existence has essential dialectical structures; existence is as necessary as its essence. Essence is not prior to its own existence, and existence is not prior to its essential character; but both together form a dialectical whole, different and inseparable.

Being is thus essentially or in-itself dialectical. It becomes for-itself what it is in itself in human consciousness; Hegel calls this thinking, existential subject, aware of its dialectical essence, the '*Concept*', the third movement of his Logic. In the '*Concept*', man, the subject of all his thinking, knows himself to be essentially real, actual (*wirklich*); and reality as dialectical is known to be the essential background of the dialectical subject; Reality or '*Substance*' has subject character. '*Concept*' means that actuality becomes a conscious-being (*Bewusstsein*); if we translate '*Concept*' with man as philosopher, then this man finds himself in the world, and finds world in himself.

In giving himself to the objective contents and values of the world, man gives them personal existence and representation. The subject, on the contrary, gains objective meaning and value, overcoming man's private immediacy as natural soul. In practice he desires to be desired, to be loved and to be recognized by the other, just as he loves and recognizes in turn.

The fourth and last part, entitled *IDEA* or 'absolute spirit', is the awareness of all the movements of the whole present also in non-logical forms in art and religion. The whole as it is thought in truth is the whole of all possi-

ble worldviews and metaphysical positions, positive as well as negative ones, superficial or immediate as well as profound and mediated ones.

Hegel's Logic justifies the truth of *negativity* or irrationality (categories Entfremdung, das Begrifflose, Zufall, schlechte Unendlichkeit, etc.) which we saw so painfully and dominantly at work in the incompetences of the human consciousness in the *Phänomenologie des Geistes*.

The Call to Heidelberg

In the correspondence with his friends Paulus, von Raumer, and Daub in Heidelberg, there are fine statements on *the meaning of philosophical instruction on the university level*:

"P.S. I have held back in the present reply to express wholly the gratitude which I feel partly from your interest in my affairs, partly for your interest in the situation of philosophy in Germany and in our universities. Equally enjoyable is the kindness with which you consider my previous works and the hope you express for my efficacy in a university. Indeed, in no Science is one so alone as one is in philosophy. I am heartily longing for a living comradeship of work. I can say this is the highest desire of my life."⁷³

The university is to him also his church.⁷⁴

Philosophy should be a required study for all students so they can understand the basis of their particular science in connection with all other sciences. As such it functions

73. Br. II., p. 116.

74. *Ibid.*, p. 89.

as a service course. For the philosophy student, on the other hand, philosophy is in itself the highest and most independent value of human culture. However, this will be the case only for a few individuals. But it is all the more important that it be preserved and carried on in such individuals.⁷⁵

Rumors from Jena that Hegel is nonunderstandable have created some doubts in Heidelberg. These doubts are frankly expressed. Hegel replies that in Jena he was only a beginner and then expresses his indebtedness to his *Gymnasium* teaching: "I was too timid then in Jena and was bound to my notes. The *Gymnasium* has forced me to talk freely and simply. And this has been more advantageous to me than academic lecturing could have been."⁷⁶

The decisive letter is written on August 2, 1816, to von Raumer:

"Allow me, after our conversation, to submit to you my thoughts about the teaching of philosophy at universities. I beg you to be lenient with the form and not to demand more details and cohesion than a hasty letter can give.

"I begin with the observation why one should talk about this as a special problem since it would seem a simple thing that the teaching of philosophy should be under the same rules as the teaching of other sciences. The peculiar embarrassment which is now-a-days visible when it comes to the presentation of philosophy is probably due to the turn which this science has recently taken. The previous system of

75. *Ibid.*, pp. 299-329.

76. Br. II., p. 123.

it and its disciplines are now more or less antiquated. On the other hand, a new idea of philosophy is still without systematic structure—and its systematic relation to other sciences is not yet accomplished.—On the one hand we have therefore, sciences without philosophical interests, on the other hand, a philosophical interest apart from the sciences.”

He then speaks for a page on this discrepancy of the former antiquated metaphysics and the actual sciences. “On the other hand, a new idea has not realized its demand to shape the wide field of objects which belong to philosophy, to an orderly and articulate systematic whole. The postulate of precise informations and the otherwise obvious truth *that the whole can only be grasped by working conscientiously through its parts*⁷⁷ is not only evaded, but is even rejected by the contention that preciseness and plurality of information is superfluous for the idea or even against it or below it. A philosopher who belongs to this *intensive* school you may have known personally in München; Franz Baader issues from time to time some leaflets which purport to contain the whole essence of the whole philosophy, or at least one of its disciplines. Those who publish this way have the advantage that the public believes that they also could work out their general thoughts. Friedrich Schlegel’s recital of transcendental pihlosophy I experienced myself in Jena. In six weeks he was through, but not exactly to the satisfaction of his hearers who had paid for a half-year course. A greater opulence we found in a general philosophy which called on fantasy to aid it; high and low, far and near, brilliant and turbid, profound and superficial meanings were here

77. Letter to von Raumer, August 2, 1816 (italics mine).

brewed together, favoring especially those regions of nature and of mind which are in themselves occult and arbitrary, (against Schelling's 'philosophy of nature'). An opposite method to reach philosophical extension is the critical or skeptical one; it has in the historical philosophy material which it is parading. Since it gains nothing but negative results, it is boring and unenjoyable. It may have its value in sharpening intellectual wits, just as the fantastic school may be useful in producing a fermentation of mind or to ignite what is called edification, or to awaken in some the idea of philosophy itself. None of those methods can fulfill its promise and lead to a study of philosophy. Lack of information, ignorance of principles and in special scientific knowledge, are contradicted by serious scientists and by practical needs of the state. The scientific method in philosophy is not only necessary for philosophy itself, but also for its applicability to the demands of the time. To the previous forms of knowledge we cannot return, but the rich content of concepts and problems which they contain cannot simply be ignored either. They need a transformation to be appropriate to the present standpoint of philosophy. Philosophy can always do what it should do if it helps in the acquisition of precise informations by following a precise method which both goes into details and gives order to them. In this logical form philosophy can be *learned* like any other of the sciences. There is a pedagogical prejudice afloat that the only thing that matters is to think for yourself regardless of the content, as if learning and thinking for yourself would contradict one another. But an objective thought cannot be learned in any other way than to think it yourself. It is a common error that original thought must deviate from what other people think, with the result that what is

new is thought to be not true; or, rather, what is true is not new. There is an infectious disease and obsession that every one must have his own system of philosophy; and those hunches are held to be the more original and more perfect the crazier and more distasteful they are, because that would be the proof that you are really different.

If philosophy could not be learned, she could not be clear and communicable; on the other hand, she must be learned and is not a common good in that sense that every man possesses a reason. Her universal communicability will abolish her foolish reputation, as if only those become philosophers who are not capable of acquiring solid knowledge. Her universal content and all spiritual and natural conditions inevitably lead to the positive sciences. And the study of these sciences is necessary for a thorough philosophical insight. In her preliminary phases philosophy has a formal value in the cultivation and practice of thinking, and in purging thinking from the fantastic through the precision of her concepts and methods. She is capable of doing this in a higher degree than mathematics because she has not, like mathematics, an abstractly sensuous content only.

Philosophy shall not try to be edifying; she must satisfy this need in a more adequate way. To justify religion cannot be the function of feelings, fantasies, or confused notions. *It must be the enterprise of philosophy to justify such precious contents for a comprehensive insight, to appropriate them in precise thoughts, and thereby to safeguard them from obscure dead-end alleys.*

"Reality, the spiritual and the natural world, are always the same. So it is evident enough what must be the disciplines of philosophy. *Logic* comprises both what is abstract in general as well as that which was formerly

treated in metaphysics; *philosophy of nature* deals with one part of the concrete whole; and *philosophy of mind* (Geist) comprises the spheres of psychology and anthropology, the theory of legal and moral duties, aesthetics, and philosophy of religion; *history of philosophy* must be added.

"I am horrified to see how long-winded I have become and how much I must beg your indulgence. I only add my most cordial wish for the happy continuation of your journey and the assurance of my distinguished respect and that you can count on me."⁷⁸

The man who started the ball rolling in Heidelberg was the theologian Karl Friedrich Daub. He had read Hegel's publications and was deeply moved by them. He wrote to Hegel: "If you would accept this call, then Heidelberg would have for the first time since its foundation (430 years back) a real philosopher in you.

"The philosopher whose name is Hegel does not only bring diligence with him but many other gifts about which the many here as well as elsewhere have as yet no inkling, and which cannot be acquired by mere diligence. But approbation cannot long be lacking, if only they can hear a philosopher. I am convinced of this, venerable man, and I hope much from your generous application for the renaissance of Science, which at present is wooden and petrified at the German universities. I am writing as if we were old friends. And, indeed, my acquaintance with you is not from yesterday; I do know you, and not merely from the titles or prefaces of your works, or the reviews which have smeared you. I hope to be moved out through you from my theological isolation,

78. *Ibid.* (all italics mine).

a desert perhaps more barren even than the philosophical one which you mention."⁷⁹

Hegel's last letter from Nürnberg is dated October 13, 1816. It is addressed to his old friend Paulus in Heidelberg. In it he reports that the common departure of the Hegel family had to be delayed because his wife, over-exerting herself in packing, had lost a child and had to recover. Hegel had to leave in advance to start his new lectures at the University of Heidelberg on October 28.

Appraisal

Hegel in Nürnberg was happily married, but nevertheless felt as lonely as ever. He continued to lead a double life: during the day an ordinary schoolman and administrator, at night a philosophical genius. Having to teach youngsters improved his language. His systematic philosophy began to be understandable, and his speeches on the philosophy of education are masterpieces. His fame began and was richly deserved through the immense achievement of the *Logic*.

79. Br. I., pp. 95, 118.

Professor in Heidelberg

1816 - 1817

The Personal Situation

Hegel's first letter from Heidelberg cheered up his wife. Life in Heidelberg was cosy and homey, a "dear life". Here in those beautiful surroundings she will learn to enjoy taking walks. "Yesterday I started my lectures, but the number of hearers is not as one had dreamed it to be. I am, if not perplexed and impatient, at least astonished. In one course I had four hearers." There is a tragi-comic discrepancy between the grand opening lectures on the importance of systematic philosophy (in which the "morning-dawn of a new era" and the liberation of the human spirit is saluted) and the four students! The situation improved quickly, however, and soon Hegel had an enrollment of seventy.¹

After his family had joined him, he described (to his sister Christine) his rural apartment in a large farm house outside the town. "Our landlord has a large farm. The boys enjoy all this activity in the yard and barn with cows and horses. The mild climate and the quickening sun have very much aided my wife's recovery. The countryside here is smiling, romantic and fertile. We have traversed it in many directions. If you are following the

1. Br. II., p. 147.

Neckar River upwards, you are rewarded by most beautiful and changing views of the forests and hills, especially delectable when you are floating down the river again. On the other side there is the magnificent, rich plain towards the Rhine; the slopes which mark the border between the hill-country and the plain are full of fruit trees and vineyards." He tells her about family excursions to Schwetzingen, famous for its lovely eighteenth century Rococo castle and park and its choice asparagus; and the old city of Speyer, dating back to the Romans and famous in the history of the middle ages; and to Mannheim. "So far we have had a very enjoyable life here."

The letter ends with an expression of concern for his sister's mental condition. He is relieved to know that a cousin has taken care of her and advises her to follow his insight and well-meaning counsel. "The most important thing for an individual is to overcome his idle broodings and to find satisfaction in active work for a noble purpose —an activity which you can find under the guidance of our friend."² Four years later he wrote to his sister on the same topic of her mental condition:

"I was heartily pleased to learn from your letter about the happy return of your health and that you again have mastered yourself, and I wish I could stay with this feeling. I wish that these painful and bitter sentiments had reference only to the past and not also to the present and future. I hope that the recovery of your spirit and soul will overcome the memory of your sufferings and those feelings of being wronged and insulted by people. Do work on yourself in putting this past behind you and to care for viable intercourse with people. The more you can master those memories and remove them from your

2. Br. II., p. 167.

present life, both internally in yourself and externally toward others, the more wholesome will be your mind and the more friendly your relation to others and their relations to you. If you keep on making reproaches to others, the less you gain their kind inclination which you are coveting. Receive these fraternal appeals as they have flown from my heart; let peace reign in your heart also; and may your thoughts, directed to God, help you to achieve this firmness and consolation through this higher love.”³

I have shown before, that Hegel was fully aware of pathological traits in himself and saw his indefatigable work as a ‘salvation’. One day he arrived in the class-room without noticing that he had only one shoe on—the other had got stuck in the mud outside the building.⁴ When speaking of Socrates, Hegel was indirectly making such a personal confession. “Socrates is said to have remained immobile on one spot for a whole day and night, sunk in his meditation until the morning sun had awakened him out of his ecstasy, a state of mind in which he was often supposed to be. This is a cataleptic situation which may be akin to somnambulism or magnetism in which the sensuous consciousness has wholly died away, a violent physical departure, an inward abstraction from the concrete organic being, in which the individual separates himself from his inner self; in this external appearance we see proof how the depth of spirit has labored in itself.”⁵

Students

The story of Baron Boris von Uexküll,⁶ who had come

3. Br. II., p. 283f.

4. Ros., p. 301.

5. W. XVIII., p. 51.

6. Ros., pp. 302-304.

all the way from Riga in his native Estonia (which then belonged to Russia) in order to study with Hegel in Heidelberg, is typical for most, if not all, of Hegel's students. The first thing the Baron did after his arrival and after having procured a room was to go to a book-store where he purchased Hegel's *Phenomenology of Mind* and the *Logic*. Comfortably seating himself in his easy chair, he opened the books and anticipated imbibing Hegel's wisdom and enjoying himself. After a few pages he had no idea what he was reading. He was completely bewildered and frustrated; assuming that the author probably knew what he meant when he was writing, he decided to go to him and ask him for an authentic explanation or interpretation of his written words. He found an ordinary and friendly man talking about ordinary and friendly things, and interested in Uexküll's Baltic-Russian background. The advice he received was that he should first apply himself to the study of mathematics and the natural and historical sciences before attempting to tackle philosophy. Uexküll followed this advice, but nevertheless insisted on also hearing all of Hegel's courses and became a devoted friend, convinced of the truth of Hegel's philosophy without, however, becoming a parrot of the paragraphs of the 'system'. Later while in Russian diplomatic service, he traveled widely, always accompanied by his copy of Hegel's *Logic*. Hegel's many letters to him, save a few, were lost; in the abortive Russian revolution of 1905 the Uexküll-Hegel archives were burnt when the revolutionaries destroyed the family estate.⁷ Boris von Uexküll is an interesting example of a non-professional, non-technical 'Hegelian'. It is also interesting to note how Hegel saw the relation of Europe to Russia. In compari-

7. Fischer II., p. 1212.

son to the vast potentiality of Russia, Europe was a system of nationalistic cages or of marionette theatres. "You are lucky to have a fatherland which is great and without a doubt has a higher destination. The other modern states, so it seems, may have already reached goals of their development; some may even have passed their culmination and may have become stagnant. Russia, on the contrary, already the strongest European power, may carry in its womb an immense potentiality of development of intensive nature. You have the personal fortune to occupy through your birth, talents, and knowledge—a not inconsiderate position in this colossal structure."⁸

The first professional disciple was Friedrich Wilhelm Hinrichs, who continued to lecture on Hegel's books after the author had left for Berlin. Hinrichs accompanied Hegel on his daily walks. Hegel told him never to trust a philosophy which was not moral and religious in its foundation, because the goals of religion and philosophy are the same, but sought in different media of expression. Dialectic, the logical method of philosophy, should put an end to the amateurishness of "isms" and "schools". Only the stubbornness of a one-sided intellectualism, an arrogant immaturity, or the anxiety of privileged, vested interests in obscurity, could retard (but not prevent) the victory of truth.⁹

Victor Cousin, a young professor of philosophy at the Sorbonne in Paris, undertook in 1817 an intellectual expedition of discovery in Germany. He intended to visit Hegel for a few hours, but found the encounter so fruitful and fascinating that he stayed for three days and afterwards returned for several weeks. He says that Hegel ex-

8. Br. II., p. 297.

9. Ros., p. 303.

pressed himself awkwardly even in his own German. But what he said was so 'expansive' and 'confiding', profound as well as vast, that Cousin was in one ecstasy. "Hegel was a spirit of a limitless freedom. All things were subject to this speculative critique, religions as well as governments, arts, literatures and the sciences; and he placed philosophy above everything."¹⁰

He found Hegel in accord with him on the liberal ideas of the French Revolution; both men were for a constitutional monarchy and against the reaction of the restored Bourbons. But he was stunned by Hegel's historical and philosophical critique of the New Testament. Hegel declared that its stories and its language were mythical; that its dogmas were symbols in need of philosophical interpretation. Cousin was used to, and could understand, the consistency of the 18th Century French rationalists who were consistent enough to desire the abolition of religion. But what troubled him in Hegel was that he wanted to preserve the Christian religion while at the same time destroying its scriptural basis: "et il s'en faut bien peu que Jésus-Christ ne soit un pur mythe, un grand nom comme celui d'Homère."¹¹ Yet, "above all, I shall, I will, render my great and sincere thanks to Germany; she has cured me forever from the theological exegesis [of the scriptures] to which I was beginning to engage myself in France."¹²

They again agree on Hegel's criticism of French rationalism which offered no philosophical principle for personal and spiritual existence. When Cousin departed they were friends for life. "I have prophesied him"; Cousin

10. *Revue des Mondes*, 1857, p. 546.

11. *Revue des Deux Mondes*, p. 551.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 549.

said later to his students, "when I returned from Germany I already pronounced that I had found a genius."¹³

The Academic Situation

Friedrich Christof Schlosser, the historian at the University of Heidelberg in Hegel's time, had an insatiable appetite for empirical facts; he filled nineteen volumes of his *Universal History* with them.¹⁴ He invited the philosopher and other colleagues to stag-parties. His judgment on Hegel is that his philosophy is not of this world and has nothing to do with life (*Lebensfremd*). In his *World-History* he includes Hegel by excluding him. "Of Schelling's most important pupil, who later pursued his own course, George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, we need not speak, because his efficacy was confined to his class-rooms."¹⁵ This 'world-historical' inclusion by exclusion is rather ironical! Hegel is more 'alive' than ever, whereas Schlosser's ponderous and moralistic scholarship is buried in libraries or confined to historical class-rooms. What is mortal in Hegel are the empirical facts which are necessarily problematic and antiquated.

Schlosser probably heard Hegel express himself enthusiastically about Jakob Böhme. And so he inserted a second remark that "Hegel tied his philosophy to Jakob Böhme."¹⁶ Hegel had received the complete works of Böhme from his admirer, friend, and former student from Jena, van Ghert, who worked in the ministry of education in Holland. In a note of thanks Hegel sums up his impression on reading the works of the Seventeenth Century

13. Fischer II, pp. 120-124.

14. F. C. Schlosser: *Weltgeschichte*, 1844.

15. F. C. Schlosser: *Weltgeschichte*, Vol. XV, p. 684.

16. F. C. Schlosser: *Weltgeschichte*, Vol. XIII, p. 371.

philosophizing cobbler. Unfortunately, he says, Böhme had no education and consequently no clear concepts. He is a profound and reflective soul with a great speculative talent, who projects his moral and religious problems and insights into naturalistic images which never quite fit or express what he wants expressed. Schlosser's second 'world-historical' estimate of his colleague is again comical in trying to size up Hegel by two 'influences'—“Schelling's pupil”¹⁶ and “Tied to Böhme”!

Aesthetics

Heidelberg in Hegel's time was agitated by a vivid aesthetic feud between classicists and romanticists. The head of the classical party was Johann Heinrich Voss, professor of Greek and the congenial and admirable translator of Homer's *Iliad* and *Odyssey*. He was the son of a North-German peasant and was naturally rustic!

The world to him is realistic, natural, clear, plastic, unproblematic, rational. He hates the romantic sense for its mystery, for its 'clair-obscur', for its subconscious hunches and motivations. "Obscurantistic mysticism," he calls it. In a powerful and brutal language, reminiscent of Luther's style, he attacks the romantic movement and accuses it of undermining protestantism and enlightenment. His chief wrath is directed against Friedrich Creuzer, his colleague in classic studies, whose work on the *Philosophy of Symbols and Myths*¹⁷ threatens Voss' beloved Homer by seeing general mythical and symbolic patterns in him, and pointing to analogies in Hindu mythology. Besides Creuzer, there were Brentano and Arnim, who edited old

17. Friedrich Creuzer, *Symbolik und Mythologie der alten Völker*, 4 vol., Leipzig, 1810.

German folk-poetry and the Nibelungen Lied, which they praised as the German equivalent of Homer. Voss said that was like comparing a ‘pig-sty’ to a palace.

Hegel maintained friendly relations with both parties. Creuzer's work contributed to his growing Aesthetics. From Creuzer he adopted the term ‘symbolic’ for what is now generally called ‘archaic’. In Heidelberg he worked out his first book on *Aesthetics*, which he still used in Berlin as basis for his lectures on aesthetics. It is very regrettable that Hotho, the editor of Hegel's *Aesthetics*, did not preserve this original text but padded it with numerous students' lecture-notes over a period of many years.

The tension between the classic and the romantic style in the arts, was an old problem to Hegel. Already his first independent essay on the “Difference between Greek and Modern Poetry” in the Stuttgart Gymnasium had envisaged it.

By ‘classical’ he means a style by which man frees himself from the pressures and irrational immediacies of life. The ‘classical’ artist does not leave or transcend life, but delves into its troubles and conflicts and shapes them in clear and convincing images. Man liberates himself when he can see himself objectively; his own private or subjective trouble contributes to and disappears in the image of an essential and perennial human situation. Life is shaped or formed in its own language, and in being shaped or formed it achieves its own idealization or de-realization. The meaning of classical art-style “is not an abstract ideal but an inwardness which determines itself through itself, which appropriates in an external appearance its own expression, which is a free totality in

18. W. XIII., pp. 8-9, 17, 67.

which the spirit achieves an identity of itself with a natural appearance. It can originate only through the freedom of a mind which can produce this identity of form and expressed content, and is, at the same time, true and genuine self-expression.”¹⁸

Hegel’s understanding of the classical art-style was not only derived from his own original apprehension of the Greeks, but was also nourished from his contemporary experience of Goethe and Schiller. His reading in Bern of Schiller’s *Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man* was, as we saw, one of the most decisive moments of his development.

“Goethe brought his great sense to bear on overthrowing in this area mere intellectualism and its arrogance of being the only possible approach to nature, just as Schiller defended the Idea of a free totality of beauty in the areas of willing and thinking against an equally one-sided intellectualism. Schiller starts from the assumption that each man carries within him the potential of an ideal man. This true man is represented in the state, as being an objective and universal form, in which the manifold of many individuals strive to unify themselves in a comprehensive whole. Two kinds of this meeting of man in time with man in the idea are considered. On the one hand the state as the totality of what is right, moral, and intelligent elevates the individual; on the other hand, the individual in expanding himself to this totality, ennobles himself through his participation in the Idea. Reason demands this unity, nature on the other hand produces individuality and many-ness; man is engaged by both realms at once. In this conflict aesthetic education effects a concrete reconciliation of those opposites. It cultivates natural inclinations, sensuality, urges, and the natural soul (Gemüt)

so that they become comprehensive in themselves; on the other hand, Reason, freedom, and spirituality cease to be abstract and receive flesh and blood and are united with an idealized nature. Beauty, then, is this concrescence (*Ineinsbildung*) or comprehensiveness intuited in sensuous symbols.”¹⁹

This classical art-style, as represented by Goethe and Schiller, is counterbalanced by a *romantic* one. On the one hand this term refers to the style of the Christian-Germanic period in opposition to the Greco-Roman period; on the other hand it refers to the specific world-view of the contemporary Romantic movement with which Hegel had a close personal contact in Frankfurt in the person of his friend Hölderlin, in Jena with Schelling and with August Wilhelm and Friedrich Schlegel and Caroline Schlegel-Schelling, in Heidelberg with Creuzer, and later in Berlin with Solger.

As Hegel understands it, *the essence of the romantic movement is the breaking of the classical form*. Against the infinite perfection of the classical totality it proclaims the infinite imperfection of life. The pressures, troubles, obsessions of life and the pangs and ecstasies of existence may become so intense, the individual so desperate, that the classical form and image of life, this living, quiet mirror of a universe, is smashed to pieces as a beautiful lie and hypocrisy. Romantic irony breaks the beautiful illusion of art-within-art-itself. The individual bursts the form because the form does not assuage its pain of existence, its *Weltschmerz*. Kierkegaard’s existentialism continued this romantic breaking of forms as well as the Romantic emphasis on the infinite inwardness of passion without content.

19. W. XII., pp. 97-98.

The Romantics transfer the Absolute to the individual.²⁰ But this absolute empirical subjectivity is necessarily absolute disappointment and self-annihilation. Its proclamation of an arbitrary subjective freedom and geniality, deprived of faith in any objective values, must pass inevitably into a cult of the ugly, the bizarre, the depraved, and the disgusting aspects of life.²¹ Its desperate wittiness only seems to master the world.²² Romanticism nevertheless presents a valid and serious aesthetic problem and possibility. Its sense for the irrational is vastly superior to a prosaic and philistine smugness. "Its point of view is, in this sense, higher than those which it fought."²³

The boundless, limitless, infinitely relative "bad infinity" of the empirical world is real also and belongs to the concrete of the whole; the romantic style is its representative. The bitter outcry "All is vanity" is a necessary moment in the dialectic of that which is.

In the Nürnberg *Propaedeutik* Hegel had outlined the aesthetic world-view and had distinguished between the works of art or art-forms and art-styles, such as 'classic' and 'romantic'. In Heidelberg, under the influence of Creuzer, he added the style-form of the 'symbolic'. He had an extraordinary talent to choose misleading terms for his thought. In this case, he simply took over from Creuzer his *Symbolik* to denote an archaic style, as if not *all* art were 'symbolic'. In this four volume work Creuzer collects innumerable data of primitive mythologies, together with their artistic symbols and then interprets them as expressions of collective and subconscious attempts at ex-

20. W. XII., p. 100.

21. W. XII., p. 127; W. XIII., p. 97.

22. W. XIII., p. 219.

23. W. XII., p. 99.

plaining the world and human existence. Through Creuzer's idea, C. G. Jung in our century discovered the similarity of his collective subconscious 'archetypes' and their continued efficacy in modern man. He deepened Creuzer's problem by showing the analogy of dream-symbols with the 'archetypes' of primitive cultures and religions.²⁴ Hegel acknowledged his indebtedness to Creuzer when he introduced the problem of the 'symbolic' style.²⁵ What he means is an archaic and abstract style in which the content expressed is much vaster than the means of expressing it adequately. The collective and subconscious mind producing those forms is potentially 'comprehensive' (*vernünftig*) and human, but is actually confined to inklings and hunches (*Anklang, Ahnung*).²⁶ In this art, for example in India and Egypt, "we walk among immense riddles"²⁷ which do not contain their own answers or solutions. Abstract, allegorical 'symbols' are mixed with naturalistic traits. The two sides do not jibe; there are cracks between them which let us divine a majestic or sublime idea in the background.²⁸ This is not to be confused with a desperate romanticism or irrationalism which breaks through the classical shaping and forming of life, because here we have to do with an extreme metaphysical and religious earnestness which seeks to find expression.

Creuzer's work also became a factual basis of Schelling's last book on the *Philosophy of Mythology*.²⁹ In Schelling the archaic and the romantic are confused. He defends the

24. C. G. Jung: *Gestaltungen des Unbewussten*. Zürich, 1950.

25. W. XII., p. 417. Also: "I cannot tell you enough how much my aesthetics is furthered by your work." (Hegel to Creuzer. Br. II., p. 286.)

26. W. XII., p. 405.

27. W. XII., p. 414.

28. W. XII., p. 408.

29. Ernst Cassier: *Philosophie der Symbolischen Formen*. Berlin, 1929, vol. II, p. 21.

irrational process of living experience, as experienced in mythical imagery, against an empty, formal and abstract 'reason'.

The Political Situation

King Friedrich II of Würtemberg was a shrewd politician; first he sided with Napoleon against Prussia, and Napoleon rewarded him by doubling his territory; then he switched at the proper moment to the Holy Alliance against Napoleon, which netted him the royal title. After the Congress of Vienna he was the first German monarch who called a legislative assembly for accepting a liberal constitution which would provide personal freedom and freedom of emigration, the right of the *Landtag* to co-operate in Legislation and taxation, public accounting of state expenses, and responsibility of state officials to the parliament which was to be assembled regularly. He also proposed a common law for the old and new parts of the kingdom of Würtemberg, doing away with church confessions as conditions of citizenship, and with old feudal inequalities and special laws and privileges. In short, what Hegel had hoped for in 1798 in his unpublished notes on the affairs of Würtemberg—a liberal and democratic state which would limit the monarchy by law—was to become a reality. Originally he had hoped this action would come from the people, but now it came from the king. To Hegel it matters little who the agent is as long as the thing itself is the right thing:

"There can be no greater earthly spectacle than to see an absolute monarch limit his political power by making his people an essential, ingredient part of

it.”³⁰ “We have been so used to seeing empty royal pomp and ceremonies, and in our political nullity we have been weaned so thoroughly from political participation, that we are blind to the significance of such an event where the appearance of the majesty of the state is congruent to the objective inner value, that we should dwell on this spectacle as a beneficial, sublime, and invigorating moment.”³¹

And so he published *Estates of Würtemberg*, an essay on the proceedings. This essay of 150 pages on the proceedings was published in 1817 in the Heidelbergische Jahrbücher,³² “even though an unpolitical pettiness may misinterpret and slander the intention of the author as not flowing from a sincere enthusiasm, but rather from a slavish flattery of a court or from a cunning calculation. Our political numbness has us unreceptive to enjoy such scenes of political freedom.”³³ His political pamphlet is not only produced by a genuine enthusiasm, but also by an intense anger directed against the blind traditionalism and stubborn provincialism of the representatives of the people who declined to accept the new constitution although they were convoked on its principle. They have, like the French aristocratic reactionaries, “learned nothing from the terrible but instructive experience of the last twenty-five years, and forgotten nothing.”³⁴ They cling to their old local ‘privileges’ as if the goodness of a thing were determined by its age.³⁵

30. W. VI., p. 357.

31. W. VI., p. 356.

32. Beurtheilung de im Druck erschienenen Verhandlungen in der Versammlung der Landstände des Königreich Würtemberg im Jahre 1815 und 1816. W. VI., pp. 347-490.

33. W. VI., p. 356.

34. W. VI., p. 396.

35. W. VI., p. 396.

When the French national assembly in 1789 abdicated all special privileges against the wishes of the court, the Würtemberg legislative assembly on the contrary clung to the whole tangled "positivity" of the "good old right" against the enlightened and better insight of the king.

"Sunk in the morass of private interests,³⁶ they protect the plunder of the state and the inequality of rights inherited from medieval establishments". "The assembly did not reject the new royal constitution because it was contrary to the eternal law of Reason which citizens must demand to be the basis of a state-constitution, but because it was not the same old Würtemberg. But the dead cannot be made to live again."³⁷

The most grotesque example among many is the story of Count von Waldeck-Limpurg. This gentleman declared that his house had never ratified the alleged end of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation, that he still was the subject of his majesty the emperor, and that the emperor's forced abdication in 1806 was null and void. His domain, consequently, has not and never had been subject to a so-called kingdom of Würtemberg. At the most he would consider negotiations with the 'king', under which condition he would consent in joining him.³⁸ Hegel relished the ridiculousness of this German Don Quixote.

* * * * *

Hegel's essay is interesting beyond the immediate historical occasion because it proves the steady continuity of

36. W. VI., p. 389.

37. W. VI., p. 385.

38. W. VI., p. 383.

his political philosophy. All the following points are not new to us.

Government and people are the two appearing, living sides of one essential relationship binding them into a unity called the state. The state is a substantial identity which preserves itself through many governments and through the gradual changes of generations. If all its members, governing or governed, would lose their minds but went on living, the state would disappear. It is therefore not a reality which can be understood in biological categories only; it is more than a form of life. It is in thought and in the rational wills who affirm it as their common good. It is "objective mind", the ground and authority of positive laws, but not determined or exhausted by them.³⁹

The state is not like a legal business contract of 'atomistic' individuals who have nothing in common, to whom it would be an abstract, external, general frame. In distinction from a momentary government, the state is not something to which you can agree or not agree; its being what it is is not a matter of arbitrary subjective opinions or private greed. "If somebody only *has* a certain number of years or a certain amount of money, then he *is* nobody politically."⁴⁰ To be somebody politically, somebody worthy of this spiritual and organic order, then he must have made himself into someone who deserves the confidence of his fellow citizens⁴¹ on the basis of his competence in his professions and in moral-practical affairs. "A living cohesion is only in an *articulate* whole whose members are themselves particular, subordinate spheres of activity."⁴²

39. W. VI., p. 384.

40. W. VI., p. 370.

41. W. VI., p. 373.

42. W. VI., p. 371.

The state becomes conscious of its unity externally in being able to deal as One with other states, and internally through the inner cohesion of its members; the state is present *in* and known *to* them in their loyalty and patriotism.⁴³

If governments, parties, particular groups, or private interests exploit the state, then it is sick and does not live up to its true spiritual 'Concept'. "The *will of the people* (this is a great phrase) and those who represent the will of people should be most careful lest they profane it or misuse it frivolously. To know one's will is the most difficult and therefore the most exalted human task."⁴⁴

He sums up his verdict on the failure of the assembly to come to an agreement on the constitution: "My people, your leaders deceive you when they hide behind the words of the good old laws."⁴⁵

Rudolf Haym's brilliantly superficial and profoundly malicious book on Hegel⁴⁶ is the start of most Hegel legends, save the Marxistic one of 'thesis, antithesis, and synthesis'. In his Heidelberg chapter he says that Hegel's political essay was a "servile glorification of state-omnipotence;⁴⁷ a "mixture of rationalism and historicism"⁴⁸—precisely the two standpoints which Hegel is combating: rationalism in the form of an abstract legal-contract theory of the state, and historicism in the form of the traditionalism of medieval privileges and special rights. And to top this nonsense, he even insinuates that Hegel wrote the treatise for government remuneration and the job as

43. W. VI., p. 353.

44. W. VI., p. 418.

45. W. VI., p. 464.

46. Rudolf Haym, *Hegel und seine Zeit*. Berlin, 1857.

47. *Ibid.*, pp. 352, 353.

48. *Ibid.*, p. 354.

chancellor of the University of Tübingen.⁴⁹ Fifty-five years later, in the memoirs of his life,⁵⁰ Haym's conscience finally made him retract his slander;⁵¹ but the damage was done, particularly since Haym's Hegel book was widely read but his late autobiography was not. The people of Würtemberg did not see anything sinister in Hegel's magazine article. There was such a popular demand for it that it was re-published as a separate brochure.⁵²

The Review of the Works of Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi

Both the political pamphlet and the review of Jacobi appeared in the *Heidelbergische Jahrbücher* of 1817, of which Hegel had become one of the editors. His relation to these annals had at first been unpleasant. His *Logic* had been sent for review but was not reviewed because it contained an uncomplimentary footnote to the logic of Jakob Friedrich Fries, who was then professor of philosophy in Heidelberg. Hegel objected to his psychologism which made psychical processes the justifying ground not only of logic, but of all philosophy. Fries' transfer to the University of Jena made room for Hegel in Heidelberg and allowed him to become editor of the University's publication.

The thirty-seven page review of Jacobi's works is a model review. It is kind to the reviewed author, careful in explaining the principles under which his books are judged, and educational in trying to convince Jacobi that his standpoint could be developed into a more comprehensive world-view.

49. *Ibid.*, pp. 349-350.

50. Rudolf Maym, *Erinnerungen aus meinem Leben*, p. 102. Berlin, 1902.

51. Fischer II., p. 1213.

52. Ros., p. 312.

Hegel was kind to the author. "Most readers of Jacobi's writings probably will share with me the feeling that in their study they have conversed with a loving and noble mind and have been stimulated in many directions in a profound, instructive, and meaningful manner. It is wondrous in what high degree he unites in himself almost all extremes. From his youth on he had been averse to the principle of contradiction and the principle of the excluded middle as well as to the principle of sufficient reason, but had always followed the principle of the coincidence of opposites. I enjoy the freedom of his mind which creates between him and myself a most precious harmony."⁵³ These sentences are quotations from Jacobi applied to Hamann, but turned by Hegel back on Jacobi.

Hegel was careful in explaining the principles under which his books are judged. Hegel presented Jacobi against the foil of Eighteenth Century Enlightenment which was determined by John Locke's empiricism which tried to derive Logic from the given appearances of a subjective experience. The 'Nature' of the Enlightenment was a mechanism of physical laws. In the ethical and the religious sphere of life this same standpoint dissolved what was supposed to be 'positive religion' because its rational consciousness could not find itself in those 'positive' stories. Having abandoned the Absolute, both in the natural and the spiritual world, thinking was reduced to 'positive' sciences and culture to finite purposes and to utility as the subordination of all things to such ends.⁵⁴

Jacobi opposed this metaphysics of a finite intellectualism by discovering in his soul a spiritual reality of a higher order. He tied this feeling to the philosophy of Spinoza.

53. VI., pp. 338-345f.

54. VI., p. 315.

The finite is seen under the aspect of the eternal. This vision of faith is at the same time clear philosophical reflection, both together directed against the intellectualistic concepts of mere general possibilities, and against such empty abstractions as a "thing in itself" apart from its appearance and manifestation in the world, and against a deity conceived as a glorified mechanic or watchmaker. "In this One Absolute, all finitudes of content as well, as the subjective tinkering with them, are absorbed; mind in reaching beyond those, its own barriers, knows them as invalid forms of the Absolute, valid only *within* the appearances of objects. In this act, when it is conscious of itself, mind becomes comprehension (*der Geist wird Bewusstsein der Vernunft*). Jacobi had achieved this highest vision not only in his feeling or in symbolic representation—modes to which art and religiosity remains restricted—but in the higher clarity of thought as the ultimate true result of thought itself."⁵⁵

But—and here begins Hegel's *educational attempt to convince Jacobi*—the comprehensive vision (*Vernunftanschauung*), the divine reality in the subject which gives testimony to the divine reality of the Absolute as its own ground, is not sufficient. It is merely proclaimed with deep conviction and moving passion to be a subjective immediacy. Jacobi underrates the contribution of philosophical reflection and is not aware of the danger of romanticism.⁵⁶ What is permissible to a religious prophet is not permissible to a philosopher; he may not skip finite realities and the objective "sphere of validities" within them.⁵⁷ There is no immediacy which is not also mediated.

55. VI., pp. 316-317.

56. VI., p. 335.

57. VI., p. 335. Gelten.

To realize this, Jacobi need only reflect on what he had said himself and how he had reached his truth which now appears to him self-evident and an immediate certainty. "The systematic-methodical progression in philosophizing consists essentially in this: to reflect on that which one has said and proclaimed as knowledge."⁵⁸

The Absolute, then, is *not merely* the negation which rejects our ordinary belief in finite things and circumstances as ultimately real, because in this very negation those finite things and their "spheres of validity" are *also* acknowledged as real. Their reality, if falsely absolutized, negates the Absolute. In cancelling and transcending those negative realities, the Absolute is affirmed as a negation of their negativity. As such a negation of negative realities, the Absolute affirms itself as infinite Being. Or, because we know finite appearances not to be real in and out of themselves but as conditioned by others, we have presupposed the idea of an unconditional Being which appears in them as totality of all conditions, a totality which is both real in itself as well as for itself.

The Absolute as determining itself, having no condition outside of itself to determine it, is absolute self-determination or freedom. This, its 'substantial' nature, is evident not only in itself, as in Spinoza's 'substance', but it is also evident for itself. Becoming aware for itself of its own dialectical nature, it is also subject or spirit;⁵⁹ it is Being both *in* and *for* itself.

The "great insight of Descartes", his "cogito ergo sum," is just as ultimate and necessary as Spinoza's eternal substance which is defined as being its own ground. Only if we understand that in the negations of finite spheres (ex-

58. VI., p. 319.

59. W. VI., pp. 317-318.

tended nature and thinking subject) these spheres or 'attributes' are the same time real self-differentiations of the Absolute, have we realized in ourselves the dialectical nature of the whole, manifest and present in individuations, in free and self-responsible persons. "God is not a dead but a living God; but he is more than life; he is *Geist* and eternal Love; but this He is only through this, that Being is not only an abstract generality, but also a self-distinguishing activity which becomes known as such in the person, who is himself one of those distinctions. The person must not identify itself immediately with the Absolute; he is one with it only because he sees through his immediacy. Only in overcoming and transcending his immediacy does the self-determining and reflective person participate in the life, movement, and unity of the Absolute. Only a sensuous thing is immediate in the sense that it has no knowledge that in being mediated by others it is itself this process of mediation."⁶⁰

Jacobi rejects reason because he sees reason only in the pre-philosophical form of scientific object-thinking. And in that he is perfectly justified. God, in the perspective of this metaphysics of object-thinking or rationalism, is like a "thing", an Other, something given, outside of myself; and then this thing is to be proved or its existence is to be ascertained, and faith is supposed to be dependent on such rational proofs; which is as if we had to wait for physiological science before we could digest a meal. But reflective, philosophical, dialectical self-comprehension is nothing apart and outside of the Absolute, which we have taken as our seemingly immediate point of departure.

Because Jacobi does not distinguish between the scientific reason or intellect and philosophical comprehension,

60. VI., pp. 319-320.

he deprives himself of his own ally. He does not understand that his own, true reflections are philosophy and not merely the outcry of immediate feeling and unmediated certainties.

Finite knowledge has to do with given objects, which are ad infinitum always dependent on objects which, in turn, are dependent on others. The logical forms by which this irrational material is organized are not identical with that whose logical forms they are. Philosophical reflection, in knowing this, knows finite knowledge as this concrete and struggling process. This second knowledge, therefore, sees the empirical scientific struggle as one of the many dialectical spheres of form/content, One/Other, essence/appearance. There are many ways of cultural life which are real struggles each made real by such a dialectical process of mediation. The subject producing scientific knowledge is also the philosopher knowing himself objectively as such a process. What it does, and what it knows itself as doing, is concrete self-knowledge—a sample of the dialectical structure of all reality.⁶¹ The proceeding outward towards objects is at the same time an ‘introspecting’, a self-producing unity of a subject identical with its own activity, which is an ultimate ground of and end for itself, a mediating immediacy, a “concrete synthesis priori”.⁶²

The same criticism holds also for the philosophy of practice. Jacobi correctly criticizes the emptiness of a mere formal moral law which says what *ought* to be in contradiction to what factually *is*. Again he does not realize that a concept of a Being apart from what it ought to be, apart from moral laws and values, is just as much an iso-

61. VI., p. 320.

62. VI., p. 322.

lating abstraction as the concept of an 'ought' apart from being. What ought to be is *itself*; it is the kind of reality which is philosophically known as moral. And this reality always is the concrete dialectical struggle of the factual and the ideal side of man together as that which truly and really is his whole nature.⁶³ And this too is knowledge; it is another instance of that philosophical self-knowledge which is inseparable from our self-realization. In criticizing mere formal or rational knowledge as injurious to moral practice, Jacobi merely hits the rationalistic conception of morality. Ethics as self-reflection on what man is when he acts and behaves as a moral being is the self-consciousness of the dignity and necessity of the whole man including his failures. Moral practice without this self-knowledge again leads to a romantic chaos or arbitrary standpoints without unity and justification.⁶⁴

Jacobi, after reading this review, made a special trip from München to Heidelberg to express to Hegel his appreciation, and "the philosophers embraced one another in joyful emotion".⁶⁵ After Jacobi's death Hegel wrote to Niethammer, in whose house he had first met Jacobi, that "his death has assaulted me not only with a personal pain, but also with a remorse that he has not heard from me in Berlin; although, as you say, he has repeatedly inquired about me. One always feels left alone when one of those old trees, to which one has looked up from youth on, is gone. He was a turning point in the spiritual culture of our time, and a firm point of orientation, a comfort and support."⁶⁶

63. VI., p. 329.

64. VI., pp. 330-334.

65. Ros., p. 308.

66. Br. II., p. 213.

The Encyclopedia

Hegel published his first systematic outline of philosophy as a whole in May, 1817. It contains the essentials of his *Logic* and the original idea of his *Phenomenology* as particular spheres or 'circles'. In the infinite circle, according to Cusanus,⁶⁷ all lines coincide because all lines are either straight or curved; and the infinite circle must be both thought as curved and also as straight in any given section. This infinite circle of circles is the literal meaning of the Greek word 'Encyclopedia', which is an 'encircling culture' or 'all-around education', in contrast to its usual form as an alphabetically arranged aggregate of information. "Since philosophy must be a comprehensive wisdom, therefore each of its disciplines is in turn a philosophical whole, a circle both disclosing and enclosing in itself the totality of the whole; but in each this philosophical idea is in a particular medium of self-determination. The particular circle therefore breaks through the limitation of its medium on account of its totality-character, and so also becomes the ground of a wider sphere. *The whole presents itself as a circle of circles*, of which each is a necessary movement. The system of all essential media produces itself as the whole IDEA and is present wholly in each as well."⁶⁸

The "circle" is the "symbol of true infinity"⁶⁹ because in it every point is the result of the preceding point as well as the start of the succeeding one; and the end reached in its movement was at the same time the beginning.⁷⁰ It is

67. Nicolaus Cusanus, *Of Learned Ignorance*, Yale University Press, 1954, p. 28.

68. VI., p. 25, paragraph 6; W. VIII., paragraph 15.

69. IV., p. 173.

70. II., p. 613.

the image of philosophical mediation in which every immediate beginning is also the result of the whole movement which returns to it⁷¹ and then realizes it as an abstract point within its concreteness. In the circular movements of the "celestial spheres" of the stars and in the circular processes of organic reproduction Plato and Aristotle saw symbolic images of the presence of the eternal Being, 'time as the moved image of eternity' (Plato), as the unmoved mover (Aristotle).⁷²

What are the 'circles' in philosophy? They are what the former rationalistic metaphysics (*Verstandesmetaphysik*) treated under the titles of World, Soul, God; or Nature, History and the totality of Being, the Absolute present in the 'shapes' (*gestalten*) of life reflected in the philosophical sciences; systems of 'ought' versus 'is', such as morality and law and concrete ethics; of art and of religion. They are the concrete content of the IDEA; its wholeness is not a separate or abstract absolute outside or apart from all of its own self-differentiations. The absolute whole in itself as *Logic* in abstraction from its worldly contents, is *not* the whole; it is only a 'realm of shadows'. Philosophy is the consciousness or reflection on the value of what we are in those *many* dimensions of the *One* reality.⁷³

In philosophical comprehension, all those 'circles' of Being become articulate; they are both in and for themselves.⁷⁴ Each 'circle' mediates the others, or in the 'infinite circle' each is a part of a total movement; at the same time its totality accomplishes its eternal and un-

71. VIII., p. 57.

72. XVIII., Plato, pp. 255-265; Aristotle, pp. 328-330.

73. VI., pars. 5, 17-24; VII., pars. 9, 30-36.

74. VI., para. 5.

moved presence in every phase or moment of itself. Philosophical comprehension and its circle of circles may be compared to a 'syllogism' in which each of the three spheres—Nature, Man, the Whole—may be thought of as serving in analogy to a middle term of formal logic, linking the two others as its extremes. "The objective and final (*überhaupt*) meaning of the figures of the syllogism (Schluss) is this: that all comprehensiveness turns out to be a threefold 'conclusion' in such a way that each of its members may both take the position of an extreme as well as that of the mediating middle. This is especially so in the case of the three members of philosophy, i.e., logical Idea, Nature, and Spirit. The *same* Absolute is present in *every* partial manifestation of itself; they do not follow first a one and *then* afterwards another. Time itself is one of those manifestations.

"If nature is taken as the middle and mediating totality, then it unfolds its meaning in the extremes of logical Idea on the one hand, in the spirit on the other hand. Spirit is spirit only in being mediated through its struggle with nature, and through its orientation towards the Absolute.

"In the same way 'Spirit' can be the 'Middle'; it is that which is known to itself as the individual and active reality for whom nature and the logical idea are extremes. In Spirit the logical idea becomes essential knowledge, and the knowledge of nature becomes scientific object-thinking.

"Thirdly, the logical Idea as the Middle is the Absolute in the form of all-pervasive categories present in nature and spirit."⁷⁵ The whole circular movement of the comprehensive 'Concept' always presents the *universal* whole in *particular* spheres and in *individual-active* self-realiza-

75. W. VIII., paragraph 187.

tions. The basic systematic categories prove one another in that each is the premise and the conclusion of the others, as immediate they are undefinable because they do the defining.

"It is therefore quite wrong (unrichtig) and clumsy (ungeschickt) to think of the three circular movements as if one were 'before' or prior to the two others,"⁷⁶ as if they were abstract and distinct chunks of the One and only reality. "This is a mere rationalistic and external notion (Vorstellung) which applies its habits of external, spatial knowledge to the fluid movements of philosophy as if they were juxtaposed parts outside of one another."⁷⁷

Hegel here corrects the usual popular description of his 'system'. But this popular textbook version of Hegel's 'system' can quote his own words while leaving out the warning! What he calls "wrong", "unfitting" expressions are nevertheless used by him, due to his desire to be popularly understood. His students always complained that they did not understand, and he always complained that he was not understood. To overcome this constant worry that had accompanied him all his life, he tried to make it "easy" and "plain" and used mythical-Christian language as accommodation to a language which was familiar to students. This textbook 'Hegel', then, looked as follows: *First* 'thesis', God thinks his thoughts *before* the creation of the world and of man. He kindly informs professor Hegel of those pre-creational thoughts of His. His special and favorite friend, professor Hegel, writes down what God has confided to him in his *Logic*. *Then* 'antithesis', God makes the fatal mistake of not being satisfied with his pure thoughts and plunges headlong into an infinite

76. W. VI., paragraph 11.

77. W. VII., paragraph 18.

creation where he almost gets lost and drowned in the irrational details of an endless process in space and time. Fortunately, he, *thirdly* 'synthesis', rallies himself, becomes gradually conscious of his own former divine self and finally, after wading through a bloody mess of centuries called his 'walk on earth' luckily meets his old friend, professor Hegel again, in the paragraphs of whose 'system' God comes to a complete rest and self-satisfaction; after which he need not make history any further, because he rests fulfilled in the Prussia of Hegel's time. The whole system is thus a very simple 'thesis, antithesis and synthesis'.

Is this an exaggeration? Only a trifle. Any number of conventional presentations of Hegel's 'system' will show that my caricature is not very different from what other people mean seriously. For example: "Philosophy is the science of the Absolute. This is absolute reason, idea, spirit. He alone is real; and therefore everything real is rational, but everything that is rational is also real. The absolute reason externalizes itself in nature and returns from this alienation to itself in the spirit. This self-development is therefore a triplexity according to the scheme thesis, antithesis, synthesis."⁷⁸

"The current opinion," Hegel writes to his disciple Hinrichs, "that the Absolute has only comprehended itself in my philosophy would need a lengthy comment; a brief comment is this: that if one speaks of philosophy as such, one does not speak of 'my' philosophy because every philosophy is comprehension of the Absolute—not of an alien object, but a comprehension which is at the same time a self-knowledge. Religion and theology has always de-

78. Heinrich Schmidt: *Philosophisches Wörterbuch*. Article "Hegel". Alfred Kröner Verlag. Leipzig, 1931.

clared the same intention. But misinterpretations are impossible to prevent in those people who, in such ideas, can never eliminate from their heads the private person in themselves or in others.”⁷⁹

The whole of reality, the universe of philosophy, is both eternal and temporal, infinite and finite, One and Many, Being and process—this is its concrete dialectical ‘Concept’. Man within this whole relates himself to himself and to the whole. Reality is his ground as well as his goal of comprehension and of participation. But this is, as we know from the *Phenomenology of Mind*, a slow and laborious process. Consequently, in each of the circles, spheres, or dimensions of reality, there are essential degrees or levels of insight and self-realizations, different “attitudes of thought.”⁸⁰ I now turn to some of those ‘attitudes’ or ‘isms’.

Irrationality

“In this field of change and contingency, the Concept cannot be held to be valid.”⁸¹

If man clings to the passing, transitory, mortal, temporal finitude and external appearances as if they were real and absolute in and for themselves, he clings to a metaphysical lie; and as practice this is “the evil” (das Böse).⁸² This real rebellion against the Absolute is the misfortune and misery of the world. On the contrary, if man despises the finite and behaves as if it were not the other aspect of the Absolute, he “does not acknowledge

79. Br. II., p. 216.

80. VIII., pp. 99-200.

81. VI., p. 10.

82. III., p. 98.

reality either and is extinguished in abstraction like a candle without air . . .”⁸³

The external manifold as externally perceived is immediate experience; if isolated, it is a staggering life, a drunk ribaldry in which there is no clear articulation of particular and essential orders but merely the whirl of an indefinite multitude.⁸⁴ Things are outside of one another in spatial locations; they are relatively large or small in this arbitrary relationship, always dependent on others, and determined by that which they are not, and likewise perish in time.⁸⁵ And so they place and replace one another in an endless and “bad infinity” or “positivity”.⁸⁶ In this irrational (*begrifflos*) whirl of nature, “indifferent chance and indeterminable lawlessness” reigns.⁸⁷ This “impotence of nature”⁸⁸ is the real rebellion of the incomprehensible against comprehension.⁸⁹

The same irrationality appears in man if his “natural soul” rebels against the spirit in him. This natural soul lives in subconscious communication with the life of nature and gets arrested or “fixed in isolated fragments and meaningless obsessions. In its extreme it is a complete “falling to pieces” (*Zerrüttung*) and insanity.⁹⁰

To the isolated and falsely absolutized finitude, the Absolute necessarily appears in the form of “nothing” or as its own annihilation. It is “absolute power just because it can alienate itself in this free shape of independent differences, external compulsions, accident, chance, and opin-

83. VIII., p. 220.

84. X., p. 55.

85. VIII., p. 101; W. IX., p. 53.

86. VIII., p. 10.

87. IX., p. 62.

88. IX., p. 64.

89. IX., p. 64.

90. W. VIII., par. 321.

ion—all of which must be seen through in their own real nothingness (*Nichtigkeit*).⁹¹ The man who adopts this attitude of extreme subjectivism of immediate experience either lives in a desolate awareness of the vanity of all things (the greatest degree of this vanity is to ‘think’ that one can have philosophy without its *Logie*), or he lives in fear, anxiety, and dread; or he loses his authentic existence in that peculiar haste and distraction and the noise of day-interests and stunning twaddle characteristic of our time.⁹² In religion this metaphysics of absolutized immediacy is a ‘pantheism’ which believes that the sum of all finite things is all there is. But a sum of zeroes does not amount to anything, least of all to an All. “What in itself is nothing can become nothing;” it can only perish and be devoured.⁹³

Rationalism

In the *Phenomenology* there are several mediating steps between the irrationalism and thoughtlessness of immediate experience and the standpoint of reason (*Verstand*). But in the *Exposition* (*Vorbegriff*) of the *Encyclopædia* Hegel begins with scientific experience as the first position of thought, in contrast to the thoughtlessness of the irrationalistic position which is not given a chapter of its own.

On the theoretical side rationalism is at home in the ‘positive’ or empirical object-sciences. “All other sciences, save philosophy, have such objects as are assumed to be given to an object-imagination (*Vorstellung*), and which are presupposed and assumed to be there before the sci-

91. W. V., p. 46.

92. W. IV., p. 35.

93. W. VIII., pp. 213-340.

ences begin to determine them further in which process the object-image is augmented and refined. Mathematical sciences, descriptive sciences (zoology, botany), medicine and jurisprudence all presuppose that there are general classes or kinds of things, such as quantitative and spatial magnitudes and numbers, laws, sicknesses, plants and animals, etc. On the formal side those sciences rely on formal logic; on the factual side there is uncertainty and wrangling concerning what is taken to be given or not.”⁹⁴ Reason is carried by a naïve faith that it is able to ‘get at reality’, when in reality it only gets at abstracted objects; and that the general and typical structures and order it finds in its object-image is reality’s true and essential nature.

Metaphysically speaking, this standpoint is not yet aware of its inherent contradictions, the chief of which is the unresolved discrepancy between the general object in the form of being thought and the same object as belonging to the non-rational immediate experience. In one word, it is a *dualistic* metaphysics. The world as scientific object is split between logical form and irrational data and between subject and object, giving rise to one-sided ‘isms’ such as rationalism, irrationalism, subjectivism or idealism, and objectivism or realism.

Rationalism has a practical as well as a theoretical side. “As in the theoretical, so also in the practical sphere, reason (*Verstand*) has an irreplaceable value. In order to act, the rational man must have an essential character which selects certain purposes which he pursues with steadfastness. Whoever wants to achieve something great must know how to limit himself, as Goethe says. He who wants all indeed wills nothing and can become nothing.

94. W. VI., paragraphs 10, 11.

There are plenty of interesting things in the world; but to achieve something as an individual in a concrete situation, one must concentrate oneself on a definite goal and must not disperse one's faculties in all directions. It is of decisive importance that every profession be pursued rationally. Reason further is an essential ingredient of all human culture. A cultured man will not be satisfied with vague and foggy slogans but will grasp objects in their clear outline, whilst the uncultured one swaggers about in uncertainty. How often we have much trouble in coming to an agreement with unreasonable people who are not capable of fixing their attention on the objective point in question.”⁹⁵ Understood in this general sense, reason shows itself in all spheres of reality. How imperfect is a state, for example, which does not develop a definite differentiation of public functions (*Stände*: this should not be translated by ‘classes’) and professions in which the different political as well as governmental functions are cultivated in different organizations, just as in the biological organism, the different functions of life such as feeling, movement, digestion, become visible in differentiated organs.”⁹⁶ Hegel appreciates the role of reason in art, religion, and philosophy. Also in these spheres of the ‘absolute mind’ “each thought must be grasped in its own definite clarity and precision, so that one does not get stuck in a vague and indefinite confusion.”⁹⁷

But reason (*Verstand*) is not philosophical comprehension (*Vernunft*). It meets its fate in the Socratic dialectic and irony fully developed by Plato.⁹⁸ This is the negative dialectic or dialectical skepticism which shows that reason

95. W. VIII., p. 187.

96. W. VIII., p. 188.

97. W. VIII., p. 189.

98. W. VIII., pp. 191-192.

necessarily involves itself in self-contradiction if it tries to identify its conceptual thinking with reality. This negative dialectic is not to be misunderstood as sophistry. The sophists are intellectualists championing one-sided and abstract conceptions in their isolation, particularly if they lie in the direction of their momentary interests in momentary situations. "For example, it is reasonable to say that in order to exist I am entitled to the means of existence; but if I act from this reasoning *alone*, then the intellectual verity may become the principle of theft and murder. Or, it is also reasonable to say that I must act in accord with my own insight and conviction; but if I act from this reasoning *alone*, then there is no objective ethical obligation or principle which could not be undermined by it. To show up this one-sidedness of abstractions was the work of Socrates in whom philosophical comprehension functioned as an absolute form of philosophical faith."

If reason applies its habit of thinking to the metaphysical "circle of circles" or to the interpenetrating spheres of world, soul, Absolute (which we have seen are interdependent categorical aspects of the whole), then we have the old and untenable rationalistic type of metaphysics (*Verstandesmetaphysik*). Its basic mistake is to take those metaphysical problems as if they were experimental things or given objects *about* which the philosophizing subject can predicate general-formal classes or concepts. Thus it discussed whether the world was finite in space and time or infinite and endless, whether the soul was a simple indivisible entity or a multiplicity of faculties, whether God was infinite and beyond the world and the soul or finite and immanent.⁹⁹

99. W. VI., pars. 18-25; VIII., pars. 26-39.

A positive dialectic or speculative-concrete comprehension knows that *all* reality is a living unity of such necessary opposites which are different sides of its own activity. The speculative ‘Concept’ (in distinction from the abstract rational concept which abstracts that which many things have in common) is this living self-differentiating unity. It is “itself and its own opposite”.¹⁰⁰ The speculative ‘Concepts’ are identical with ‘circles’ of reality; they are “self-differentiating self-movements” or the abstract predicates which reason had applied to the metaphysical totalities of nature, man, and the whole are different manifestations of this active, living whole. Each of those totalities reflects the dialectical nature of the whole in their different media. Reality, in other words, is not a static thing beyond or behind the “predicates” which “we” may or may not attribute to it; just as the soul, for example, is not some entity sitting behind its own functions. The soul is dialectically One in its own multiplicity of functions; the world is infinitely present in each moment of its finitudes; the Absolute is absolutely in the negation of its own opposite which is its own relativity or nonabsoluteness. Reality is that which shows itself in its own utterances and in its own inevitable conflicts and in that which is not, such as errors and illusions; and each of its essential spheres of life is limited and thus real in comparison with other equally real spheres of life.

“The Concept understands itself as well as its non-rational shape of life.”¹⁰¹ Thus a religious metaphysics can thrive without philosophical self-comprehension, but the philosophical comprehension could not function at all without also including in itself the religious world-view.

100. W. I., p. 507.

101. W. VIII., p. 17.

Critical philosophy, connected with the name of Kant, overcomes the metaphysics of pure empiricism of immediate experience as well as the metaphysics of reason. The irrational flux of immediate appearances, apprehended or perceived in external and internal perceptions and located in space and time, is only one side or aspect of reality; the other equally fundamental aspect is the idea of formal logic, ordering and relating the given perceptual material by its principle of consistency and noncontradiction. But formal logic with its general classes and their relations is empty without being the relation of a given stuff. This is the 'synthesis a priori' of nonrational content and rational form, a dialectical unity of opposites. But reality in the form of being-thought or as object for a subject of scientific knowledge is not identical with reality. The scientific process of probing further and further into the infinitely given never reaches a final result. Reality as totality of all conditions is never given but is presupposed. It is present in ethical, artistic, and religious experience as a new and wider synthesis of absolute idea of an unconditional whole and vital interests of life. Kant's own Logic is the dialectical logic of philosophy; it moves from the scientific logic of natural and historical sciences to the self-comprehension of the Absolute, and it limits all particular or finite spheres of reality. This logic of philosophy was practiced by him, but he did not know it as the logic of his own philosophy. "It is the greatest inconsistency to maintain on the one hand that reason only knows appearances, but on the other hand to contend that this kind of knowledge is the only knowledge we have and thus absolutize it; a

102. W. VI., paragraphs 27-34; VIII., paragraphs 40-60.

limit or barrier or deficiency of human knowledge can only be known in comparison with the idea of a complete and perfect whole; it is lack of consciousness not to see that in designating something as merely finite and limited one has proven the presence of the infinite and boundless actuality (*Wirklichkeit*)."¹⁰³ Without this ontological truth and reality Kant's philosophy of religion and ethics would be without ontological ground or foundation.

Kant's negative dialectic, like the Socratic one, is true: a merely formal-logical manipulation of appearances is not metaphysical knowledge. But this critical self-limitation of empiricism and rationalism is untrue if it pretends to be a positive metaphysics. It is true that formal-logical classes and predicates are not reality and a known totality of given objects is antinomical or self-refuting; but it is false to suppose that reality is a static "thing-in-itself" behind and beyond the dialectic of its own self-distinctions of finite/infinite, eternal/temporal. We must with Kant's own dialectical Logic of philosophy, move forward to a positive or concrete, 'speculative' dialectic.

Experience of the Absolute

Immediate experiences in their sensuous fullness as well as scientific object-thinking are as nothing if they are not experienced by a self, a subject experiencing and thinking. Likewise, the comprehensive totalities of philosophy, world, soul, God are as nothing if they are not known, if they are not present in the actual and living experience of man. It is in the consciousness of the existing subject that all such content is affirmed or denied; they are known

103. VIII., p. 47.

both as self-distinctions of its own unity as well as self-distinctions of reality.¹⁰⁴

This is the truth of empiricism in the sense in which Hegel has developed the concept of philosophical experience: that they have no assignable meaning apart from this free appropriation of all contents by the subject. This is not any 'idealism'. The subject is ontologically real, but only if it overcomes its immediate or rationalistic or sceptical subjectivity and fills itself with the value and presence of objective contents.¹⁰⁵ The ordinary empiricism of empirical sciences does not know that it is a limited metaphysics.¹⁰⁶

The principle of the ontological ultimacy and dignity of the subject as model and sample of all true reality goes back to Descartes' meditations as distinct from the rationalistic program of Descartes' mathematic-logical method. The subject discovers its ultimate and indubitable reality in its freedom and in its thought that everything given may be doubted. In this thinking as doubting the I exists as indubitable. This is the affirmation of the subject as inseparable from Being. Whatever is given to me, including myself as object, is uncertain. But the being of this uncertainty is not uncertain but is the actual presence of the certainty of self-comprehension and self-knowledge in 'I think'. But this discovery of the dialectical reality of the subject relating itself to itself, making itself its own problematic object, and thus asserting itself as an ultimate reality is but the transfer of the ontological argument to the finite subject. The ontological argument says that the Absolute, the Being greater than which nothing can be

104. VIII., p. 116.

105. VIII., p. 117.

106. VIII., p. 118.

conceived, cannot be conceived to exist merely as a private-subjective or psychological idea in my head. Such a psychological presence is finite, doubtful, and is *not* a Being greater than which nothing can be conceived; it is not that which it pretends to think. In the breakdown of my finite idea of the Absolute, the Absolute maintains itself and reveals itself in breaking down my finitude.¹⁰⁷

The Absolute and man as ultimate subject are thus analogous in their common dialectical unity in reality and in man, in which both sides are equally unavoidable. Or, simply, reality is present and actual in human experience. Or, in all that is "emphatically real", in all metaphysical totalities, the different degrees and levels of comprehension must always be both distinguished and united: that which it is in abstract immediacy, that which it is not (negative dialectic of one-sided, isolated aspects), and that which it is as unity of its own opposite aspects (positive or 'speculative' dialectic).¹⁰⁸ Or, Reality is distinguished in its 'being', in its 'essence' and in its 'comprehension'.

Hegel's systematic intentions seem to me clearly stated in the various introductions and expositions (*Vorbegriff*) of his *Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences*. The edition of 1817 contains in germ all essentials which are more fully elaborated in the second edition of 1827. They are, at any rate, considerably different from the popular version of the 'system'. In my English version of it I have tried to state this clarity of Hegel and at the same time to avoid the unclarity and ambiguity of his style.¹⁰⁹

107. VII., paragraph 76.

108. VI., paragraph 13; W. VIII., paragraph 79.

109. Hegel: *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Ed. Gustav E. Mueller, Philosophical Library, N.Y., 1959.

The following poems and diagram show the whole at one glance.

The "Circle of Circles" in two of Goethe's poems:

Wenn im Unendlichen dasselbe
Sich wiederholend ewig fliest,
Das tausendfältige Gewölbe
Sich kräftig ineinander schliesst—
Strömt Lebenslust aus allen Dingen,
Dem kleinen wie dem grossen Stern—
Und alles Drängen, alles Ringen
Ist ewige Ruh in Gott dem Herrn.


If in the Infinite the Same
Self re-encountering ever flows
The myriad-folded cosmic frame
Together acts, reacts, and grows,
A living joy from all stars pouring
Joins great and small in One accord,
And all the wrangling, all the soaring,
Forever rests in God the Lord.¹¹⁰

Dass du nicht enden kannst, das macht dich gross,
Und dass du nie beginnst, das ist dein Los.
Dein Lied ist drehend wie das Sternengewölbe,
Anfang und Ende immerfort dasselbe,
Und was die Mitte bringt ist offenbar
Das was zu Ende bleibt und anfangs war.

That thou canst never end doth make thee great,
And that thou ne'er beginnest is thy fate.
Thy song is changeful as yon starry frame,
End and beginning evermore the same;
And what the middle bringeth but contains
What was at first, and what at last remains.¹¹¹

110. Author's translation.

111. Translated by E. A. Bowring.



The Call to Berlin

The defeat of the Prussian absolute monarchy and its militaristic-feudal state inherited from Frederick the Great in 1806 was not only a military but also a philosophical defeat. A great reform was undertaken. And there were great leaders: chief among whom was Fichte. In his *Address to the German Nation* given in French-occupied

112. Gustav E. Mueller: *Heinrich Pestalozzi—His Life and Work, Origins and Dimensions of Philosophy*, Pageant Press, N.Y., 1965.

Berlin, he called for a spiritual and moral rebirth through education.¹¹² A delegation of teachers went to Pestalozzi for the planned reform of general education of the people. The University of Berlin was founded with Fichte as its first *Rektor* and Schleiermacher as its first professor of theology. This is the situation to which Hegel referred in his opening Berlin lecture in which he lists as a hopeful sign of a new time the transformation of the former 'mechanical' Prussia into a state founded on intelligence. "The respect for the power of the spirit has become so valid that only that which can measure up to ideas, can hope to survive; what is to be valid must justify itself in thought and insight. And it is particularly this state which now has received me, which has through its spiritual power gained a balance in political reality and has become the equal of other states which might have been superior to it in external means. Here the cultivation and the flowering of the sciences have become an essential moment in the life of the state."¹¹³

On the other side of the ledger there were two extremes equally repugnant to Hegel. The one was the feudal reaction all over Europe, whose head was the powerful prince Metternich in Vienna; the other was the turbulent nationalistic youth-movement among the student fraternities in Germany, which to twentieth century eyes bears a close resemblance to the Nazi-mentality of the recent past. This vague "back to Teutonism" movement culminated in the *Wartburgfest* (1817) where a number of "un-German" books were burnt, and a year later in the murder of the mediocre playwright, A. Kotzebue, who was believed to be an informer and spy for the Holy Alliance. This in turn unleashed a violent and ridiculous wave of reaction, censorship, and political interference with the universities.

113. W. VIII., p. 32.

In a letter to Creuzer, written a few days after the murder of Kotzebue, he expresses his concern for the students who participated in secret meetings and his disgust over their persecution: "All this does not contribute to any serenity, and that you probably feel the same depression goes without saying. I am now fifty years old, of which I have passed thirty in a perennial up and down of fears and hopes. I had hoped to finally live without hopes and fears, but now I see that it must go on and on even in a worse key, as it seems to me in my darker hours."¹¹⁴ In another letter to Creuzer he says "I hope a recent peril will not touch me. In response to a denunciation by a good for nothing fellow, the King has made his minister of education responsible that no doctrines be taught which might lead to atheism and might seduce youth. I am lecturing on philosophy of religion and have a good conscience. You know I am a timid man and I love peace; it does not contribute to comfort to see every year how a new thunderstorm is shaping up."¹¹⁵

Rosenkranz tells a charming anecdote in this connection. "Hegel's benevolence for his students led him to the border of adventurousness. Here is only one little example. One of his students was in the city jail because of alleged political connections. His window looked out towards the river Spree. His friends, convinced of his innocence which afterwards was also proven by the investigation, tried to show their sympathy for him by visiting him at midnight on a boat so they could talk with him through the window. Being also Hegel's students, they persuaded their teacher to join the party. A bullet from a guard might have ended all further pedagogical efforts. It seems that Hegel came to realize the strangeness of his situation on

114. Br. II., p. 219.

115. Br. II., p. 242.

the water. When the boat stopped at the window, the political conversation was to be conducted in Latin for caution's sake. Hegel, however, only uttered some pointless generalities and asked the prisoner, "Nunc me vides?" ("Do you see me now?"). Since he could have touched his hand, the question was somewhat comical and did not fail to arouse great hilarity in which Hegel joined."¹¹⁶

Minister von Altenstein, who called Hegel to Berlin on the recommendation of the faculty, knew that he was strengthening his own liberal position against both extremes. Hegel's philosophy would exert a moderating but progressive influence. His ministry comprised both administration of church and schools, and the official immediately in charge of the Universities was Johannes Schulze, a thoroughly educated man with competent training in philosophy. As soon as Hegel began his courses, Schulze, his administrative superior, decided to study with him. "I resolved to undertake a thorough training in this new system of philosophy, because up to this point I was limited to the study of Spinoza's *Ethics*, Schleiermacher's *Lectures on Ethics*, Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, and some *Platonic Dialogues*. From 1819 to 1821 I therefore visited every afternoon all lectures of Hegel on his Encyclopedia, Logic, Psychology, Philosophy of Law, Philosophy of History, Philosophy of Nature, Philosophy of Art, and Philosophy of Religion. I took careful notes in order to make the content my own. After the lectures Hegel was frequently my guest, or I accompanied him on his walks where we had further fruitful discussions on the problems . . . How much I owe to his lectures, his books, and his personal intercourse both for my scientific progress and for the consistency in my political standpoint I cannot

116. Ros., p. 338.

express completely . . . but I frankly confess that he has always been a faithful, intelligent, and unselfish adviser for my problems in the administration of higher education in Prussia.”¹¹⁷

Again, we owe to the prolific vituperations of Rudolf Haym the popular Hegel legend that he was called to Berlin in order “to be a servile tool of reaction”.¹¹⁸ Schulze himself wrote to Haym in the same year in which the latter’s insinuation appeared (1857): “It would not be difficult to convince you that Hegel had never enjoyed any special favoritism on the part of the government, and that he was very far from serving reaction. Your accusation that he has made his system a shell for a so-called Prussian reaction misses him completely.”¹¹⁹

Varnhagen von Ense, who knew both Altenstein and Hegel well, wrote on the same legend that “the noble Altenstein was not inclined towards Hegel’s philosophy on account of vain-glory or of servile interests, but simply because he was convinced of its value and merits and encouraged other philosophical tendencies as well. He left him in his modest position, gave him neither distinctions nor other advantages. Hegel’s rise to a position of eminence and spiritual power was merely the natural course of things. He owed his success exclusively to his own energy and work. The administration did nothing against the attacks to which he was frequently exposed from enemies who were neither decent or subtle.”¹²⁰

Altenstein wrote to Hegel that “When I took over the administration of public instruction, one of the most im-

117. Fischer I., p. 137.

118. Rudolf Haym: *Hegel und seine Zeit*. Berlin, 1857, p. 359.

119. Fischer II., p. 1216.

120. Fischer II., p. 1215.

portant affairs was for me to fill the chair of philosophy, vacated through the death of Professor Fichte. I therefore invite you hereby to accept the position of a full professor of philosophy at our royal university. I do not under-estimate the obligation which may detain you in Heidelberg, but you have greater obligations for your science for which a wider and weightier opportunity is awaiting you here. I am thinking of the Royal Academy of Sciences. I esteem the gain of such a profound thinker who is thoroughly prepared in his science and of such a serious teacher animated by such a rightful orientation that I would contribute anything which may seem necessary to facilitate your change.”¹²¹

“After serious consideration,” Hegel replies, “I have decided to accept your offer. The main reason for this decision was having had the good fortune to see your excellency at the head of the educational administration and to see the confidence which you had in me. There can be no more satisfying prospect for me than to be active in pursuit of scientific endeavors.”¹²²

Among the financial details was also the question of whether there would be a pension for the widows of professors in Berlin as was established in Heidelberg. Altenstein assured him that Prussia has a “solidly founded and well-administered treasury for the widows and orphans of professors at the university.”¹²³

In his letter of resignation at Heidelberg, Hegel also mentioned besides financial improvement that he hopes to find wider opportunities of being useful beyond the immediate duties of teaching. This is the same practical

121. Br. II., pp. 170, 178.

122. Br. II., pp. 173, 192.

123. Br. II., pp. 174-178.

concern that was burning in his youthful dreams of a *Volksreligion* and that was present in his letter to Schelling when he applied for his position in Jena and also in his letters to Niethammer from Bamberg when he dreamed of a social and national efficacy for his philosophy.

He left Heidelberg in October, 1818 for "the sandy Berlin where you drink your wine in thimbles" as Mrs. Paulus regretfully lamented. He stopped over in Jena to see old friends and in Weimar for a visit with Goethe, implementing a friendly correspondence on the theory of colors. In Berlin the family found a house ready which the sister of Altenstein had procured for the Hegel family.

Appraisal

For the first time since Hegel's highschool period do we find him without depressions. The two short years in Heidelberg are idyllic. His productivity was just as unbelievable as before. The whole Encyclopedia of 1817, the Aesthetics and two long essays, all entirely creative and original works, are the fruits of this short time. The call to Berlin brought the central figure in German philosophy to the central university. In Berlin his usual pattern of emotional instability would reassert itself, ranging from the highest elation—"the morning dawn of spiritual rebirth of the world"—to despairing despondency—"the gray dusk of an old dying world."

Professor in Berlin

1818 - 1831

Carl Wilhelm Ferdinand Solger

Solger, professor of philosophy and aesthetics, was the first to move in the faculty senate of the University of Berlin that Hegel be invited to become Fichte's successor.¹ Solger and Hegel became friends. "I like him very much and hope to get closely acquainted with him," Hegel wrote after their first personal meeting.² This closeness is partly due to the surprising similarity in their philosophy, which does not prevent them from mutual criticism. Solger thinks that Hegel does not respect empirical reality enough, and Hegel says that Solger gives it too much importance.³ Solger writes to his friend, the romantic poet Ludwig Tieck, on April 26, 1818: "I am curious to see what effect Hegel's presence will have here. Many believe that his appointment will be disagreeable to me. But I first suggested him and can assure you that I expect nothing but a strengthening of philosophy. When I was teaching when Fichte was here, I had ten times more students than now. I revere Hegel very much and agree with him in many central points most noticeably (auffallend). In

1. Ros., p. 318; Fischer I., p. 140.

2. Fischer II., p. 1219.

3. Fischer II., p. 1219.

our dialectic we have taken the same way independently of each other, attacked the problem from the same new side. Whether he will understand where I differ I don't know. I would like to identify dialectic and life." And again on November 22, 1818, he wrote: "I was curious to see what this good man Hegel would accomplish here. No one mentions him because he is quiet and studious. They would rather like to have some silly, unoriginal nobody who tells them what they already know; in that case the students would be noisily driven to take his courses for the benefit and salvation of their souls."⁴

Solger wanted to see philosophy effective in life, and, failing in this desire, he became embittered. This is the situation as Hegel described it. "One cannot read without acute pain such utterances of most extreme disgust caused in Solger's mind through the image of his experience. Because Solger exaggerated the importance of this image of his experience in himself, he failed to trust the deeper human spirit, present in his spirit as well as in all times, and failed to direct his work and energy towards this sanctuary of the mind. Solger believed this spirit to be completely absent and nothing but a shallow, dazzling surface of spiritual and intellectual emptiness to be present; he should have left this popular flatness to the happiness of its own vanity."⁵

The reader will find in my *ORIGINS AND DIMENSIONS*⁶ an extensive account of Solger's aesthetics and its contribution to Hegel's under the title, "Solger's Aesthetics—A Key to Hegel."

4. Fischer I., p. 140.

5. XX., p. 193.

* Gustav Emil Mueller: *ORIGINS AND DIMENSIONS of Philosophy. Some Correlations*. Pageant Press, N.Y. 1966, pp. 429-444.

Enjoyment of Life

Expansiveness

The absorption of Solger's 'irony' was a last finishing touch in the development of Hegel's systematic aesthetics. It was backed by his artistic experience. He participated in the musical and literary life of Berlin; he undertook four journeys to the Netherlands, to Vienna, to Paris, and to Bohemia, and dedicated his time mainly to art galleries, architecture and the theater. He understood beauty in life as the festive celebration of human existence in spite of its problematic practical side.

This 'going out', this comfortable expansion, was a remarkable change in his style of living. Hitherto there was little enjoyment, but rather an intense concentration, contemplation, reflection and production. He also began to 'let himself go' in his lectures, which were never routine but grew and changed from year to year. There was no let-up in his studiousness. The monumental witnesses to this expansiveness are the many volumes which his students and friends compiled from student notes over thirteen years. There were three volumes of *Aesthetics*, three volumes of *Philosophy of Religion*, three volumes of *History of Philosophy*, one volume of *Philosophy of History*, and also the *Philosophy of Right*, published by himself, and a volume of essays published partly in newspapers, partly in the *Jahrbücher für Wissenschaftliche Kritik*, a journal founded by Hegel.

The Yearbook

Originally he proposed to the government to finance his journal in a fashion similar to the French *Journal des*

Savants. He argued that a state-subsidized scientific journal would relieve the editors not only from financial worries, but also free them from the fickle demands of a 'market', or from the private tastes of the owners. This shows his high regard of the ethical objectivity of the state. But the government turned him down. Having failed in his plan, he found Goethe's publisher, Cotta, in Stuttgart ready to publish the *Yearbooks*. The plan introduced a novelty, the signing of book reviews in order to avoid the often malicious and irresponsible use of anonymity which was then customary; the program called for objective and positive appreciation of important contributions to culture, philosophy, and literature in Germany as well as abroad. The acceptance and rejection of contributions to the *Yearbook* was to be the common decision of its editorial board.

Varnhagen von Ense, the chief editor, tells about the difficulty Hegel caused by his tyrannical tendency to determine the policy of the board: "The whole company felt that this could not go on. It fell to my lot to oppose him in the name of all and to make clear to the revered man that he too would have to respect his limitations. This became a violent battle carried on from both sides with ruthless acerbity, a personal quarrel with accusations and reprimands. However, there was nothing dishonorable in it, nothing that would have lacked moral respect. During the dinner following this explosion, Hegel's friends were abashed by his behavior and, on my side, by the issue itself. As we left the table, I accosted Hegel and said, 'We must not depart in this manner. I have told you, and you have told me, things that are hard to take; but there is nothing irreparable in them. I need not assure you that my highest esteem for you is unchanged. Let us

part as friends. Here is my hand.' Hegel not only shook it, but embraced me and tears were in his eyes. We had not expected this turn. Ever since then we had no more fights."⁶

Reviews and Essays

His own first contribution to the *Yearbook of Scientific Critique* is an essay on the Hindu *Bhagavad Gita* which had been published in two translations by Friedrich Schlegel and Wilhelm von Humboldt. Various other new books in English on Hinduism he drew in for comparison and comment. Absurdities of mythical thinking he enjoyed together with an appreciation of metaphysical concepts in Hindu religion and morality. The reader has here an instructive laboratory example of how Hegel worked on the categories of his *Philosophy of History* and also how he continued, after the first initiation through Creuzer's *Symbolik*, to enlarge his horizon beyond the Classical, Jewish and European Christian cultures.

How not to write a philosophy of history was illustrated by a review on a book on this subject written by the Roman-Catholic convert Joseph Görres.⁷ Hegel points out that Görres made arbitrary and unverifiable assumptions when he took some legends in the Jewish Bible for categories of the historical existence of humanity (e.g., 'paradise' is thesis, 'fall' is antithesis, and 'redemption' through the church is synthesis). Hegel pointed out that he mixed those romantic fancies with other categories derived from biology, the favorite analogy of historical epochs with bio-

6. W. XX., pp. 57-131.

7. *Ueber die Grundlage, Gliederung und Zeitenfolge der Weltgeschichte*. W. XX., pp. 414-441.

logical stages of infancy, youth, maturity, old age. These passages can be applied without changing a word to Oswald Spengler's *Decline of the West*. Hegel said that Görres finally succumbed to a superstitious numerology. "The thinking comprehension of the necessity of the categories of the historical mind must rest on historical documentation and a critical estimate of the trustworthiness of the sources; only on this basis can knowledge claim the title of scientific truth."⁸

Hegel's newspaper contributions consisted of a review of *Lessing's Letters to His Wife*, two theater criticisms, and a humorous chat entitled *Who Thinks Abstractly?* Lessing's letters produced a "feeling of pleasure and pain"; after reading long novels, nothing could be more welcome than this communication of authentic life. One eagerly looks forward to its development; no great intrigues interfere, those requirements of a novel to keep the attention of the reader; nevertheless, interest is never lagging and is all the more cordial and sympathetic since all the circumstances are so natural and human; the only impediment, deficient income (love alone is not strong enough to subsist alone in a desert and to renounce all conveniences), lack of security, postponed Lessing's marriage time and again--six years in fact! And in this waiting period there was almost nothing but aggravation, suffering and sickness; and then their marriage lasted only three years. Is one not pushed to reflections on the nothingness of man's existence and his most cherished concerns? Nevertheless, life not merely consists of misery and trouble. In its concreteness there are also the agreeable habits of regular activity, the incessant renewal of feelings of bodily comfort. Lessing's exchange of letters attunes the reader both

8. W. XX., p. 416.

to melancholy and to agreeableness. Only the language of pain and sorrow is more eloquent than the one of joy; mixed in is a little unnoticed vanity of the heart which persuades us from its most hidden recesses that we awaken a greater sympathy when we are seen to suffer, rather than when we are seen to be gay; that we appear of a somewhat greater stature in sorrow than in joy. On the other hand, Lessing liked to meet his bride's complaints with wise rules; yet in the next letter we may find the most striking proofs how rationalistic maxims have been wiped out in the writer by the force of adversities and how little effect they have over the powers of agreeable and disagreeable moods. The mutual sharing of all moods and affairs is the natural and unaffected tone of the whole correspondence. The total impresison (*Totaleindruck*) of Lessing reminded Hegel of the Greeks, and he concluded with sentences similar to those of his earliest Tübingen fragments. "This tragedy is not a self-indulging introspective empirical psychology. This is nature. Early conditions effective in our youth and education inhibit nature in us. We get used to occupying ourselves with brooding on our souls. External objects are judged too much according to rational concepts and not enough according to aesthetically felt impressions. The heart is hardened and only a cold calculating intellect is left us; and this intellect is glued to mere means and is oblivious to ends in themselves. *Only the Greeks knew to enjoy life* with a keen interest in every living and sentient being. Everywhere this pure Greek spirit discovered relations free from artificiality and in which the heart was engaged."⁹ Thus Hegel bestowed on Lessing the highest aesthetic value which he could award. It is the *aesthetic*

9. W. XX., pp. 451-455.

enjoyment and acceptance of a tragic life without artificial sentimentality or "happy ends".

Equally personal is Hegel's newspaper comment on the performance of Schiller's *Wallenstein*¹⁰ which was first staged when Hegel was Schiller's neighbor in Jena. In his aesthetics all plays of Schiller are analyzed and appreciated. This *Wallenstein* trilogy is one of the miracles of world-literature. The subject matter is the Thirty-years War. Schiller immersed himself in this immense material while professor of history at the University of Jena. His lectures appeared as an interesting and readable book, *The History of the Thirty-years War*. In the trilogy the historical tale is transfigured; its poetic essence appears condensed in the unfathomable greatness of a daemonic character, Wallenstein, supreme and victorious commander of 'his' army serving the counter-Reformation emperor in Vienna. He was in absolute control of his own army and idolized it in a superstitious mixture of fear and faith. He dreamed of a peace, his peace, but it was treason in the eyes of his emperor, his friends, and his military enemies. His tentative and exploratory steps are dream-actions; his inner qualms and hesitancy are likewise hardly conscious but are projected into astrological speculations. His friends are enthusiastic idealists; his enemies cold-blooded realists, whose plots and intrigues weave his tragic fate. He was assassinated by those whom he believed to be his co-conspirators also dreaming of ultimate victory.

Does Hegel speak of *Wallenstein* or of his own tragic world view? This "tragic totality," he says, "is vividly present to me." "This freedom and self-determination

10. This quotation and the following quotations are from W. XX., pp. 456-458.

succumbing to finite ends and causal determinations is a most tragic Essence (*Wesen*) in a great and consistent representation." His friends and enemies did not see Wallenstein's vision of peace, but grasped it from their finite and practical interests and ends. The independence of this genius was one-sided in itself and was getting necessarily involved in unforeseen consequences of his actions; he was engulfed in effects which he had both produced and not produced. He was both responsible and not responsible.

But behind this "great tragedy" lies a "second tragedy" which is not tragic in this great sense but merely pathetic and hidden. In the 'first' tragedy life is struggling with life; but in the second one life is overwhelmed and vanquished by a meaningless death. "This tears my soul (*Gemüt*) to pieces, and I cannot elevate myself from this horror with any feeling of elevation." What does he mean? What is this "death triumphing over life"? I believe we have in this cryptic sigh something akin to Beethoven's funeral march in the *Eroica*. We have seen from the beginning how Hegel fought against that which is 'dead', and the 'dead' are forms of culture no longer viable. We also remember Hegel's comment on Napoleon's end as an "essentially most tragic" event to which the tragic hero has contributed with his will against his will. And the triumph of petty reactionary interest over the tragic giant was a triumph of 'death'. Hegel's passage is cryptic because he could not afford to call the era of Metternich publicly the "triumph of death" and remain professor of Philosophy at the royal university of Berlin.

After tragedy—comedy! The German stage needs good pensive comedies. What do we have besides Lessing's *Minna von Barnhelm* or Kleist's *Broken Jug*? Learn to

laugh at the pettiness of our affairs, my friends! Must we import all the gaiety from Paris? In this vein Hegel wrote a long, careful criticism of a comedy of Raupach, a mediocre but successful and very prolific playwright of the period, with the intention of showing that Raupach had a promising talent which, if purged of his sentimentality and other weaknesses, might produce something. As if a critic could make an Aristophanes out of a jolly philistine! But only a thief can give more than he owns!

That Hegel could write comedy himself he showed in a witty ironical chat entitled *Who Thinks Abstractly?* Be not afraid! I am not going to smuggle any 'thinking' into this under the pretext of an informal, social chat! The colourful life, this beautiful world, hates thinking like a bubonic plague and flees from it; save himself who can! Don't worry, I know we are in a good and educated company, and I know that good people do not think, least of all abstractly. But it is quite proper, isn't it, that good and educated people gossip about the un-good and un-educated ones of which this world, alas, is so blessed with? And they, of course, those clods, those troglodytes, those cave dwellers, think abstractly. There is no dearth of edifying jokes about them. There was, for example, that murderer by the name of Binder. In the eyes of the law and of many he was just that, a murderer, so off with his head! But just when the guillotine had chopped it off, an old woman exclaimed, "See how God's merciful sun is so beautifully illuminating Binder's head!" Shocking, indeed, to abstract thinkers.

And here is what I heard on the marketplace. A customer said, "Your eggs are rotten, woman!" "What," the seller replies, "my eggs rotten? You must have a rotten taste. And who are you, daring to blame my innocent

eggs? Your father was eaten by lice, a drunkard lying in ditches. And your mother went with French soldiers. And one knows where your finery comes from, etc., etc. . . ." In short, there was no good thread left to the customer, and she and her whole tribe were put in the doghouse, subsumed under the one crime—to have found rotten eggs; rotten—one abstraction against another!

Travels

Hegel's aesthetic pilgrimages to the Netherlands, Vienna, Paris, and Bohemia are beautifully described in his frequent and eloquent letters to his wife. "For people with money keeping to the highways, the world is in good condition.¹¹ This is his vacation 'philosophy'. "I travel mainly out of a sense of duty and obligation and would enjoy it a hundred times more if I could divide my time between my studies and my family life. Only one thing is lacking in my contentment—a letter from you."¹² We see a conscientious student of art, well prepared for what he is going to see and hear, armed with guide-books, and doing his assignments. But he sees with his own eyes and deep penetration; he is particularly aware of the mixture of modern expressions in old costumes. He was in one aesthetic ecstasy in the Baroque splendors of Vienna and especially in response to Italian opera, pure and passionate music with a tone "free of sentimental longing" (*sehnsuchtsloser Klang*).¹³ Everywhere, but especially in the Netherlands, he was charmed by the organic fusion of nature and human expressions and by the authentic ex-

11. Br. II., p. 344.

12. Br. II., p. 352.

13. Br. III, p. 183.

pression of this fusion in Dutch painting. In Paris, "the capital of the civilized world,"¹⁴ he took in "greatness" and "reasonable clarity", a "fine average and nothing bad."¹⁵ Hegel admired the French artistic culture in contrast to the German "anarchy" in which everyone blamed and praised according to his own whims and prejudices—"an immense confusion of our taste which can stomach the most heterogenous productions."¹⁶ In the Netherlands and in Paris he had good friends, van Gheert and Cousin, to lead and inspire him. In Paris he also took in an English Shakespeare Company. Their artistic freedom he admired.

He compared: in Germany one sees Shakespeare performed with a pedantic care for historical accuracy—as if a work of art were there for scholars, not for the public. The English, on the contrary, perform only those parts which are excellent and understandable in themselves without requiring antiquarian knowledge of those externals that are antiquated. Even the best in art has its mortal-temporal side and which needs refreshing touches for other nations and other times.¹⁷

On his way back from Paris Hegel took a detour through Weimar, invited by Goethe who wanted to hear about Paris. On the way to Weimar there he made a special stop in order to take in a performance of Goethe's *Egmont*. He wrote to his wife, "I arrived here yesterday evening when the sun was setting. Then, after some dressing up, I directed my steps to the goal of this detour, the old revered friend. The house was lit up, the Grand-duke

14. XIV., pp. 502, 515.

15. Br. III., p. 71.

16. Br. III., p. 193.

17. XII., p. 372.

having announced his visit for tea; but nevertheless I let my arrival be known. Goethe welcomed me in the most friendly and cordial manner; I had much to relate. After half-an-hour the old Grand-duke arrived. Goethe introduced me to the benevolent gentleman; I had to sit with him on the davenport to his right, and *he* asked about Paris! And so the evening passed (Zelter and Reimer had very cleverly posted themselves in the next room) as well as it might with the old gentleman in a 'conversation' until 9:30. Goethe remained always standing and, from his hints, I gathered by-and-by that the old gentleman was rather deaf and that one should not try to entertain him if he did not start the conversation first, but that one should wait until he had caught some new idea himself. Otherwise, everything was quite informal except that I had to be nailed down to the davenport for several hours. The Grand-duke had recommended his botanical gardens, so I had to go and see them this morning with Zelter and in Goethe's own carriage. They are indeed quite large and well landscaped. The Duke is a great botanist himself and had beautiful specimens of plants; unfortunately, we were not connoisseurs enough to properly appreciate everything. Then a walk on the old and well-known paths in the beautiful park which I know so well from twenty-five years ago; homage to the little river Ilm and to her soft waves which have heard so many immortal songs. At two back to Goethe's for dinner which was honored by my most excellent appetite. I sat next to Goethe very comfortably, talkative, bravely drinking and eating. I had to tell Goethe about the political and literary events and interests in France, and everything interested him very much. He is quite vigorous, healthy, as ever the old one, which is to say, the ever-young one, somewhat more medi-

tative; such a venerable, good, jolly chief that one almost forgets the high man of genius and his irrepressible energy of talent. We are, anyway, old loyal friends, and, as such, not out for observation of each other about how one should behave, or how one should speak; but we were cordially together, not for glory and honor's sake, but to tell what each one had heard and seen and so on.”¹⁸

Goethe also wrote about this visit, and it seems that it was a decisive recognition of Hegel's value on his part. “What appears unclear and abstract to us in a printed communication of such a man because we are not able to appropriate it immediately to our own inclination, becomes instantaneously our own in a living conversation because we become aware that we agree on principles and basic orientations. In a mutual development and open confidence it will be possible to come together and to unite.”¹⁹

Art of Living

This account of Hegel's aesthetic life would be incomplete without a glance at his social art of living. In one of his first letters from Berlin to his friend Fromann in Jena in which he thanks him for the hospitality and rest enjoyed on the journey from Heidelberg to Berlin, Hegel expressed his amazement and disapproval of the Berlin fashion of enjoying life in huge parties where everybody talked and nobody said anything worth saying. Society is in ‘grand style’, everybody running away from everybody under the pretext of coming together and having a good time. This does not make for intimacy in a

18. Br. III., p. 204f, Oct. 17th, 1827.

19. Glockner: *Hegel I.*, p. 331.

friendly circle, and against this unrest and general dispersion, the perfect, rounded, and closed image of our stay with you is all the more a precious memory.

He kept this style of intimate and familiar circles as his own form of social relaxation in spite of Berlin. He did not seek brilliance and 'entertainment' but a cozy and easy-going atmosphere of a candid give-and-take unpretentious relaxation. Birthdays were always celebrated among friends.

"Hegel was extraordinarily fond of the women whom he found in Berlin society, and they in turn developed and nurtured a great predilection for the good and humorous professor. He expressed his gallantry several times in poems. 'Your kindness, gaiety, and good sense', he said in one of them, "is a grace which cannot fail to bring love and friendship in its wake'."²⁰

Relaxation, trusting openness and naturalness, absence of pretense and show, friendly intimacy and full enjoyment of the present moment—such principles of the art of living are applied also to the art of letter writing. Hegel was a slow correspondent and his friends had to wait for letters. Many times his letters began with apologies for this tardiness. He saved letters for vacations when he could give whole and devoted attention to the enjoyment of such distant conversation. He did not want to write letters when he was busy since they would then be hasty and formal, or when he was full of writing notes for his books and lectures. When Hegel was corresponding he wanted his full concentration on his partner; he wrote letters for him and wanted to enjoy his absence and his individual company. His letters are very different because they are attuned to different individualities.

20. Ros., p. 359.

The aesthetic enjoyment of life is like the fine and noble taste of inspiring wine. It is amusing that the first friendly exchange between the great antagonists Schleiermacher and Hegel was a note from Schleiermacher giving Hegel the address of his wine merchant who imported 'good stuff from Bordeaux'²¹

ETHICS AND POLITICS

The Philosophy of Right

In 1820 Hegel published his *Philosophy of Right*.²² With his usual talent for misleading titles, Hegel chose the word 'right' (Recht) to stand for all manifestations of ethical freedom.²³ The philosophy of right or legality is only one subordinate sphere of ethics. In a footnote²⁴ he said quite naïvely that of course did not mean by 'right' that which is usually understood by it, but morality, social ethics and philosophy of history. When he refers to the 'right' of the world-spirit, he only means that power shifts from one nation or culture to another. He does not mean that 'might makes right', which proposition he explicitly declares to be unethical and merely 'positive'.²⁵

The 'state' is the "architectonic structure of the ethical universe. This architecture in its comprehensiveness is emerging from the mutual distinctions of the various spheres (Kreise) of public life, each justified by its own inherent standard. The power of the whole results from

21. Br. II., p. 221.

22. *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts. Oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundriss.*

23. VII., p. 38f.

24. VII., paragraph 6.

25. VII., p. 22.

the harmony of its members, each contributing to the others like arches and pillars in the upward striving of a cathedral.”²⁶

A glance at the table of contents reveals what is meant by ‘spheres’. Ethics is made articulate in the first place by formal law which determines the right and wrong of public transactions in contractual relations which are carried on by abstract agents or legal persons held publicly responsible by their signature. The second ‘sphere’ is penal law in which the moral imputation of guilt involves not merely an abstract agent, but the whole person himself. Punishment is proportional to the guilt of having violated the life of other equally concrete persons. The meaning of punishment is not to deter or to prevent or to revenge, but to restore the criminal to the solidarity of a community whose unity and dignity he has injured in himself.

This personal-moral dialectic of crime and atonement leads to the third sphere of ethics: Personal morality and conscience, freedom and responsibility. The dialectic between moral standpoints or moral philosophies of life and the paradoxes of the good are more fully developed in the central part of the *Phenomenology of Mind* which is needed to complement the reading and understanding of the very concentrated sketches of this moral sphere in the *Philosophy of Right*.

The fourth ‘sphere’ of ethics is social ethics (Sittlichkeit) which comprises the duties and rights of family life and education, professional ethics: the system of economic utility in the business society—bürgerliche Gesellschaft, political power and jurisdiction and authority backing the laws for which the public responsibility is demanded, as well as a balancing division between judicial, legisla-

26. VII., pp. 27, 35.

tive, and executive branches of political power. The Constitutional monarch is for Hegel the symbolic representative of the 'substantial' (enduring) dignity or majesty of the State, beyond passing generations, party strife, or momentary power-constellations.

The *internal* unity and power of cohesion, the patriotism of all citizens, is *externally* tested in wars with other states. This plunges the state in a stream of historical destiny over which it has no control; the ethical order of life achieved in one state meets the ethical order of life achieved by another state so that there is no ethical tribunal to which they can appeal. World-historical power shifts through the centuries regardless of the personal-moral or social-moral merits or demerits of particular states. Ethics, as organized in that totality and unity of all life-interests which is the 'objective mind', visible in the State, is limited by a philosophy of history whose question is this: 'What has each world-historical nation and period contributed to the essential culture of humanity?'

The above mentioned value-spheres of practical life are the contents of ethical reflection. These objective value-contents fill the soul with enthusiasm, loyalty, and dedication. Or the soul in grasping objective value-contents as its own life-assignments expands and becomes what it ought to be. Ethics does not *invent* the contents but *finds* them in operation through thousands of years.²⁷ Hegel's picturesque term for this is 'world-spirit' (*Weltgeist*). Its value-contents are not only *practiced* as spiritual realities, they are also *known*; they are realities in and of the thinking mind. What I should do and become? This subjective question is inseparable from the contents of the 'objec-

27. VII., p. 22.

tive' mind and is both a practical question and one of reflection. 'Objective' means that contents are shared and affirmed by many who organize their communal life through them. Subjective appropriation and objective values together are modifications of the ethical 'Concept'. Philosophy 'reflects' but does not invent the 'Concept'. Philosophy as ethics reflects the individual *and* social practice, subjective aspirations and objective values, as contents of mind. The dialectical synthesis of vital-subjective interests and of objective values are completed in the conscious reflection in which they are present *for us*; in our consciousness they are grasped and made articulate in reflection. This dialectical, ethical 'Concept' of human nature is present in all the different value-spheres of the practical *Geist*. They are discovered in their difference and in their complementary opposition to one another. Their tensions are present *structurally* in any given society as well as *historically* in the clashes of succeeding generations and cultures; visions and loyalties clash and replace one another. "This insight into the necessity of such difference, in the transition from one content to another, is the speculative method of knowledge, which is alone capable of saving philosophy from the decadence which our times are shamefully inflicting upon it."²⁸ It is the moving life of a comprehensive whole, both in contemporary social structures in space and in socio-historical 'times' which philosophy, and philosophy alone, can comprehend as necessary "moments" of the whole of humanity. Without this dialectical comprehensiveness and penetration, different value-contents would simply come and go without contributing to a remembered processional whole of humanity which is trying to realize itself. The

28. W. VII., p. 20.

harmony of this whole enacts itself through inevitable tensions. "It is therefore from this dialectical side that I would wish this treatise to be understood and judged."²⁹

The self-differentiations of the 'objective mind' in *reality* are at the same time self-differentiations of *philosophical comprehension*. If they cannot be justified as necessary aspects or 'moments' of the ethical whole, they cannot be justified at all. They are then merely 'positive' or irrational. In philosophical reflection man finds himself united with his own true self; whereas without philosophy man must rely on external and given authorities, factual governments, or on factual feelings, sentiments or opinions which are relative and subjective and which may or may not agree with that which is objectively valid and right. Philosophical truth is the ground for ethical freedom or ethical self-agreement.³⁰

The ethical world must be distinguished and distinguishes itself from the world of nature. Naturalists make the metaphysical assumption that nature is a system of laws which they are endeavoring to find and to formulate. The changing horizons of their factual knowledge does not touch the underlying metaphysical assumption that there is this One Nature which is presupposed and in which their experimental progresses or regresses take place.

All this is different in the ethical world of man. Here laws are projected, planned, proclaimed and decreed (*Gesetze sind Gesetztes*). In the collisions of what is claimed to be the good and desirable life, praise and blame cannot be avoided; evaluations are not settled by referring them back to an indifferent nature or to causal

29. W. VII., p. 21.

30. W. VII., pp. 22, 23.

origins. Man must find in his dialectical self the ground for what is rightly held to be good and what is rightly fought as evil. Practical existence as a whole is tragic because evil is the inevitable frustration of what is demanded as good and because loyalty to one conception of the good is in collision with loyalty to an opposite cause. It is understandable, therefore, that man frequently has longed to escape from this 'unhappy consciousness' to an aesthetic 'peace of a nature' which is beyond good and evil; or desperately to declare this 'law of the heart' would end the futile battle of virtue with the world course! In philosophical comprehension the dialectical struggle of practice is affirmed. These different and conflicting values are understood as limited expressions of the search for the good. If the battle of the spirit with itself were not tragic, there would be no need for philosophy.³¹ We must begin with the faith that the tragic ethical world is not 'God-forsaken'.³²

There can be no greater evil, therefore, than to ignore a comprehensive ethics which knows that contradictory practical causes and their 'standpoints' ('isms') merely serve to make explicit the dialectic of the practical *Geist*. This tolerant ethics should not be replaced by an immediate appeal to feeling and immediate convictions, a 'mush of hearts' which is the principle of demagogic sophistry and threatens the inviolable rights of the different spheres of ethical life with an undifferentiated mob-rule. If law and right are denounced as fetters of the 'heart', then there are no restraints and checks against the flood of arbitrary and irrational power-interests.³³ Laws that

31. VII., pp. 24, 25.

32. VII., pp. 25, 28.

33. VII., p. 333.

are just, known, accessible to all, and guaranteeing the equal right of all are the guarantors of freedom. Philosophy as ethics and a state in which law and rights prevail belong together. If, on the contrary, the state is submerged by arbitrary opinions and subjective-momentary passions, then philosophy also must succumb to the dictates of irrational power because her critical voice would be intolerable to dictators—"at best philosophy may be tolerated in such a 'state' as one tolerates brothels."³⁴

Philosophy is a function of the State, not a servant of a government. Its function is to teach future citizens the ethical principles on which a dynamic free, and differentiated community can live and work together. Freedom is shown to be inseparable from the respect for law, and law is shown to be groundless if it does not protect freedom in its differentiated spheres.

'Objective Mind' and 'Absolute Geist'

But philosophy also transcends the State, and the State protects this transcendence in honoring its own limitation. The sphere of the objective-practical, secular mind (*Weltgeist*) is limited by art, religion, and philosophy, all of which envision the Absolute. The state has the duty to protect the right of religion and of free artistic creation; the free and decent state is the worldly condition of the cultivation of the Absolute ('absolute Geiste'). Plato defended the state as a beautiful totality of life, a unity of differentiated functions of the soul against the chaotic individualism of the sophistic attack on morals and social ethics. But Plato identified the Absolute with this limited sphere of the objective mind and thereby "violates his

34. VII., p. 31.

own vision of the free and infinite personality.”³⁵ The modern state, in respecting this limitation of its power, surpasses Plato’s equation of the philosopher-statesman.

The State, on the other hand, has no duty to pay salaries to professors of philosophy who in the name of ‘philosophy’ undermine its ethical principles; and it has a right to dismiss them. Freedom cannot be abused as a pretext to prepare its abolition. This sophistic-pragmatic doctrine that “might makes right” or that “right is that which works” or “right is the interest of the stronger” Hegel fought both on the “left against the proto-Nazi mentality of his old enemy Fries, who dreamed of what he called ‘justice from below’”³⁶ (the Nazis called it ‘people’s courts’) and to the ‘right’ against the reactionary Ludwig von Haller for whom the state was the private property of the rulers.

*Was vernünftig ist, das ist wirklich;
und was wirklich ist, das ist vernünftig.*

The usual translation of this famous saying in the *Preface* “What is rational is real, and what is real is rational” lends itself to the usual misinterpretation that Hegel is a ‘rationalist’ and that he means to absolutize the factually existing Prussian state. If he had meant rationalism, he would have said ‘Das Verständige ist das Reale, das Reale ist das Verständige’. This would have been his formulation of rationalism; but he did not say that.

We have rendered the term “vernünftig” throughout as “comprehensive”. In Hegel’s ethics the ‘State’ is comprehensive; it comprehends in its concrete unity or totality

35. W. VII., p. 33.

36. W. VII., paragraph 258, footnote.

all functions of life, protecting each in its own proper excellence; as such it is '*comprehensive in itself*'. But its comprehensiveness is also *for-us*, its citizens. We must understand, support and defend our laws and institutions. Apart from being comprehended as comprehensive, there would be no state as, for example, there is none for babies. The state is comprehensive *in-itself and for itself*. Hegel thus renewed the Platonic analogy both of the individual soul and the state. The soul is comprehensive and concrete unity and totality of all its functions; and so is the state as creation and projection of the soul. The soul is a state in miniature, and the state is the soul 'writ large!³⁷

This comprehensive totality, then, is actual (*wirklich*), which does not mean factually given ('real'). It is present in its particular institutions and in active, individual citizens who could not be active outside of or apart from that comprehensive context in which their activity makes sense. The 'Concept' is the unity of this concrete universal, its particular spheres or dimensions and its individuated life. The comprehensive 'Concept' gains its actuality in and through all its individual members in whom it lives and by whom it is actively affirmed.

The first sentence—only that which is comprehensive is actual—applies to the ethical world, called the 'State', the general principle that 'Substance is also subject'. The whole of practical activities, organized in the state becomes 'actual', actualized in all individual citizens. The 'whole state' reveals itself as a whole in each and all participating members.

The second sentence—what is actual is comprehensive—is implied in the first. True meaningful activity cannot

37. W. VII., p. 20.

take place in isolation. The actual, active individual subject cannot act apart from the life of its world. Practical activities are bound to their time, their day. A philosophical comprehension of their meaning, however, reconciles them with this temporality because it knows that the performance of daily tasks is not merely temporal but is weaving a "substantial" or eternal meaning. "We free ourselves from the present by finding ourselves active in it."³⁸ "Our subjective freedom is preserved in that which is substantial which is meaningful in and for itself, and is not a prey of that which is merely particular or accidental."³⁹

Shortcomings

Nevertheless, the fact that Hegel mixed monetary political issues and personal likings and dislikings with a philosophical-political ethics was a weakness which discredited his book more than it deserved. One of his closest friends to whom he had sent one of the first copies, N. von Thaden, expressed his dismay in a classical letter of just criticism. "I am most obliged for the copy of the *Rechtsphilosophie* and thank you for the enjoyable gift. What is good, excellent, solid, and correct in your ethical doctrine you know yourself better than an intimate disciple may tell you in superfluous praises. Listen rather to what is displeasing to the faithful friend and assiduous student of your philosophy. You have started a new campaign, greater than ever, and have ruthlessly insulted and injured both friend and enemy. A philosophy without adjectives is now compromised, and you are slandered as a royalistic philosopher or as a philosophical royalist;

38. W. VII., p. 36.

39. W. VII., p. 35.

hence a part of your brave book has turned into a defensive historico-philosophical polemics. The highest, greatest, most important statement that "Being is that which is good and comprehensive" is philosophically true but politically false. You have presented the State as the actuality of Right and as actualized freedom." But this, von Thaden goes on to show in two pages, must not be identified with empirical facts of this state as favorably or unfavorably compared with other empirical states. The Prussian institution of "majoratsherrn" (politically privileged landowners) is treated as if it were rooted in the "natural right", while "the free state of North America is ignored". "In general I would have much preferred if you had presented those *Outlines* purely philosophically, as essentially and as simply as possible; and thus you would have refrained from burying them under a lot of partly passionate and partly quite superfluous footnotes."⁴⁰

Hegel's answer to this apt criticism of his friend is not known. But in the Preface of the second edition of the *Encyclopedie* (1827) he makes it crystal-clear that one source of his troubles lies in the ignorance of the reading public. "Philosophical categories such as 'Wirklichkeit' (actuality) are carefully distinguished in my *Logic* from 'Possibility' or from what is externally given as real (*Dasein*) or from 'Existenz'.⁴¹ And if the reader now takes them in a sense which they do not have, he is attacking a straw-man." But this defense, we may reply, is also the fault of the writer who expected too much of his readers. If he enters the political arena with philosophical cate-

41. For another brief summary of "actuality" as a dialectical unity of accidental "contingency" and "necessity", "freedom" and "comprehension", see also XX., p. 434f.

40. Br. II., p. 281.

gories, he cannot expect political readers to have studied his very difficult *Logic*. This is precisely what von Thaden meant when he said "philosophically true, but politically false".

Hegel finally seems to have learned this lesson. "Those who defend the rights of statesmen and of the state are accused of servility or are even suspected of playing the role of informers, as if they wanted to incite the government to action against rhetorical demagogues or superficial anti-religious rationalists. Philosophy cannot be effective against ignorance and violence, against evil passions and their noisy propaganda. She must (also to keep peace with oneself) become aware that she exists only for a few."⁴² This tone of philosophical loneliness is just as strong in this period of external fame and reputation as it was in his early writings. To think a universe requires that one concentrate all his energies on this all-absorbing task means that loneliness is an essential condition for being impartially open to all sides of existence. In a poem written in reply to a poetic birthday greeting he wrote, "Everyone only wants to hear his own words. If I would enter such a talking contest, I would merely contribute to the evil. In trying to counteract it, my word would merely augment it."⁴³

The English Reform Bill⁴⁴

It is beautifully ironical that the last political essay of

42. Br. III., p. 323.

43. Br. III., 346. *Doch was ist ihr, die du verklagst, Verbrechen?
Nur dass sich jeder selbst will hören, obenan will
sprechen;
So wär' das Wort, dem Uebel abzuwehren
Selbst nur ein Mittel, dies Unheil noch zu mehren.*

44. W. XX., pp. 473-518.

the 'philosophical royalist', in which he wanted to discuss the significance of the English Reform Bill, was cut off by the royal Prussian censor for being too radical! Only the first installment of three pages appeared in the *Preussische Staatszeitung* of 1831. Soon afterwards the censor Granow, notorious for his childish opinions and decisions, died. Hegel mentioned this in one of his last letters and with his dry ironical humor commented that "Death has paled our world-famous censor Granow some days ago; he is mourned, according to the death-notice in the newspaper, by his survivors—also, to be sure, by the manuscripts surviving his censorship."⁴⁵

What happened is, of course, what we would expect to happen, knowing the remarkable stability and continuity of Hegel's political philosophy. This essay maintained exactly the same in-between 'middle of the road' position which is already present in his first judgments on the merits and demerits of the French Revolution. On the one hand, England needs political reforms of her "positivity" very badly; on the other hand, it is to be hoped that the continental excesses of the great revolutions will be avoided. The 'positivity' of a jungle of medieval privileges is irrational and untenable in a modern society. French abstractions of an atomistic mass of individuals who are to determine politics by nothing but votes and numbers cannot substitute for mature and experienced statesmanship. General declamations of the rights of men and of citizens cannot replace political wisdom which has to deal with complex, multiform, and dynamic constellations of power and of *Sittlichkeit*.

As to English 'positivity', it is absurd that the "rotten boroughs" of a few inhabitants outweigh large modern in-

45. Br. III., p. 342.

dustrial cities, that seats in parliament are wares auctioned off to the highest bidder,⁴⁶ that the Church of England sucks huge amounts of money out of the people, not for services but for idle, well-paying ecclesiastic titles. (Hegel had said the same thing about the State-Church of Bern!) In church politics England is worse than Turkey; the latter left churches of other faiths unmolested when they had conquered a country, but the English forced their State-Church on Ireland. Although all the Irish Catholics did not attend, they had to finance that imposition.⁴⁷

"The feeling of justice is awakened against the stubbornness of privileges even in those who profit by them . . .⁴⁸

If the choice of the state officials is a matter of private interests and dirty money-profit, then such a state of affairs is likely to be the forerunner of the loss of political freedom and of the decline of constitutional law. . .⁴⁹ One will also agree that the right way to correct corruption cannot be based merely on moral sermons to individuals, but on the reform of the corrupt institutions themselves⁵⁰ . . . against the prejudice of inertia and old beliefs . . . every right and its legal form may be said to be 'positive' in the sense that it is posited by a political authority, as law, which demands to be obeyed. But at no time more than in our period has a general reason (*Verstand*) been led to make the distinction between what is merely positive in form and positive in the sense that the prescribed content be right and comprehensive (*vernünftig*) in and

46. W. XX., p. 496.

47. XX., p. 487f.

48. *Ibid.*, p. 489f.

49. *Ibid.*, p. 476.

50. *Ibid.*, p. 476.

for itself⁵¹. . . The exorbitant cost of a confused jurisprudence has made justice accessible only to the rich⁵² . . . landowners were permitted by feudal laws to 'turn out their farmers by the hundreds, even thousands, for the sake of money-profit . . . and even burned down their houses, where their families had lived for centuries, in order to prevent their return'⁵³ . . . those squires have also the right to ruin farmers by their hunting parties⁵⁴ . . . The contrast of immense wealth and quite helpless poverty in England is enormous; but still greater is the contrast between aristocratic privileges and positive laws in England and the legal constitutions of the civilized states of the continent; they are founded on the principles of actualized freedom.⁵⁵ This cannot forever remain foreign to English intelligence.⁵⁶

Philosophy of Religion

The three volumes of Hegel's *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion* are now available in two different versions. In the old edition the editors tried to make a readable book and avoid repetitions from the notes of various students. The new critical edition in the Meiner Verlag distinguishes Hegel's own notes for the lectures and the student notes from the lectures. In these lectures all the earlier efforts flow together like rivers in the ocean. I distinguish five sources for origins of Hegel's philosophy of religion.

51. *Ibid.*, p. 478.

52. *Ibid.*, p. 484.

53. *Ibid.*, p. 490.

54. *Ibid.*, p. 492.

55. *Ibid.*, p. 512.

56. *Ibid.*, p. 518.

First, there is a profound *personal* concern. The question 'what it means to approach God', as he wrote to Schelling from Bern, had agitated him all his life. He was convinced that religion was necessary for a full human existence which would not be worth much without it.

A second origin of his philosophy of religion is his *critique* of the so-called New Testament, as we saw when we studied him as a student of theology in Tübingen.

A third origin, his 'Life of Jesus' was written in Bern. It is no life of Jesus at all, but the beginning of a logical construction of what later is called the 'speculative Concept' of religion (*Vernunft-Begriff*). This *logical* justification of religion is the core of Hegel's last book with the misleading title *Proofs of the Existence of God*. The kernel of it is Hegel's contention that the terms of the Christian faith are analogies to dialectical truths. *Religion is the Absolute in the form of mythical and cultic symbols*. This does not mean that Hegel intended to *replace* religious life by speculative logic. The latter comprehends the former, the former does not comprehend the latter.

The fourth origin of Hegel's philosophy of religion is first formulated in *Propädeutik* of the Nürnberg period and in the *Encyclopedia* of Heidelberg (1817). This '*encyclopedic*' or *systematic* approach understands religion as one 'circle' or 'sphere' of the Absolute which finds its value in its limitation against other spheres. As form of the 'absolute spirit' it is limited by the other forms of the absolute spirit—art, and philosophy. It is also limited by the 'objective mind' or 'world-spirit'. The church has to fight for its absolute life in competition with moral-political and scientific-practical interests; it is the religious 'Sunday' versus the prosaic 'work-day' of human existence.

A fifth origin of Hegel's philosophy of religion began

in Jena. *Phenomenology of Mind* contains a brilliant sketch of the rise of the religious consciousness from primitive religions of Nature or immediate being, through the religion of essence in which dualisms and many gods prevail, to the highly complex and comprehensive symbolism of the Christian religion. This *phenomenological* approach is worked out in the second volume of the *Lectures*. Hegel is the first European philosopher who undertook an adventurous journey through all the major manifestations of religious consciousness, seeing in all of them symbolic analogies to ontological categories. Taoism, for example, sees the universal Being in all beings, a 'central harmony' in all changes of nature. But Hinduism discovers Being as the Nothing of all finite Beings, the great negation of all finite illusions, the 'veil of Maya'.

In the religions of Essence the subject is discovered as 'the truth of substance', as Creator and Lord of History over against a godless world or in the many gods, personifying the pluralistic oppositions between value-powers that pervade all of nature and of human culture.

Christianity is the 'absolute religion', the religion of the 'Concept', because here the individual is recognized both in his finite suffering and incompetence as well as in his ontological ultimacy.

The Absolute shows itself in that which it is not, in the fragmentation of finite experience, and also cancels this its own negativity and preserves it in its eternal life.

Hegel and Schleiermacher

It was fortunate for Hegel, and particularly for Hegel's students, to have in Daniel Friedrich Schleiermacher, professor of theology at the Berlin University and preacher in

the Berlin cathedral, an opponent of equal stature who measured up to Hegel in original productivity and in universal scholarship and surpassed him in eloquence. He was the exemplary translator of Plato's dialogues. One of his closest friends was Friedrich Schlegel, the theorist of the early Romantic movement. Schleiermacher represents the romantic standpoint within Christian theology. A violent conflict with the anti-romantic Hegel was unavoidable.

Initially the relation began on mutually friendly terms. In Jena Hegel hailed the appearance of Schleiermacher's *Discourses on Religion* as a promising sign of a higher philosophical culture; and Schleiermacher was one of the first to suggest Hegel as a successor to Fichte as professor of philosophy at the University of Berlin in 1816. But in one of their first personal meetings there was an explosion. Schleiermacher wrote in an apologetic note, "I was quite glad that the nasty word which escaped me in our recent encounter was answered by you in the same vein; that mitigated my self-reproach which my violence that came as a surprise to myself had left in me. I wished that we might continue our discussion where it stood before those improper words were uttered. For I respect you much too highly not to desire to come to an agreement with you."⁵⁷ Hegel replied, "I thank you, most esteemed colleague, that your words have removed our recent disagreeable encounter and have at the same time mitigated my own excitement and have left in me an enhanced respect for you."⁵⁸

But this personal effort to get along amicably and respectfully foundered on a 'sea of troubles'. Schleiermacher

57. Br. II., p. 221.

58. *Ibid.*

prevented the admission of Hegel in the *Academy of Science*, one of the points promised by Altenstein as an inducement to exchange Heidelberg for Berlin; and Hegel retorted by barring Schleiermacher and his students from participation in the *Jahrbücher*. Towards the end of Hegel's life the relation had mellowed; Schleiermacher, too late, advocated Hegel's candidacy for the Academy of Science, and it was an event noticed in academic gossip that Hegel and Schleiermacher had been seen together at the amusement park *Tivoli* gliding down together on a slide⁵⁹ (*Rutschberg*).

Schleiermacher and Hegel together reformed the church inherited from the Reformation. Schleiermacher knew that his liberal protestantism was not the protestatism of the sixteenth century Reformers and said so. Hegel, on the contrary, believed that the central Christian dogma, the Trinity, was a mythical-symbolic expression of the truth that the Universe was a dialectical Being and Process. Schleiermacher denied the divinity of Christ but had a warm personal affection and devotion to a historical-individual Jesus whom Hegel considered a mixture of pathology and historical legends. The poet Heinrich Heine, a student of Hegel, quotes a remark Hegel made to him that "in the Berlin cathedral you are served a Christianity without the divinity of Christ like turtle soup without turtle."⁶⁰ Whittled down to a slogan, Schleiermacher was a 'unitarian' and Hegel was a 'trinitarian'.

Schleiermacher's background is 'Pietism', a sect founded by Graf Zinzendorf in the eighteenth century. It was anti-intellectual and anti-dogmatic. It stressed instead of

59. Fischer, II., p. 1218.

60. Heinrich Heine: *Deutschland II.*, Hamburg und Campe, 1885, p. 62.

dogma and intellectual creeds a personal love for the individual Jesus. Schleiermacher emancipated himself from the sect but elevated its core. 'Feeling' became his central religious category. 'Religion is the Feeling of absolute dependence'. Every religion and all its symbols and dogmas are expressions of this "pious state of mind"; and this enthusiastic feeling, in turn, may be kindled by any occasion. Religious feeling, in distinction from any other empirical or practical feeling, is the individual's sensing of a universe different in each individual. Jesus, for Schleiermacher, is that historical individual in whom this feeling of absolute dependence on the 'universe' is expressed in its purest and most perfect form: 'I and my father are one'.

To Hegel this religion is neither 'actual' nor 'comprehensive'; in other words, it cannot lead to an understandable church-community; it can only dissolve it. In his *History of Philosophy* he criticized Schleiermacher together with Friedrich Schlegel's 'romantic irony' and irrational subjectivism. "In the subjectivity and individuality of its very own world-view the ego finds its highest vanity—religion. All the different individuals have God in themselves. This Culture (Bildung) is estranged from the intelligible world which has lost significance and truth. It is composed⁶¹ of a deity which once had been past in time and singular in space and in existence (Dasein),⁶² of a world beyond actuality and its self-consciousness, and of⁶³ still another world which has to arrive . . . a mere longing and yearning . . . giving expression to feel-

61. XIX., p. 642.

62. XIX., p. 643.

63. *Ibid.*

ing in prophetic and/or poetic Discourses,⁶⁴ the language of which is neither poetry nor philosophy. This irrational (begrifflos) prophetic talk from inspired tripods demands that everyone should find it immediately thus also in his own heart. A multitude of inspired ones is born, each of whom utters his own Monologues⁶⁵ and who understand each other in warm hand-pressures and mute feelings, each beholding and relishing in himself his own pious virtuousity.”⁶⁶

Hegel’s sharpest attack on Schleiermacher’s theological standpoint occurred in 1819 when he wrote a Preface to Hinrichs’ *Philosophy of Religion*.⁶⁷ Hinrichs was, as we saw, Hegel’s student and friend in Heidelberg. It is touching to read how he advised his disciple against the exclusive use of dialectic: the public will not understand it; the public is the reader and you must write for readers; show that you can do what people call ‘teaching philosophy’—intersperse your dialectical developments with plain, straightforward reason and tell them what you are going to deal with; give them historical hints and concrete illustrations, classifications, and surveys.⁶⁸ Hinrichs took the advice and rewrote his manuscript; Hegel then added the *Preface*⁶⁹ which brought a professorship to Hinrichs and much trouble to Hegel. Schleiermacher was deeply hurt although his name is not mentioned.

Religious faith and philosophical comprehension, Hegel

64. This refers to Schleiermacher’s *Reden über die Religion. An die Gebildeten unter ihren Verächtern*. Schleiermacher. Sämtliche Werke. Abt. I., Vol. I.

65. This refers to Schleiermacher’s *Monologen*. Sämtliche Werke. Abt. II., Vol. I.

66. XX., pp. 642-644.

67. *Vorrede zu Hinrichs Religionsphilosophie*. XX., pp. 3-28.

68. Br. II., p. 253f.

69. XX. The following quotations are all from the *Preface*, pp. 3-22.

said are both deeply anchored in the same human mind and are among its highest functions. If they are at war, then man is miserably torn to pieces (*unseligste Entz-weiung*). This blissless fission cannot be healed by ignoring the conflict. This is the peace of frivolity and indifference. The conflict is merely despised and suppressed. But such a conflict of the deepest concerns of the mind, if it is suppressed, becomes pathological and because it is unrecognized and subconscious, it is all the more dangerous. A spurious armistice is brought about if philosophical comprehension is reduced to a scientific reason, busy with bringing finite phenomena under control, and if faith is deprived of objective truth and content and is replaced by mere subjective certainty or feeling degraded to a belief in believing.

Faith is neither a subjective certainty alone nor a rational creed or objective institution alone; its true 'Concept' unites both sides in their essential difference (*beide in unterschiedener Einheit verbunden*). Truth faith, in other words, cannot be 'actual' apart from the Logic of philosophical comprehension. The religious spirit fulfills itself in that which it believes God to be, in objective and true contents; and the objective revelation of the Eternal Being (which is at the same time its Eternal History of manifesting itself and eternally taking back its self-manifestations) must be present in the religious human spirit. Spirit is liberated to its own essential and eternal nature; this is its 'rebirth'. The Christian dogma of the Trinity is the dialectical Absolute in mythical language.

"Comprehension knows and contemplates the Infinite and Eternal Being as that which alone truly IS."¹⁰ Faith is the symbolic expression of this truth in distinction from

70. XX., p. 6.

historical tales and 'positive stuff' with which the absolute revelation of the Trinity is surrounded or obscured, and also in distinction from reason which is endlessly busy with negative and critical learning about his same 'positive stuff'. Mere historical or factual belief believes the same things positively which scientific reason shows to be false or problematic.⁷¹

The romantic irrationalism, having conceded the victory of enlightenment-reason over 'positive' religion, tried to salvage religion by assigning to it a little province in man which reason shall not touch, the province of Feeling. It had conceded too much because the rational critique of historical 'wrappings' and 'by-plays' does not even phase religious truth revealed as well as hidden by them. It is quite true, of course, that reason with its abstract rules and regulations is not capable of absolute truth. But this abstract reason is not concrete and comprehensive. And comprehension has not only no grudge against feeling but comprehends it within its totality. What it has a grudge against is a feeling unrelated to that which is felt.⁷² Feeling in abstract isolation is irrationalism; it is in the clutches of the same abstract reason against which it means to raise its voice in protest⁷³; feeling taken by itself is a subjective state of the natural soul which may or may not be connected with the highest as well as with the lowest values and contents of reality and of the mind. The holy duty and right, beauty and awe, may be felt just as much as their opposites—the profane, the vices of envy or arrogance, the passions of suffering and hate. All depends on whether such contents as God, truth, freedom

71. XX., pp. 8-9.

72. XX., p. 17.

73. XX., p. 22.

are derivable from feeling, or rather whether feeling is determined by them.⁷⁴

If the 'feeling of absolute dependence' would constitute religion, then a dog would make the best Christian. Such is the animal ignorance of God coupled with the sophistic rationalization that truth is too good for us. But the Absolute is not envious and does not deny itself to the spirit which it creates and contains.⁷⁵ The feeling of absolute truth does not shun a logical reflection on its own ground and essence, and it does not make us "dependent" only. It also affirms our own highest freedom from mere natural dependencies, feelings, and determinations. "Faith, true faith, is the living testimony of the inherent spirit of truth which must be implanted in our own heart."⁷⁶ There is certainly no denying that Hegel had written his *Preface* with a feeling amounting to a glowing passion.

Whether Hegel is just to Schleiermacher is another question. Schleiermacher's theology is embedded in a subtle dialectical philosophy which may be more important than the particular *Theory of Faith* (*Glaubenslehre*). It is flanked by considerable works on ethics, education, politics, aesthetics, and the art of living; and it has a background of penetrating books on the history of church and of philosophy.

The development of critical theology since this clash between Hegel and Schleiermacher has brought a dialectical solution of their conflict. Schleiermacher's liberal theology is bankrupt because Hegel's insight that the historical Jesus was a pathological individual or a false 'prophet' later surrounded by pseudo-historical fables has

74. XX., p. 21.

75. XX., p. 19f.

76. XX., p. 24.

been verified. On the other hand, Schleiermacher's insight that all dogmas are mythical-religious symbols produced by religious consciousness has also been verified in all 'de-mythologizing theology'. This is in agreement with Hegel's phenomenology of the religious consciousness, except that Hegel would add that dogma, in turn, also creates and unifies the religious consciousness whose symbol it is.

Seen in this light, the central dogma of Christianity, that Christ is the second person of the trinity, thus would be the unifying symbol of the Christian church. And Hegel says that it is actually the best symbol because it is the religious apprehension of a dialectical truth. 'God the Father', 'God the Son', 'God the Spirit' express in personifying mythical imagery the truth that the infinite whole of reality manifests itself in that which it is not, in the fragmentary and finite, and also cancels this its negativity and takes it back into its eternal presence.

Hegel restored the absolute meaning of the Christian religion on the basis of a dialectical destruction of a pseudo-historical certainty, and by a dialectical destruction of the dogma in isolation or as a rationalistic formula.

Hamann—a Christian Existentialist

The complete works of *Georg Hamann* were reviewed by Hegel in the *Jahrbücher*.⁷⁷ This careful essay is particularly interesting in view of the later Christian existentialism of Kierkegaard. The following is a paraphrase of this essay.

Hamann was born in 1730 in Königsberg. In his youth

77. *Ueber Hamanns Schriften*. Herausgegeben von Friedrich Roth. Berlin 1821-1825. XX., pp. 203-75.

he was exposed to the whole impact of a rationalistic enlightenment; later he became acquainted with Kant. He revolted against both and returned to a fundamentalistic Biblicalism, adopting the orthodox 'scriptural principle' of the original reformation. He delighted in shocking the rationalistic and cultured world with it. He was out to disturb and scandalize everybody; there is a profound and intentional hatred and hostility in everything he did and wrote. There is no writing of his, Hegel says, which does not have this personal invective intent. Whenever a friend of his had published anything and found acclaim, Hamann tore it to shreds with what he calls alternately the Word of God or the Socratic Method.⁷⁸ Hamann reveled in his discovery that the Bible itself is such a revolting, absurd and disgusting book that it must 'shock the hell out of' all those who believe in human culture.

The story of his conversion is remarkable. He was sent to London to negotiate business for a company in Königsberg owned by the two brothers Berens and their sister, to whom Hamann was engaged. In London he embezzled the money he had collected, made debts, and was cheated by an Englishman whom he had found praying on his knees and therefore trusted. His appetite, Hegel says, for devouring books as well as the goods of the stomach and the pleasures of the flesh were boundless and indiscriminate, hence his need for other people's money.⁷⁹

In such dire circumstances he discovered the Bible and found in it to his great rejoicing that he was the greatest of sinners sunk in original and total depravity but now saved by the Lord through this very discovery. All other men were in the same situation, only they did not know

78. XX., pp. 208, 254.

79. XX., p. 217.

it or at least did not confess it. It would be his mission, henceforth, to make them aware of their sin and to put the fear of the Lord and of eternal hell into their hearts. He, as well as all the rest of the damned human kind, had murdered Christ, their brother; we are all patricides and should implore the Lord for mercy.⁸⁰ Later, having failed in all worldly professions, he lived at the expense of his poor father and said "he did not care how expensive he was to the old man because to read the Bible and to pray is the work of a Christian."⁸¹

The brothers Berens sent him additional money so he could return and naturally expected at least an apology or an explanation. The scene of confrontation with the three Berens is an existentialistic comedy! Hamann was contrite, very contrite and humble, but he accused the Berens of worldly righteousness. The money was exceedingly and gloriously well spent for buying the priceless pearl of Christian wisdom that we are all sinners together. Brethren, let us pray! If the Berens did not see it that way, they were damned hypocrites. If they concealed their anger and passions, they were dishonest. And, being dishonest, they were sinners; but if they were angry and passionate, then they were honest and showed they were stinking sinners in being angry.⁸²

Kierkegaard said later against Hegel that truth is an infinite subjective passion. But Kierkegaard only said it; Hamann lived and practiced it. His business was to make everybody furiously mad in order to prove to them that this was the sinful stuff human existence is made of. Needless to say that Miss Berens did not marry him. And the

80. XX., p. 218f.

81. XX., p. 224.

82. XX., p. 220.

woman he lived with he did not marry because marriage was a bourgeois hypocrisy.

"The religious principle of his dialectic is to maintain his superiority against all so-called mere worldly obligations and against activity in concrete situations and to identify his accidental personality with this."⁸³

Hamann wrote about Kant's attempt to influence him. "He [Kant] has exposed himself to the danger of coming too close to a man to whom the sickness of his passion has given a strength to think and to feel which no sane person can possess."⁸⁴

"It would have not been difficult for him," Hegel says, "to have found an enjoyable circle of new friends with whom he could have relished the common exhalation of self-indulging sinfulness."⁸⁵ But Hamann was too bold a spirit, too free and fiery. He tore into such sectarians with the same ferocity as he did into the worldly folks. He hadn't forgotten the prayerful cheating Englishman. "All clinging to words and literalisms of religion is Lamasism."⁸⁶ Equally "all visible, public and common institutions are neither religion nor wisdom, which cometh from above, but earthly, human, and satanic, like Roman father confessors or prosaic belly-clericals (*Bauchpfaffen*)."⁸⁷

Hegel's long essay is a benevolent appreciation of this "fermentation of the concrete Idea" which is disturbing and infuriating to rationalists and irrationalists, to the pious and worldly alike. His Christianity, Hegel says, is both brilliant and spirited energy as well as absolute freedom. It is without historical or dogmatic crutches. Too bad it

83. XX., p. 222.

84. XX., p. 223.

85. XX., p. 234.

86. XX., p. 237.

87. XX., p. 245.

remains in a formless contraction and helpless intensity⁸⁸ But individual existence is, as we have seen all along, an ultimate ontological category for Hegel. That Hamann makes this articulate and explicit against formal systems and conventions is that which is of 'speculative value'.

Hamann's Christian paradox, "Believe because it is absurd and shows you up as absurd," appears to Hegel as an existential, personal practice of dialectic. The paradox baffles all those who cling to specialties or want a neat and orderly system of abstractions.

Goethe enjoyed Hegel's essay of 74 pages. "Hegel has written in the Berlin *Jahrbücher* an essay on Hamann which I am reading and re-reading again these days. I cannot but praise it most highly. Hegel's critical judgments have always been good."⁸⁹ Hamann's daughter, on the other hand, was furious when she read it. "Yes, my father was not married," she wrote to Hegel, "but there are many marriages with ceremonies and church-bells without the intimate loyalty of my parents. You have ruthlessly broken into the paradise of my childhood memories."⁹⁰

The Proofs of the Existence of God⁹¹

Iwan Ilyin, in his great book Hegel's *Philosophie als Kontemplative Gotteslehre*, treats Hegel's whole philosophy as if it were nothing but a contemplative theology. But Hegel's religious metaphysics or contemplative theology is not the whole of his philosophy but only one of

88. XX., pp. 224-246.

89. Goethe's *Gespräche mit Eckermann*. 17. II. p. 1829.

90. *Hegel Studien*. 1961, pp. 89-101, Karlfried Gründig; *Nachspiel zu Hegel's Hamann Rezension*.

91. *Beweise Für das Dasein Gottes*. XVI., pp. 359-553.

its centers. There is simply no one center in Hegel's philosophy. The 'center' of his infinite 'circle' may lie anywhere. For example if we take the *Logic*, the dialectical method of the mutual interdependence of all ontological opposites to be the whole of philosophy, we again would fail because we would have the whole only in an abstract i.e. one-sided logical form. Logic, the "realm of shadows" as Hegel calls it is as nothing without the living contents, the non-logical visions of values which must be thought. Religious actuality, the relation of God and man, has its own proper concrete realm (*eigentümliche Gestalt*) in addition to Logic.⁹² Religion is and contains more than its truth or 'Concept'; to know it only from this side is one-sided' (*einseitig*).⁹³ Religion is a 'Concept' of comprehension (*Vernunftbegriff*), but at the same time it is an infinitely modified form of historical life.

Hegel's last nineteen lectures in his last book, which he was working on when his death took his pen out of his hand, are entitled "Proof's of the Existence of God." He returns here to his earliest theological reflections; it is both a summary as well as the best introduction to Hegel's philosophy of religion.

There is considerable inconsistency in his language. In principle 'God' is a mythical, religious term in which the Absolute is religiously personified and appropriated. Hegel is in perfect agreement with Kant that 'God' cannot be proved to exist anymore than Goethe's Faust can be 'proved' to exist other than as a poetic symbol in Goethe's tragedy. But Hegel says against Kant that reality-as-a-whole, the comprehensive actuality of world-itself, the Absolute, can indeed be proved; the whole of philosophy

92. XVI., p. 360.

93. XVI., p. 488.

is this proof. Only when the Absolute can be proved, can 'God' be reintroduced as the religious-mythical symbol of that same Absolute. And only when we keep this distinction in mind and do not follow Hegel when he switches terms without warning does his last book make sense. The title should read 'Proofs of the Absolute'.

The movement of the introductory lectures is by now so familiar to us that we can report on them briefly. There is first an historical introduction of the relation of faith and reason and the problem of uniting them in their separate functions, both of which together constitute man as a spiritual *and* contemplative being. The second lecture shows the difference of 'proving' something in the finite world distinct from a 'proof' or verification of the religious assumption. In the finite world all empirical evidence, agreements of those who investigate, formal logical deductions or mathematical calculations, have this in common: they all refer to essentially irrational events which are conceptualized by various sciences as various levels of abstractions. Given phenomena in the form of being known are never identical with their real irrationality. All 'proofs' in this sphere of actuality are ideal possibilities or probabilities which may or may not be verified in experience. The acts of knowing are not identical with that which is known. "This opposition of knowledge against the object to be known is the finitude of knowledge."⁹⁴ This negative insight prepares the way towards a totally different (*ganz anders*) act of cognition demanded by the infinite assumption of faith.⁹⁵ Religious faith, the third lecture continues, is an incontestable and essential value of human experience, which value is valuable both in it-

94. XVI., p. 375.

95. XVI., p. 378.

self and for itself. It is transmitted and implanted by education which would not be possible if there were no objective value-contents and their own truths uniting the generations of those who believe in them. The fourth lecture is in agreement with Schleiermacher's 'Feeling'. "Religion must be felt, must exist in feeling, otherwise faith is not religious."⁹⁶ To transmit universality and necessity of religion by religious instruction is not enough. Religion by itself also is not enough; it demands an intense existential appropriation. But subjective certainty is no 'proof'; it may lead to fanatical sectarianism or to religious insanity.⁹⁷ We are obliged, therefore, he says in Lecture Five, to reflect, to unite the truth and the life of religion, to seek the justifying ground of our faith.

Genuine religious experience need not shun the clarity of probing reflection. This reflection must be 'circular'. The elevation of the human mind to the Absolute already presupposes that the Absolute has made this elevation possible. The absolute whole is also present *in* nature but not *to* nature, whereas in man his religious appropriation of the Absolute takes the form of sacrificing the natural-human self's finite interests and purposes. Death in this sense is a religious symbol. The affirmation of the unconditional spirit of and in man is at the same time the negation of finite and natural man as ultimate or absolute.⁹⁸

The 'proofs' of the Absolute in its religious personification as 'God' are dialectical-logical explications of faith in and for itself. The elevation of the spirit to 'God' in the inner experience of feeling, intuition, imagination and thought is at the same time the availability of 'God' re-

96. XVI., p. 385.

97. XVI., p. 389.

98. XVI., pp. 396, 398.

vealing himself for and in man. The dialectical-logical explication of this double movement is one with it; it is not external to it as if man could stand aloof and approach God as if He were a finite and external object. The 'proof' is the living self-movement of the content in the reflective logic of self-awareness or self-knowledge (Lecture VI). This is not only an elevation of thought, but also its purification from merely historical and merely subjective by-products. For this contemplation we need a logic of concrete thinking which unites religious life of unconditional devotion and sacrifice with its 'Speculative Concept' which keeps the vast, necessary, and abstract distinctions of dialectical Reason together. (Lecture VII).

This so-called Concept is the indivisible or individual soul understanding itself in analogy to the absolute One and Whole. In our finite existence the many and successive interests and functions of the soul, its values and their negations or evils, are not unified; they fall apart and are in opposition to one another. In the absolute actuality of the subject of all activities, the 'God' of religion, they are eternally present and in harmony no matter how disharmonious the world may appear to us (Lecture VIII). This is the Divine Love in and by which the finite world with its tragic divisions and tensions is unconditionally embraced or affirmed as Good or Holy.

The Ninth Lecture sketches the three historical 'proofs' of the existence of God. *The cosmological proof* starts from that being which, as accidental, does not depend on itself (*nicht sich selbst trägt*). This argument therefore concludes that there must be a true and necessary Being in light of which the accidental character of finite facts is recognized. This is the proof *ex contingentia mundi*.

The teleological proof starts from that being which

finds itself only partly determined by its own purposiveness and concludes that in the light of the Holy this teleological imperfection is known as sin. Human incompetence could not be known and confessed apart from the religious knowledge of the Holy.

The third, *the ontological proof*, starts from the 'Concept' of God and concludes that it cannot be a mere subjective concept in our heads. Our errors presuppose Truth as an absolute standard. Let us now examine each of these arguments in turn.

The Cosmological Proof

If we admit that all things of and in 'this world' are temporal or mortal, transitory and unfinal, accidental or contingent—they might just as well not be or be different from what happens to them—then we have already seen 'this world' in the light of religious knowledge; we have already compared the non-absoluteness of everything in experience with the idea of a necessary and absolute Being in which the negativity of 'this world' is dialectically negated. And it is not we who arbitrarily or externally make this reflection, but it is the essential nature of the things of 'this world' to pass and change and thereby give testimony to the omnipresent Absolute in them. The religious argument is not merely a rational movement from a premiss to a conclusion, but both sides together form a concrete dialectical relation—creation and creature—in which the negativity of the creature is at once also the negativity in and of the Absolute. The negation of the negativity of the creature is also its absolute affirmation.

The negativity of the immediate and finite Being is the

omnipresence of the infinite Being which mediates itself with itself through its finite manifestations. "The spirit elevates itself from the contingency and from external necessity [nature as system of laws] because those thoughts are insufficient and unsatisfactory in themselves. Spiritual man finds pacification in this thought of absolute necessity because it is the peace with himself [with the logical demand of completed unity]. Being is that which it is, unconditionally necessary; and all longing, striving, and demanding that Being be different from what it is, sinks away from the mind. The otherness and finitude is eternally completed in Being, infinite in itself and omnipresent, with nothing outside; there are no barriers in this Being because its infinity means that it is mediated with itself."⁹⁹

The Teleological Proof

The usual 'positive', undialectical statement of the teleological proof infers from some successful purposes or achieved goods in this world that there must be a good, benevolent author and 'father in heaven'. But the same logic also would have to infer from frustrated purposes or evils in this world a satanic, malevolent, even sadistic, tyrant as author. This 'positive' form of the teleological proof, Hegel says, is invalid.

The valid teleological argument is first stated by Socrates. The idea of the good is the motivating wisdom of his life. Not my sinews and muscles, he said, motivate me to stay in prison and drink the hemlock; it is because I think this action is better. The teleological argument thus hangs together with the appearance of freedom and moral

99. XVI., p. 472.

self-determination.¹⁰⁰ We *seek* the good because we are not in possession of it. And if we think that we *have* a good, then we *seek* to preserve it. Concept of absolute purpose must be distinguished from external teleologies of utility which imply that God created the oak tree so that man might have corks for his wine-bottles.¹⁰¹ This general form of this external teleology is the observation of evolution in nature. The inorganic-physical appearance of life is first in time and a condition for organic life. The lower levels can exist without the higher; the higher are dependent on the lower. Plants are the condition of animals, and all levels of natural life are conditions for man. This temporal evolution does not alter the contingency of all given things; what survives and succeeds in its adaptation to natural environment is what survives and succeeds: this is no justification.¹⁰² Our life-adjustment experts might do well to ponder those pages!

Likewise, purposes imposed on materials which remain external to the purpose which they serve (as in machines) are irrelevant for the *religious* teleological argument. They only lead to a deistic mechanic, a heavenly watch-maker, whose machinery is faulty and in constant need of repair.

External teleologies do not explain and do not reach the absolute good and its actuality disclosed in and for the religious soul. What is last in time is first in reality-value. It is the key and ingress to what 'actuality' reveals itself to be. The human soul, aware of its freedom and self-determination or integrity of its moral value, is the "actual Concept" (*wirklicher Begriff und begreifliche Wirklichkeit*). It is the one and only reality, present in

100. XVI, p. 518.

101. XVI, p. 537.

102. XVI, p. 528f.

us, where Being and self-knowledge are one. A long development of modern philosophy, from Descartes' "I think—I am" through Leibniz "monad" to Kant's "primacy of practical reason" and "man as an ultimate end in himself and not merely as a means to ulterior hypothetical ends," is condensed in Hegel's 'actual Concept'.

From this central 'Concept' the naturalistic theory of evolution must be revised. There are no different realities on top of each other. There is only the one and same living reality which appears in and for itself in levels of self-organization. There is nothing dead in reality; what we call so is a lower form of an organization of life and energy that is not understood but merely noticed in its external behavior. It is appearance of life, or it is life as not understood in analogy with ourselves, with the 'actual Concept' in us.

We are 'end in itself' when we know that we represent the absolute Being, when we recognize each other as having 'ontological' status representing the same Absolute each in his own way. There is a concrete, absolute unity unfolding itself in the many spheres and phases of life; this unity is both perfection and imperfect process. It is both universal and unique; it is I, but it is also universal; it is the same in you. You and I together form the community of purposive actuality which is never as it ought to be seen from the moral point of view; and this always is as it ought to be. This moral struggle from the 'point of view' of the Absolute in many individualities and the cycles and phases of life, in reproduction and mutual interaction and interdependence, resembles the actual Concept. The same Absolute is also actual in nature as organic whole. But only in the human spirit is the actual concept also present for itself. The teleological arguments

infers from this its presence, its absolute ground. It is not derivable or understandable out of finite or scientific categories of the phenomenal world; they would be *as nothing* if the soul did not exist to think them.

The teleological proof of the Absolute contains the same negativity, as the cosmological argument. "In the world there is only relative and no absolute wisdom."¹⁰³ "The relative from which *we* begin perishes as well as finds itself (*zu Grundegehen*) in the Absolute which thus shows itself to be its truth."¹⁰⁴ "Even the highest of human wisdom is incompetent to master the world. This negative insight is possible and necessary because we measure it with the concept of a divine wisdom which is not incompetent, but which is eternally fulfilling itself in and through the incompetence of human purposes and cross-purposes."¹⁰⁵ Seen in its divine truth "the world-soul is One principle or unity, One organic system of a living universe, a living system."¹⁰⁶

But this universal purposiveness can not be found in experience. Experience is always finite and is a battle with finite barriers. "If we contemplate those purposes which are, relatively speaking, the greatest, then we see that they are mostly harassed and unsuccessful. The earth is covered with ruins, with remnants of the most glorious human creations, which the most beautiful peoples had considered their pride and joy. On the other hand, we see the pettiest, meanest and despicable purposes succeed."¹⁰⁷ "And if we think the moral end is that which ought to be, then we must make the discrepancy and the moral battle

103. XVI., p. 523.

104. XVI., p. 524.

105. XVI., p. 533.

106. XVI., p. 523.

107. XVI., p. 531.

for the good perennial.”¹⁰⁸ “But we must not confuse our moral finitude with the Good itself which is eternally fulfilled in the actuality of world-itself. Man is not here to bring this Good about because it is eternally present in his tragic battles and fights with the innumerable evils of finitude.”¹⁰⁹ The competence of the absolute Good is thus shown through the reversal or negation of the more or less negative and relative good because the latter cannot be good unconditionally or unquestionably.

This is the same world-view of a tragic optimism which Hegel discovered in the Frankfurth period. Life as perennially problematic is unconditionally affirmed as the appearance of the Good.

The Ontological Proof

Hegel is the first philosopher who understood the dialectic of Anselm’s Ontological Argument. If we think ‘God’ as the Maximum, as “that Being greater than which nothing can be conceived”, then we cannot identify this concept or definition with the absolute Being because as concept it is only in our mind and *is* as such not the Being which it defines. But, on the other hand, a Being greater than which nothing can be conceived cannot be conceived apart from conceiving it. The Absolute is present in conception as that Truth in the light of which all empirical truths are limited. It is through this dialectical negation of the human concept as sufficient that the Absolute is made manifest. God is not only power as in the cosmological argument, or the Good as in the teleological argument, but also truth. Truth must be presupposed as absolute in

108. XVI., p. 534.

109. XVI., p. 552.

every sentence which means to say something true. Yet truth is not accessible apart from all the more or less fallible attempts to express and to cultivate it in human culture. Only in 'God' is Truth identical with Being. There can be no true religion without this absolute dedication to the truth in thought.¹¹⁰

Long historical excursions in the direction of Anselm and in criticism of Kant's mistaken criticism of Anselm contain expositions of the ontological argument, Hegel's favorite. Kant measures metaphysics by his concept of physics and does not understand that his own dialectico-philosophical concept of physics as a synthesis a priori of formal logic and perceptual data is not physics. His limitation of scientific knowledge to mere appearance is based on the very ontological arguments which he falsely reflects. It is in the light of the absolute truth which is one with all-comprehensive actuality that the relative and imperfect human truths are understood as analogies or promises of truth which eternally is what it is and nothing else. Hegel's last spoken and published sentence reads as follows: "All that is speculative is a mystery to reason." (Alles Speculative ist dem Verstände ein Mysterium).¹¹¹

The Rektor

In the academic year 1830-31, which was to be the last year of his life, Hegel received the honor of being elected *Rektor* of the University of Berlin. Unlike the president of a North American University, the *Rektor* is not primarily administrative. The *Rektor* represents the University; his main function is an academic lecture to the as-

110. XII., p. 553.

111. Br. II., p. 221.

sembled University on *dies academicus*. As Rektor Hegel tried to persuade the government to finance a non-denominational chapel for the University, but he failed in this project.

He delivered two *Rektor-addresses*, both in Latin. The first was for new students who had fulfilled their eight years of Greek and Latin in the Gymnasium as entrance requirement for the University. In this welcoming speech Hegel puts the finishing touch on his paedagogics which began with his valedictorian speech at the Gymnasium in Stuttgart and was continued in his addresses to the high-school students in Nürnberg. It is beautiful in its solemn simplicity. My soul, he says to the assembled faculty and students, is elated by the magnitude and authority of the cause I was called upon to represent; and at the same time I am agitated by emotion amounting to perturbation, but consoled by a general benevolence without which any individual's power would be insufficient.

The University, this sacred "con-sociation," is a republic in which freedom and law are inseparable. We are governed by our own laws which are also the laws of the cause we serve. Letters and arts, sciences of things human and things divine, reflect the universe. A University has no place for arbitrariness, and its great task cannot be carried out by individual ingenuity alone. It is a community of learning, a mutual give and take. It is your very own concern, "combatants", in which we all are engaged (*Vestra omnia, commilitones, res est, quam agimus*).

On the one hand it is the service of truth to which we are all dedicated. On the other hand this discipline in freedom is at the same time the only true preparation by which you can make yourselves ready to serve in the

kingdom of God and in the well-being of the state. All utility is based on the internal truth of realities. In giving yourself heart and soul to this living truth of reality you become your own true selves. If you only have a practicality or utility in mind, you will not acquire that wisdom and fortitude in yourselves that is necessary to face the vicissitudes and perils of experience (*Veritas se ipsam ad utilitatem traducat, neque esse sine illa possit. Unde qui meram utilitatem persequitur, in profanam se vanitatem proicit, neque animi constantiam et in rebus gerendis prudenteriam et gravitatem acquirit.*)¹¹²

Academic freedom of following the truth together is equally removed from the relativity of opinions and the licentiousness of manners as it is from a formal memorizing and a blind subjection to what the teachers impose upon you. "This freedom in truth itself is the school and mother of all other forms of freedom."¹¹³ The university is both founded on a ground which is its own ground and is an end which is final in itself; but it also is a means to envision and augment the sacred community of men. It is both theoretical and practical, religious and secular, universal in its scope and individual in its existing members.

* * * * *

The second address was delivered as the contribution to the University to the four-hundred years of celebration of the Lutheran Augsburg Confession. In it Hegel reforms Luther's Reformation but still calls it Lutheranism. In this speech¹¹⁴ Hegel seems to defend one protest-

112. XVI., p. 524.

113. XVI., p. 525.

114. XVI., pp. 532-544.

tant denomination. I say "seems" because the Lutheranism he is defending is Hegelianism; it bears little similarity to the position of the sixteenth century reformers. He called himself a Lutheran and this was new. In Hegel's early Writings Luther is scorned for his half-way Reformation. Formerly Hegel was always aloof from all Christian confessions.¹¹⁵ A Jena aphorism says that protestantism had ceased to exist. In Bamberg there was a horrified exclamation of disgust against the imposition of teaching a Sunday school class. In Nürnberg he freed his teachers from church attendance. In Heidelberg Cousin reports that Hegel told him that 'Christ' was a myth. In the Berlin Lectures Hegel said that the innumerable sects were the necessary result and "realization" of the "scriptural principle" proclaimed by the Reformation because the Scripture itself is so mixed-up and contradictory that all those dogmatic differences *must* develop if it is taken as an infallible guide. Not 'Scripture' but a philosophical faith must be taken as that guide.

Now Hegel boldly identified this philosophical faith as being universal and "comprehensive" with the 'evangelical' position. The Reformers would have hurled their most theological maledictions, their Scriptural art of cursing, against a partner who did not even have 'Scriptural Proofs'. Hegel sided with Luther only in sharing his immense courage to break and reject the authority of the Church. But he saw clearly what Luther could not see at all: that if you deny the authority of the church, then you cannot uphold the authority of the 'Holy Scripture'. It was the church which over a period of at least a century gradually produced this collection of stories around Jesus the Christ and sanctified it and sealed it with its

115. Dok., p. 353.

authority. If the authority of the Church was denied, then the authority of the 'Scripture' became untenable too. Hegel saw the Reformation as this untenable midway station between the erroneous church and the philosophical dialectical truth of faith. The freedom of the spirit of inquiry, the priesthood of all believers, the ethical universe of the State as basis or realization of religious faith and the perennial reform and critique of mere historical dogmas are now widely accepted as the tenets of protestantism. But this critical position owes more to Hegel and Schleiermacher than to the Reformation which, on the contrary, declared the infallibility of the Scripture and the absolute and unquestioning obedience to this written 'Word of God' to be the exclusive way of 'salvation'. To doubt the 'Scripture' was the sure road to hell and damnation.

Hegel and the Reformation agree on the negative meaning of 'Protest'. Both Hegel and the Reformation protested against religion as a specialty or as an isolated profession. The elevation of chastity, poverty, and blind servitude (alias 'faith') contradicts the ethical dignity of marriage, of honest work and economy, and, above all, the unconditional freedom of the absolute spirit for whom there are no absolute given authorities in the world, the 'Scripture' not excluded.

Hegel's solemn public address in celebration of the Reformation is his last word on religion. It is in perfect accord with his earliest critical reflections in Tübingen and in line with his whole maturing thought on the questions: What does it mean to approach God and What is the 'Kingdom of God'. It is not 'double talk'. The perennial crisis of 'positivity', this ever recurring earthquake toppling anything less than the religious apprehension of the

Absolute itself, is for Hegel the way of protestantism from the beginnings of the Christian tradition.

Enemies

Hegel experienced the beginning of an extremely hostile reaction against his philosophy. He collected several books of his critics and undertook to answer them in the *Jahrbücher*¹¹⁶ but actually only read through two of his critics; he broke off the series in disgust. There was no opponent worthy of his mettle. What a difference in comparison with his Jena essays where the young giant discovered his strength and tested it in joyful competition with what was best in contemporary thought! Now he can only show with his usual thoroughness that his would-be critics cannot read; they cannot even quote him correctly. "Look you, must I quarrel with such rabble?"¹¹⁷

One passage is worth mentioning. The critic protested against the omnipresence of the philosophical 'Concept' in all cultural realities and said that men have accomplished their greatest values in all ways of life, regardless of a concern with philosophy. "Quite so!" Hegel replies. "Without that content which genius, contemplation (*Verunft*), and conscience produce, philosophy would indeed be empty. Why then does the author not join his 'immense majority of this non-philosophical humanity' in order to produce at least something in science or politics, in art or religion (it need not even be the greatest value!) without slandering philosophy? Humanity gives him the example that any standpoint leads to achievements only insofar as this standpoint is actualized and appropriated;

116. XX., pp. 314-393.

117. XX., p. 362.

but this critic undertakes to achieve something in philosophy yet tries to take his standpoint outside of her.”¹¹⁸

In the third edition of the *Encyclopedia* (1830) Hegel summarizes: “After the second edition several criticisms of my philosophy have appeared which have for the most part shown no competence for such undertaking. Such frivolous replies to works which are the thoughtful product of many years of laboring with the seriousness of the content and with the demands of logical penetration (*wissenschaftliche Forderung*) offer no enjoyable sight, but only the impression of evil passions.”¹¹⁹

Instead of entering the argument and the sphere of philosophy’s fundamental and objective problems (*Sache selbst*), the critics attacked the personality of the author mostly because they are afraid for their own orthodoxy, as if philosophy were dangerous to the salvation of their souls.¹²⁰

In the Preface to the second edition of the *Logic* (1831) Hegel says that another source of trouble was the peculiar haste and dispersion of modern life¹²¹ which had lost the patience of thought. “My violent adversaries cannot even make the simple reflection that their objections contain categories which they use as premises, but which must be critically investigated before they are used. This thoughtlessness or unconsciousness has gone incredibly far.”¹²² “It is doubtful whether the absorption by momentary political interests and passions and the deafening roar of trivial chatter will allow participation in the dispassionate quietude of a thinking contemplation.”¹²³

118. W. XX., p. 366.

119. W. VIII., p. 25.

120. W. VIII., p. 26.

121. W. IV., p. 32.

122. W. IV., p. 33.

123. W. IV., p. 35.

The Preface of the *Philosophy of Right* compares this modern consciousness with the dusk, a cultural night; new dark ages seemed to be in the offing, in which philosophy is like the solitary bird of wisdom, a night-owl. A civilized people without metaphysics is like a temple without a sanctuary—a hollow edifice, destined to crash.¹²⁴ A “situation of despair—unimpeded, unconscious, and uncritical”!¹²⁵

Hegel saw in the philosophical bankruptcy of the coming nineteenth century the symptom of the coming degradation of European civilization. Rosenkranz quotes printed utterances of Hegel’s colleague Niehbur, the famous author of the first critical history of Rome. He said in public what Hegel said to Rosenkranz in private. Speaking of the French July revolution of 1830 which had replaced Bourbon reaction by a money-bag in human shape (Louis Philippe, whose slogan was “Messieurs, enrichissez vous”), Hegel said that “peculiar to it is the complete absence of exultation, hope, and illusion, compared with 1789. We in Germany hasten towards barbarism—this is my firm conviction. In France things are no better. That we are threatened with devastation, as we were two hundred years ago, is unfortunately equally clear to me. The end of this song will be despotism on ruins. In fifty years, perhaps even earlier, in all of Europe or at least on the continent, there will be no trace left of free institutions . . .”¹²⁶ If the meaning of history is the discovery of freedom from nature and freedom for values, then the loss of freedom is just as historical as the realization of freedom. Completed unfreedom would be the end of his-

124. IV., p. 13.

125. VIII., p. 10.

126. Ros., p. 415.

tory. Therefore, "The worst weather is still better than no weather at all."¹²⁷

Friends

Hegel had the satisfaction of assembling a large number of devoted and loyal students and friends. Clustered around the *Jahrbücher* they became known to the world as the 'school'. The strength of Hegel was the weakness of the 'school'. His philosophy was so vast and his personality so overpowering that the 'school' consisted mostly of imitation and elaboration of what the master sayeth.

Hegel saw the beginning of the later split of the 'school' into 'right' and 'left'. The 'right' was represented by Carl Friedrich Göschel's book *Aphorisms on Non-Knowledge and Absolute Knowledge in their relation to the Christian Creed*.¹²⁸ The 'left' is violently audible in a long, respectfully-fierce letter written by the young Ludwig Feuerbach¹²⁹ to which Hegel did not reply.

Göschel was a Lutheran minister who had studied Hegel's work and saw in them *the* Christian philosophy and joyously proclaimed this in his book which appeared without Hegel's knowledge. He reviewed it with delight in the *Jahrbücher*. Experts are agreed that Göschel's work is very mediocre and wonder why Hegel was so complimentary. And yet this enthusiasm is not difficult to understand. That his philosophy expressed the truth of Christianity was his own conviction. And after so many vitriolic attacks on him as the Antichrist he was naturally

127. XVI., p. 402.

128. *Aphorismen über Nichtwissen und absolutes Wissen im Verhältnis zur Christlichen Glaubenserkenntnis*. W. XX., pp. 278-313.

129. Br. III., pp. 244-248.

happy to see a friendly echo of his own conviction in the Christian clergy. But the situation is highly ambiguous. Actually, Hegel had freed himself from historical Christianity, but he felt this liberation was the essence of the Christian faith. The Christian religion was subordinated to a vaster vision of the dialectical constitution and movement of reality. Thus it was also preserved. What he wanted was not a revolution but a reform of Christianity in which its own mythical and dogmatic modes of expression were to be "comprehended".

Ludwig Feuerbach, on the other hand, misinterpreted the presence of the Absolute in the human *Geist* as being the absoluteness of the human self-consciousness in whose image God was created, and he demanded that this man-created God-image was to be taken back into man, the divine God-creator. He asked Hegel to drop all his theological terminology. Nothing could be more alien to spirit and letter of Hegel's philosophy than this psychologism of a naturalistic anthropology. To posit man as God is to Hegel an uncomprehending (*unvernünftig*) infamy and blasphemy.¹³⁰

How did Hegel appear to his students? There are some vivid glimpses. Heinrich Heine, whose free, flexible, and ironic prose probably would not be what it is without Hegel's dialectic, tells of a visit: "Conversation with Hegel was a sort of monologue groaned out in jerks (*stossweis hervorgeseufzt*) with a toneless voice; the baroque style of his expressions often hit me and remained in my memory. One beautiful starry night we stood at the window, and I, a youth of twenty-two, I had just come from

130. VIII., pp. 20, 26. Compare my essay on this in *Die Entwicklung der Religionsphilosophie in der Hegelschen Schule*. Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung. IV., p. 3.

a good dinner and coffee. I spoke with sentiment of the stars and called them the abode of the blessed. But the master murmured, 'The stars, hm! hm! The stars are only a luminous leprosy in the skies.' 'For God's sake,' I exclaimed, 'then there is no happy locality up there to reward virtue after death?' But he, fixing me with his pale eyes said cuttingly, 'So you want a tip for having cared for your sick mother or for not having poisoned your brother?' "¹³¹ Heine's artistry is not too trustworthy; Hegel's 'monologues' seem to be a unique experience of Heine's. But there are numerous authentic descriptions to the contrary by the novelist Karl Cutzkow, Ludwig Feuerbach, David Friedrich Strauss, Michelet, J. Ed. Erdmann, and others.¹³² Here is a summary:

In his lectures he appeared much older than in his study. He was constantly wallowing like a mole in his innumerable notes. His sentences came slowly, haltingly, as if born in pain, and interrupted by coughing and tobacco snuffing. He seemed repetitious; and yet, if the hearers did not pay the closest attention, they were all of a sudden lost. Words, almost disconnected from any grammar, would fall like rocks from a mountain. Newcomers marvelled how other students could write good notes. His blue eyes looked as if covered by an inner veil, looking inward, unaware of who was there. Husserl¹³³ would have said that the empirical world was "bracketed". He turned his spiritual intuition and inwardness out in concepts (the intuitive and the conceptual sides inseparable) forming 'The Concept'. Oblivious of himself, his

131. Heinrich Heine: *Deutschland II*. Hamburg. Hoffmann und Campe. ed. 1885, p. 51.

132. Collected in *Fischer II*, pp. 1229-1232.

133. Gustav E. Mueller: *On the Historical Significance of Husserl's Phaenomenology*. Sophia. XXI. N. 2, 1953.

authority was the authority of truth and of a painful effort to cope with it and to communicate it in a wealth of illustrations which never, however, wandered from the topic. Sometimes the audience would be struck by an awe as with a thunderbolt. People left with trembling knees. No one ever heard of any 'thesis, antitheses, and synthesis'.

In his study he was completely changed—a jovial, good old Suabian, without any affectation or professorial mannerism, he was interested in the individual, in his problems and backgrounds.

The most complete description of these two Hegels, the public and the private, we owe to Heinrich Gustav Hotho, the later editor of Hegel's *Aesthetics*. "It was at the beginning of my studies when I entered for the first time, timidly but trustingly, Hegel's room. He was sitting at the broad desk and was digging impatiently in a disorderly heaped-up mass of books and papers. His prematurely aged figure was bent on his work but was of an original power and persistence; a comfortable yellow and gray dressing-gown hung sloppily from the shoulders to the earth; he was neither of an imposing dignity nor of ingratiating amiability; rather, the first thing one noticed in his whole conduct was an honest straightforwardness reminding one of our sturdy ancestors. I shall never forget my first impression of his face as he turned around. His cheeks seemed lifeless; no personal passions, but the whole past of incessant thinking, day and night at work, was reflected in them; the torture of doubts, the experience of uncompromising tempests of thought, seemed not to have subdued these forty years of reflection and meditation; only the restless impetus to unfold the early seeds of truth ever more promising and richer, ever more severe

and inescapable, had shaped the forehead, the face and the mouth . . . How dignified was the whole head, how noble the nose, the high, slightly receding forehead, the quiet chin! The nobility of faithfulness and of righteousness in greatest as well as in smallest things, the clear consciousness to have sought with all his powers an ultimate satisfaction only in truth—all this was imprinted most strikingly in every form of his individuality."

Hotho described the manner of Hegel's lecturing, confirming what we have already seen. He concluded, "He was wholly plunged into the matters at hand, and it seemed that they were speaking through him without any subjective additions. And yet a paternal concern for clarity and understanding mitigated the severe seriousness which might have discouraged the hearers. In the depth of an almost indecipherable mystery this magnificent mind labored and wove in a grandiose ease and comfortableness. Sometimes his voice would rise, his eyes would throw lightnings over those assembled, or would glow in a quietly burning fire of a convincing splendor, while his never failing words grasped through all the heights and depths of the soul."¹³⁴ His intimacy of feeling, sympathy, and helpful participation are illustrated by many letters.

After Minister von Altenstein had lost his sister (the same who had helped the Hegels to get settled in Berlin), Hegel wrote, "The sorrow of participation in the immeasurable loss which you have suffered tends to concentrate and settle itself in that center where it is rightfully present in its whole extent and strength. That center is the heart which has known the full value of the object of that sorrow, tested and carried out through a whole life. To have been privileged to gain an image of that value be-

¹³⁴ Glockner: *Hegel*. Vol. I, pp. 438, 441.

longs to the best and rarest human experiences of my life. In the image of the immortalized sister of your Excellency, memory is occupied with all virtues which may adorn a woman's soul . . . touched and delighted with all those virtues . . . acquaintance with the seriousness of life and its pains and sufferings, heavenly patience, loving sympathy with all those who suffer, devoted friendship and infinite love for her brother . . . yet the highest value and individual grace of this richness lay in the undivided harmony, in the simple flower of a serene naturalness and straightforwardness, in the virginal youthfulness of a noble nature.

"I enjoyed the freshness of this source streaming clear through all tempests . . . my wife found in her a motherly friend who always took a cordial interest. Now inexorable destiny has left nothing for us than to approach her with tears and a handful of flowers and earth to say for the last time farewell to such a presence. This loss, though, loses itself in the loss which your Excellency has had to endure. Destiny has struck, but providence has left your Excellency a great heart in order to make it the grave of that heart of which this bitter destiny has bereft us. If this ultimate sorrow once has been buried in that still sepulchre, then nothing may henceforth disturb your peace. For such a much-containing and living heart the womb of the future will still hold a harvest of satisfactions and joys."¹³⁵

And to his friend Beer, when he lost his son, he wrote, "It is with infinite pain that I must learn tonight, dear esteemed friend, what immense blow of misfortune has hit you together with your lovely, fine wife. One had hidden the news from me until evening; otherwise, I would

135. Br. III., 303f.

have tried to talk with you, not in order to say words of consolation, for at the present moment I would not know of any which would mean much in this immediate and new anguish; but only to bring you my deep feeling with you and for you, to share your sorrow and to commiserate with you on such an irreparable loss. I might have perhaps asked you the same question which I asked my wife in a similar situation when she lost her first and then only child: whether she would prefer not to have had this child at all. It is past! The feeling of that happiness remains: to remember the dear boy and his friendliness towards everyone. Be not unmindful of this satisfaction which you have enjoyed; keep this memory firmly and vividly in mind against the loss of the presence; thus your son, and the enjoyment which you had in him, will remain.

"It is such a moment of your life and of hard experience in which the natural cheerfulness, which in ordinary times cannot be overestimated, must prove that it rests on a deeper ground enabling the spirit to endure even such calamities."¹³⁶ This Philosophy of life is also the life of his philosophy!

Triumph and Death

Hegel's triumph is his conquest of Goethe. I have illustrated Hegel by Goethe's verses. There are several good books on this relation of the poet to the philosopher. Goethe's best, most condensed poetry as well as his reflection on nature, on life and on art are thoroughly 'Hegelian'. He finally recognized and acknowledged it himself. At first Hegel was seen by Goethe as a young *Privatdozent* whom he had called to the University of

¹³⁶ Br. III., 349.

Jena. Then there was a comradeship in their defense of the concreteness of colors against Newton's one-sided quantitative mechanism of the mere physics of colors. Out of this developed a friendship. And, lastly, Goethe saluted Hegel, the master.

For a summary of their common world-view I repeat some thoughts from the Goethe chapter in my *Philosophy of Literature*.¹³⁷ Both Goethe and Hegel are intuitive thinkers. They both are anti-abstract, anti-rationalistic, but also anti-subjective thinkers. Hegel said that to think without thinking something is like swimming without going into water; and Goethe said that he had always avoided thinking about thinking. "All we can be aware of and all we can talk about are manifestations of the Idea," was Goethe's statement of a common principle. Hegel said that nothing can be thought that is not a living reality; his 'Concept' is the dialectical unity of a form and a content which are inseparable but not, therefore, one. They are one only in their polarity. And Goethe said that he was glad that he had ideas which he could see with his eyes.

What is thought, then, is a living and moving, a concrete shape of universal life. The thinker is to say what is; he is to translate the movement of a meaningful reality into a self-comprehension, a self-understanding; the poet is to shape and to present this same content in his images to the imagination. Emerson called Goethe the writer of the world, pointing to this epic-objective quality, this plastic-philosophical roundness of Goethe's expression. The same thing could be said of Hegel.

Behind and beyond all particular efforts of presentation

137. Gustav E. Mueller: *Philosophy of Literature* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1948). (Out of print.)

lies the whole as the truth of all particularities. "You always comprehend particular experiences as organs of the whole reality," Schiller wrote to Goethe; he could have written it to Hegel also. But this whole is not something in itself from its self-manifestations. It exists in its movements; it persists through the movements and even destroys them. "Whatever once was, there burns and brightens free in splendour; for 't would fain eternal be," says Faust in this Hegelian manner.

Both Goethe and Hegel are all-absorbing universalists who do not ask, 'What can I get from reality', but rather, 'what can I find in and give to reality?' And the universe is the only thing concrete enough to let them lose themselves in it. But in losing yourself you shall find yourself; personality is established through participating in the widening circles and spheres of existential experience. "The highest good of moral creatures is personality," says Goethe. And Hegel said, "In the Christian world the subject is not a mere accident of the deity, but an infinite end in himself. In this divine world the creation of true individuals is all that matters. The state may demand the sacrifice of the individual to save the whole, but in relation to God and in God's realm the individual is an end in and for itself."¹³⁸

This universalism of both men includes those limiting standpoints which would deny it. There are other monads with different modes of life, which are unwilling or unable to share with you. They must be understood in their difference whether they agree to that or not. "No one has a right if he does not know how to solve such contradictions with *Geist* (spirit) in understanding the other, even if he is not understood in turn," said Goethe; and Hegel: "A

138. W. XIV., p. 247.

true refutation must enter the force of the adversary and must put itself within its limitation; to criticize from the outside just to maintain one's right where the other is not, does not further anything."

Goethe wrote nothing of importance that is not a confession, an externalization of an internal movement. Hegel wrote nothing of importance that is not filled with his own feeling of his own participation; his world-soul is his Faust. He is just as scornful of a mere antiquarian, un-genuine, unexistential curiosity, and irresponsible, abstract, non-participating knowledge, as Faust is of Wagner. To such, "The *Geist* of times is a book with seven seals."

Both Goethe's Faust and Hegel's philosophy celebrate the primacy of contemplative reason. Action and activism are immature and provisional evaluations within the totality of life; they are and express negation, limitation, subjectivity, and impatience; they are necessary and ingredient moments of the whole life:

Man's active nature, flagging, seeks too soon the level;
Whence, willingly, the comrade him I gave,
Who works, excites, and must create, as Devil.¹³⁹

But seen in the eternal presence of the whole as whole, all such tension and 'oughts' are mediated and rest in being:

Thou fortunate vision,
Of all thou wast 'ware,
Whatever it might be,
Yet still it was fair. ¹⁴⁰

139. Goethe's *Faust*, Bayard Taylor's translation, Oxford.

140. *Ibid.*

says Lynkeus at the end of Faust; and Hegel in his preface to the *Phenomenology of Mind* speaks of the life of reason as the "Bachanalian revel wherein no member is not drunk, but which is at the same time transparent serenity" in being.

Both for Goethe and Hegel there is no direct, immediate, romantic identification with the Absolute. "To reach the infinite, reach out in all dimensions of the finite," says Goethe; and Hegel: "the Absolute is grasped only in and through negations of itself, in the determinate and limited manifestations of its dialectic. For this reason they are anti-romantic; Hegel called the romantic immediacy an insanity that tramples our common humanity underfoot; and Goethe called romanticism illness. They are both classical in their respect for essential measures and for the value of limitations.

For both Hegel and Goethe Christianity is a symbol of a human-divine reality. Both think Christianity within their own world of truth as one of its major manifestations. Thus the Christian symbol is used as frame in Faust, and Hegel liked to express his philosophy to the layman in Christian terms. For example, there are his charming letters to Duboc, a businessman in Hamburg who had taken up the study of philosophy as a fascinating hobby and had asked Hegel for a comment on whether he had understood him correctly or not. Hegel told him that the best way to approach his philosophy is to understand it in analogy with Christianity. "When this faith in God or Truth stands surely and firmly for itself, then there is no need and no question to go and establish it by knowledge, but rather to make it explicit and to comprehend this foundation. In the sense of a philosophical Absolute I define (bestimmen) the truth as that which is

concrete in itself, or as you put it, as a unity of opposed determinations, but in such a way that those oppositions remain intact in their unity; truth is not something that is static, fixed (abstract identity of Being), but as movement is life itself.”¹⁴¹

The philosophical covenant between Goethe and Hegel was sealed in two beautiful letters. “Since you approve of the main line of my thinking,” Goethe wrote to Hegel, “I am thereby all the more confirmed in it and believe to have gained considerably and in many aspects, if not for the Whole, at least for myself and my inner life. *May everything, which I may still be able to accomplish join that which you have founded and built up.* Preserve for me your beautiful inclination of long standing and rest assured that I find in it one of the most beautiful flowers in the springtime of my soul; I have reasons to rejoice.”¹⁴² This “springtime” may refer to the completion of his Faust at that time.

Hegel replied, “Through your kind mentioning of my inclination, which you estimate as of value to yourself, I am stimulated, yes, even justified, to speak to you about the motives of my devotion and even piety which I feel for you; if I look back on the course of my spiritual development, I see you interwoven in it everywhere and might call myself one of your sons; my inwardness has received enduring strength from you to resist abstractions and has taken its orientation from your creations as from fire signals.”¹⁴³

For Hegel’s birthday in 1821 Goethe sent him a fine, colored crystal wine-cup, artfully designed to illustrate

141. Br. III., p. 12f.

142. May 3, 1824. Br. III., p. 42 (italics mine).

143. Br. III., p. 83.

some points of his theory of colours, with the note: "The Urphenomenon recommends itself to the Absolute." Goethe's "Urphenomenon"¹⁴⁴ is identical with Hegel's 'Concept'—a living shape developing its own essential form in a manifold of functions and phases of developments. There is a comment in Goethe's Theory of Colours: "We must confess the limitation of intuition (Schauen) may the philosopher take the Urphenomenon up into his region."¹⁴⁵ Is not this the meaning of the "recommendation"?

Hegel thanked him profusely in a humorous letter of four printed pages. He admired the "unfathomability of the phenomenon and the meaningfulness of its presentation . . . Wine has always been instructive, a Dionysus in nature; the sparkling spirit of colours appears here better in its naïvete than in Newton's torturing triangular glass-rod. Every experiment with it is at the same time drunk to your health. It verifies my faith in the trans-substantiation of the inner into the outer, of thought into the phenomenon, and of the phenomenon into thought."¹⁴⁶

Celebration

The philosophical chalice was henceforth used to celebrate the joining of Hegel's and Goethe's birthdays at midnight between the twenty-seventh and the twenty-eighth of August. The philosopher's fifty-sixth birthday was the external culmination of his career. He described this celebration in a letter to his wife who was tending to

144. The prefix "ur" gives to its following word the meaning of "first," "primordial," "original," "non-derivative," etc.

145. Werke: *Ausgabe letzter Hand*. Vol. 52, paragraph 177.

146. Br. II., 275f.

her health in Carlsbad: "In the morning there were several well-wishers, dear faithful souls and friends, also letters with poems, then a business meeting during which appeared a special visitor—guess! His Excellency von Kamptz in person. In the afternoon I kept quiet and only drank and toasted with you on our agreed-upon time, saving myself for the evening. There was to be much honor, joy, and proofs of love for me in a new restaurant Unter den Linden, initiated for the first time . . . grand, most exquisite dinner . . . around twenty persons; then a deputation of students bringing me a precious cup of silver (when the silversmith heard it was for me he contributed his share because he had been one of my hearers) on a velvet pillow together with a number of bound poems. Many others were delivered orally, among them one by Rösel in connection with an antique Greek piece which he had already sent in the morning. So it was difficult to get through before midnight. That the students played music and sang for me goes without saying; the company kept them for eats. Among the guests was one I did not know. It was Professor Wichmann. I was told the execution of my bust . . . was entrusted to him . . . next week . . . this week I am still too busy with lectures . . . I shall pose for him. At midnight we then conjoined mine with Goethe's birthday, the 28th. You cannot imagine what cordial, deeply-felt testimonies of confidence, love, and respect I have experienced, both from mature and from younger friends. It was one, for the many cares of life, rewarding day." The cup from the students bore the inscription: "To our great teacher."¹⁴⁷ This celebration had a comical aftermath. A newspaper published a short and modest description and was reprimanded by the

147. Br. 111., p. 136.

censor, that, in the future, descriptions of birthdays should be reserved for royal birthdays only.¹⁴⁸

The End

In 1829, Hegel's physician ordered a rest-cure and a treatment at Carlsbad. Hegel then sent the following petition to Minister von Altenstein: "Chest trouble, which has interrupted my lectures and my literary production last winter, has still not left me, and I cannot further refrain from using proper means to combat its effects and my weakness. As the most efficient cure my physician has ordered a stay in a bathing-resort. I find myself, however, in such an unfavorable financial situation that I cannot afford a considerable expense out of my own means. We had to use the money which my wife owned because my official salary did not suffice to cover all expenses which I had to incur, even without spending more than was demanded by our real needs and by what was socially expected. A raise of my fixed salary, for which your Excellency had given me reasons to hope, I have never received and have not dared to request." After asking for a special grant, he concluded, "This may prolong the life of a man who is conscious of having devoted himself through eleven years with faithfulness and severe earnestness to the performing, to the utmost of his capacity, of the difficult tasks which your Excellency rightfully expects from a public teacher of philosophy." The government granted three-hundred dollars and Hegel undertook his last journey to Carlsbad.

He paid his farewell visit to Goethe, "a youth of eighty

148. Br. III., p. 402.

years", who kept him for a week. They enjoyed their intimate and informal conversation.¹⁴⁹

In Carlsbad he happened to meet his erstwhile friend Schelling. To his wife he wrote that this was a most enjoyable meeting and "we again were united in old, cordial friendship."¹⁵⁰ Marie Hegel told Niethammer after Hegel's death, "But this 'old friendship' was nevertheless not requited on Schelling's part. Hegel's serenity and naturally open feeling (*Gemütlichkeit*) would have liked to straighten things out and he did not know what rancour was."¹⁵¹ Marie apparently saw this clearer than her husband. Schelling wrote to his wife, "Imagine, yesterday, sitting in the bath, I heard a disagreeable voice outside inquiring after me . . . it was Hegel from Berlin . . . In the afternoon he came again much impressing himself and very friendly, as if there was nothing between us . . . we did not touch Science. I would not have gone in for that anyway. And since he is an intelligent person, we had some good chats in the evening. Still, I have not paid back his call; it is a little too far away for me."¹⁵²

In 1830, Varnhagen writes to Goethe: "I begin to be seriously worried for Hegel. The fever will not leave him and his wife is still sicker. He came to me yesterday and appeared to me like his shadow."¹⁵³

The end came suddenly on November 14th, 1831. An epidemic of cholera had swept through Berlin that summer, and, as a precaution, Hegel and his family sojourned in the country. In autumn the epidemic was ebbing, and Hegel returned to his work for the fall semester. He was

149. Br. III., p. 278.

150. Br. III., p. 270.

151. Br. III., p. 445.

152. Br. III., p. 445.

153. Fischer II., p. 1238.

one of the last victims of cholera in its most virulent and concentrated forms. "It has taken a great victim," Schleiermacher said.¹⁵⁴

Marie Hegel wrote to his sister Christiane a close description of the last days of his life, from which I omit medical details and prescriptions. "I try to collect myself to tell how it all happened. My blessed, beloved husband began to feel unwell after a cheerful breakfast on Sunday morning. He complained about a stomach ache although there was no negligence in observing the rules of diet. He had begun his lectures the Thursday before in full vigor; Saturday evening he was examining; and for Sunday afternoon we expected dear guests. I asked them not to come so that I could take care of him. The physician appeared without delay and gave his orders. None of us thought the situation serious. His ache was bearable. Then there was vomiting; first without, later with gall. He had similar attacks before. His night was very disquiet. I sat up all night and wropped him in linen; he was tossing around all the time and asked me repeatedly to take care of myself and to leave him alone with his 'impatience'. The pain in the stomach became unrelentingly piercing, 'like a toothache, one can not lay quiet with it'. Monday morning he wanted to get up. We brought him to the living room, but his weakness was so great that on the way he almost collapsed. We set up his warm-bed in the living room. He only complained about weakness, his pains having subsided. He said, 'I wish to God I had had such a quiet hour at night.' He said he needed rest and that I should not receive visitors. When I felt his pulse he took my hand lovingly as if to say, 'Don't worry!' . . . Then hiccups

154. Fischer II., p. 1218.

came and he had difficulty in urination. But withal he rested well; his temperature was steady; he was fully conscious and without fear of danger . . . At three o'clock in the afternoon he had a breast-convulsion; then he fell quietly asleep. But his left cheek felt icy; his hands turned blue and cold. We kneeled at the bedside, suppressing our sobs, not wanting to disturb him, and listened to his last breath. He was slumbering away and went over into a transfiguration (*Hinüberschlummern eines Verklärten*).

"Let me break off. You know all now. Weep with me, but thank God for this painless, mild and blessed end."

She then tells that she was permitted to keep the body at home instead of having it carried off to the general cholera-ward, and how the friends all came without fear of infection. "Many had seen him only a few days earlier in full health; many had heard him lecture on Thursday and Friday. They were delighted with a special vigour and fire. He had remarked to me himself, "Today I felt more at ease" (*Heute ist es mir leicht geworden*).

"He now rests at the place which he had selected for himself, next to Fichte and near Solger. Yesterday, Wednesday afternoon, was his solemn funeral. Professors and students from all the faculties assembled in the great auditorium.¹⁵⁵ Here his loyal friend, the present *Rektor* Marheineke, spoke to the deeply moved assembly. Then an endless procession of students who carried the torches in black crepes because they were not allowed to carry them burning, and an innumerable number of carriages, moved to the house of mourning. My poor disconsolate sons together with Marheineke and Geheimrat Schulze followed the bier. At the grave Hofrat Förster spoke and

155. "Our universities and schools are our church." (Br. II., pp. 89, 141.)

Marheineke said the benediction: 'The Lord bless you and keep you: The Lord make his face shine upon you and be gracious unto you: The Lord lift up his countenance upon you and give you peace: Both now and in the life everlasting.'¹⁵⁶

Christiane, on receiving this letter, sat for hours motionless before she was shaken by convulsive weeping. Some weeks later she did not return from her customary walk. She had drowned herself in the river.¹⁵⁷ "To the sister the loss of her brother is unredeemable and she offers the highest sacrifice for him," we read in the *Phaenomenology* about Antigone.¹⁵⁸

And ever after . . .

From Marheineke's¹⁵⁹ obituary: "We cannot concede to death any victory over him; death has only torn away from us that which was not himself. For his true self is his spirit shining through his whole essential life (*Wesen*), gracious, friendly, benevolent; that spirit which was made manifest in his high and noble conscious (*Gesinnung*) which unfolded itself in the purity and amiability in the quiet greatness and childlike simplicity of his whole character which should reconcile all prejudice if he were really known; that spirit which lives in his works and lives in his numerous friends and admirers and which will live forever."¹⁶⁰

Varnhagen von Ense:¹⁶¹ ". . . but his death has left a

156. Ros., pp. 422-424.

157. Ros., p. 425.

158. W. II., p. 350.

159. Professor of Theology.

160. Fischer I., p. 202.

161. Editor of the *Jahrbücher*.

frightful gap. The longer one looks at it, the less it can be filled and the wider it becomes. He was the real pillar of the University. The scientific dignity of the whole, its firmness and cohesion, rested on him. Collapse now threatens from all sides. Such a unison of profoundest, universal thought and the most immense knowledge in all empirical realms is now entirely lacking; what is left is specialized for itself and must grope for a higher relationship and will but rarely find it. They all feel it now, even his adversaries, what we have lost in him. The whole city is stunned by this blow; it is as if this shock were vibrating even in the crudest minds. The many friends and disciples are desperate. I met Gans¹⁶² yesterday, his eyes reddened; he and his wife breaking out in tears as we reached his home. I too am grasped, and, constantly feeling this stirring agitation, am almost sick."¹⁶³

Goethe to Varnhagen: "Unfortunately I must begin my letter with the deeply felt regret that what we have feared has happened; we have lost this highly gifted, many-sided, significant, spiritual leader; a well-founded and productive man and friend. The foundation of his philosophy lay beyond my horizon; but where his activity reached me and where it influenced my efforts, I was always truly and spiritually furthered."

Goethe to Zelter:¹⁶⁴ "A sequence of consistent individual moments is always a modification of eternity itself, and it was granted to you to be always your own true self in all transitions and thus to satisfy my way of thinking as well as Hegel's."¹⁶⁵

162. Edward Gans, Hegel's student, later colleague as professor of Law; editor of Hegel's *Philosophy of History* (1840) and of the second edition of his *Philosophy of Right*.

163. Ros., p. 426.

164. Composer, Music-Director in Berlin, mutual friend of Hegel and Goethe.

165. Fischer I., p. 202.

Systematic Conclusion

In the Far East a symbolic diagram of a world-view is called a Mándala'.

Everyone of his books, whether he published them himself: *The Phenomenology*, *The Logic*, *The Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences* and his *Ethics*, entitled *Philosophy of Right* and several volumes of *Essays*; or whether they were published by his students: *Philosophy of History*, *Aesthetics and Philosophy of Art*, *Philosophy of Religion*, *History of Philosophy*—everyone of them, I say, presents a 'circle', an organization of life, all of which represent the moving, dynamic whole of truth and of comprehensive actuality (Wirklichkeit). Each 'circle' in the infinite circle presents the whole wholly in its medium; but as mutually limiting, each circle also does *not* present the whole adequately or wholly. The logic of philosophy, therefore, is this dialectic.

The same whole may appear in consciousness, as Hegel developed it in *Phenomenology of Mind*. In Hegel's Phenomenology the idea of a self-developing whole was unfolded in the medium of human consciousness as it discovers itself in historical break-throughs and crises; in the 'Mandala' this phenomenology of consciousness has shrunk to one modest circle within all possible philosophies of culture (*Geist*).

Everyone of the finite 'circles' in the infinite 'circle' may become the center of the whole, may and does give rise to one-sided metaphysical 'stand-points' or 'isms', in which the objective value of that particular sphere becomes absorbing and important to the individuals dedicating themselves to it.

The whole may become articulate in onto-logical categories which mediate and permeate nature and culture

(circle A-B-C in the Mandala). The whole may be manifest in the formal-logical and mathematical structure, the mechanisms and chemisms and self-organizing processes of nature, which mediates the whole and the conscious spirit, both of which it also excludes (circle B-C-A in the Mandala).

Or Culture in many levels and values of *Geist* may be the mediating center, which works out the consciousness of itself by working at nature as object for a subject, envisaging the whole of reality as its goal (circle C-A-B of the Mandala).

Wherever the center, each is always a form of divine-human-natural life and energy pulsating into all and all into each.

Let me repeat once more Hegel's own description which now looks as if it were meant to explain the *Mándala* p. 341: "Since philosophy must be a comprehensive wisdom, therefore each of its disciplines is in turn a philosophical whole; but in each this philosophical idea is in a particular medium of self-determination. The particular circle therefore breaks through the limitation of its medium on account of its totality-character, and so becomes the ground of a wider sphere. *The whole presents itself as a circle of circles*, of which each is a necessary movement. The system of all essential media produces itself as the whole IDEA and is present wholly in each as well."¹⁶⁶

Thus this individual Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel has worked out in careful labor at each finite system, his magnificent contemplative VISION (IDEA) of and his religious faith in the ABSOLUTE.

166. Gustav E. Mueller: *Hegel Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Philosophical Library, New York, 1959, paragraph 6.

Appendix

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich: Sämtliche Werke, Stuttgart.
Fromann. Jubiläumsausgabe in zwanzig Bänden. Herausgegeben von Hermann Glockner.

- I. Aufsatz aus dem kritischen Journal der Philosophie und andere Schriften aus der Jenenser Zeit. 1927.
- II. Phänomenologie des Geistes.
- III. Philosophische Propädeutik. Gymnasialreden und Gutachten. Über den Philosophieunterricht.
- IV. Wissenschaft der Logik. Erster Teil. Die objective Logik.
- V. Wissenschaft der Logik. Zweiter Teil. Die subjective Logik, oder Die Lehre vom Begriff.
- VI. Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse. Und andere Schriften aus der Heidelberger Zeit.
- VII. Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse.
- VIII. System der Philosophie. I. Erster Teil. Die Logik.
- IX. System der Philosophie. II. Zweiter Teil. Die Naturphilosophie.
- X. System der Philosophie. Dritter Teil. Die Philosophie des Geistes.
- XI. Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte.
- XII. Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik. Erster Band.
- XIII. Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik. Zweiter Band.
- XIV. Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik. Dritter Band.
- XV. Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion. Erster Band.
- XVI. Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion. Zweiter Band.

- XVII. Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie.
Erster Band.
- XVIII. Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie.
Zweiter Band.
- XIX. Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie.
Dritter Band.
- XX. Vermischte Schriften aus der Berliner Zeit.
Vorrede zu Hinrichs Religionsphilosophie.
Über die Einrichtung einer kritischen Zeitschrift.
Aufsätze aus den Jahrbüchern für wissenschaftliche
Kritik:
1. Rezension der Schrift "Über die unter dem Namen Bhagavad Gita bekannte Episode des Mahabharata". Von Wilhelm von Humboldt.
 2. Über Solgers nachgelassene Schriften und Briefwechsel.
 3. Über Hammans Schriften.
 4. Über "Aphorismen über Nichtwissen und absolutes Wissen im Verhältnis zur christlichen Gläubenserkenntnis". Von Karl Göschel.
 5. Rezension der Schriften. "Über die Hegelsche Lehre, oder absolutes Wissen und moderner Pantheismus" und "Über philosophische Wissenschaften insbesonders".
 6. Über "Der Idealrealismus". Von A. L. I. Ohlert.
 7. Rezension der Schrift. "Über die Grundlage, Gliederung und Zeitfolge der Weltgeschichte, Drei Vorträge von I. Görres".
- Kleine Aufsätze:
1. Wer denkt abstrakt?
 2. Über Lessings Briefwechsel mit seiner Frau.
 3. Über Wallenstein.
 4. Über die Bekehrten.
- Essay: Über die englische Reform-Bill.
Drei Lateinische Reden, gehalten an der Universität Berlin:

1. Bein Antritt des Rektorats.
2. Bei der Promotion des Dr. Rose.
3. Bei der dritten Säkular-Feier der Übergabe der Augsburgischen Konfession.

Glockner, Hermann: *Hegel Lexicon*. Erster Band, A-Form, 1935.

Zweiter Band, Form-Inhalt, Kontinuität, 1937.

Dritter Band, Kontrakt-Propädeutik, 1938.

Vierter Band, Prophet-Z, 1939.

Not in this edition:

M or ML: *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion*.
Editor Georg Lasson. Meiner Verlag, 1925.

Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte. Editor Georg Lasson. Meiner Verlag, 1917.

Dok: *Dokumente zu Hegel's Entwicklung*. Hrsg. von Johannes Hoffmeister. Frommann, 1936.

Nohl: Nohl, Dr. Herman: *Hegel's Theologische Ju-gendschriften*. Tübingen, J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1907.

Mollat: *Die Verfassung des Deutschen Reiches*. Hrsg. von Georg Mollat. Frommann, 1935.

Hegel's Erstes System. Nach den Handschriften der Kgl. Bibliothek in Berlin im Auftrage der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften Herausgegeben von Hans Ehrenberg, 1915.

Jenenser Realphilosophie: *Band XIX. Die Vorlesungen von 1803-04*, Meiner, 1932.
Band XX. Die Vorlesungen von 1805-06. Meiner 1931, Beide aus dem Manuscript hrsg. von Joh. Hoffmeister.

Lasson: *Schriften zur Politik und Rechtsphi-losophie*. Hrsg. von Georg Lasson. Leipzig. Felix Meiner, 1913.

Selected Bibliography

- Asveld, Paul: *La Pensée Religeuse du Jeune Hegel*. Paris, Publications Universitaires de Louvain, 1953.
- Baillie, Sir James Black: *The Origin and Significance of Hegel's Logic*. A general introduction to Hegel's system. London. MacMillan and Co., Ltd., New York, 1901.
- Bauer, Bruno: *Kritik der Evangelien und Geschichte ihres Ursprungs. I. und II. Teil*. Berlin, Gustav Hempel, 1850.
- Baur, Dr. F. Ch.: *Die Tübinger Schule und ihre Stellung zur Gegenwart*. Tübingen, L. Fr. Fues, 1859.
- Biedermann, A. Emanuel: *Die Freie Theologie oder Philosophie und Christentum in Streit und Frieden*. Tübingen, Fues, 1844.
- Unsere Junghegelsche Weltanschauung*. Zürich, Friedrich Schultheiss, 1849.
- Bloch, Ernst: *Subjekt-Objekt*. Berlin, Aufbau Verlag, 1951.
- Böhm, Franz: *Anti-Cartesianismus. Deutsche Philosophie im Widerstand*. Leipzig, Felix Meiner, 1938.
- Bradley, Francis H.: *Appearance and Reality*. A metaphysical essay. Oxford, 1946, 10. Aufl.
- Brentano, Clemens: *Augewählte Werke in vier Bänden*. Leipzig, Max Hess.
- Caird, Edward: *Hegel*. Edinburgh and London, W. Blackwood and Sons, 1903.
- Chalybäus, Heinrich Moritz: *Historische Entwicklung der Spekulative Philosophie von Kant bis Hegel*. Dresden und Leipzig, Arnoldische Buchhandlung, 1843.
- Coreth, S. J. Emerich: *Das Dialektische Sein in Hegel's Logik*. Wien, Herder, 1952.
- Creuzer, Friedrich: *Symbolik und Mythologie der alten Völker*. 4 Bände. Leipzig, 1810.

- Croce, Benedetto: *Lebendiges und Totes in Hegel's Philosophie*. Heidelberg, 1909.
- Dilthey, Wilhelm: *Die Jugendgeschichte Hegel's*. Berlin, 1921.
- Dürck, Dr. Johanna: *Die Psychologie Hegel's*. Bern, Paul Haupt, 1927.
- Engels, Friedrich: *Ludwig Feuerbach und der Ausgang der Klassischen Deutschen Philosophie*. 1845-46. Stuttgart, Dietz, 1910.
- Erdmann, Dr. Johann Eduard: *Grundriss der Logik und Metaphysik*. Halle, H. W. Schmidt, 1864.
- Falkenheim, Hugo: *Goethe und Hegel*. Tübingen, J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1934.
- Feuerbach, Ludwig: *Das Wesen des Christentums*. Leipzig, Otto Wigand, 1849.
- Kritik des Anti-Hegel: Zur Einleitung in das Studium der Philosophie*. Ansbach, Carl Brügel, 1835.
- Findley, J. N.: *Hegel: A Re-examination*. N.Y., Collier, 1962.
- Fischer, Kuno: *Hegel's Leben, Werke und Lehre*. 2 Bde. Heidelberg, Carl Winter's Universitätsbuchhandlung, 1911. (Die zweite Auflage enthält von Hugo Falkenberg gesammelte Beiträge zu Hegel's Leben. 159 Seiten.)
- System der Logik und Metaphysik oder Wissenschaftslehre*. Heidelberg, Carl Winter's Universitätsbuchhandlung, 1909.
- Flügge, Johannes: *Die Sittlichen Grundlagen des Denkens. Hegel's Existentielle Erkenntnis Gesinnung*. Hamburg, Felix Meiner, 1953.
- Glockner: Glockner, Hermann: *Der Begriff in Hegel's Philosophie*. Tübingen, J. C. B. Mohr, Paul Siebeck), 1924.
- Hegel, Erster Band. Die Voraussetzungen der Hegelschen Philosophie*. Stuttgart, Fr. Frommann, 1929.
- Hegel, Zweiter Band. Entwicklung und Schicksal der Hegelschen Philosophie*. Stuttgart, Fr. Frommann, 1940.
- Johann Eduard Erdmann*. Stuttgart, Fr. Frommann, 1932.
- Haym R.: *Hegel und Seine Zeit*. Berlin, Rudolph Gärtner, 1857.

- Haering, Dr. Theodor L.: *Hegel, sein Wollen und sein Werk.*
Leipzig und Berlin, B. G. Teubner, I. Band: 1929, II.
Band: 1938.
- Harris, William, Torrey: *Hegel's Logic*. A book on the genesis
of the categories of the mind. A critical exposition. Chi-
cago, S. C. Griggs and Co., 1890.
- Hartmann, Eduard von: *Über die Dialektische Methode*. Bad
Sachsa, Hermann Häacke, 1910.
- Heidegger Martin: *Holzwege*. Frankfurt, Klostermann, 1950.
- Heine, Heinrich: *Sämtliche Werke*. Hamburg, Hoffmann und
Campe, 1885.
- Hessing, Professor J.: *Das Selbstbewusstwerden des Geistes*.
Stuttgart, Fr. Frommann, 1936.
- Heuss, Theodor. *Deutsche Gestalten*. Studien zum 19.Jh.,
Stuttgart und Tübingen, Rainer Wunderlich Verlag (Her-
mann Leins), 1947.
- Hobhouse, Leonard Trelawney: *The Metaphysical Theory of
the State*. A criticism. London, G. Allen and Unwin, New
York, The Macmillan and Co., 1918.
- Hölderlin: *Werke in vier Teilen*, hrsg. von Marie Joachimi-
Dege. Berlin und Leipzig, Deutsches Verlagshaus.
- Hoffmeister, Johannes: *Hölderlin und Hegel*. Tübingen, 1931.
—*Goethe und der Deutsche Idealismus*. Leipzig, Felix
Meiner, 1932.
—*Hölderlin und die Philosophie*. Leipzig, Meiner, 1944.
- Hommes, Jakob: *Zwiespältiges Dasein. Die Existentielle Onto-
logie von Hegel bis Heidegger*. Freiburg, Herder, 1953.
- Hübscher, Arthur: *Schopenhauer*. Stuttgart, Reclam, 1955.
- Hyppolite, Jean: *Etudes sur Marx et Hegel*. Paris, 1955. Genèse
et structure de la Ph.G. Paris, 1946.
- Ilijin, Iwan Alexandrovitch: *Die Philosophie Hegel's als Kon-
templative Gotteslehre*. Bern, Francke, 1946.
- Kedney, John Steinfert: *Hegel's Aesthetics*. A critical exposi-
tion. Chicago, S. C. Griggs and Co., 1885.
- Kepler, Johannes: *Zusammenklänge*. Übersetzt von Otto Bryk.
Jena, Eugen Diederichs, 1918.

- Kaufmann, Walter: *Hegel*. N.Y., Doubleday, 1965.
- Knittermeyer, Hinrich: *Schelling und die Romantische Schule*. München, Reinhard, 1929.
- Knox, Israel: *The Aesthetic Theories of Kant, Hegel, and Schopenhauer*. New York, Columbia University Press, 1936.
- Kojève, Alexandre: *Introduction à la Lecture de Hegel*, Paris, 1947.
- Hegel. *Eine Vergegenwärtigung seines Denkens. Kommentar zur Phaenomenologie des Geistes*. Stuttgart, Kohlhammer, 1958.
- Kroner, Richard: *Von Kant bis Hegel*. 2 Bde. Tübingen, J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), I. Band: 1921, II. Band: 1924.
- Lange-Eichbaum, Wilhelm: *Genie, Irrsinn und Ruhm*. München, Ernst Reinhardt, 1942.
- Lasson, Georg: *Hegel als Geschichtsphilosoph*. Leipzig, Felix Meiner, 1920.
- Leese, Kurt: *Die Geschichtsphilosophie Hegel's*. Berlin, Furche Verlag, 1922.
- Leisegang, Hans: *Denkformen*. Berlin, de Greuyter, 1951, (4 Kap. Hegel.)
- Levy, Heinrich: *Die Hegel-Renaissance in der Deutschen Philosophie*. Berlin, Pan Verlag, 1929.
- Litt, Theodor: *Hegel*. Heidelberg, Quelle und Meyer, 1953.
- Löwith, Karl: *Von Hegel bis Nietzsche*. Zürich, Europa Verlag, 1944.
- Lukacs, George: *Der Junge Hegel; über die Beziehungen von Dialektik und Ökonomie*. Zürich, Europa Verlag, 1948.
- Maier, Josef: *On Hegel's Critique of Kant*. New York, Columbia University Press, 1939.
- Marcuse, Herbert: *Hegel's Ontologie. (Und die Grundlegung einer Theorie der Geschichtlichkeit.)* Frankfurt am Main, Vittorio Klostermann, 1932.
- Marx, Karl: *Das Elend der Philosophie*. Stuttgart, Dietz, 1907.
—*Gesammelte Schriften von Karl Marx und Friedrich Engels*. Erster Band März, 1841-März 1844. Stuttgart, Dietz, 1913.

- Moog, Willy: *Hegel und die Hegelsche Schule*. München, Ernst Reinhardt, 1930.
- Morris, George Sylvester: *Hegel's Philosophy of the State and of History*. An exposition by George S. Morris. Chicago, S. C. Griggs and Company, 1887.
- Müller, Gustav Emil: *Geschichtsphilosophische Grundbegriffe bei Marx*, Bern, Haupt, 1924.
- Hegel über Offenbarung, Kirche und Philosophie*. München, Ernst Reinhardt, 1939.
- Hegel über Sttlichkeit und Geschichte*. München, Ernst Reinhardt, 1940.
- Die Entwicklung der Religionsphilosophie in der Hegelschen Schule*. Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung, 1950.
- Dialectic*. New York, Bookman Associates, 1953.
- The Interplay of Opposites*. A dialectical ontology. New York, Bookman Associates, 1956.
- The Hegel Legend of Thesis, Antithesis, and Synthesis. Journal of the History of Ideas*. New York, 1958.
- Mure, Geoffrey Reginald Gilchrist: *An Introduction to Hegel*. Oxford, The Clarendon Press, 1948.
- A Study of Hegel's Logic*. Oxford, The Clarendon Press, 1950.
- MacKintosh, Robert: *Hegel and Hegelianism*. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1903.
- McTaggart, John Ellis: *Study in Hegelian Cosmology*. Cambridge, University Press, 1918.
- Studies in Hegelian Dialectic*. 2nd ed. Cambridge. The University Press, 1922.
- A Commentary on Hegel's Logic*. Cambridge, University Press, 1910.
- Nadler, Käte: *Der Dialektische Widerspruch in Hegel's Philosophie und das Paradoxon des Christentums*. Leipzig, Felix Meiner, 1931.
- Nink, S. J., Caspar: *Kommentar zu den Grundlegenden Ab-*

- schnitten von Hegel's Phänomenologie des Geistes.* Regensburg, Josef Habbel, 1931.
- Reyburn, Hugh Adam: *The Ethical Theory of Hegel. A study of the philosophy of right.* Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1921.
- Rintelen, Fritz Joachim von: *Der Rang des Geistes. Goethes Weltverständnis.* Tübingen, Niemeier, 1955.
- Romang, T. P.: *Der Neueste Pantheismus, oder die Junghegelsche Weltanschauung. Allen Denkenden Gewidmet.* Bern, Stämpfli, 1848.
- Rosenkranz, Karl: *Erläuterungen zu Hegel's Encyklopädie der Philosophischen Wissenschaften.* Leipzig, Dürr'schen Buchhandlung, 1870.
- Royce, Josiah: *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy.* Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1892.
- Ruge, Arnold: *Die Religion Unserer Zeit.* Leipzig, Verlagsbüro, 1849.
- Schlosser, Fr. Chr.: *Weltgeschichte für das Deutsche Volk.* 15. Band. Berlin, Oswald Seehagen, 1898.
- Schmidt, Erik: *Hegel's Lehre von Gott.* Gütersloh, Bertelmann, 1952.
- Schubert, Johannes: *Goethe und Hegel.* Leipzig, Felix Meiner, 1933.
- Solger, K. W. F.: *Erwin. Vier Gespräche über das Schöne und die Kunst.* Berlin, 1907.
- Stace, W. T.: *The Philosophy of Hegel. A systematic exposition.* London, Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1924.
- Staiger, Emil: *Der Geist der Liebe und das Schicksal. Schelling, Hegel und Hölderlin.* Frauenfeld, Huber, 1935.
- Steinbüchel, Theodor: *Das Grundproblem der Hegelschen Philosophie.* Bonn, Peter Hanstein, 1933.
- Stirling, James Hutchison: *The Secret of Hegel; Being the Hegelian System in Origin, Principle, Form, and Matter.* New edition carefully revised. Edinburgh, Oliver. London, Simpkin, New York, Putnam's, 1898.
- Strahm, Hans: *Aus Hegel's Berner Zeit. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie,* Bd. 41.

- Strauss, David Friedrich: *Das Leben Jesu*. Leipzig, F. A. Brockhaus, 1864.
- Wallace, William: *Prolegomena to the Study of Hegel's Philosophy and Especially of His Logic*. 2. Aufl. Rev. and Augon. Oxford, The Clarendon Press, 1894.
- Wein, Hermann: *Realdialektik*. München, Oldenburg, 1957.
- Windelband, Wilhelm: *Präludien*. Tübingen, Mohr, 1911.
—*Die Erneuerung des Hegelianismus. Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie*. Tübingen, 10. Aufl., 1921.

INDEX OF NAMES

- Abraham, 53, 110
Aenesidemus (Schulze), 141, 188
Altenstein, Minister von, 346, 415,
 425
Anselm, 402
Antigone, 15
Aristophanes, 26, 358
Aristotle, 4, 15, 40, 101, 134
Arnim, 307
Aquinas, Thomas, 160

Baader, Franz, 295
Beethoven, 357
Böhme, Jakob, 308
Brentano, Clemens, 260, 307

Calderón, 148
Cart, Jean Jacques, 43
Chalybäus, Henrich Moritz, 9
Christiane (sister), 14, 66, 429
Cicero, 15
Coreth, Emerich, 7
Cousin, Victor, 304
Creuzer, Friedrich, 307, 343, 344
Croce, Benedetto, 11

Daub, Karl Friedrich, 298
Descartes, 321, 339
Diderot, 221
Dilthey, 64
Dionysos, 69

Eleusis, 60
Empedocles, 68
Endel, Nanette, 75
Engels, Friedrich, 11
Ense, Varnhagen von, 352, 429
Epectetus, 15
Erdmann, J. E., 220, 413
Euripides, 15

Faust, 76, 159, 420, 421
Feuerbach, Ludwig, 412, 413
Flügge, Johannes, 8
Fichte, 36, 37, 130, 142f, 160, 172,
 195, 198, 199, 227, 342, 428
Fischer, Karl Ludwig, 153
Fischer, Kuno, 219
Fries, J. Fr., 151, 371

Gellert, 37
Gibbon, 44
Glockner, Hermann, 6, 7, 220
Goethe, 13, 130, 132, 139, 151,
 159, 167, 215, 221, 283, 309,
 348, 360, 362, 392, 417-25, 430
Görres, Joseph, 353
Göschel, Friedrich, 411

Haering, Theodore, 3, 7, 207
Haller, Ludwig von, 371
Hamann, Georg, 388-92
Hartmann, Nicolai, 8
Haym, Rudolf, 317, 346
Heidegger, 220
Heine, Heinrich, 412
Herder, 139
Hitler, 115
Hinrichs, Wilhelm Friedrich, 304,
 329, 384
Hölderlin, Friedrich, 26, 44, 59,
 67, 69
Homer, 15, 31, 37, 149
Hotho, Heinrich Gustav, 414
Humboldt, Alexander von, 342
Humboldt, Wilhelm von, 342, 353
Hume, David, 44, 103
Hippolyte, Jean, 220

Ijin, Iwan, 7, 392

- Jacobi, Friedrich Heinrich, 139, 195, 198; 318-24
Jesus, 30, 32, 42, 49, 53, 54; historical, 115
- Kant, 5, 9, 22, 36, 37, 40, 45, 50, 107, 108, 116, 121, 139, 140f, 144, 168, 194, 195, 198, 205, 271, 393, 403
Kepler, 164, 165
Kierkegaard, 38, 390
Knebel, 215
Kojève, Alexander, 220
Krause, K. Chr., 151
Kroner, Richard, 8
Krug, 186
- Leibniz, 84, 137, 160, 193
Lessing, 18, 26, 38, 139, 215, 354
Litt, Theodor, 7
Louis XIV, 84
Luther, 405, 406
Lycurgus, 103
- Macchiavelli, Niccolo, 99
Maimon, Salomon, 142
Marheineke, Philipp, 429
Marx, 1, 9, 10, 220
Metternich, 343, 357
Montesquieu, 44
Moses, 53, 107, 112
- Napoleon, 84, 162, 163, 281, 284, 313, 342, 357
Newton, 164, 165, 167, 423
Nietzhammer, Immanuel, 151, 163, 215, 218, 249, 257, 258
Nietzsche, 32, 41, 56, 69, 106, 188, 196, 218
- Pascal, 197
Paul, 48, 54
Paulus, H. E. G., 150, 299
Pestalozzi, Johann Heinrich, 142, 342
Plato, 15, 26, 31, 40, 134, 190, 201, 271
Pythagoras, 53
- Reinhold 141, 173
Richelieu, 99, 100
Robespierre, 44
Rosenkranz, Karl, 6, 207, 257, 272, 344, 410
Rousseau, Jean Jacques, 26
- Schelling, 26, 44, 45, 46, 68, 130, 132, 143, 148, 149, 150, 154, 155, 160, 168, 173, 211, 215, 216, 227, 296, 312, 426
Schiller, Friedrich, 44, 130, 139, 309, 356, 419
Schleiermacher, 139, 144, 174, 342, 364, 380, 382
Schlegel, August Wilhelm von, 148
Schlegel, Caroline, 148
Schlegel, Friedrich, 353, 383
Schlosser, Friedrich Christof, 306
Schopenhauer, 1, 188
Schulze, 141
Shakespeare, 15, 148
Socrates, 19, 30, 32, 302
Solger, Carl Wilhelm Ferdinand, 349f, 428
Sophocles, 15
Spengler, Oswald, 354
Spinoza, 44, 136, 144, 150, 319
Stace, W. T., 4
Stein, Freiherr von, 342
Steinbüchel, Theodore, 7
Strauss, David Friedrich, 413
- Tacitus, 15
Thaden, N. von, 373
Thycydides, 15, 103
Tieck, Ludwig, 349
- Uexküll, Boris von, 302
- Varnahagen, Ense von, 346
Voltaire, 44
Voss, Johann Heinrich, 149, 307
- Wallenstein, 356
Windischmann, 215

GENERAL INDEX AND GLOSSARY

(By keeping Hegel's original key-terms, the reader will require a reliable knowledge of this terminology.)

- Absolute, 64, 68, 132, 172, 174, 178, 179, 182, 244, 279, 287, 320, 380, 421; own negations, 245; spirit 173, 244
Abstract, 88; abstraction, 58, 248; abstractions, 13; abstractly, 358
Action, 64
Activism, 420
Actual, 88; actuality, 87, 236; "Wirklichkeit," 374
Ad philosophiam nullomodo pertinet, 166
Aesthetic, 63, 112, 133, 143, 183; enjoyment, 355, 364; existence, 143; aestheticism, 143; aesthetics, 65, 188, 307-312
Alienates, 60; alienation, 64, 127, 291
America, North, 374
Analytic, 19
Anarchy, 88, 89
Anthropology; naturalistic, 412; ontological, 108
Antiquarian, 2
Antinomies, 291
Anxiety, 82, 155
Appearance, 239
Archaic, style, 311
Argument, ontological, 192
Aristocracy, 79; aristocratic, 43; privileges, 378
Aristotelian, 19, 225
Art, 71, 143, 174, 198, 224, 278; meaning of, 108; of living, 382; philosophy of, 143; work of, 118; arts, mechanical, 175
Ataraxia, 192
Athens, 99
Authentic, 203
Authority, 16, 51, 95
Autonomy, practical, 58
Baptism, 72
Beautiful, 22, 116; beauty, 35, 40, 56, 69, 112, 113, 118 310; in life, 351
"Beautiful-soul," 67, 72
Becoming, 225
"Beginnings," 273
"Begriff," 3, 5, 219, 230
Being, 126, 134, 225, 291
Bern, 43, 78
Bewusstsein, 141
Beyond, 102
Bible, 53; Jewish, 105, 108
Business, 98, 99; society, 98
Caeco studio simulacrum verarum philosophiae notionum quaerens, 165
Caesars, deification of, 104
Capitalism, 114, 223
Cartesian, rationalism, 188
Catechism, 37
Causality, 123
Certainties, 246
Christ, 33, 48, 115; Christian, 20; religion, 136; Christianity, 27, 30, 31, 59, 105, 380, 421; Christians, 104
Church, 35, 38, 45, 55, 57, 89, 94, 119, 217, 293; history of, 223; protestant, 217; churches, 30.

- "Circle," 325; of circles, 341
Citizen, 20
 Civilization, 20; modern, 289
 Classes, middle, 21
 Classical, 307; classicists, 103
 "Cogito ergo sum," 321
 Comedy, 21
 Commercial-economic, 106;
 commercialism, 51
 Communistic, 9
 Community, 42; free, 83
 Comprehension (*Vermunft*), 42,
 85, 128, 136, 141, 156, 160, 161,
 167, 175, 184, 186, 241; com-
 prehensive (*vernünftig*), 36, 87,
 88, 125, 141; totality, 372; com-
 prehensiveness, 239
 Concept, 116, 141, 292, 327, 336,
 396; (*Begriff*), 230; concepts,
 141
 Conscience, 87
 Consciousness, 247, 281; facts of,
 190
 Contemplation, 62, 64; contempla-
 tive, 420
 Contradiction, 169; contradictory,
 183
 Contrary, 183
 Cosmology, 18
 Courage, 86
 Crisis, 120, 228
 Criticism, 17, 185
 Critique, philosophical, 183, 184,
 236
 Crucifixion, 34
 Culture, 20, 100, 180

 Dasein, 374
 Death, 33, 61, 75, 220, 395
 Decadence, 40, 103
 Despair, 410
 Despotism, 40, 46, 81, 113
 Destiny, 75; historical, 366
 Determinism, naturalistic, 23
 Dialectic, 5, 8, 16, 22, 64, 132,
 144, 170, 173, 208; existential,
 247; Socratic, 334; dialectical,
 36, 72, 83, 87, 94, 95, 118, 122,
 123, 129, 160, 167, 171, 182,
 197; method, 239; process, 247;
 dialectician, 22
 Dialogue, living, 246
 Diary, 155
 Dictators, 370
 Difference, 130
 Dogma, 115; dogmatic, 30, 144,
 dogmas, 37, 49; dogmatism, 178,
 192, 237
 Dualism 114, 136, 137, 185, 186;
 dualisms, 141, 176
 Duty, 47, 56, 142, 222

 Economics, 18, 98
 Education; humanistic, 260;
 progressive, 267
 Egotism, 122
 Empirical, 17, 175; reality, 250;
 sciences, 198; empiricism, 160,
 212, 337; ethical, 204
 "End in itself," 400
 End in and for itself, 419
 England, 79, 98, 376
 Enjoyment, aesthetic, 356, 364
 Enlightenment, 16, 18, 21, 26, 140;
 reason, 386
 Epicurean argument 139;
 Epicureans, 157
 Er-fahrung, 243
 Error, 244
 Essence, 291; religions or, 380
 Essential, 225
 Estrangement, 70
 Eternal, 63, 72; eternity, 23, 75,
 183; image of, 65
 Ethical; empiricisms, 204; ideal-
 isms, 204; ethics, 18, 97, 161,
 181, 201, 324; concrete (*Sitt-
 lichkeit*), 97; social, 365
 Europe, 304; European, 137
 Evil, 16, 20, 97, 369; (*das Böse*),
 330
 Evolution; theory of, 400
 Existence, 248; aesthetic, 143;
 human, 143; meaning of, 132;
 existential, 27, 64, 74, 225;
 dialectic, 247.

- Existenz, 374
 Experience, 28; historical, 209;
 immediate, 141, 273, 337
 Exploitation, 112, 114

 Factuality, 182
 Faith, 51, 126, 128, 161, 193, 385;
 religious, 118
 False, 238
 Family, 24; life in the, 262
 Faustian, 223
 Feeling, 22, 69, 383
 Feudal, 30, 79, 84; reaction, 281
 Fichtean, 6
 Finite, 58
 Florence, 99
 Formalism, 149, 204
 France, 84, 100
 Free, 95, 112; state, 103; freedom,
 23, 35, 40, 45, 47, 51, 60, 62,
 84, 75, 92, 95, 96, 99, 101, 265,
 404; academic 405; subjective,
 373
 French Revolution, 26, 30, 43, 47,
 66, 84, 94, 282, 305, 376

 Geist, 16, 23, 71, 202, 278, 367
 Genius, 100, 174
 German Don Quixote, 315
 Germanic, 10, 101, 104
 Germany, 84, 87, 100
 God, 46, 51, 102, 117, 139, 279,
 393
 Good, 18, 78, 97; life, 204; goods,
 19
 Government, 94, 101, 316
 Greece, 103, 264; Greek, 21, 26,
 31, 67, 105, 111, 118; tragedy,
 121; skepticism, 189
 Growth, 74
 Guilt, 75

 Hand anlegen, 152
 Happiness, 19, 251; happy, 19
 Hebrew, 15
 Heidelberg, 300
 Hell, 33
 Hellenistic-Roman, 135

 Heroes, 33
 Hindu, 353; Hinduism, 380
 Historical, 2, 4, 27, 39, 42, 49, 85,
 143; destiny, 366; experience,
 209; History, 16, 78, 97, 101,
 172, 209, 236; meaning of, 410;
 philosophy of, 140, 353, 366
 Holy, 116
 Holy Alliance, 281, 285, 313, 343
 Humanity, 45, 51, 61
 Hypocrisy, 82

 "I am," 59, 60
 IDEA, 292, 326
 Idealism, 11, 114, 122, 160, 172,
 179; idealisms, ethical 204;
 ideality, 182; Ideology, 180
 Identity, 130; law of, 169
 Images, 69
 Imagination, 22, 31, 35, 63, 71;
 religious, 120; imaginative, 94
 Immediate, experience, 273, 337;
 immediacy, 206
 Immoralism, 205
 Imperative, 117
 Imperialism, 56
 Individual, 47, 64, 139; unique,
 253; world-historical, 84; individu-
 ality, 183; individuals, ethi-
 cal value of, 47; individualized,
 124; individuated, 138; individ-
 uation, 137, 139
 Infinite, 60, 63, 72; infinity, 65
 Injustice, 66, 82
 Insanity, 88
 Institutional, 40
 Instruction, philosophical, 293
 Intellect (Verstand), 109; 194,
 199, 200; intellectualism, 87,
 319
 Intelligibility, 127
 Intolerance, 55
 Intuition (Anschaun), 60
 Irony, 184
 Irrational, 135, 167; irrationalism,
 200, 236, 240; romantic, 386;
 irrationality, 330-331
 Isolated, 88; isolation, 42, 68, 86

- Italy**, 99
Jehovah, 107, 112
Jewish; **Bible**, 105, 108; **Jews**, 103, 115
Joy, 75, 116
Judaism, 53, 105
Jurisprudence, 18
Justice, 377
“Know thyself,” 27
Knowledge, 142, 193; **real**, 170
Language, mythical, 143, 144, 287
Law, 60, 91, 95, 96, 404; of identity, 169; laws, 88, 112, 113, 135, 368; laws, moral, 36, 51, 181, 224, 279
Legality, 38, 97, 114
Life, 59, 70, 74, 76; beauty in, 351; enjoyment of, 351; festive, 61; good, 204; guiltless, 68; in the family, 262; infinite, 58; public, 262; unity of, 75; universal, 75; value of, 42; vision of, 75
Limits, 245
Living, art of, 362
Logic, 161, 173, 285-293; formal, 3, 36, 136, 160, 170, 198, 238, 239, 287; speculative, 160; pragmatic, 287
Loneliness, 211, 375
Love, 36, 57, 68, 77, 104, 122, 250, 256, 280 302; religious 120; loving, 58; loves, pathological, 116
Lutheran, 26, 41
Magic, 33, 154
Man, 203; vocation of, 50
Manifold, 183
Marriage, 205, 249
Masters, 102
Mathematica, 237
Mathematical, 136, 138, 238; Physics, 165
Materialism, 63, 180
Maturity, philosophical, 228
Mean, 21, 83, 96, 101; Aristotelian, 19
Mechanism, 56, 268
Medieval, 100
Melancholic, 154
Mentality, Nazi, 371
“Messianic secret,” 34
Metaphysics, 18, 87, 290
Method, dialectical, 239; speculative, 367
Middle-class, 14
Mind, 35, 71
Modern, 35; moderns, 22
“Monads,” 137, 161
Moral, 34, 36, 47, 141, 279; practical, 172; -practice, 198; moralism, 77, 116, 117, 142, 181, 204, 223; abstract, 83; morality, 35, 38, 46, 97, 117, 181, 252
Mystery, 403; -religion, Greek, 63; mysteries, 47, 60
Mysticism, 42
Mythical, 37, 287; language, 143, 144
Naturalism, romantic, 155; naturalists, 368
Nature, 64, 70, 88, 157, 167, 171, 172, 180, 203, 208; life of, 71, 156; philosophy of, 148
Nation, 21; national, 34, 42, 50, 54, 111, 282; Socialism, 282; nationalistic, 10
Nazis, 282; mentality, 371
Necessity, 75
Negative, 232; negations, absolute's own, 245
New Testament, 48
Newspaper, 213
Nibelungen Lied, 308
Nihilism, 222
Non-contradiction, 169
Object, 63, 183; sciences, 135; thinking, 63; Objectivism, 11, 103, 160; realistic, 123; Objective, 36, 38, 367; Mind, 78, 209; Objects, 114

- Oligarchy, 79
 Oneness, 183
 Ontological, 108, 124, 136, 248; argument, 192; Ontologically, 137; Ontology, 18, 134, 231
 Opinion, 127
 Optimism, 200; tragic, 64, 69, 85, 121
 Orient, 102; Oriental, 100, 137; Orientalism, 106
 Originality, false, 187
 "Orthodoxy," 45, 47
 Ought, 85, 109, 116, 118, 172, 173, 195

 Pain 23
 Pantheism, mystic, 129; 137
 Paradise Lost, 109
 Paris, 360
 Pathologies, 121; pathology, 126
 Patriot, 163; patriotism, 85, 94, 366
 Peace, 50, 60; contemplative, 62
 Perception, 141; subjectivity of, 274
 Person, 42; personal, 175
 Pessimism, 200
 Phaenomenological, 49, 106
 Phenomenology, 107, 162
 Philosophy of Religion, origins of, 378f
 Philosopher, 17, 30, 65; statesman, 371; Philosophers, 45, 157, 185; of nature, 238; Philosophical, critique, 183; instruction, 293; maturity, 228
 Philosophy 47, 63, 122, 128, 132, 137, 142, 149, 151, 155, 156, 159, 161, 169, 174, 181, 182, 184, 193, 195, 198, 206, 224, 240, 243, 247, 281, 370, 375; critical, 337; educated by, 226; growth of, 176; history of, 122, 152, 176, 210; logic of, 144, 208, 337; need for, 177; need of, 211; of history, 353, 366; of mind, 298; of nature, 296, 298; of practice, 323; political, 316, 370; political-social, 83; schools of, 184; subjective-personal, 83; system of, 297; task of, 231; totalities of, 338
 Physico-theology, 65
 Physical, 138; physics, 135, 237; mathematical, 165
 Platonism, 54, 112
 Pleasure, 23
 "Pietism," 382
 Poet, 65, 278; Poetry, 206; Poems, 69
 Polis, 58, 103
 Politics, 18, 46, 78, 217; political, 38, 163; philosophy, 316, 376; power, 223; reaction, 284; politically, 21
 Popularity, 187
 "Positive," 40, 52; "positivism," 40; logical, 173; positivity, 52, 63, 68
 "Possibility," 374
 Potentiality, 231
 Poverty, 378
 Power, 96, 366; brute, 86; political, 223; powers, 92
 Practical, 17, 20, 47, 176, 183, 333; moral-, 172; practicalities, 62
 Practice, 64, 173, 218; philosophy of, 323
 Pragmatism, 109
 "Pre-established Harmony," 138
 Prejudice, 77
 Preservation, 75
 Privileges, 46; aristocratic, 378
 Process, dialectical, 247
 Progress, 140
 Property, 99; right, 114
 Protestantism, 406, 408
 Providence, 31
 Psyche, 4, 134
 Psycho-pathology, 66
 Psycho-therapy, 105
 Psychologism, 412; psychology, 18, 120, 134
 Purification, 75
 Purposiveness, 401

- Rational, 47, 167
 Rationalism, 11, 38, 94, 109, 135, 136, 160, 170, 180, 200, 236, 240, 305, 322, 332, 371; Cartesian, 188; rationalist, 191; rationalistic, 30, 37, 42, 355
 Reactionary, 150
 Real (*Dasein*), 374; realism, 11, 114, 160, 179; realistic, 64; reality, 63 123, 127, 137, 171, 183; empirical, 250
 Reason (*Verstand*), 27, 28, 38, 63, 67, 130, 137, 138, 139, 141, 169, 170, 171, 172, 177, 191, 194, 233, 403; abstractness of, 224; analytical, 190; enlightenment, 386; formal, 181; scientific, 121, 322
 Rechtsphilosophie, 373
 Reflection, 64
 Reform, 82; Reformation, 382, 407
 Reintegration, 75
 Relation, "I-Thou," 58
 Relativities, 17
 Religion, 30, 34, 46, 65, 93, 94, 116, 118, 120, 161, 174, 198, 224, 279, 383; Christian, 136; dignity of, 106; religious, 72; faith, 118; love, 120; imagination, 120; religions, of essence, 380
 Republics, 56
 "Reward," 50
 Right, 364; rights, property, 114
 Roman, 99, 101, 111; Rome, 100, 264
 Romantic, 26, 67, 68, 139, 156, 307, 421; irrationalism, 386; movement, 310; naturalism, 155; romanticism, 149
 Russia, 304
 "Salvation," 33
 Sarcasm, 187
 Savior, 40; "saviours," 104
 School, 24, 260-264
 Science, 161, 182, 234; sciences, 51, 155, 164, 290; descriptive, 237; physical, 137; scientific, 172, 173, 177; empirical, 63, 198; reason, 121, 322; scientism, 109, 195, 200
 "Scriptural Proofs," 406
 Sect, 57; sectarian, 93; sects, 35, 120, 196
 Self-Alienation, 56, 75, 106, 107, 108
 Self-Comprehension, 172; (*Vernunft*), 219
 Self-Contempt, 63
 Self-Estrangement, 40
 Self-Knowledge, 129, 197, 247
 Self-Respect, 40, 56
 Sense-data, 189
 Sentiment, 79
 Sexual, 36
 Shame, 125
 Sin, 280
 Sittlichkeit (Concrete Ethics), 97
 Skepticism, 11, 134, 161, 188, 237, 245; empirical, 135; Greek, 189; truth of, 191; skeptical, 139, 165
 Slaves, 102
 Socialism, natural, 282
 Society, business, 98
 Socratic, 19; dialectic, 334
 Solitary, 288; solitude, 50; Philosophie ist etwas Einsames, 151
 Sophistic, 187
 Sorrow, 104
 Soul, 134, 338
 Space, 61, 62
 Space-time, 138, 141
 Speculation, 4; speculative, 5, 45, 230, 336, 403; method, 367
 Spirit, 18, 71, 77, 158; absolute, 173
 State, 38, 47, 94, 99, 101 202, 316, 364; church, 57, 80; free, 103
 Statesman, philosopher, 371
 Stoics, 157
 Subject, 63, 135, 183; subjective, 36, 38, 63; freedom, 373; mind, 78; transcendental, 231; subjectivism, 11, 103, 122, 160; ideal-

- istic, 123; subjectivity, 192; subjects, 114; of perception, 274
 Substance, 135, 136
 Suffering, 86
 Supernatural, 33
 Superstitions, 17, 103
 Syllogisms, 27
 Symbol, 174
 "Synthesis a priori," 5, 129, 168
 Synthetic, 18
 System, 4; of philosophy, 297
 Systematic, 122

 Taoism, 380
 Teleology, 143
 Temporality, 72
 Teutonism, 343
 Théodicée, 139
 Theologians, 39, 65; theological, 41, 44, 49, 80, 105; theology, 25, 139; de-mythologizing, 388; liberal, 386; physico, 65
 Theoretical, 218
 "Thesis, antithesis, and synthesis," 4
 Thing-in-itself, 112
 Time, 23, 61, 62, 75, 183
 Tolerant, 111
 Totalitarian, 110; totalitarianism, 94
 Totality; comprehensive, 372
 Tragedy, 21, 58, 67, 113, 355; Greek, 121; tragic, 63, 118 369; optimism, 64, 69, 85, 121
 Transcendental, subject, 231
 Translations, 267
 Trinity, 385; trinitarian, 119, 382

 Triplex, 6
 True, 55; truth, 37, 50, 60, 112, 121, 150, 184, 186, 227, 233, 238, 244, 368; service of, 404
 Twaddle, 187

 "Unitarian," 382
 Universality, 183
 Urphenomenon, 423

 Value, 47
 "Vernünft" (Comprehension), 3, 23, 36, 37, 39, 50, 128, 141, 156, 184, 219, 341
 Vernünftig, 88, 125
 Verstand, 4, 23, 36, 38, 87, 109, 141, 169, 171, 333
 Vienna Congress, 283
 Vitality, 71
 "Volksreligion," 30, 34
 Vorstellung, 120

 Wealth, 378
 Weltgeist, 370
 Westphalia, treaty of, 93
 Will of the people, 317
 Wirklich, 372
 Wirklichkeit (actuality), 374
 Wisdom, 19, 27, 61, 401
 "Wissenschaft," 3, 4
 World, 338
 World-course, 274
 "World-historical Individual," 84, 226
 World-soul, 401
 Work, 31